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1. Introduction 
 
In the 1850s the Italians and Japanese, not having consolidated their modern 
states yet, were witnessing as mere spectators, the industrialization, the explorations, 
the achievements and the strengthening of the rest of the protagonists in the 
geopolitical chessboard. Developments that most certainly caused them restlessness 
and anxiety. The goal of the current study is to highlight the nature and to outline the 
origins of the Japanese colonialism by comparing it with the Italian one. The collation 
with the European colonialism in general would be inappropriate on the grounds that 
each Great Power moved differently in the colonial arena according to its interests 
and aspirations. For this reason, I chose the comparison with the Italian equivalent 
phenomenon with which, I am convinced that it shares many common and perhaps 
largely unknown elements. The two phenomena naturally encompass interesting 
differences as well, the highlighting of which will help the deeper understanding of 
the birth, the development and the causes of the early Japanese and Italian 
colonialism. It should not be disregarded that the developments and the political-
social fermentations of the period immediately after the establishment of the two 
states, after the Meiji restoration in Japan (1868) and after the unification of the 
Italian state (1871), formed ideologically and practically the basis of the two nations' 
imperialist development until the Second World War. The subsequent similar course 
of two newly formed (latecomers) states, their totalitarian political system during the 
interwar era, their alliance in two world wars, the defeat, the resulting democratization 
and the economic miracle they performed after 1945 attest to a remarkable unison and 
a common historical evolution, the axis of which were laid in the last quarter of the 
19th century. Studying therefore this period, the aim is, tracing behind the two 
nations' obvious cultural and social differences, to highlight the common ground of 
their colonial policy. In this context, the events that led to the formation of the first 
colonies, Taiwan (1895) for Japan and Eritrea (1890) for Italy and the comparison of 
these early experiences are crucial for the comprehension of their later imperialistic 
structure. Hopefully this thesis can make a small contribution to understanding 19th 
century colonialism in general. 
 
Japan and Italy were formed in the same period, the period of the New 
Imperialism, a time of diplomatic mistrust, protectionism, frenetic colonial and 
economic rivalry and of militarism, when the Great Powers (British Empire, the 
French Third Republic and the Russian Empire) had already established their 
hegemonic position in the world. Japan and Italy at the end of the 19th century were 
in need of stability, internal and external security, economic reorganization and 
immediate settlement of the economic and social problems arising from the rapid 
increase of their population.1 Furthermore, seeking to compete on an equal footing 
                                                          
1 Many Meiji intellectuals were monitoring with sympathy the situation of the newborn Italian State 
noticing an "essential likeness" in the challenges these two nations were facing. See Fusatoshi Fujisawa, 
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with the Powers of the era, claiming a place in the sun, they considered modernization 
and rapid industrialization as the only way forward. These facts as well as the policy 
of expansion that they partly adopted for the resolution of these issues are unique and 
particular. The phenomenon of the early Japanese colonialism in relation to that of the 
other states is intensely reminiscent, as to the origins and aspirations, of the 
corresponding Italian one. Its collation with that of Britain's or Germany's, the two 
superpowers at the time, would be inappropriate.  
Contrary to Lenin's theory about the unbreakable relationship between 
imperialism and the export of surplus capital, in the dawn of their colonial adventure, 
Japan and Italy had difficulty in luring domestic capital into colonial investment since 
they had a shortage not an excess of private capital. Despite their feeble fiscal position 
however, immediately after their formation, they inaugurated a policy of expansion. It 
was then presumed by the respective ruling classes that the participation in the 
colonial game would be panacea, it would, as if by magic, form the lever that would 
topple and nullify their disadvantageous geopolitical position abroad and would 
resolve the economic and social problems of vital importance that beset them in the 
interior. This consideration, this common perception, these convictions which were 
shared by politicians, merchants, industrialists and military simultaneously in two 
regions of the world so remote and alienated between them provoke the interest of the 
scholar.  
Both states fearing their exclusion from the markets, their pushing aside from 
the international developments, their marginalisation and their conversion into 
supernumeraries in the era of the chaotic imperialist struggle, envisaged in their own 
colonial expansion their strategic security and survival. They both viewed military 
victories and territorial expansion as the shortest way to obtain a place in the sun. 
Thus, even if they had not achieved the degree of industrialization and of economic 
development of the more powerful states, still being weak and agrarian, they 
attempted to ensure their position in the world through colonies and trade. The 
problem of their economic backwardness and military weakness was causing 
insecurity and stress even when they were achieving successes. The expansion and the 
establishment of spheres of influence constituted a necessity for the survival of the 
nation. The possession of colonies would present to the world a powerful, prestigious 
and modern Italy and Japan, arbiters of developments and, in addition, it would 
contribute to the stability of the international system. So they participated in the 
colonial struggle imitating the imperialist powers. 
The international, mainly the British, historiography has among others ignored 
the origins of the Italian and Japanese presence overseas. The early Italian colonial 
venture was geographically more limited compared with the French and the British 
                                                                                                                                                                      
"Giuseppe Mazzini e l'Asia", The Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences, n. 122 (Nov., 2009), p. 
58. 
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ones.2 So was the Japanese one. They also did not last as long as that of the other 
Powers as they ended earlier (de facto in 1941, de jure with the Treaty of Paris on 10 
February 1947 for Italy and 1945 for the Japanese case).3 The majority of the studies 
relating to the Japanese and Italian expansion are referring principally to the 1930s-
1940s period when the first invaded Manchuria and the later Ethiopia. 4 Obviously 
researchers find these events, closely related to the outbreak of the Second World 
War, more fascinating and thus have been neglecting, in the writer's humble opinion, 
the first crucial steps that paved the way for this expansion. The indifference about the 
issue and its pushing aside by historians such as Hobson is not explained only by its 
limited temporal and geographic scope. Lenin and other Marxist and non-Marxist 
researchers, identified imperialism with monopoly capitalism, expansionism with 
industrialization, colonialism with the export of capital, subjugation with the 
economic deprivation and exploitation of underdeveloped peoples.5 Seen in this light 
the Italian and Japanese cases constitute the exception to the rule. The unavailability 
of investment funds, the disconnect between industrialization and expansionism, the 
ultimately limited dynamic of the Italian and Japanese economies in the late 19th 
century prompted the researchers to overlook and ignore the issue. The economic 
weakness behind their colonial project does not mean of course that the phenomenon 
did not have a serious socio-political impact on Africans, Asians and Italians or that it 
does not require investigation. 
                                                          
2  Paolo Jedlowski, "Memories of the Italian colonial past", International Social Science Journal, 
62/203-204, (Mar.-June, 2011), p. 37. 
3 With this treaty, which was imposed by the victorious Allies, Italy, among others, recognised the 
independence of Ethiopia and withdrew its claims from Libya, Somalia and Eritrea. By that time the 
new liberal government and in particular Alcide De Gasperi (1881-1954) was asking for their return. In 
1951 Libya became an independent and sovereign state. A year later Eritrea gained its autonomy and 
formed with Ethiopia a federal state. The United Nations entrusted Italy with just the ten-year 
administration of Somalia (1950-1960) aiming to gradually achieve self-government and ultimately 
independence for the country. See Angelo Del Boca, "Myths, suppressions, denials, defaults," in A 
place in the sun, Africa in Italian colonial culture from post-unification to the present, ed. P. Palumbo, 
(London-Los Angeles-Berkeley, 2003), pp. 20-21. Japanese control over Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria 
and other Asian and Pacific regions, conquered prior and during the Second World War, explicitly 
ended upon the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent signing of the Empire's formal surrender on 
September 2, 1945. The abrupt deconstruction of the Italian and Japanese Empires meant that these 
nations did not concern themselves with the procedures of decolonization or the responsibility of their 
former actions. This fact partially explains the intellectual immaturity, aloofness, awkwardness or in 
many cases the systematic downplaying of their colonial history in school textbooks and literature 
alike. Nationalistic denial of exploitation and past war crimes or the portrayal of Italian and Japanese 
colonial rule as more “lenient” in relation to that of the other imperialistic powers are very much 
present to this day. See Peter Cave, “Japanese Colonialism and the Asia-Pacific War in Japan's History 
Textbooks: Changing representations and their causes” in Modern Asian Studies Vol. 47, No.2 (Mar. 
2013), pp. 543-545. 
4 For Andall and other historians, certain aspects of Italy's overseas expansion are yet to be examined. 
See Jacqueline Andall, "Italian Colonialism: Historical Perspectives Introduction", Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies, 8/3, (Nov., 2010), pp. 371-372. 
5 Tom Kemp, "The Marxist Theory of Imperialism" in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, ed.  R. 
Owen, B. Sutcliff, (London, 1972), p. 22. 
4 
 
What was the ideological background that steered Meiji Japan's and early 
Italy's ruling classes to expand in the Asian mainland and Africa respectively? How 
did the expansionist tendencies, the incentives and the ulterior motives of their 
colonialisms take place in the end of the 19th century? What was the attitude of the 
Catholic Church towards the Italian counterpart? Did the state religion of Shintō and 
the worship of the emperor played an analogous role in the 19th century Japan? If it 
did, in what extent? Many scholars trace a common ideological and historical course 
as late as the interwar period. The competiveness and unjustness of the international 
system, which put Italy and Japan in its margin, the aversion to democratic ideas and 
the shift towards more radical and authoritative norms are well documented. Aiming 
at capsizing their precarious situation both states espoused chauvinistic and 
militaristic doctrines as Dr. Reto Hofmann brilliantly analyzes in his book The Fascist 
effect, Japan and Italy, 1915-1952. Japan's and Italy's late formation, their interwar 
world domination aspirations and embracement of authoritarian ideologies and their 
democratization as a result of the end of the Second World War are taken for granted 
by many modern history experts6. No study thought seems to address Japan's and 
Italy's "natural" and self-evident resort to aggressive expansion, absolutism and 
militarism in the 20th century as means of national self-approbation and property. 
Why did these particular states turn to imperialism instinctively? Why did they belong 
to these nations that felt threatened and obliged to violently overturn the 20th century 
status quo? Could we possibly detect in the first phase of their modern evolution some 
common disposition towards the subjection of other nations and belligerent 
eagerness? Are the Japanese and Italian modern nations inherently "imperialistic" or 
their strive for domination is a reasonable byproduct of well established colonial 
practices amidst an acutely antagonistic natural order? A parallel and deeper 
understanding of the 19th century socio-cultural-psychological parameters, such as 
tradition, mentality and religion that shaped and explain the later ideological 
framework of Rome's and Tōkyō's expansionist disposition has never been attempted. 
W. Beasly's and K. Hayman's remarkable studies on Japanese imperialism associated 
the phenomenon with the German one, failing in the author's opinion to also note the 
similar, to some extent, economic-military but especially cognitive conditions 
deriving from analogous geopolitical considerations and anxiety. By simply ignoring, 
                                                          
6 Whethear or not Japan in the 1930s demonstrated the characteristics of a typical Fascist regime is still 
a heated matter of debate among the historians. However, this issue will not be addressed in this 
dissertation. For a more comprehensive and in-depth study on the subject see the following readings: 
Moore Barrington, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
the Modern World,  Boston 1966, Arendt Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism; new edition with 
added prefaces, San Diego-New York, 1979, Duus Peter and Okimoto I. Daniel "Fascism and the 
History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 
Nov., 1979, pp. 65-76, Harootunian Harry, Overcome by Modernity History, Culture, and Community 
in Interwar Japan, Princeton 2000, Dower W. John, Origins of the modern Japanese state: selected 
writings of E. H. Norman, New York, 1975, Harootunian Harry, “Constitutive Ambiguities: The 
Persistence of Modernism and Fascism in Japan's Modern History” in The Culture of Japanese 
Fascism, edited by Alan Tasman, Durham-London 2009, pp. 80-114, Martin Bernd, Japan and 
Germany in the Modern World, Oxford, 1995.  
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as many others, the Italian counterpart, the obviously most resembling one, they chose 
the second-best paradigm.   
   The unique work of J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A 
Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, in which he successfully 
confronted the British and Dutch rule on Burma and Indonesia respectively 
demonstrates that a seemingly unrelated comparison of experiences can indeed be 
fruitful and valid. The dissertation’s starting-point could not be any other but the date 
of Japan's and Italy’s founding; the modern nation states were more efficient in 
promoting centralized administration, economic unity, and national policies. Its 
chronological end-point is the end of the Boxer rebellion in 1901. This development 
marks a shared meeting point in the same time and place for the two phenomena. 
Collaborating, with the Great Powers in search of a new elevated international status 
pushed these still secondary states to participate in the subduing of the Boxer Rebellion 
(1899-1901). In the first introductory chapter, there will be a brief examination of the 
theories and trends that drove the most potent nations of the world to seek colonies in 
the 19th century. The thesis will then investigate Italy’s and Japan’s early colonial 
policies in two parts. The first part will shed some light on Italy’s political and 
financial situation after the unification as well as its foreign relations, the nation’s 
colonial legacy, and finally its standing in the geopolitically crucial Mediterranean 
Basin. Examining these developments will help the reader understand the ideology 
and the factors that urged Italy towards expansion in Africa. The occupation of 
African lands and the subsequent formation of the first Italian colony, Eritrea and its 
administration will follow thereafter. Finally, in the last chapter, the Italian presence 
in the Far East during the turn of the century will be presented. Accordingly, the 
second part dedicated to Japan, will start with examining the nation’s military, 
economic and social conditions in the aftermath of the Restoration. Next, Japanese 
expansionist tendencies will be studied as well as the origins, reasoning and the 
ideologies behind them. The establishment of Japan’s first colony, Taiwan will follow 
as the thesis presents the country’s standing in the Far East, its major area of interest. 
The final chapter of the second part will examine Tōkyō’s policy in the Asian 
mainland after 1895. Lastly the dissertation concludes with the presentation of the 
similarities and the differences between the two phenomena and with the author’s best 
attempt to objectively interpret them.  
 
   A comparative, transnational study between the early Italian and the early 
Japanese colonialism is without precedent. These two phenomena, influential as they 
may be, have yet to attract the thorough attention of the international scientific 
community; let alone be the focus of a comparative study. It is a qualitative, 
comparative, interdisciplinary research based on the interpretation and analysis of 
historical events, encompassing these social-economic-cultural-psychosocial 
parameters that influenced profoundly the evolution of the developments in question. 
In spite of the modern analytical methods, the concentration of relevant literature and 
primary sources is the most reliable approach to historiography. I am of the belief that 
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this thesis, an original undertaking, can offer a complete examination of the 
phenomenon of colonialism since it examines the issue from two so different angles. 
The results of the study interpreted with objectivity and scientific methodology will 
shed light and will contribute to the understanding of Italy's and Japan's historical 
development at least until the First World War.  
 
Expansion has always been examined according to different points of view 
depending on the era and current scholarly trend.7 These efforts were largely focused 
on 19th and 20th century Europe, and thus have neglected the full extent of the 
question and have been unable to grasp the diversions and long term rural/urban 
implications to the conquered Asian and African peoples. Social anthropologist Max 
Gluckman was the first researcher to introduce anthropology and social relations in 
the colonial equation in his 1940 work, "Analysis of a social situation in modern 
Zululand". The next researchers to renounce the commonly used Eurocentric 
viewpoint - with the purpose of examining the full complexity of the colonialist-
colonized relations - were A.L. Epstein and J. Clyde during the 1950s. Subsequently, 
Albert Memmi's remarkable work "The colonizer and the colonized" published in 
1957, in which the author, rather boldly considering that much of the globe was still 
dominated by the West, presented colonialism as a European degrading disease. A 
few years later but in line with Memmi's and Aime Cesaire's criticism, was Fanon's, 
"The wretched of the World", in which the author identified nationalism, an integral 
part of the petit bourgeois ideology, as the source of colonial oppression and 
expansion. Equally critical and inclined to distance themselves from the Eurocentric 
doctrine and place Africa and Asia at the center of the expansion discourse were 
Walter Rodney, Talal Asad and of course Edward Said in the 1970s. As the 
springboard to this shift of historiographical perspective, from the West not to the 
conquered people, which would be identically erroneous, but somewhere in between 
one can only identify Onwaku Dike's, "Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta", 
published in 1956. In these terms, Ade Ajayi's famous dictum, in which he described 
colonialism as an "episode" of the whole African history gains validity. Over the 
following decade, anthropologists8 like Thomas Beidelmon, John and Jean Comaroff 
and Bruce Berman made a step forward in studying colonialism in a scientific and 
unbiased way, dealing with the internal dynamics and contradictions in the colonies 
and unfolding the dark role of religion in controlling and pacifying colonial subjects. 
Lastly, Crawford Young in "The African state in comparative prospective" and 
                                                          
7 In the 1970s the focus turned on the social and economic aspects whereas in the 1980s on the cultural 
aspects of the phenomenon. See Frederick Cooper, Colonization in question. Theory, Knowledge, 
History (London, 2005). For more details on the cultural aspect of imperialism, see John Tomlinson, 
Cultural Imperialism. A Critical Introduction, (London-New York, 1991) and Julianne Burton, Jean 
Franco "Culture and Imperialism", Latin American Perspectives, 5/1 (1978), pp. 2-12. 
8  For anthropologists colonialism was seen as a culture-changing process, the alteration of the 
conquered people's customs and social institutions. Anthropology's contribution to colonial studies has 
been immense but merging it with the historical method can be a challenging task. See Vittorio 
Lanternari, Antropologia e imperialismo e altri saggi, (Torino, 1974), pp. 28-29. 
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Mahmood Mamdani in "Citizen and Subject", published in 1994 and 1996 
respectively, set the record straight by evaluating the implications on both sides.9 
It is needless to say that all these scholars usually treated the question under 
certain geographical and linguistic limitations since they had different cultural and 
scholarly backgrounds as well as distinct interests, dictated by their personal scientific 
goals. Thus, it is only logical that the majority of them have dealt with English or 
French past overseas acquisitions, as these nations had exercised a disproportional 
influence, in comparison to other states' colonial rule, over the globe. 
As an analytical term, imperialism is used to describe any effort of a nation to 
impose or maintain its dominance, control or influence over another people or 
nation.10 Although the term (Impérialisme), was first formulated in France during the 
time of Louis Philippe I (1773-1850) and later used to describe the grandiose foreign 
policy of Napoleon III (1808-1873), it began to be widely spread in mid 1870s 
Britain, to explain the expansion of the European states outside Europe.11 Thereafter, 
imperialism was considered to be a synonym of colonialism, describing the 
establishment and extension of maritime powers' political sovereignty over foreign 
peoples and territories.12 From the onset of the 20th century the term imperialism 
referred to a specific form of colonial exploitation connected to the establishment or 
maintenance of sovereignty over subordinate societies but it was also equated with the 
imposition of any form of political control or influence by one community over 
another.13 Imperialism implies an aggressive behaviour, whatever its reasoning, of 
one nation against another but also the impulse behind this action, being a political 
doctrine with multiple roots and ramifications. Since its meaning is somewhat vague 
and circumstantial, it came to represent both a particular episode of world history and 
the "expansionistic ambitions based on the asymmetry of power and social, military 
and economic factors" from the dawn of mankind.14 Imperialism is a set of policies, 
often backed up by military force, whose aim is domination of one society over 
                                                          
9 Cooper, Colonization in Question, pp. 35-51. 
10 Thomas Guback, "Observations on the cultural imperialism, the cinema and the TV" in The Cultural 
Imperialism, ed. G. Andreadis, P. Rodakis, D. Stamoulis, M. Charalambides, trans. L. Istikopoulou, 
(Athens, 1987), p. 117. 
11 Emmanuel Roukounas, Diplomatic history 19th century, (Athens, 1975), p. 158. 
12  Benjamin J. Cohen, The question of imperialism, The political economy of Dominance and 
Dependence, (New York, 1973), p. 10. 
13 Any kind of foreign rule, even the influence exercised by missionary missions and schools can be 
defined as imperialism. See Richard C. Thurnwald, "The Crisis of Imperialism in East Africa and 
Elsewhere", Social Forces, 15/1 (Oct. 1936), p. 85. Soukarno (1901-1970), the Indonesian nationalist 
leader, portrayed imperialism in 1930 as "a concept, an idea, a lust, a programme, a system, a policy of 
subjugating or controlling the country of another people or the economy of another nation". See 
Nicholas Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia 'A fleeting, passing phase', (London-New York, 2004), 
p. 8. 
14  H.L. Wesseling, Imperialism and colonialism, essays on the history of European expansion, 
(London, 1997), p. 84. 
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another, whether by annexation or by implementing less formal means.15 To Edward 
Said, imperialism was the "theory, colonialism the practice of changing the uselessly 
unoccupied territories of the world into useful versions of the European metropolitan 
society" by transforming them "according to the needs and interests of the colonial 
rulers".16  
The term imperialism indicates the dynamics of the colonial empires' 
formation.17 That is the deliberate activity and inclination of acquiring or promoting 
the political control, direct or indirect, of a state in expense of another nation. Direct 
control indicates a state of full sovereignty in which the conqueror controls the 
activities of the subordinate state, legislating, imposing taxes and drafting economic 
policy. This dependence relation is defined as colonialism. A less absolute form of 
control based on a system of influence upon the inhabitants of a subordinate territory 
is indirect imperialism. It includes a wide range of manifestations varying from subtle 
economic penetration (neo colonialism) and political influence to military pressure.18   
Imperialism, as a concept and collective attitude, has been known throughout 
the centuries. However, in modern times three distinct phases can be identified. The 
first one is closely connected to strict government rule and interventionism, especially 
in administrative and economic sectors that rendered the colonies completely 
dependable by the metropolis. The ulterior purpose was achieving self sufficiency. 
This practice due to vast military spending and overextension, in the face of 
international antagonism, resulted in the financial decline of the great empires of the 
16th century, nominally Spain and Portugal.19 In an attempt to avoid the financial 
burdens deriving from military campaigns and direct rule, 19th century Britain 
discarded this outdated and disadvantageous policy in favour of the famous "free 
trade imperialism.20 Unrestricted free trade (laissez-faire) and economic penetration, 
while keeping administrative obligations to its dominions to the minimum became the 
corner stone of British imperialism. 21  As long as England held its financial 
                                                          
15 Assimilation, introducing western customs, the alteration of the indigenous people's beliefs and 
mentality, process that would facilitate European domination is called cultural imperialism. See David 
K. Fieldhouse, Politica ed Economia del Colonialismo 1870-1945 (Bari, 1996), p. 12. 
16 A. Dirk Moses, "Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History" in Empire, 
Colony, Genocide. Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk 
Moses, (New York-Oxford, 2008), p. 22. 
17 Empire is a mechanism of marking and policing boundaries, of designing systems of punishment and 
discipline with the purpose of instilling a sense of belonging to diverse populations. See Cooper, 
Colonization in Question, p. 30.  
18 Fieldhouse, Politica ed Economia, p.4 
19Berch Berberoglou, Globalization of capital and the nation state, Imperialism, Class Struggle and the 
state in the Age of Global Capitalism, (New York, 2003), p. 14. 
20Cohen, The question of imperialism, p. 22. Adam Smith's views influenced and played a significant 
role in altering Europe's obsession with accumulating metals as means of national wealth in favour of 
free trade policies. See Adam Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, ed. Edwin Cannan, (Chicago, 1976), pp. 269-300. 
21 At the time avoiding annexations and employing loans, threats, expeditions and blockades as means 
of promoting British interests was a quite successful strategy. For more information on the British free 
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predominance, thanks to its industrialization and export of goods to underdeveloped 
countries, which resulted into accumulating great amounts of capital, this system 
seemed stable. In the last quarter of the century, England's industrialization level was 
reached and even surpassed by Germany and the US, a development that led to fierce 
economic antagonisms of unprecedented scale. Nationalism, a protectionism policy 
led by Germany in 1879, and aggressiveness characterized the global setting 
eventually delivered the fatal blow to free trade. According to some historians, that 
was birth of the "New Imperialism" or "Neo Mercantilist Imperialism".22  
The term colonialism came to the fore after 1880 and was first used by the 
British newspaper Standard in May of 1889 in the sense of conquering territories and 
overseas expansion.23 Subsequently the term was used in the title of a book published 
in 1905, by the French sociologist Paul Lours and came to describe the general 
conditions of the overseas dominions and the entire colonial system without any 
positive or negative connotation. Later, colonialism came to represent Europe's direct 
political control over populations of "different race, inhabiting territories separated by 
salt water from the imperial centre". This kind of interpretation is not restricted to a 
particular historical period but is more limited than imperialism because it outlines 
only one form of foreign rule. The set of activities which lead to the creation and the 
maintenance of colonies, i.e., of territories that traditionally were not inhabited by 
populations of the metropolitan authority is characterized as colonialism. The 
metropolis24 exercises direct sovereign rights in the colonies and determines the social 
structure, the governance and the economic functions. Colonization, in contrast, is a 
technical term, initially used to explain the immigration flow of people who 
abandoned their homeland and became settlers (coloni) in other parts of the globe.25 
Colonization as a concept is related to colonialism but it signifies the settlement of 
peoples in overseas territories and in the case of internal colonization in frontier and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
trade school of thought see Michael Havinden, David Meredith, Colonialism and Development. Britain 
and its Tropical Colonies 1850-1960, (London-New York, 1993), pp. 45-51. 
22 Bernard Semmel, The rise of free trade imperialism, Classical Political Economy the Empire of Free 
Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850, (Cambridge, 1970) pp. 4-7. 
23Roukounas, Diplomatic history, p. 159. 
24  Robert Delavignette, a renowned expert on colonial affairs, defined the concept of metropolis: 
"colonialism takes the form of political expansion, with the center of the expansion turning into 
metropolis; it becomes a matter of state, and there is a tendency to find an empire based on the 
principle of linking to the metropolis countries often separated from it even further ethically and 
sociologically than they are by physical distance...From this point of view, it becomes clear that there is 
no colonization without metropolis or a mother country”. See Olufemi Taiwo, How Colonialism 
preempted modernity in Africa, (Bloomington, 2010), p.26. 
25Wesseling, Imperialism and colonialism, pp. 9-10. Colonization's first manifestation in modern times 
can be traced during the 16th-17th centuries. Aligned with the ancient concept of colonia, that is the 
immigration of people from one place to another and their permanent settlement, the Spanish, Dutch 
and French established permanent communities and brought with them the institutions, tradition and 
social structures of their homelands to distant areas. Indeed, the word colonization derives from the 
latin verb colere, cultivate. See Taiwo, How Colonialism preempted modernity, p. 25. 
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semi occupied areas of the state, with the purpose of enhancing economic 
development and stability.26 
European colonization in the 19th century evolved nominally into three forms. 
Colonization by settlement which occurred notably in America and Australia. 
Secondly, "politico-economic" colonization, mainly in Asia and in tropical and 
equatorial Africa. Last, there was a mixture of these two kinds, which coupled 
settlement with the exploitation of the native population and their land.27 A colony is 
a foreign territory that besides the native population is inhabited by settlers, in search 
of opportunity and a better life, that maintain bonds of dependency or retain the 
citizenship of their mother country. There are numerous types of colonies depending 
on their purpose and function. Commercial ones are created as trading posts, potential 
markets and raw materials providers for the metropolis. Military colonies are 
established to safeguard the empire's vital interests and its lines of communication. 
Civil and "welfare" colonies are predominantly adapted to European settlement and 
agricultural activities. Penal colonies, either preventive, correctional or penitentiary 
were used by colonial states as places of exile and punishment of their insubordinate 
citizens.28 Today colonialism's scholars sort and classify colonies in two categories: 
settler colonialism and exploitation colonialism.29 The first kind refers to the massive 
emigration to find, usually arable, land and the second to the exploitation of the 
colony for the benefit of the metropolis. 30  During the most acute phase of 
imperialism, the concept of the settler colonialism rested primarily upon two 
theoretical pillars: strategic security and low cost occupation of valuable areas.31 
Whereas imperialism indicates the impulsion and the disposition to construct 
colonial empires, colonialism defines the political, economic and intellectual 
inferiority and subsequent subjection of the non-European societies to the most 
powerful states as a result of imperialism. 32  This form of rule does not require 
European immigration and settlement as does colonization and the conquest and 
exploitation on the part of the dominant state is implied. Robert J.C. Young separated 
imperialism and colonialism, arguing that the former is a tendency, a mentality, the 
theoretical base of the phenomenon while the latter is the practical one. Paul Sweezy 
                                                          
26 Moses, Empire, Colony, Genocide, p. 23. 
27 Ibid., p. 26. 
28 Carmelo Grassi, Colonie penitenziarie, (Milano, 1912), pp. 1-6. 
29 Keith Hancock, Wealth of Colonies, (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 18-20. Another categorization based on 
demographical aspects is the following: "mixed" colonies, where settlers and enslaved natives 
coexisted, "plantation" colonies where settlers relied and imported slave workers from Africa and "pure 
settlement" colonies in which white settlers eliminated the indigenous population. See Lorenzo 
Veracini, Settler Colonialism, A Theoretical Overview, (Basingstoke 2010), p. 5.  
30 Ηarry Magdoff, Colonialism: the European expansion after 1763, trans. A. Karakatsouli, (Athens, 
2007), p. 111.  
31  Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation", The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 14/4 (Dec. 1976), p. 601. 
32 Ronald J. Horvath, "A definition of Colonialism", Current Anthropology, 13/1(Feb., 1972), pp. 46-
47. 
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and Jean Suret Canale have argued that colonialism rendered the colonized countries 
poorer and thrust them in a more deplorable state than before their occupation. In full 
contrast to the imperialists who, in an effort to justify their overseas presence, were 
claiming that foreign rule would develop and modernize the backward parts of Africa 
and Asia, there were the intellectuals, socialists and others who countered that 
colonies were nothing more than an unnecessary burden in the state's treasury.  
Depending on the type and the intensity of the imperial rule, the basic 
distinction between colonies and dominions-protectorates 33  or other forms of 
dependence can be made. In colonies, governments exercised full administrative 
control. Moreover, colonies were efficiently transformed into state provinces and in 
most cases the native national identities were deformed in the process. Informal 
empires, protectorates, semi-colonies, states that felt European pressure and influence 
but were not conquered, are quite different from actual colonies that assumed the role 
of satellites and became part of the global capitalist system paving the way for their 
future economic underdevelopment. The most typical example of indirect rule can be 
drawn from the British colonial experience. The British domination pattern preserved 
native autonomous administrational systems without interfering and exercised as less 
central political and economic rule as possible. Self-government, that is ruling 
through or in collaboration with the social upper strata, was deemed more profitable 
than the imposition of troublesome direct control.34 
Responsible for the colonial impetus and its particular intensity is a 
complexity of ideological, economic, political, strategic, psychological, metropolitan 
and peripheral motives. The European's appetite for expansion in the late 19th century 
is partially explained by their sense of superiority in comparison to other civilizations, 
and the tendency to impose, a tendency harmonized with human nature. In the course 
of the last 30 centuries of human presence on the planet one phenomenon is 
commonplace and is fuelling theories about cause and effect and historical causation, 
i.e., the recycling of historical events. This phenomenon is the inherent predisposition 
to prevail and to dominate others, the insatiable greed and the instinctive fight for 
survival.  
The imperialistic phenomenon was at its zenith in the period 1850-1914,35 
because it was then when, because of the industrial revolution, the Europeans 
                                                          
33 The term "protectorate" has a dual significance. Initially it declared an autonomous region, which 
was diplomatically and militarily protected against third parties by a more powerful country. During 
the 19th century partition however, the colonized countries were referred to as colonial protectorates, 
which of course did not enjoy any sort of autonomy. 
34 Fieldhouse, Politica ed Economia, pp. 11-19, 49-56. 
35 Indicatively, this period was named by the researchers "Age of Imperialism" and "Age of the New 
Imperialism" to demonstrate the intensity of the expansionist phenomenon. The term “new” was 
employed not because of the increment of capitals that were invested outside of Europe but to illustrate 
the rivalries, the aggressiveness, the unfounded obsessions and the outburst of nationalist agitations. 
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possessed all the means to proceed to the world's partition. Africa36 in particular was 
the main pole of attraction for the European imperialists due to its proximity to 
Europe and the obvious incapacity of its peoples to resist and overturn the schemes 
against them. Africa and Asia, being at the time "unclaimed and available, were the 
principal targets of European penetration. Oceania was initially regarded as barren 
and unprofitable whereas North and South America were fortified by the Monroe 
doctrine.37 
One of the many results of the second Industrial Revolution (1870-1914) was 
the generation of massive profits. Those few, who accumulated them, desired to 
invest abroad in search of new outlets and further profits.38 This surplus capital could 
be safely exported in the colonies under the reassuring government protection. Since 
self-sufficiency was not feasible, industrial states had to resort to exports and 
colonies, via conquest and investment, could be transformed into profitable markets 
for their manufactured goods.39 Economic rivalries, escalated by economic depression 
between the 1870s and 1890s, and speared up by nationalism led to protectionist 
tariffs, commercial war and anxiety among the capitalists, the merchants and the 
politicians. It was deemed that if, industrial states (Britain, Germany, U.S., France) 
aspired to survive and thrive amidst the late 19th century's anarchic international 
arena, they had to export and supply themselves with raw materials in the cheapest 
possible prices. The obvious answer to this problem was colonialism. Colonies, 
according to the imperialist way of thinking, could change into lucrative investment 
fields and could also become the suppliers of essential goods. They could even absorb 
the West's manufactured products. Europe, in order to achieve the incorporation of 
every territory to the global capitalistic system, a fact that would facilitate the 
development of trade and the unencumbered distribution of goods, had to reorganize 
                                                          
36 For general information regarding the historical evolution of the African nations in the modern era 
see Molefi Kefe Asante, The History of Africa, the quest for eternal harmony, (New York, 2007), 
Giovana Tomasello, L'Africa tra mito e realtà, Storia della letteratura coloniale Italiana, (Palermo, 
2004), Basil Davidson, The search for Africa, history, culture, politics, (New York, 1994) and Arnold 
Guy, Africa, a modern history, (London, 2005).  
37  The Monroe doctrine was the policy proclaimed and inaugurated on 2 December 1823 by the 
American president James Monroe (1758-1831). It made clear that any attempt by European 
governments to intervene in the internal affairs of the American states or to colonize parts of the 
Western Hemisphere would be considered by the U.S. an act of aggression. Furthermore, the 
proclamation in question was assuring the Europeans that the U.S. would not interfere and would 
respect the colonies already established around the world. In this way the newly created Latin 
American States, after the liberating revolutions of the period 1808-1829, would be avoiding once and 
for all the European economic and political hegemony. 
38  Investments in railways, ships and telegraphs facilitated state administration and increased the 
prosperity of the mother country and the treasury of the colony. See Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles 
of Progress. Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940, (New York-Oxford, 1988), 
pp. 380-381. 
39Formal political control of colonial markets assured their availability when needed, while informal 
control of other markets also made this quite possible. See Patrick J. McGowan, Bohdan Kordan, 
"Imperialism in World-System Perspective: Britain 1870-1914", International Studies Quarterly, 25/1 
(Mar. 1981), p. 61. 
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the world according to its interests and impose its political and cultural institutions. 
Every part of the globe was to be linked as member of one world system. Greater 
degree of dependence and efficient autarchic control were the means to this end.40 
   In the era of rapid industrialization and of European omnipotence, 
penetrating and conquering the African and Asian hinterland was now as feasible as 
never before thanks to the swift progress in the fields of weaponry, medicine, 
communication and transportation.41 The proponents of expansionism discerned and 
lent a financial tone to the colonial undertaking. In its endeavor to maintain the 
monopoly in science, in technology and in economic development, the metropolis was 
forced to depend increasingly on regional agricultural products and raw materials. 
Thus, backed by state protectionism, the powerful economic figures of the times were 
the driving force behind the race to acquire territories in other continents in order to, 
ultimately, exploit peoples and retain reserves and sources of industrial goods. The 
possibility of relatively safe and profitable investments in the occupied countries and 
the securing of markets for Europe's industrial products, in connection with the supply 
of cheap and necessary for the industry raw materials, were the incentives for both the 
discoveries and the annexations of seemingly insignificant territories.42 The limitless 
growth of capitalism, the willingness and the capability to invest in mines, ports and 
railways in the colonies and the quest for faster and more efficient profit led the 
manufacturers and financiers of the metropolis, who in their turn influenced their 
governments, to draw up a policy of expansion. Although raw materials were and 
could continue to be extracted from areas without the need of enforcing political 
control, international rivalry, fear of exclusion and greed intensified the imperialist 
struggle. Rubber, metals, oil were, among others, products of fundamental importance 
for Europe's rampant industrial expansion. Expansion turned into a stressful necessity 
since the danger of being excluded from a market and being superseded by a rival 
Great Power became the fear of industrialists and governments. The culmination of 
the frenetic race for securing markets and commercial posts at the end of the 19th 
century has taken place mostly on Africa and thus is known as "The Scramble for 
Africa" or "Race for Africa".  
                                                          
40Ibid., p. 51. 
41 The discovery of quinine, the construction of railways and steamboats, which would later enable the 
aggressive gunboat policy, and especially the use of advanced weapons gave the 19th century 
colonialists a huge advantage not only in relation to the Africans and Asians but also over their Spanish 
and Portuguese precursors. See Daniel R. Headrick, "The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and the 
Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century", Journal of Modern History, 51/2 
(Jun. 1979), pp. 240-261. 
42  Europe's constant need for imports, natural resources and for finding vital investment areas 
constituted an important economic factor of the imperialist expansion. The demand for raw materials 
made the colonies a necessary investment and colonialism by extension a useful policy. It is the French 
Prime Minister Jules François Camille Ferry, (1832-1893) who is credited with the expression 
"colonialism is the daughter of industrialization," which highlighted the inextricable link between the 
metropolitan capital and the explorations and campaigns in the depths of Africa and Asia. See David K. 
Fieldhouse, The theory of capitalist imperialism, (Hong Kong, 1967), pp. 26-52. 
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To John Atkinson Hobson (1858-1940), imperialism brought very feeble trade 
results, promoted rivalries that increased the possibility for wars and cost the nation 
far more than it received. Only but a few gained explicitly from the expansionist 
practice and had the influence and power to enforce it upon their government policies. 
Those beneficiaries were the shipbuilding and armament manufacturers and the 
soldiers, sailors and financers whose careers were dependent on these industries.43 
Hobson devised an economic explanation of the imperialism based on his 
underconsumption theory. Europe in its industrial heyday tended to produce more 
than it could possibly consume. This overproduction could be diverted overseas as 
manufactured exports, generating capitals for the metropolis. This is why commercial 
outlets and exclusive markets were deemed as imperative by western capitalism.44 In 
line with this theory if the population at home augmented its consumption rate to keep 
up with the rise of the domestic productive powers there would be no excess of 
products resulting in the imperialists forfeiting their claims and need to find foreign 
markets. He finally concluded that the logic of dominion and expansion is a fruit of 
the anarchic nature of the international system in which states, in an increasingly 
competitive spirit, thrive perpetually to "maximize their individual power position".45 
H.N. Brailsford agreed with Hobson's point of view that imperialism is basically an 
economic phenomenon which benefits mostly the interests of the upper classes, the 
plutocracy.46 
Marxist political theory suggests that all political phenomena originate from 
economic and material causes; thus imperialism is the inevitable product of the 
capitalistic form of production and the control of underdeveloped parts of the world is 
an expression of Europe's financial needs and greed. 47  According to Marxist 
historians, imperialism intensifies the unequal exchange and the exploitation of 
weaker states in the interests of a handful of capitalists in a few countries, whereas, 
domestically, the dominance of trusts, the rising cost of living and wars contribute to 
the economic oppression and impoverishment of the masses. 48 The capitalist 
dominance of the state is absolute, the bourgeoisie rule by deception, bribery, 
corruption and control of press. Under imperialism, capitalism expanded 
geographically, in search of raw materials, cheap labour, and "superprofits".49 In a 
world dominated by global markets, large corporations, trusts and cartels, Lenin 
                                                          
43 Peter J. Cain, Hobson and Imperialism. Radicalism, New Liberalism and Finance 1887-1938, (New 
York, 2002), pp. 108-114. 
44 Michael Barratt Brown, The Economics of Imperialism, (London, 1974), p. 24. The reason for which 
surplus funds are not invested in the interior of the European countries but in other continents is easily 
understandable. The demand and potentially the absorption of funds were far greater overseas away 
from the saturated markets of Europe. 
45Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia, pp.6-10. 
46 Victor. G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism, (London, 1974), p. 5. 
47 E. M. Winslow, "Marxian, Liberal and Sociological Theories of Imperialism", Journal of Political 
Economy, 39/6 (Dec 1931), p. 715. 
48 David G. Smith, "Lenin's "Imperialism": A study in the Unity of Theory and Practice", The Journal 
of Politics, 17/4 (Nov. 1955), pp. 550-551. 
49Ibid., p. 563. 
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(1870-1924) noted that the more developed the capitalism, the more intense and 
perceptible becomes the lack of raw materials, the more acute is the international 
antagonism for their acquisition and finally the more desperate is the race to establish 
colonies.50 He insisted that imperialism should be regarded as the monopoly stage of 
the capitalist development. Alongside the "classical Marxists", Hilferding and 
Bukharin51  recognized as the main cause of the feverish and predatory quest for 
colonies the formation of monopolies and the intensification of the competition 
between the Great Powers. 52  For Hilferding the main stimulus came from the 
developed states' will to secure monopolies taking advantage of the industrial and 
banking possibilities merged, as he called it, into finance capital. The developed-
capitalist states were becoming more dependent from the periphery's raw materials 
and markets. According to Lenin the imperial states would annex and bring under 
their political control vast extensions of land in order to satisfy businessmen and 
entrepreneurs, who were always pressing for more action, like securing commercial 
opportunities and over powering foreign economic antagonism.53  Hence capitalist 
Powers in modern times tried to construct a self-contained imperial system, struggling 
with each other for spheres of influence in the underdeveloped world, imposing 
protective tariffs, controlling pre-capitalistic backward nations and building fleets to 
protect their world trade. Polish philosopher Rosa Luxembourg in her work The 
Accumulation of Capital, published in 1913, argued that capitalism survives thanks to 
the international financial system, militarism, high protection and the colonialist 
policy.54  
Paradoxically, imperialism was not thoroughly negative. In reality it served a 
historical necessity as the only mean to liberate the backward societies from their 
millennial stagnation and to introduce them to industrialization and progress.55 To 
Marx as immoral and cruel the imposition of imperial rule and the eradication of 
traditional structures may have been, the process is still a progressive step towards the 
formation of class consciousness, global revolution and socialism in a world scale.56 
Overlooking the fact that imperialism could actually delay and put an end to capitalist 
                                                          
50 Kemp, The marxist theory, p. 22. 
51 For the complete theory of these prominent intellectuals see Nikolai Bukharin, Imperialism and 
World Economy, (London, 1917), Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital, A Study of the Latest phase of 
Capitalist Development, ed. Tom Bottomore, trans, M. Watnick, S. Gordon, (London-Boston, 1981) 
and Vladimir. I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (Sydney, 1999). 
52 Antony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, A Critical Survey, (London-New York, 1990), p. 
20. 
53 Fieldhouse, Politica ed Economia, p. 5. This view was not shared by Karl Kautsky. Defining his 
"ultra-imperialism" notion he concluded that major powers would most likely agree to "exploit the 
world jointly rather than fight over it". See Tarling, Imperialism in Southeast Asia, p. 7. 
54  Brewer, Marxist Theories, p. 56. Imperialism condemned the less developed states to poverty, 
stagnation and an eternal subordinate status. See A. James Gregor, Maria Hsia Chang, "Marxism, Sun 
Yat-sen, and the Concept of "Imperialism", Pacific Affairs, 55/1 (1982), p. 66. 
55  Jorge Larrain, Theories of Development. Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency, (Cambridge 
1989), pp. 46-47. 
56 Kolja Lindner, "Marx's Eurocentrism. Postcolonial studies and Marx scholarship", Radical 
Philisophy, (Sept. 2010), p. 5.   
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development, some Marxists proponents considered it as a positive development for 
the colonized peoples.57  
    However, it would be a mistake to interpret a phenomenon of such intensity 
and importance, such as colonialism, with the industrial production and economic 
growth indexes as the single rule.58 The ideological axles upon which the colonialist 
zealots practically relied, which would also place the issue on a fresh footing by 
treating it from a new strategic viewpoint, were the rise of nationalism, of liberalism 
and of the imperialism theory during the 19th century. The partition of the world was 
part of the European power games59 and acted as the safety valve, i.e. the outlet for 
nationalistic tendencies. The activity of pressure groups, as already stated, linked 
inextricably the national interest with colonialism. In a time when national interest 
equated with power and prestige, the willingness of the European governments to 
build colonial empires seemed to be the only way to increase the nation's vital forces, 
by providing to it strategic and naval bases for the fleet, new populations for 
exploitation and recruitment, and raw materials for its industry. 60  Generally the 
student of colonialism could come to the conclusion that the combination of 
missionaries, of propaganda and of the technological, economic and military gap 
between Europe and the other continents, was the key reason behind the culmination 
of the imperialist phenomenon. 
Protectionism, economic antagonism and the rise of militarism intensified 
even further the race for the possession of colonies among the old protagonists of the 
game. After 1850, new players made their appearance creating an asphyxiating and 
explosive situation. The new states (newcomers) which were formed in the second 
half of the 19th century, such as the German Empire (1871), the Kingdom of Italy 
(1861) and the Empire of Japan (1868), besides the internal nationalist pressures, the 
                                                          
57 Larrain, Theories of Development, p. 70. 
58I n contrast to the economic justification of the phenomenon, a more recent approach downsizes the 
importance of trade and highlights the role of the diplomats as the key agents of colonial partition. 
Only at the end of the process did the businessmen engage into financial activities, obliged to balance 
the colonies' budget. See Patrick Wolfe, "History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to 
Postcolonialism", The American Historical Review, 102/2 (Apr. 1997), pp. 400-401. 
59 Politicians at the Age of Imperialism used overseas territories as bargaining counters and 
counterweights in a global game of diplomacy. Decisions made by state men such as Benjamin Disraeli 
(1804-1881) and Francesco Crispi (1819-1901) in respect to their expansionist policy had a profound 
international impact not limited by their states’ borders (state man’s imperialism). In contrast to 
common beliefs the central state has not been the only agent of imperialistic expressions and policies. 
Settlers and colonial administrators acting usually for their own end proposed and convinced their 
government to extent their jurisdiction. Furthermore, entrepreneurs and merchants active all over the 
globe asked frequently their governments to intervene in their favour. Typical example of this process 
is Britain's conquest of some arid islands in the Pacific at the suggestion of its Australian subjects (sub-
imperialism). The practice of incorporating territories, as strategic bases in order to defend other 
colonies is called by modern colonialism scholars "protective annexation". See Mackenzie, The 
partition of Africa, (London-New York, 1983), p. 37. 
60 Serge Berstein-Pierre Milza, History of Europe. The European agreement and the Europe of nations 
1815-1919, trans. Anastasios K. Dimitrakopoulos, (Paris, 1997), p. 176. 
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fear of exclusion from the worldwide markets and the need of the manufacturers to 
export their goods had to deal with another problem, one which advocated and 
vindicated their appetite for colonies. This was the population growth and the solution 
of immigrating to the colonies. In the decade of 1840, one million Germans emigrated 
to the South and North America.61 108,000 people emigrated from Italy every year in 
the period from 1876 to 1880 and between 1881 and 1884 this number reached the 
figure of 154,000.62 The citizens of the newly established states asked for the partition 
of the world and believed that it is fair and just for the countries with denser 
populations to obtain breathing space (lebensraum) in one way or another. And if the 
traditional colonial powers, such as France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Britain, had 
already established firmly their prominent position in this colonized world, the new 
states would vigorously seek their share.63 
So began the partition and panic spread everywhere. In 1870, just one tenth of 
Africa was under European control. In 1900, only one tenth remained independent.64 
The British Empire in the same period covered one fifth of the world's surface having 
increased its size by 5 million square miles, and its population by 88 million, which 
represented the one fourth of the entire world population.65 At the beginning of the 
20th century, France controlled 6,000,000 square miles from 700,000 and a population 
of 52 million people while Germany, which had no colonial dominions until 1884, 
ruled now 14 million people and 1 million square miles of African land.66 In total, 
more than 10 million square miles and more than 100 million Africans came under 
European authority in the space of approximately a decade. 67  The international 
situation, uncontrollable and a cause of conflicts and disputes for the Great Powers, 
had to be ironed out. The Berlin Conference was held in 1884-1885 for exactly this 
reason. Its decisions were ignored by the colonialists and as a result they failed to 
impose the desired discipline to the unruly colonial rivalries. On the contrary, chaos, 
fueled by the inexhaustible quest for wealth, spread even more rapidly: the coastal 
spheres of economic influence evolved into colonies, which now stretched to the 
depths of Africa and Asia, native states were occupied and the colonialists drew 
arbitrary but official borders as they deemed fit.68 
   In addition, the Europeans, believing that they had the sacred mission of 
civilizing the world, gave new meanings to the concepts of racism and nationalism. 
                                                          
61 M.E. Chamberlein, The new imperialism, (London, 1970), p. 27. 
62 Carlo Zaghi, L'Africa nella coscienza Europea e l'imperialismo Italiano, (Naples, 1973), p. 242. 
63Chamberlein, The new imperialism, p. 27. 
64 Ibid., p. 6. 
65 Cohen, The question of imperialism, p. 30. 
66 Chamberlein, The new imperialism, pp. 9-12. 
67 Mackenzie, The partition, p.1. Between 1800 and 1878 Europe had absorbed 17,000,000 km2 and 
from that time until 1914 a further 22,500,000 km2 (in 1800 it controlled 55% of the earth's surface, in 
1878 67% and in 1914 84,4%). Just the Ottoman Empire, Siam, Ethiopia and Persia had escaped 
Europe's firm colonial grip but, since they were susceptible to western economic penetration and 
influence, could be considered as semi-colonized areas. See David K. Fieldhouse, Storia Universale, 
Gli imperi coloniali dal XVIII secolo, vol. 29, (Milano, 1976), p. 124. 
68 Mackenzie, The partition, p. 19. 
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"Popular imperialism" satisfied the public’s psychological needs and since it diverted 
their attention from domestic malfunctions served perfectly the ruling elite's interests. 
Many 19th century European citizens, under the influence of romanticism and of 
rising nationalistic fervor, supported the colonial undertaking and felt pride at the 
sight of their national flag waving overseas.69 Enthusiastic nationalist demands and 
the reconciliation of internal tensions were the results of a militant propaganda staged 
by the state in collaboration with geographic and exploration societies. These popular 
at the time, organizations exalted the national spirit and promoted the idea of the 
civilizing mission.  
It was therefore, Europe's paternalistic duty to Christianize the heathens, to 
bring about modernization, to spread western morals to "backward" nations, to 
combat illiteracy, hunger and slavery.70 These ideals disguised and covered under the 
illusion of a philanthropic "mission" were for many people a praiseworthy enterprise 
and a reasonable cause to invade the jungles of Africa and Asia. 71  Besides the 
attraction to mystery and adventure, which were supplemented by events such as the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 or the discovery of the South African mines in 
1867, there were theories that charged and pushed ruling elites, merchants, 
industrialists, military and ordinary men alike to take up the colonial enterprise.  
The proponents of European expansion utilized and relied on axioms from 
important economists such as the accumulation of capital by Adam Smith (1723-
1790), the reduction of profits and wages by David Ricardo (1771-1823), the growth 
of the world's population by Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and of course from the 
social Darwinists,72 who were claiming that the European civilization was proven to 
be more adjustable and therefore superior to others.73 The theories of the economists 
appeared attractive to the entrepreneurs who wanted to restructure their countries' 
                                                          
69 E.M. Burns, European history, the western culture: Modern Times, trans. T. Darveris, (Thessaloniki, 
2006), p. 688. 
70Ibid., p. 678. The imperialism's positive side was displayed in the 1890 Bruxells conference, when 
Europe confronted by the antislavery question in Africa seemed keen to act for the welfare of 
Europeans and Africans alike, by fighting the infamous slave trade, introducing western technological 
innovations, such as telegraphs and railways, diminishing intertribal wars, by preventing the 
unrestricted trade of firearms and alcohol and finally combating illiteracy and poverty. See Lewis 
Henry Gann, Peter Duignan, "Introduction" in Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, The history and 
politics of colonialism 1870-1914, vol. 1,ed. Lewis Henry Gann and Peter Duignan, (Cambridge, 
1969), p. 26. 
71 Hans Kohn, "Some reflections on Colonialism", The Review of Politics, 18/3 (Jun. 1956), pp. 259-
260. 
72 According to Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), nature favours the prosperity of the more resilient 
plants and the more capable animals through evolution and natural selection. The social Darwinists 
considered that this principle, "the survival of the fittest" the famous expression coined by Herbert 
Spencer (1820-1903), could be applicable in society as well. In this manner the foundations of the 
struggle between ethnic and racial groups were laid and social policies were enacted that were 
detrimental to those citizens who were unable to sustain themselves. At the colonial front this meant 
that the weak, underdeveloped nations of Africa and Asia had to give way to the more powerful and 
vanish.  
73 Burns, European history, p. 725. 
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economies and to expand their businesses across the globe seeing that it would yield 
them huge profits.74 E.G. Wakefield and J.S. Mill, clearly influenced by the doctrines 
of Adam Smith, considered colonialism as the only effective solution for absorbing 
the surplus capital of the fully industrialized countries. The Italian political economist 
A. Loria discovered yet another advantage that the brutal exploitation of non-
European peoples yielded.75  He argued that imperialism acts as a deterrent, as a 
stumbling block, to the eventuality of future destructive Intra-European wars. 
Intellectuals like the German writer Paul Rohrbach and state men like Ferry 
maintained that inferior "primitive people" had no inherent right which the white man 
should respect. Even those that were inclined to take up "The Whites Man's Burden" 
or the idea of tutoring the backward peoples in a more humanitarian and reciprocally 
beneficially way, claimed that Western civilization had indeed the right to intervene 
and exploit underdeveloped and stagnant areas.76 An ideology and a particular psychic 
thus emerged, in 19th century Europe, product of emotional complexes, propaganda 
and of pressing sociopolitical influences. Joseph Schumpeter's atavistic explanatory 
theory of imperialism outlines the importance of the homo sapiens’ archaic 
predisposition towards violence as the key factor of limitless expansion.77 Aggressive 
and irrational territorial expansion had its origins in preindustrial warrior-aristocratic 
societies and has been a modern manifestation of an ancient tendency.78 
According to the most fervent criticizers of colonialism, subjecting peoples to 
alien rule constituted a crime that disrupted African development, broke down social 
ties and denied the inalienable right of all people to control their destiny, a 
fundamental human right. 79  The liquidation of the "old tribal society" and its 
particular institutions was systematically encouraged and caused irreversible moral 
and socioeconomic consequences. 80 Foreign rule, through assimilation, "denies 
history" to the colonized, in the sense that it deprives their cultural rights and 
identity.81 Natural economies, adapted to the native population were ruined; their 
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means of production and raw materials ravaged and agricultural activity was oriented 
to exclusively satisfy the needs of the metropolitan states.82  
The notions about the colonized people’s inability to govern themselves and of 
their cultural inferiority were eagerly accepted by the imperialists, fitting and 
justifying, unsurprisingly, their reasoning and interests.83 Racial prejudice was the 
ideological precursor and generator of these notions. Racism was not just a cognitive 
byproduct of European military and industrial supremacy in the 19th century. 
Fragments of it can be traced even among the texts of great scientists and enlightened 
philosophers such as Voltaire (1694-1778) and Kant (1724-1804) whose influential 
writings have formed the psychic and worldview of later generations. 84  Some 
Imperialists, intoxicated by their own arrogance, Christian charity and Europe's self-
evident cultural superiority felt obliged to bring about progress and impose their 
colonial rule. A type of rule that, by definition was aiming more to exploit the world's 
resources rather than developing it. 85 To Aime Cesaire, the relationship between 
colonizer and colonized is characterized by contempt, mistrust, arrogance, 
intimidation, the police, forced labour, "brainless elites" and "degraded masses". 
Colonialism, more than the philanthropists and the missionaries, was mainly 
conductedby the merchants, the ship owners, the adventurers whose own moral 
relativism, greed and brutal instincts would gradually decivilize and dehumanize 
them.86  
The European expansion since its origins in the 19th century was a 
complicated phenomenon, a result of numerous events and quite often of irrational 
dispositions. Therefore, it cannot be described by a sole oversimplifying 
interpretation. Furthermore, every state acted, in accordance to its special needs and 
interests in a distinct way amidst the peripheral crises and global developments. Yet, 
since government policy is interchangeable and inconstant due to domestic pressures 
and political intentions and distinct in relation to every circumstance, the 
characterization of each states’ expansionistic tendencies cannot be attempted without 
the danger of overgeneralization.  
Modern historiography claims to have discovered the nature of each colonial 
state’s individual colonialism, although they did not administer their colonies in the 
same way and were driven to expansion for a multiplicity of reasons. According to 
this scheme English expansion to the world had an economic base and aimed at 
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promoting financial interaction in a liberal fashion, refraining from direct, 
unprofitable rule where possible. On the other hand, the French stood for 
administrative centralization and cultural assimilation of their African and Asian 
subjects. In line with the notions of justice and fraternity, numerous French 
acquisitions were considered as an integrated part of the country (colonies 
incorporées) and their inhabitants as equal French citizens. Finally, the Germans 
despite their military and bureaucratic tradition imitated the British administrative 
model. In reality the imperialism of each power was distinctive in its origins, purposes 
and its relation to the advance of industrialization.87 Moreover, intensification of the 
overseas expansion in the late 19th century cannot be accredited to the 
implementation of a concrete strategy by the imperial powers. It first appeared more 
like a spontaneous reaction and in contrast to earlier expansion it was the fruit of the 
demarcation of spheres of interest and the incremental rise of nationalistic fervour that 
led to successive partitions.88  
During the 1880-1890 period, the European public opinion89 and governments 
were, for a wide set of reasons, more inclined to embrace conservative ideologies in 
domestic and foreign policy. Liberalism in Britain and France was asphyxiating under 
the increasing pressure of nationalistic rhetoric and the socialist parties presented a 
fragmented and divided front.90 Socialists, Communists and even Anarchists all over 
Europe, lacking a common ideological platform, stood powerless and were unable to 
restrain the nationalistic tide. The Italian liberal parliamentary system under the strong 
influence of the Catholics and the Conservatives was transforming into an 
"oligarchical" institution whereas in Germany both the national-liberals and the 
progressive party were practically overshadowed by Bismarck's plethoric personality. 
In Russia, liberal opposition to the tsarist regime came as late as the 1905 revolution. 
Under these circumstances, conservatism soon took the form of nationalism and the 
omnipresent central interventism prevailed over liberal voices bidding for equal rights 
and democratic reforms. The spread of ideas such as "only these nations that can 
transform themselves into empires can have a bright future" and the conviction that 
the greatest national duty of every European state was to infiltrate politically 
underdeveloped lands, degenerated the nationalistic zeal into imperialism. 
Eventually, everyone succumbed to the trend. After 1890, Britain developed 
the paradox of liberal imperialism based theoretically on the supremacy of the British 
race. In Germany, what at the time seemed an Anglo-Russian partition of the world 
provoked distress and nationalistic feelings even among the leftists. In France, 
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regardless of the nation's supposedly liberal tradition, the whole spectrum of the 19th 
century society adopted the imperialistic doctrine.91 Colonial France was committed 
to the assimilation policy and the mission civilatrice, its supplement instrument. 
Imperial Germany, on the contrary, in regard to its overseas possessions, had 
seemingly commercial origins. However, a closer look proves that only but a few 
possessions turned profitable (Togo, Samoa, Kiaochow) and that the great bulk of 
German immigrants never flocked towards the colonies. For some scholars Germany's 
inability to form a nation until 1871 in conjunction with the national security 
preoccupation resulted in the generation of a colonial complex. Thereby, "belated" 
German colonialism manifested itself with extreme vigour and aggressiveness within 
the context of 19th and 20th  century imperial expansion.92 
In France the origins of the new imperialism can be traced in the rising tide of 
nationalism and revisionism as the state had yet to recover from the humiliating defeat 
in the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. In Germany, although rapid industrialization 
could offer motivation and economic justification, expansion served also as a social 
policy destined to unite the Germans, fragmented politically for centuries, around 
foreign policy matters and eradicating internal tensions. On the contrary, King 
Leopold's (1835-1909) success in establishing the Congo colony was the fruit of his 
own interests and ambitions so that Belgium's expansion was later called "one man's 
imperialism".93  
To some historians, modern colonial empires aspired to maintain their old 
privileges in the world as they had been doing until then but by the 1880s, influence 
was not enough. International rivalries, peripheral crisis, sometimes as a threat to the 
established status quo sometimes as an opportunity to expand their rule, fear of 
commercial exclusion and geopolitical isolation weighted now disproportionally. In 
an era of distrust and protectionism another power's advances in even previously 
unknown and insignificant lands, was reason enough for animosity and panic to 
spread out. In this context, every annexation was not just a response to different 
circumstances, but a reaction to a previous annexation. Characteristically, the British 
were drawn to Egypt (1882) for the sake of their Indian colony's protection. When the 
French, in an effort to topple their rivals' advances set their sights on Sudan (1898), 
the British felt compelled to claim Sudan as well.94 This example demonstrates that 
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empires had stopped seeking valuable and advantageous areas and were franticly 
expanding for the sake of expansion.95 
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2. Italy's domestic and international situation after the 
Unification 
 
The kingdom of Italy was founded on 17 March 1861 under Vittorio 
Emanuele II (1820-1878) after many years of liberating wars (Risorgimento).1 The 
fragmented in 1815 peninsula (Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, Kingdom of Two 
Sicilies, Duchies of Parma, Tuscany, Modena and Lucca) was unified and 
"piedmontised".2 According to the Piedmontese state's charter, soon to be adopted by 
the whole nation the king was "by divine right" the supreme leader of the army, the 
head of the state and the head of the government. His authoritative figure ensured 
everyone's equality before the law, social rights, and the function of the parliament in 
a way that respected royal privileges before anything else. The new state's legislative 
power was divided between the parliament (Camera dei Deputati), elected by a small 
number of constituents deriving from the nation's male population (1.9 % of the 
population i.e. 418,000 were entitled to vote in 1865) and the senate (Senato) whose 
members were directly appointed by the king. New laws had to be approved by the 
king as well. The first Prime Minister (Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri) Camillo 
Cavour (1810-1861) skilfully tried to infuse a more constitutional and liberal 
countenance to the regime. Despite these initiatives the Italian king at the time could 
still dismiss his Ministers at will, dissolve the parliament, declare wars and negotiate 
treaties with foreign states, often superseding the Minister of Foreign Affairs.3 
The new state’s borders did not include however, regions considered as 
integral parts of Italy such as Venice and Rome which were densely populated by 
people of Italian descent. The participation in a new war against Austria in 1866 
would follow aiming to achieve the state's territorial completion, resulting in the 
annexation of the Veneto province. 4  More specifically, in August 1865 Prussian 
diplomats approached their Italian colleagues to propose an alliance in the event of an 
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upcoming Austro-Prussian war. These talks culminated to a commercial treaty and in 
April 1866 an "offensive and defensive alliance" was concluded which, if victorious, 
would hand over Austrian controlled Venice to Italy. Indeed, the superior Prussian 
army defeated the Austrian forces in just seven weeks (14 June-23 August 1866). In 
October the 3rd 1866, despite the unsuccessful Italian military campaign in land and 
sea, the entire province of Veneto, through French mediation, came under Italian 
jurisdiction. Equally important for the Italian cause was the fact that by ceding Venice 
and negotiating a peace treaty, Austria was finally recognizing officially the Italian 
state.5 
Τhe "roman problem", the future of the capital of the papal state which 
enjoyed the honorary protection of the French Emperor, was the subject of talks 
between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Visconti Venosta (1829-1914) and the 
French government which led to the treaty of 1864. According to the treaty's 
provisions, among others, the Italian government committed to respect the territorial 
integrity of the Vatican state and the French assented to the gradual withdrawal of its 
security forces from Rome.6  Venosta, in this way, skilfully managed to turn the 
dispute into an Italian internal issue. Moving the capital from Turin to Florence in 
1865 appeared as a gesture of good faith and gave the impression that Italy, for the 
time, would renounce the goal of occupying Rome. 
The indisputable symbol of national independence Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-
1882), 7  always an active revolutionist, supported by his faithful volunteer corps 
attempted in numerous occasions to occupy Rome and to fuel anti-papacy and pro-
unification insurrections. These efforts, regardless of the government's discreet 
support, posed a source of trouble and were a cause of embarrassment to Italian 
foreign policy due to its previous declaration of respecting the papal state's integrity.8 
In the end it was another international development four years later which paved the 
way for the Italian state’s new territorial expansion. When war between France and 
the Prussian dominated Northern Germany states finally came, the parliament and the 
king regardless of their pro French sentiments remained neutral, fearing new 
humiliations and defeats. Only after the brilliant German military victory in Sedan 
(1st of September 1870) did Italian government decide to act drastically and to grab 
the opportunity to conquer Rome.9 In 20 September 1870 the Italian army, taking 
advantage of the absence of the French forces since they were redeployed to the 
battlefront, breached the walls of the practically defenceless city. After a referendum 
and general elections, Vittorio Emanuele carried out his first visit into the city which 
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six months later was to become the nation's new capital.10 The integration of the papal 
territories caused not only the fury of Pope Pius IX (1792-1878) but also the hostility 
of the Catholics within and outside Italy, forming an additional threat to the already 
fragile and unstable state.11 
The greatest problem facing the new leadership on the day after the 
Unification was the finances, i.e., the repayment of the enormous debt that was linked 
to the costs of the liberating wars and the effort to fund and operate the public 
administration, the fleet, 12  and the army. 13 The public debt of the kingdom of 
Piedmont-Sardinia was immense and approximately equal to the public debt of all the 
other Italian states put together, before the Unification.14 As a matter of fact, during 
the 1861-1870 period, the public debt rose from 2,300 million to 8,200 million. To 
deal with this grim situation the government decided to resort to raising tax rates and 
to privatizing public land, i.e. land mainly confiscated from the Catholic Church.15 
   The organization of the state was at a pitiful level due to the long-term 
conflicts and political instability. The most urgent problems were created from the 
union of territories that were until recently subject to different administrative, military 
and legal systems. 16  The consolidation of state structures, the creation of a new 
national consciousness, and the smooth transition from the radical-reactive spirit of 
the Risorgimento period to disciplined orderly social life posed major challenges for 
the new leadership. The new ruling class, based in Turin, the capital, was sympathetic 
to and influenced by the liberal trends then prevalent in Europe. During the years 
between 1859 and 1865 the lengthy process of vigorously modernizing the legislation 
from the Napoleonic period and introducing modern regulations in public 
administration, security and education, electoral law and penal code, took place. The 
answer to the pressing problems rested with the country’s in depth transformation by 
the enactment of the urgently needed17radical innovations in the social and economic 
fields. These could not be limited to the dissolution of the political barriers between 
the various regions, that previously formed the Italian city states, or to the recognition 
of the new state abroad. 
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Regionalism, a product of long-standing political fragmentation, and anarchy 
created a volatile and dangerous situation in the country's South (Μezzogiorno), 
which often rose up and undermined whatever authority the state exercised there. 
Indeed, the turmoil and the continuing unrest in Sicily during the 1860s created 
countless problems for the then Prime Minister, Cavour, and his successors Βettino 
Ricasoli (1809-1880) and Urbano Rattazzi (1808-1873). After the dissolution of the 
kingdom of the Two Sicilies under the Bourbon dynasty and the subsequent disorder 
caused by revolutionary upheaval, the South of the country was gripped by constant 
insurgency and fierce government responses (War of Brigandage 1861-1865). The 
collapse of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies as well as the destitute conditions drove 
many peasants into acts of rebellion. Contempt in the South for the recently founded 
institutions and distrust towards any new type of government provoked Turin to 
respond in a rather authoritative way. The ruling elites that sought to unify and 
urgently “piedmontize” or “Italianize” the entire peninsula could not tolerate an 
autonomous and defiant South. In response to the acts of anarchy that the government 
feared could escalate into full scale social revolution, the government established 
military posts and barracks in every city and deployed half of the kingdom's armed 
forces (100,000) in the regions of Naples and Sicily in 1862-1863 under general and 
later Prime Minister, Alfonso La Marmora (1804-1878). They were confronted by a 
guerrilla force of approximately 25,000. The Italian national army was followed by an 
army of magistrates and state officials in order to pacify, "Italianize" and spread the 
administrative unification. Clerical-conservative indoctrination and pro-Bourbon 
sentiments undermined the new provisional regime set up by Turin in the Neapolitan 
provinces. The southerners did not see the regular Piedmontese forces as liberators 
but as foreign conquerors, exploiters and oppressors. The latter found themselves in 
extreme strain due to malaria, inefficient logistic support, long lines of 
communications, unsuitable preparation and equipment for partisan warfare. The 
entire South was proclaimed in a stage of siege in which the constitutional provisions 
were suspended: starting from August 1863 and until December 1865 regular soldiers 
were given the right to shoot brigands bearing weapons on sight and to arrest suspects 
indiscriminately to be judged by Military tribunals. 18  Military "campaigns" were 
organized and many cities were declared under martial law to enforce order and to 
combat the phenomenon of banditry.19 Only after the hostilities reached to the point of 
full-scale armed conflict and marked indelibly the animosity between the North and 
the South, did the government decide to collaborate with the local nobility and Church 
to impose its legislation and authority.20 The spread of the ideas of socialism21 and 
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anarchism22 in connection with the distress of the anti-monarchists, the Catholics and 
of all those who were disappointed or harmed by the government's reform efforts 
(middle class, ship owners, landowners, industrialists), gave the impression that the 
young state would soon collapse from within. 23  The conflict can be accurately 
described as a civil war in terms of national disunity and casualties. The southerners 
saw the government’s victory as a subjection to northern rule in a typical example of 
internal colonialism.  
According to the Italian historian Αre "two nations in one" coexisted in Italy: 
the southern medieval-type feudalism was confronted by the first timid attempts of the 
developing North to establish industrial enterprises. 24 For many conservative 
politicians and intellectuals only the king, seen as a symbol of unity, could merge the 
liberal tendencies of the North and the South's population traditional inclination to 
rally around a prestigious figure.25 Actually the new state’s 22 million of inhabitants 
had little in common since they had different daily life experiences, different 
economic practices, different values, culture, language and memories.26  
   Under these separatist tendencies and external dangers, the government was 
forced to put the reformist and modernization work, which Italy needed, on the back 
burner. These were reforms that would have allowed the country to participate in the 
global economic-industrial race with the most powerful, rich and advanced states of 
Europe. 27  Instead, a large portion of the state budget was invested in military 
armaments and in defensive works.28 Indicatively, fifteen forts were erected just in the 
Rome area within 1877, which cost 23 million lire.29 The realization of the military 
might of the neighbouring states of France and Austria-Hungary and the fear that the 
country was unprepared and vulnerable in the event of an attack by land and sea 
persuaded the parliament to spend increasingly larger funds to create a combat 
effective army. During the war of 1866 against Austria the Italian army and navy’s 
limited capabilities and vulnerabilities were exposed. The defeats of Custoza, the 
same location of another Italian failure against Austrian forces in 1848, and the sea 
battle of Lissa was testimony of the problematic amalgamation, the lack of a unified 
chain of command, the unpreparedness and the internal rivalries between the former 
Bourbon and Piedmont-Sardinian forces, now synthesizing the Italian army.30 The 
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reorganization, essentially from scratch, of the armed forces required amounts 
proportionately much larger than what other Great Powers expended.31 
La Marmora during his tenure as the Minister of War initiated a program of 
reorganization of the Italian armed forces. After consultation with a specialized 
committee the engineers and artillery officers, a military academy was founded in 
Turin, a military college at Asti, an infantry school at Ivrea, and a cavalry school at 
Pinerolo. Moreover, his military regulations, approved by both houses on 20 March 
1854, increased the length of service and revolutionized the conscription methods. 
The supply system was improved, payment increased and promotion through merit 
were encouraged. The first examples of heavy industrial plants around 1861 were 
depending on army contracts and produced military armaments.32 However, in the 
1860s the regular forces were suffering from the lack of men, officers, supplies and 
horses and the transport system was still basic. 33  In the early1860s military 
expenditure represented approximately 40% of the state budget, but in the late 1860s 
that figure decreased to almost 20%, only to skyrocket again in the late 1870s. In 
addition, many in the new state called for the expansion of the borders. 34  The 
leadership, in harmony with public opinion, considered the military build-up as the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
F. Cossiga, (Milan, 1988), pp. 194-196. The army initially adopted the French model but soon 
dismissed it in favour of the more efficient German one. See Romanelli, pp. 53-54. 
31 Chabod, Storia della politica, p. 574. 
32 Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army, pp. 46-49. 
33 In January 1860 the reorganization task was entrusted to the new Minister of War Manfredo Fanti 
(1806-1865). He was able to build up 50,000 men of the Central Italian region into a well disciplined 
force along the Piedmontese lines. On March 25 1860 these forces became formally part of the unified 
Italian army. During his five years the military doubled in size and Fanti reorganized his Ministry in 
order to promote specialization and confront the administration challenges of this increase. 13 divisions 
comprised the army after March 1860. A year later conscription and Piedmontese military laws were 
extended to Southern Italy and on May 4 1861 the Italian Army was formally established. The Army 
was composed by 17 divisions, 250,000 Italians from every region after the annexation of Umbria, 
Marches and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. On March 27 1862 the national territory was divided 
into six military districts and three infantry divisions were assigned to each one. See Amedeo Tosti, 
Storia dell'Esercito Italiano (1861-1936), (Varese-Milan, 1942), pp. 58-59. The task was completed by 
the 1873-1876 Minister of War Cesare Francesco Ricotti Magnani (1822-1917). His 19 July 1871 
regulations brought Italian conscription and organization practises closer to the Prussian example, in 
contrast to the French military influence prevalent for decades. Ricotti establisehd the War School in 
1867 organized peacetime manoeuvres, ordered modern equipment and promoted Italian armaments 
independency from foreign suppliers. Under his orders an arms factory in Turin and a powder one at 
Fontana Liri were erected. Fortifications and barrack buildings were also built. However, lack of coal 
and iron sources and financial strains impeded the industrialization of the army. Modern warfare was 
based on technicalinnovation but Ricotti, despite his efforts, could not near the coveted Prussian 
method. See, Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army, pp. 108-111.   
34 The rest of Europe not only did not share but mocked the groundless proclamations, the stressful 
territorial claims, the clumsy and uncoordinated diplomatic pressure and the Italians' utopian 
objectives. It appeared that Italy had the claims of a Great Powers but the means, diplomatic and 
material, of a small one. See Bosworth, Italy and the wider world, p. 16. 
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first step towards the coveted territorial expansion.35 The fact that Italy at the given 
moment was in no position to clash with any of the Great Powers seemed to have little 
to cool the passions. The grandeur of the Risorgimento brought euphoria, optimism 
and the hope to the Italian patriots that this could continue, that the heroic days of the 
recent past had not yet passed.36 The military obligations arising from Rome's treaties 
with its allies, the militaristic tradition of the royal house of Savoy37  and of the 
liberating wars, the charged atmosphere of the new imperialism period, the necessity 
to enforce order within the interior, the rise of the Army's prestige, the conquering 
aspirations for conquest in Africa and Europe led the Italian leadership to burdensome 
expenses, disproportionate to the financial capabilities of the lean and underdeveloped 
kingdom.38 
     The country's fiscal condition was certainly far from an optimal state. The 
technical difficulties and shortages did not allow the Italian governments to create a 
stable and prosperous internal market.39 The roadways, the infrastructure works and 
the railways that would connect Italy with foreign markets, by developing the foreign 
trade, were at an embryonic stage.40 The agricultural sector was by far the country's 
most developed, but it was also one of the most backward in Europe, and it absorbed 
60% of the labour force. 41 The biggest problem was the destruction of the 
infrastructure during the revolutionary period and the consequent disruption of the 
production process. In addition, the agrarian crises42of the 1855-1865 period, the 
increased prices, the high tariffs, the obsolete farming methods, state interventionism 
and the lack of modern technological equipment brought Italian agriculture on the 
verge of breaking down.43 Only a "miracle" would place it at a competitive level.44 
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unification Italy's crosshairs were aimed to those provinces of Austria-Hungary which were 
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36 Bosworth, Italy and the wider world, pp. 17-19. 
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Italian case", The Journal of Italian history, 1/2 (1978), pp. 315-318. 
38 The budget deficits and the grave economic stagantion conditioned the equipment and performance 
of the Italian army. In 1879 when Austro-Hungary deployed some troops on the Italian border, Rome 
terrified by the eventuality of a surprise attack in Venice, devised a defensive military plan. The 
shortages were so great that even adequate artillery guns were missing. See Massimo Mazzetti, 
L'Esercito Italiano nella Triplice Alleanza, Aspetti della Politica Estera 1870-1914, (Naples, 1974). pp. 
18-20. 
39 A market that would revitalize the land's economic life and would absorb to a satisfying degree the 
manufactured products, industrial and agricultural. See Luzzatto, L'economia Italiana, p. 91. 
40 Antonio Gramsci, Il Risorgimento E L'Unità D'Italia, (Rome, 2010), pp.72-73. 
41 Duggan, Concise History, p. 149. 
42 The economic crises of 1873-1874 and 1888-1894 struck equally hard the industries, the agricultural 
sector and the credit institutions. The severity of the last one was additionally aggravated by the 
customs war with France in 1887. See Gino Luzzatto, "Gli anni piu critici dell'economia Italiana (1888-
1893)" in L'economia Italiana dal 1861 al 1961 Studi nel 1o centenario dell'unità d'Italia, ed. A. 
Giuffre, (Milan, 1961), pp. 420-432 
43Romanelli, L'Italia Liberale, pp. 242. The trade balance remained deficient for many years after the 
cessation of hostilities. The following years were considered as "the darkest of the Italian economy". 
See Duggan, Concise History, p. 166. There should, however, be a particular wariness about these 
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The exploitation of land in Naples and Sicily, which maintained feudal medieval 
organization, suffered particularly from the economic malaise.45 The dismal economic 
situation of the farmers, particularly in the South, naturally brought about a drop in 
living standards. Poverty, hunger, rise in crime, and illiteracy46 composed the setting 
of the Sicilian peasants' lives. 47  The fact that the rural areas were the core of 
resistance against the governemnt, and that strikes,48 unemployment, banditry, and 
violence were widespread there is no coincidence. The coveted recovery would be 
dramatically delayed and would be based mainly on foreign capital.49 
The country’s most important economic sector on the eve of its unification has 
to be investigated further. During the 1860s, before the incorporation of the Rome and 
Venice regions the arable lands accounted for 11,875,584 hectares, the grasslands for 
1,271,076, the rice fields for 138,092, the pasture fields for 6,196,645, the swamps 
and ponds for 1,318,823 and lastly the uncultivated lands for 5,775,787.50One third of 
the entire Italian terrain is mountainous or semi-mountainous due to the Alps and the 
Apennines. The high population density of these regions is disproportional to their 
limited agricultural capabilities. In the other Italian regions where the land was arable 
and suitable for cultivation the ancient system of rural latifundism prevailed. 
However, 19th century capitalistic development required adaptation to the modern 
economic challenges and progressive mechanisms such as intensification of 
production, exportation of goods, and accumulation of profits and investments, rather 
than subsistence production. The typical agrarian model was the small family 
proprietorship administered by proprietors implementing archaic ways of production 
and resting indifferent to the capitalist transformation of agriculture. Despite the 
unsettling drop-off the government seated in Turin not only failed to undertake a vast 
economic reform but introduced more property and income taxes and intensified its 
presence (statism).51 Inconsistent and susceptible to the influences exerted by foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                      
assessments. A portion of historiography does not evade grandiose expressions and exaggerations 
about the issue.  
44 Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia Moderna, lo sviluppo del capitalismo e del movimento operaio 
1871-1896, vol. 7, (Milan, 1978), p. 193. 
45 Ibid., p. 218. 
46In 1860 78% of the population over 6 was illiterate. See Gaetano Salvemini, Le origini del Fascismo 
in Italia, (Milan, 1966), p. 13.  
47 In the period under examination, 200 people were dying every day in Naples due to the hardships. 
See Ibid., p. 11. The Italian South's socio-economic situation after the unification is described in the 
books: Giuseppe Galasso, Il mezzogiorno nella storia d'Italia, (Florence, 1977) and Alfonso Scirocco, 
Il mezzogiorno nell' Italia Unita (1861-1865), (Naples, 1979). 
48  In 1871 there were 23 strikes, 64 in 1872 and 103 in 1873. See Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia 
Moderna, p. 35. 
49 Gramsci, Il Risorgimento, p. 73. 
50Giacomo Acerbo, "L'agricoltura italiana dal 1861 ad oggi" in L'economia Italiana dal 1861 al 1961 
Studi nel 1o centenario dell' unità d'Italia, ed. A. Giuffre (Milan, 1961), p. 109  
51 Some of the most prominent Italian economists like Valfredo Federico Damaso Pareto (1848-1923) 
and Maffeo Pantaleoni (1857-1924) characterized the state's protectionist-interventist interference in 
the late 1880s as "state socialism", although it was not able to generate tangible or rapid economic 
development. See Giuseppe Are, "Alla ricerca di una filosofia dell'industrializzazione nella cultura 
economica e nei programmi politici in Italia dall'Unità alla prima guerra mondiale" in 
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economic interests the government was not up to the task of achieving budgetary 
balance and socio-political stability.52  
For many the solution, partially, was deemed to be the introduction of customs 
and tariffs that would allow the Italian agricultural enterprises to expand in new 
markets and reconquer the internal one. The very first directions regarding the state's 
economic policy were laid out in May 1861, by the Prime Minister Cavour, who 
during his parliamentary speech supported the policy of signing commercial treaties 
with European states and eliminating internal and international customs, promoting 
the concept of free trade. In line to his proclamation Italy and France signed a 
commercial treaty in 1863 that boosted trade reciprocally, gave rise to Italian 
agricultural exports and attracted the importation of French manufactured goods and 
investments to the state. This seemingly favourable development was abated by the 
aspiring industrialists' protests who found themselves helpless against intensified 
competiveness. The liberal part of the parliament detested protectionism and 
interventionist policy, supporting instead the reduction of the army's budget and fiscal 
relaxation. The Conservatives on the other hand, obsessed with the safeguarding of 
the tradition and influenced mostly by Catholic-social thinking, identified economic 
progress and industrialization as the evils that would cause the overthrow of Christian 
values.53 
 During the first years of the Unification agrarian crises and economic 
difficulties forced the Italian leadership to turn to the solution of industrializing the 
country, but little capital was available for investment in this crucial field of economic 
development. The general weakness of the financial sector, the lack of an industrial 
base, of a strong internal market and the absence of state subsidies were not positive 
omens for the growth of the Italian industry.54 Customs duties and charges arising 
from the system of protectionism,55 made the export of Italian products at competitive 
prices in the international market impossible.56 The mines were suffering from the 
lack of equipment and steel production had reached a stalemate. The shipbuilding 
companies needed funds to modernize and to participate in the international trade, in 
order to claim a larger share of the profits. The shipbuilding companies multiplied but 
soon found themselves outdated and surpassed by the new technological innovations 
of the modern iron ships. In 1871 Italian shipping amounted to 980,000 tons of 
obsolete sailing ships and just 32,000 tons of steamers whereas in 1880 the figures 
were 922,000 tons and 77,000 respectively.57 In 1881 only 46.3% of the exported 
Italian goods and 29.7% of the foreign products imported by the Italian kingdom were 
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52 Are, Economia, pp. 149-193. 
53 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
54 Duggan, Concise History, pp. 153-156. 
55 Martin Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1995, (London-New York, 1996), p. 95. 
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transported by Italian owned ships. The ports of Bari, Brindisi and Palermo were 
characterized as inadequate. The state in its effort to boost the Italian commerce 
overseas, during the 1861-1869 period, invested almost 34 million lire to improve the 
infrastructure of its naval facilities. However, these funds were too broadly dispersed 
along the long Italian coastline to achieve a notable effect. In 1881, the "parliamentary 
committee for the investigation of the commercial fleet" concluded that the nation 
was still lacking adequate docks, disembarkation points, appropriate tracks and the 
necessary harbour width to compete with the other maritime powers, already active in 
the east through the Suez Canal.58 
The newly formed state’s priorities were: establishing new industrial units, 
expanding the older ones, setting up schools and technical institutes, improving the 
means of production, agricultural and non-agricultural, balancing the budget, 59 
completing public works and extending the road and railway network.60 In 1859 the 
Italian railway numbered just less than 2,000 kilometres in Piedmont, Tuscany and 
Lombardy and not even a kilometre in the rest of the peninsula,61 while the telegraph 
was not yet widespread. The results and the consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution, which as has been seen were consolidated in Europe, would be markedly 
delayed in Italy. Only in the 1880s the railway network's length reached the 9,000 
kilometres and a decade later numbered almost 19,000 kilometres. The venture 
obviously stimulated the metallurgic manufacturers that up to that point were 
dependent almost exclusively on the shipbuilding enterprises, and particularly the 
steel production industry. The delayed but nevertheless crucial project of connecting 
the Italian provinces and the whole of the county with the rest of the world 
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1861 al 1961 Studi nel 1o  centenario dell'unità d'Italia, ed. A. Giuffre, (Milan, 1961), pp. 288-290 
59The fiscal deficit in 1868 reached 338 millionlire, in 1870 307 and in 1872 113 million. See Chabod, 
Storia della politica, p. 565. 
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Castranovo, "La storia Economica" in Storia d'Italia, Dall'Unità a Oggi, vol. 4, (Turin, 1975), pp. 5-
111. For some scholars Italian agriculture and the gross domestic product in the 1861-1881 period 
actually developed in a satisfying way, taking into consideration the logical shortages and difficulties 
of the time see Gianni Toniolo, "Alcune Tendenze dello Sviluppo Economico Italiano 1861-1940" in 
L'Economia Italiana 1861-1940, ed. Gianni Toniolo, (Roma-Bari, 1978) pp. 9-14.  
61 Salvemini, Le origini del Fascismo, pp. 11-14. 
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demonstrated the determination of the government to unify the country and 
consolidate its rule.62 
   The inability to obtain loans and credits was justifying the lack of private 
initiative and interest in investing capital in the industry. 63  The newly founded 
kingdom boarding nations which were making progress in all the areas of economic 
activity (agriculture, shipping, heavy industry), was still demonstrating the structure 
and the mentality of past centuries.64 The retarded agricultural sector, the slow growth 
of the industries in conjunction with the constant import of foreign products did not 
advance the creation of an extensive market for the domestic products.65 The anaemic 
Italian economy suffered from a lack of funds and from a basically timid, 
opportunistic and indifferent middle class still in the making. 66  The lack of raw 
materials, mainly of iron, coal67 and steel, naturally created additional difficulties. The 
textile industry and the sericulture were more developed than the other sectors but still 
they did not threaten foreign companies.68 The chemical industry, the metallurgy, the 
construction companies and those associated with the extraction and exploitation of 
mineral reserves were still in their infancy. Only the area of the Turin-Milan-Genoa 
industrial triangle recorded notable economic growth in the first twenty years after the 
Unification.69 
This modest Italy would seek to capture distant territories and to exploit them 
almost immediately after its formation. The middle class who would be looking 
abroad for investment opportunities and enrichment was absent, and so was the 
powerful elite of industrialists, who might haveurged the government to establish 
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Italiana 1861-1940, ed. Gianni Toniolo, (Rome-Bari 1978), p. 127.  
63As demonstrated by the bank scandals of the following years the Italians were quite right not to trust 
their county's financial institutions. In 1889 the fiasco of the construction industry sector raised some 
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printing money illegally. Other banks such as the Banco di Napoli and the Banco di Sicilia were 
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64Luzzatto, L'economia Italiana, p. 15. 
65 Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia Moderna, p. 227. 
66 Giovanni Bosco Naitza, Il Colonialismo nella storia d'Italia (1882-1949), (Florence, 1975), p. 8. 
67 As a result of the coal’s scarcity, Italy had to secure the vital raw material for its nascent industries, 
mainly the metallurgy and mining sectors, from England. The imported coal's worth was approximately 
30 million lire in the first decade and 50 in the second decade after the unification. See Armando 
Sapori, "L'industria e il problema del carbone nel primo cinquantennio di Unità nazionale" in 
L'economia Italiana dal 1861 al 1961 Studi nel 1o  centenario dell'unità d'Italia, ed. A. Giuffre, (Milan, 
1961), pp. 262-263. 
68 Indicatively, in 1870 there were 500,000 textile machines in Italy, 30 million in Britain and 5.5 
million in France, whereas in regard to steel production, Italian reserves reached 30,000 tones, Britain's 
4 million and France's 1 million. See Duggan, Concise History, p. 151. 
69Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia Moderna, pp. 225-229. 
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commercial stations and naval bases in the example of the colonialist states. Domestic 
financial activity was characterized by weak internal dynamics with a meagre 
disposition for investments. Italian colonialism was never taken into consideration70 
by the prominent theorists of the colonialism phenomenon, such as Hobson and 
Lenin, because of the weakness of the Italian capitalism and industry, compared to 
that of Germany or Britain and the country’s clearly lack of surplus capital. 
Manypeasants in the South felt, because of the exploitation and the oppression, that 
they constituted an economic colony of the North. Some Italians said that the 
economically undeveloped south was their own “Africa”, and therefore seeking 
colonies abroad was uncessary. 71  The pretext of seeking raw materials and of 
investing capital, with which the other Europeans justified the partition of Africa, did 
not apply to the Italian case as well. There were not sufficient funds to satisfy 
domestic demand, let alone invest in arid and unknown African regions. What the 
country was not lacking however was surplus population.72 
   The demographic growth of Italy rocketed after 1870 73  and created 
additional problems. Population was growing an estimated at 400,000 people per 
year.74The agrarian crises, unemployment, and economic recession prompted many 
young people to emigrate. Immigrating to European and especially American 
territories 75  appeared as the only solution, "the safety valve" of whole 
generations. 76 These overseas communities broadened the capabilities and the 
financial benefits for the metropolitan commerce77providing a way for the country's 
social and economic issues to be defused. 78 The "Free colonization'" trend of 
emigration led to the spontaneous creation of Italian communities abroad, out of the 
political reach of the government. An impressively large portion of the population, 
even in the relatively developed northern cities such as Milan and Turin, was now 
settling at Argentina, the United States and Brazil. 79  Besides this spontaneous 
emigration out of Italian territory, some considered applying an Anglo-Saxon model, 
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according to which a partially unexplored region, like Australia, would be colonized 
and serve as a destination for emigrants.80 
The recurrent transatlantic passage of thousands of immigrants each year was 
certainly an additional incentive for the development of the Italian shipbuilding 
industry. Indeed, the expansion of the Italian commercial fleet was analogous to the 
increasing immigration flows during the 1894-1900 period. This mirrored the growth 
of the German maritime industry in the 1870s-1890s partially due to the existence of 
thriving German communities in South America.81 The lack of raw materials such as 
coal and iron and the ineffective state protection of the nascent Italian metallurgic 
industry arguably hit shipbuilding hard and placed it in a disadvantageous position in 
the midst of acute international competition. Whereas the lack of capitalistic 
organization, reliable credit institutions, funds and entrepreneurial spirit, as already 
stated, exacerbated the situation of the commercial shipbuilding industry, the State 
prioritized the strategically crucial military shipyards. The 1896 naval bill promoted, 
even with considerable delay, the national shipbuilding industry and offered financial 
incentives to the companies to use mainly domestically manufactured materials. A 
series of other laws (1866, 1872, 1878) exempted the importation of essential 
resources to the shipbuilding industry from any custom tolls. As influential as 
Cavour's laissez-faire views were, in the Unification's aftermath, the Italian 
government still had to put in place much needed tariff barriers in 1885 and 1896.82 
Protectionism was an economic policy espoused by many states, such as France, 
Japan and Italy in the late 19th century in contrast with the free trade approach, which 
was more in line with the British economic practices.83 
In the 1880 decade the population exodus rose dramatically, as 1.3 million 
Italians left their ancestral homelands.84 This momentous development naturally led to 
a debate about what to do. A part of the general public considered emigration as as a 
citizen's right, which additionally provided enormous psychological and financial 
benefits to the nation, while at the same time spreading and maintaining Italian 
identity, the italianità.85Some held it brought about the rise of national prestige and 
influence, by demonstrating the Italian intelligence and industriousness to the ends of 
the earth. Others were less enthusiastic, butviewed it as simply a necessity. The 
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downside was that the expatriate population represented an unprecedented loss of the 
most productive part of the Italian workforce.86 Moreover, the Italian kingdom may 
have been suffering from a lack of means and of financial soundness but it had to be 
in a position to defend its subjects worldwide. The millions of Italians who lived and 
worked abroad were often the victims of racist behaviour and unjust exploitation.87 
The Catholic Church, although concerned with these abuses, perceived immigration 
as a useful instrument of Catholic religious propaganda diffusion to distant lands.88 
The Italian immigrant was often the recipient of maltreatment in the late 19th-early 
20th century New World, just as with the Japanese and other Asians, and were often 
considered "the direct heir of the slave".89 The only way to protect them was to carve 
out a dynamic foreign policy of applying pressure on the governments of the host 
countries.90 Since 1861 the Italian Maritime Ministry held a naval station in the Rio 
de la Plata's estuary, which in 1865 became the base of the Naval Division of South 
America, and a five ship flotilla was despatched to Argentina to safeguard the 
interests of the nationals residing there.91 
   One possible alternative to emigration to the Americas was was to establish 
colonies under governmental control, which would absorb the surplus population.92 
The demographic-migration issue was to become a key alibi in Rome's effort to take 
colonies, in which Italians were promised cultivable land, opportunities, stature and 
social advancement. The channelling of the surplus population in other areas 
constituted one of the pillars of the Italian colonial policy and reinforced by extension 
                                                          
86 Young men aged 15-25, would be assimilated, would not contribute to the efforts of the national 
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88De Courten, La marina mercantile italiana, p. 92. 
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Problemi di emigrazione: dal primo congresso degli italiani all'estero alla legge Johnson,(Bologna, 
1924), pp. 81-84. 
90  Alberto Aquarone, Dopo Adua: politica e amministrazione coloniale, (Rome, 1989), p. 32. A 
measure to apply pressure was the despatch of warships in the territorial waters of the reception 
countries. For this reason, building a powerful fleet was one of the Italian government's priorities. 
91Ciro Paoletti, La Marina Italiana in Estremo Oriente, 1866-2000, (Rome, 2000), p.7. Rome at the 
time sought to countervail the absence of consular authorities in South America with the frequent 
dispatch of warshipsas means of diplomacy. The dispatch of a warship in Colombia in June 1885 
attests to this fact. Back home many expansion enthusiasts envisioned the creation of New Italies 
throught the medium of emigration in South America see Stefano Pelaggi, Il colonialismo popolare: 
L'emigrazione e la tentazione espansionistica italiana in America latina, (Rome, 2015), pp.  22-34. 
92 Irma Taddia, L'Eritrea-colonia 1890-1952, paesaggi, strutture, uomini del colonialsimo, (Milan, 
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the rhetoric linking the demographic issue with the quest for colonies. This 
justification of Italian colonialism as an alternative solution to the population problem 
had a more logical basis compared to the potential economic and raw material 
benefits of Africa. This argument was made despite the fact that for a newly 
established and economically backward state, sustaining free emigrent communities 
was perhaps more logical than possessing African colonies, since coloniesdid not 
provide a clear benefit and were costly because of their operational and military 
expenses.93 
   1870 was the year of the catalytic developments which would alter Europe's 
political landscape decisively in the 19th century. While the North German 
Confederation was triumphing over France during the Franco-Prussian war, resulting 
in the unification of Germany and its rise to the position of the greatest Power of the 
time, Italy occupied Rome, which until then enjoyed the protection of Napoleon III. It 
therefore, seized the historic opportunity at a time when the second French Empire 
was being abolished. Rome, natural centre of the new state, constituted for the Italians 
a fervent desire, an idea, due to its rich ancient heritage. This city was reliving visions 
of greatness.94 
The new government, trying to bridge differences with the Vatican 
issue,95offered the pontiff special privileges and acknowledged his spiritual rights 
(Leggi di quarnigione). This overture failed, and a rupture opened between the new 
secular Italy and the Pope. Dissatisfied with the limitation of his authority, he could 
request the protection of the Catholic powers (Austria-Hungary and France) at any 
time against the "arbitrariness" of the Italian government. Although their concerns 
may have exaggerated, they were enough to push Italy to the side of the one or the 
other Great Powers. In this climate of uncertainty Italy was in search of security and 
hovered between the two poles of power, one time to the side of the French Third 
Republic and another to the side of the German Empire, as will be seen further on.96 
The country's delicate position was burdened by internal paralysis as well; since one 
government was quickly succeeding another resulting in an inability to maintain a 
consistent foreign policy.97 
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94 Three Rs evoked the glory of the past: Rinascita-Risorgimento-Roma (Renaissance-Revival-Rome). 
See R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, the least of the Great Powers: Italian foreign policy before the First World 
War, (Cambridge, 1979), p. 200. 
95Anticlericals, radicals and socialists propagating the abolition of religious orders and the distribution 
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   France, an ally of the country during the war of 185998 against Austria, 
offered its full aid and support for the successful resolution of the Italian 
independence issue. The French investments and close cultural ties bode an 
auspicious coexistence and friendship. The matter of Rome, however, would 
complicate the relations between the two states. First of all, the French considered the 
occupation of the city under their protection, at a time when all their forces were 
deployed and fighting at the Franco-German borders, as a treasonous act. Italy's 
neutrality during the war of 1870 revealed the will of its political leadership to remain 
uninfluenced and independent, to etch out an independent foreign policy, 
relinquishing after many centuries the humiliating role of a second-rate Power.99 Italy 
achieving Great Power status, i.e. the exercise of a policy of strength and prestige that 
was sought after with so much zeal, was not acceptable to France and Germany. In 
addition, the French Catholics were pressurising their government to undertake a 
crusade for the Eternal City's "return" to the Pope. The friction ceased, temporarily, 
after the election victory in France of the Democrats (5 March 1876) under the 
anticlerical Léon Gambetta (1838-1882), an event that seemed to normalize the 
situation.100 But work accidents of Italian immigrants in France, the tariff war, the 
issue of Nice and Savoy's restitution101 and the natural rivalry for the supremacy in 
the Mediterranean would be the breeding grounds of constant tension.102 The fear of 
French aggression eventually led Italy to the German camp.103 Paris' hostility would 
be manifested in various ways during the period of Africa's partition.  
   The problem of the Papal Seat did not affect the relations between Italy and 
Germany, despite the Empire’s 13 million Catholics’ interest in the matter, because of 
Bismarck's anticlerical policy (Kulturkampf).104 The vulnerable kingdom was seeking 
the preservation of peace and status quo in Europe and the Mediterranean since it was 
not yet in a position to carve out a dynamic foreign policy.105 In the face of cooling 
ties with France, and in need of security, it turned to Germany, which agreed to 
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provide assistance in the event of a French challenge.106 Bismarck, despite the given 
Franco-German rivalry, urged Paris towards colonial conquests, thus playing a double 
game in the hope that in this way the French would "forget" the German annexation 
of Alsace and Lorraine.107  Berlin guaranteed Italy’s independence but an official 
alliance between them posed risks for the latter. Such an event would not only incur 
the hostility of France but it would also render Rome weak economically and 
militarily, a satellite of Berlin. The difference in strength between the two, still 
informal allies in 1873 would bring about the loss of Italy’s diplomatic independence, 
closely intertwined with the coveted Great Power dream.108 Germany would not allow 
an autonomous Italian policy and would reduce the country to a regional-medium 
strength Power with a mainly anti-French and anti-Russian role, in co-operation with 
Austria and Britain.109 Signing alliances was potentially leading to the loss of the 
independence that was obtained with so many sacrifices, whereas neutrality would 
result in diplomatic isolation, as the Italians painfully discovered during the Congress 
of Berlin (1878) and the crisis in Tunisia (1880-1881).110 This dilemma plagued the 
right and the left wing of the Italian parliament as well as the new government in 1876 
under Agostino Depretis (1813-1887). Italy needed the German protection but did not 
dare to fully sever its ties with France. The delicate and unusual position of Italy 
should be examined in this light, in the midst of emerging issues such as the balance 
of power in the Mediterranean 111  and Adriatic, and the partition of the Ottoman 
Empire's territories (Eastern Question).  
   An ally of Germany since 1879, Austria (Austria-Hungary after the 1867 
compromise) was the rival state which prevented in every way the process of the 
Italian unification and independence. It was the hated century-old enemy that had 
oppressed and drained Italian wealth. The war between Piedmont and Austria in 1859, 
the occupation of Venice and Lombardy, the oppression and the arrogant intervention 
in the domestic issues of the Italian states had not been forgotten. Rome, sooner or 
later, would have to choose between war and alliance. If it truly wanted German 
support, it ought to overlook everything that was separating it with Austria and 
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maintain good neighbourly relations. 112  The thawning of tensions and later the 
alliance with Vienna (1882) were tokens of conciliation and goodwill towards Berlin. 
In reality however, there was more to divide than to unite the two allies. The issue of 
the irredent Italian territories, 113  which were still under Habsburg control, was a 
constant source of uneasiness between the two governments. Italian friendship was 
not unconditional as Rome was demanding its irredent provinces as compensation 
from Vienna each time that Austria-Hungary was annexing new territories in the 
Balkans or elsewhere.114 The obstinate refusal of Italian requests caused tension in the 
alliance. Essentially, there was never collaboration or a common course of action 
between the three states, which by acting without coordination were surprising even 
their own allies. For example, while Bismarck did not particularly think highly115 of 
his new Mediterranean ally, Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister, during his visit in 
Berlin in 1877, bluntly requested that Austria-Hungary abandon its claims to the 
irredent territories in favour of Italy. As expected the first steps toward an 
independent and dynamic foreign policy in connection with irredentism brought about 
Rome's isolation.116 
   In the same period the Italo-British relations experienced numerous 
fluctuations, as will be seen further on. These relations were shaped in light of the two 
countries' economic and geopolitical interests at each given time in the Mediterranean 
and Africa. In the first place, British members of the parliament and the British public 
opinion alike saw with benevolence and sympathy the Italian movement for self-
determination and emancipation.117After the Unification the Italo-British diplomatic 
relations, aided by the lack of conflicting interests, were established on the basis of 
the common anti-French orientation, and are characterized by consensus, at least in 
most cases. Although the co-operation between the two parties proved to be mostly 
indirect and theoretical, the influence exerted by the powerful British to the 
imperialist circles of Rome was more than obvious.118 The British Empire, the largest 
colonial power and ruler of the seas, was the reference point, the model to be followed 
and the indicated objective for the Italian supporters of imperialism. 
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   The first serious test for the independent but inexperienced Italian diplomacy 
occurred during the Balkan crisis of 1875-1876, in another escalation of the Eastern 
Question. The violence with which the High Porte squashed the revolutions in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and later in Bulgaria, caused Russia's involvement and 
declaration of war in April 1877. The Russian triumph was followed by the signing of 
the San Stefano treaty (3 March 1878), a settlement that essentially made Russia, 
overlord of the Balkan Peninsula. Britain, now exiting its "splendid isolation"119 under 
Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), proposed the establishment of 
an alliance between Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy to deal with the Russian 
danger, an initiative that did not come to fruition.120 After a suggestion of Bismarck, 
the Congress of Berlin (June-July 1878) was convened in order to avoid a new 
European war. As a result of the modification of the San Stefano treaty, Britain 
pocketed Cyprus, due to the diplomatic support it offered to the High Porte, and 
Austria gained the "provisional" military control of Bosnia and of Herzegovina.121 
The favourable for the Austrian interests German policy resulted in the continuation 
of the Russo-Austrian antagonism in the Balkans and the internal weakening of the 
Alliance of the Three Emperors (Germany-Austria-Hungary-Russia).122 
   What impact had these important events on the inexperienced, newly 
established, Italy? The new Benedetto Cairoli (1825-1889) government participated in 
the negotiations with the dual objective of protecting the Italian interests in the 
Ottoman Empire and obtaining territorial gains from Austria. The return of Trento to 
Italy was after all fair and imperative after Vienna's latest expansion in the Balkans. 
The hot-tempered and emotional public opinion urged the Foreign Affairs Minister 
Luigi Corti (1823-1888) to demand from his counterpart Count Αndrássy (1823-1890) 
the restitution of the irredent Italian regions. The Austrian government, clearly 
annoyed but bolstered due to the German support, refused once again. Instead it 
advised Rome to capture Tunisia or Libya, unaware that Bismarck had recently sent 
out the same proposal to Paris in an attempt to win over the French government. 
Britain trying to restore balance in the Mediterranean, after annexing Cyprus, also 
suggested to the French the occupation of Tunisia. The German proposal to Corti, to 
occupy Albania or some North African lands was on the same wavelength.123 Tunisia, 
a region of enormous historical and geopolitical significance for the Italians, was 
"proposed" by the European powers to both France and Italy. Rome did not accept the 
suggestions and remained faithful to the principle of the Ottoman Empire's territorial 
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integrity,124 as it was championed and maintained after the end of the Crimean war in 
1856. 
   Rome's first attempt at having an independent diplomacy was a complete 
failure. The failure to obtain Trieste and Trento from Vienna caused popular uprising. 
Anti-Austrian protests, terrorist attacks, criticism from the press about the timidity 
and incompetence of the government, slogans about the "murder of justice" and 
frustration for the diplomatic defeat were the results of the country's "honourable" 
policy at the Berlin Congress. 125  The balance of power had changed to Rome’s 
disadvantage. The ever expanding Austria left the congress bolstered in the Balkans 
and Adriatic. Simultaneously, Britain strengthened its position in the Mediterranean 
and France was turning towards Tunisia while Rome remained apathetic, respecting 
the Sultan's sovereign rights. The Italian government had not protected the country's 
interests and left Berlin with clean but empty hands.126 The opportunity to expand 
towards North Africa was lost so as not to displease the French government.127 But 
not even this gesture gained the sympathy of Paris.128 Rome, by adhering to ethics and 
international law at a time when other Europeans were cynically dividing among them 
lands that were not their own, was continuously losing ground in the frantic race for 
colonial expansion. The Italian government remained attached to past mentalities and 
did not seem able to adapt to the realities of the new imperialism. One lesson was 
deriving from the events: Great Powers must act quickly and decisively otherwise 
they will become extinct; there is no room for moral dilemmas and second thoughts. 
Italy attended the conference as a Great Power, but its role and activity were 
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not consent. The Cairoli government failed to approach Paris economically or diplomatically, 
registering one more failure for its foreign policy. See Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia Moderna, p. 137. 
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analogous of a secondary one.129 Critics of the government said that having freedom 
of action but lacking diplomatic support turned out to be disastrous for the country. In 
the future, if it desired to take advantage of international circumstances, it had to exit 
its isolation, act more decisively, and conclude agreements and alliances.130 They said 
Italy had to finally come of age and had to do so as quickly as possible. 
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3. The Italian imperial tradition, colonial theories and the 
first exploration missions 
 
At the end of the 19th century the colonial rivalry of the European powers 
moved into a new more intense phase, which resulted in the partition of the entire 
African continent except for minimal exceptions. 1  Depending on the geopolitical 
aspirations, the psychological background, the economic objectives, each Power acted 
in a special and unique way in the confines of the relentless and chaotic new 
imperialism. Scholars have qualified British colonialism as fundamentally one of 
indirect rule, driven primarily by financial considerations.2 But how is the early Italian 
colonialism defined? Through the juxtaposition of events, from the first expeditionary 
missions to the death rattle of the early Italian colonialism in 1896 and the 
participation to the international campaign of pacification in China (1899-1901), it 
shall be attempted to comprehend the phenomenon in depth. Before mentioning the 
Italians' first timid actions towards acquiring colonies, the often-underestimated 
psychological factor will have to be analyzed.  
Most of the Great Powers were participating in the game of colonialism to 
control strategic sites or to satisfy financial-industrial needs. The influence of social 
Darwinism theories, nationalist zeal, imperialist ambitions of the military and 
politicians, concern for national security, belief that the balance of power will be 
achieved with a "fair" apportionment of African lands and that this apportionment is a 
legitimate right, were issues for all of the imperialist powers, they cannot be 
considered exclusively an Italian inspiration. What then, was unique in Italian 
imperialism? It is necessary to introduce another parameter, the mental burden of the 
Italian historical heritage in the mind of the budding imperialists. Italy was belatedly3 
driven to it by a complex of insecurities and the psychological effect of Rome's 
ancient glory. 
The principal element, which was exerting immeasurable influence on the 
psyche of low, middle and elite Italian classes alike, was the idea of the Roman 
Empire. Rome, capital of the new state, could again serve as the centre of a 
Mediterranean empire by resuming the mission4 of conquest and civilization, just as 
in ancient times. Many held that the new Italy, taking over the baton from Ancient 
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47 
 
Rome, had the right and the obligation to return under its protection and control the 
Mediterranean and North African provinces.5 Italy was predestined to reincarnate the 
old splendor and, amidst a plethora of challenges, had to reaffirm its claims in Africa 
and beyond.6 The ancient monuments, the temples and the auditoriums demonstrated 
the history of Roman might across the African shore of the Mediterranean.7  
 
Individual passages commenting military events that took place during the 
period of Italy's operations in the Red Sea can reveal characteristics of the late 19th 
century's popular mentality and the attraction to classical history of Italian society's 
pro-colonial sections. During a commemoration ceremony that took place in a Tuscan 
village in 1896 the following words were affixed to the church door: "In the titanic 
battle, the Italian cohorts reminded the barbarous Africans that the blood of Scipio 
flows the veins of the sons of Italy...At Amba Alage Italy experienced its own 
Thermopylae...and in Petro Toselli can claim a new Leonidas". In a similar occasion 
the mayor of a small village called Gessopalena maintained: "Dogali gave us the 
realization of the valour of our soldiers; Amba Alage has proven that Thermopylae 
has been equaled...Glory be to these names which entail martyrdom to the highest 
principle of all: that of the civilization of the human family". The agricultural 
assembly of Este in February 1887 cried out: "Honour and glory be showered on the 
heroes of the Thermopylae of Saati and Dogali. The whole world for ever will admire 
their military virtue and their magnanimus sacrifice. Not one of those men remained 
unscathed, all embraced the death of wounds with faith".8 
 
The belief that the new kingdom could not survive without developing 
commercial relations with the East can also be considered, in part, a historical 
remnant of the glorious medieval Italy. The illustrious histories of Rome, Florence 
and Venice suddenly became part of the Italian national history.9 The memories and 
the nostalgia of the Italian maritime republics (reppubliche marinare), rich and 
powerful until the discovery of the New World, were attractive and strengthened the 
patriotic spirit of the 19th century Italians. 10  Venice, 11  Genoa, Pisa reached the 
pinnacle of their power by maintaining dominions and therefore by controlling the 
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trade between East and West.12 The missionaries (missionari), traders (mercanti) and 
the military (militari) of the Italian states were the deputies and the exponents of a 
peculiar commercial imperialism that was new for the era. 13  These states were 
concluding commercial agreements and, among others, were imposing their interests 
and their will to the peoples of the Mediterranean region already from the 12th 
century.14 In addition, the kingdom of Piedmont and that of the Two Sicilies had been 
at times interested in increasing their influence and in expanding colonially in North 
African lands. 15  The geographical discoveries of Italian seafarers, the growth of 
commerce, the undisputed military and naval power of the Italian city-states during 
the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries represent a golden age of  Italian history, influenced 
the Italian patriots' frame of mind. If any nation was in position to claim that it had 
historical rights in African lands that was no other than the Italian. In March 1865 the 
Italian Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce Luigi Torelli (1810-1887) 
received a report from Biagio Caranti (1839-1891), his subordinate. Among other 
considerations he stated that "Italy having reached the dignity of a Nation has to 
exercise again that commercial preponderance of which its maritime cities were once 
renowned and feared. Rather than obtaining nothing now is more favorable to plant 
colonies in the most visited places by ships and tradesmen and the fact that this is a 
fundamental element for developing the commercial activity of a state is proved by 
England's great care to maintain (the colonies) that already process and to create new 
ones, even by force...".16 
Another psychological burden was the relatively recent legacy of the 
Unification, a phenomenon from which Italian colonialism drew the concepts of a 
calling 17 and of the nation's heroism.18 Italian patriots and adventurers turned the 
excitement and the enthusiasm caused by the achievement of the Unification towards 
support for ambitious imperialist activities.19 The Italian nation, after humiliations and 
centuries of subordination, was now in the agreeable position to aid, to protect and to 
civilize other nations that were not as capable (paternalistic racism).20 Of course, the 
spirit of the Italian rebirth tended to advocate principles of self-determination and 
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freedom, values which are not consistent with the expansionist doctrine. The fact that 
its apologists craftily used the national liberation movement as an alibi for the 
guardianship of underdeveloped nations, constitutes perhaps the greatest contradiction 
of Italian colonial history.21 . One place where Italian nationalists claimed a devotion 
to the idea of national self-determination was their sympathy for Ahmed Orabi, Urabi 
or Arabi Pasha's (1841-1911) national-liberating movement in Egypt. Some 
nationalists compared him with the heroes of the Risorgimento.22  On 24 July an 
Italian newspaper named him "national" and "popular hero".23 Therefore, process of 
moving from a rhetorical position of respect for national self-determination to cynical 
exploitation and coercive civilization is an interesting development. How did one 
square the ideals of freedom and humanity, either on individual or on collective level, 
with the imposing of a foreign language and authority on peoples unable to react to 
this alienation? 
According to the historian Giuseppe Finaldi there was a deliberate attempt to 
equate and connect the wars of the Risorgimento period with the wars in Africa as 
part of a tradition-inventing process, an effort to foster the Italian identity and to 
promote a nation-building programme through notions of militarism and patriotism. 
The quest for a national purpose and the unifying possibilities of a military encounter 
(the Italian colonial endeavour as defined by Finaldi) are obvious. Italian policy 
makers only had to replace the words "liberty", "justice" and "self-determination" 
with the terms "progress", "civilization" and "fame". In order to bridge the gap 
between the younger generations and the older ones of the Risorgimento, it was 
necessary to present the African wars as a continuation of the wars for independence. 
The logical discontinuity between fighting for independence and conquering foreign 
lands was easily surpassed by the axiom that any territory where the Italian flag 
waved, automatically became part of the home land. Perhaps citing Giuseppe Badia's 
quotations, an old Risorgimento fighter, can shed some to light to this obscure 
conversion: "It is necessary that the government of Italy awakens from its slumber 
through its young and enthusiastic army...Showing the world that the sons (of the 
nation) are worthy of their Roman forefathers when they ruled the universe. It is 
necessary therefore that Italians set themselves other heroic sacrifices in the process 
of bringing civilization to the barbarous people of Africa". He also said,  "The feat of 
the Great Captain of the People Giuseppe Garibaldi in 1860 was national and much-
admired; how much more would an endeavour whose aim was the bringing of 
civilization and progress to barbarous peoples". Finally, "It is true that all peoples 
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have a right to liberty and self-determination but... this disappears before civilization 
and progress".24 
The most illustrious heroes of the liberation struggle are alleged to have 
supported Italy's colonial destiny. Garibaldi made a special reference exactly to this 
calling. In addition, he urged the Italian shipping companies to operate more intensely 
and quickly than the foreign companies in the distant seas of the Orient.25 The moral 
and cultural pre-eminence of the Italian nation was extolled by yet another iconic 
form of the Risorgimento, the philosopher and politician Vicenzo Gioberti (1801-
1852). He and Cesare Balbo (1789-1853), also a politician, demanded the addition of 
Malta, Corsica, Nice and a part of North Africa to the newly founded kingdom. The 
pairing of the liberalism and nationalism ideas, in connection with the revolutionary 
zeal of the second half of the 19th century, created an explosive mixture in the psyche 
of even those more reluctant or ill-disposed towards the Italian expansionist enterprise 
in Africa. The prominent theorist and founder, in 1831, of the secret revolutionary 
organization "Giovine Italia", 26  Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) attributed an 
international role to the new state and recommended the annexation of key places in 
Asia and Africa. It is not by chance that the ideological constructs about vocation, 
Italian genius and primacy 27  were later adopted as a whole by the theorists of 
fascism.28 He furthermore, identified the means of expansion in "the Italian influence 
that has to rise in Suez and Alexandria and in a colonial invasion whenever that is and 
given the chance in Tunisian lands".29 Finally, the architect of Italian Unification, 
Cavour, is alleged to have supported the economic penetration and the active presence 
of Italian trade and shipping across the globe.30 This attitude is considered by many 
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historians as the act of birth of the Italian colonialism.31 Of course, how much he was 
an enthusiast and a precursor of the Italian colonialism remains under dispute until 
today. 
The new generation, instilled by historical glory and the theories about a 
sacred mission, was raised on the principles of nationalism and imperialism, claiming 
at the same time a place in the circle of the Great Powers, a status interwoven with 
colonialism.32 The aim was to make up for lost time. As a result, Italy had to enter the 
colonial arena, imitating the other Europeans as soon as possible. Possessing colonies 
seemed to be the crowning achievement, the confirmation of advancement and of the 
consequent prestige. When the Italian chargés d'affaires participated in a conference, 
such as that in Berlin in 1884, they were realizing that they were the outcasts of the 
international system. 33  It was a widely held view that their position would be 
improved after the occupation of African territories, even though one of the strongest 
Powers over time, Austria, never displayed any interest in acquiring colonies. The 
lack of industrialized economy and the absence of the requisite means and experience 
were not sufficient to discourage the Italian imperialists, who believed that colonies 
were created as outlets for the metropolis' demographic and economic problems since 
ancient times.34 Besides, if impoverished Portugal could maintain a colonial empire 
and the humiliated France in 1870 could continue its expansion in Africa and 
elsewhere, then Italy too was entitled to take part in the "Scramble for Africa".35 The 
never-ending pursuit of equality with the other Powers, the insecurity, a product of the 
socio-political antagonism of the late 19th century, the legacy bestowed by Ancient 
Rome, the powerful maritime republics and by the Risorgimento charged the Italian 
temperament too far and constituted an additional reason to seek lands on the opposite 
shore of the Mediterranean. As all this was not enough, the "colonial euphoria", the 
prospect of easy profits, unprecedented opportunities and imperial vocations induced 
explorers, such as Giuseppe "Pippo" Vigoni (1846-1914), to dream of an Italian 
empire which stretched from Tunis in the North to Somalia in the far Horn of Africa. 
For Deputy De Zerbi, war, even a single victory was enough to wake and elevate 
Italy's prestige to the world: "Italy is the only state of Europe that is in moral need of a 
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bloodbath".36 Racist, atavistic and bellicose notions based on ethnic inferiority and the 
savages' alleged inadequate and despotic administration patterns, inertia and inability 
to govern themselves made their appearance. The historian Alfredo Oriani (1852-
1909) whose theories were later adopted by fascist thinkers, called for the outright 
extermination of the Ethiopians: "The white race claims the land of the inferior races 
by calling them to its civilization: those that do non respond are condemned, those 
who resist will be destroyed".37 
These aforementioned theories, the fascination for the unknown, the rampant 
imagination 38  and the adventurous spirit, called moral and sentimental factors of 
imperialism by Hobson, urged the Italian explorers to penetrate geographically, to 
conclude treaties with underdeveloped peoples and to establish protectorates in the 
example of the other colonialists. The first to embark into the unknown were the 
explorers, the naturalists and the geographers.39 The Mediterranean, the ancient Mare 
Nostrum with its familiar harbours, was the prime target for political influence and 
expansion given that sizeable communities of Italian immigrants who were already 
living on its shores.40 Nevertheless, the first colonial actions were manifested, for 
reasons which shall be examined further on, far away from the hospitable and familiar 
Mediterranean.41  
Long before the Italian unification, consuls and representatives of the kingdom 
of Piedmont were already active in a geographically vast area, from the Pacific and 
Australia to Eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean. 42  The first Italian mission is 
considered that of the lazarist monk Giuseppe Sapeto (1811-1895) ironically to 
Ethiopia's Adwa in 1838 with the dual scope of proselying and exploration.43 In 1852 
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the same area was explored by the missionary Guglielmo Massaia (1809-1889), "one 
of the most famous Italians that sought to achieve the colonial aspirations of Rome's 
government against Ethiopia under various scientific, commercial, diplomatic and 
religious guises" according to an Ethiopian historian.44 The Italian interest in Ethiopia 
was said to have commenced as early as the 15th century.45 Massaia (or Massaja) took 
residence and preached in the "land of the Galla" and in the province of Scioa in the 
southwest part of Ethiopia, eventually obtaining an influential position. His activities 
attracted attention and fascination, and incited many Italian exploratory missions in 
Ethiopia during the following years. Inaccurately enough, enthusiastic journalists and 
advocates of colonial expansion in the epoch of Imperialism awarded to him the titles 
of "the precursor of Italy's destiny in Africa", "the father of the legitimate Italian 
aspiration on African lands" and "the foreshadowing torch of Roman civilization in 
distant lands", among others.46 
The Franciscan monk Leóne d'Avancheres (1809-1879) not only set up four 
rest and reorganization stations for future missions and signed a commercial treaty 
with a local chieftain (degiasmac) on behalf of the Italian government in February 
12th, 1859 but he also suggested the acquisition of a province along the Red Sea.47  In 
a 1859 correspondence to Cavour he foresaw that Ethiopia "after the Suez Canal 
opening will present great interests to European trade and the country is very 
interesting both for its climate and population and for the great advantages that the 
foundation of an Italian colony would offer". Hereafter he added "The king Negussie 
would not be contrary to cede a province of his own lands to the coast of Red Sea in 
exchange for an assistance of 300 or 400 men or a certain number of rifles and 
cannons". The Piedmontese statesman in the eve of the Second War of Independence 
in April 1859 shifted, quite understandably, his attention to Europe and away from the 
secondary African affairs.48  
Similar recommendations and proposals to the Italian government were made 
by the Catholic monk Giovanni Giacinto Stella. In various occasions he and captain 
Antonio Rizzo (1827-1888), a vigorous Italian government agent, called for juridical 
protection via the placement of a Piedmontese consul in the province of Hamasien 
following the French paradigm. The northern Ethiopian province "is ideal to every 
kind of culture because of its climate, has plenty of water, iron mines and saltpeter 
and who knows how much hidden minerals in its ground...". To these pleadings and 
suggestions Cavour, skeptic of the colonial endeavour's profitability to Italy and 
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aware that the state was still too weak to commit itself beyond Europe, abandoned the 
issue. This failure did not dishearten Stella, who continued his fervent religious and 
political activity in the land of Bogos. In 1865, after arduous negotiations with the 
local chieftain, he finally obtained a territory concession with the purpose of founding 
a colony.49 That was the only effort of this kind that bore some fruit and resulted to 
the establishment of the colony of Sciotel. On 20 February 1867 the founding of the 
Italo-African colony of Sciotel was ratified with a contract. This very act was the first 
bid by an Italian to establish an agricultural colony in Africa during the modern era. 
However Stella, realizing Italian government's disinterest in recognizing the colony, 
attempted to render it autonomous and self-governing under a new legislature on 1 
April 1869, that gave to the colony an agricultural and commercial orientation.50 The 
colony was abandoned a few months later because of the hardships, French rivalry 
and the lack of funding and support from Rome. The majority of settlers (thirty in 
total) as well as the founder of the colony succumbed due to the illnesses and the 
difficult conditions.51 Shortly after, the Egyptian authorities took over the locality, 
thus terminating the first Italian attempt to establish a colony in Africa.  
Andrea De Bono (1821-1871) was active in the wider region of Ethiopia in 
1853, followed by Angelo Castelbolognesi (1836-1874) and Don Giovanni Beltrame 
(1824-1906) in 1856. 52  Giovanni Miani (1810-1871) and Piaggia (Carlo Piaggia 
1827-1882) explored methodically Nile's source in today's Sudan, whereas the former 
Garibaldian Romolo Gessi (1831-1881) zealously headed into Sudan's interior.53 The 
clergymen and the explorers, in the name of faith, might and science bolstered the 
Italian presence and influence in distant Eastern Africa. The list of explorers who 
acted on the basis of spreading Italy’s name in the world and acquiring land and 
commercial footholds is endless. Orazio Antinori (1811-1882), Sebastiano Martini 
Bernardi and Giovanni Chiarini (1849-1879) created a centre of vital importance for 
further infiltration in Ethiopia's interior, at Let Marefia. Pellegrino Matteuci (1850-
1881) and Gustavo Bianchi (1845-1884) were interested in the Horn of Africa, 
whereas Manfredo Camperio (1826-1899) visited Libya in the mid-19th century.54 
Many travellers, such as Giuseppe Maria Giulietti (1847-1881) and Gian Pietro Porro 
(1844-1886), met tragic ends while in the performance of their missions. These grim 
events moved the until then indifferent Italian public opinion. Nationalistic bravado 
by scholars, such as Leone Carpi (1810-1898) and Amato Amati (1831-1901), about 
planting the Italian flag in places distant and largely unknown urged many patriots to 
risk everything by seeking political benefits across the globe, in the example of the 
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European imperialists.55 On 6 March, 1866 Amati, while addressing to the Genovese 
Chamber of Commerce argued in favour of a colony, preferably in New Guinea, that 
would grant assistance to Italian wanderers and would finally pull Italy out of its 
passivity. The philosopher Baldassare Poli (1795-1883) pushed further on maintaining 
that "Italy is summoned, or better destined to be once more a first rank nation in the 
seas. Because of its geographical position and its favorable and natural tendencies and, 
no less for its spirit of awakening and its commercial interests, it can only aspire the 
establishment of mercantile colonies in the most remote regions: this fact will bestow 
honour to its flag and enhance the New Kingdom's glory and prosperity".56 Several 
Italian explorers, such as Ippolito Rosellini (1800-1843), Giovanni Battista Belzoni 
(1778- 1823), Giuseppe Acerbi (1773-1846) and Bernardino Drovetti (1776-1852) 
headed at the beginning of the 19th century in Egypt; however, in the period 1856-
1890 there was a decisive shift of interest towards Sudan and Ethiopia. 57  In this 
geographical area scientists, military men tired from the stress of everyday life within 
camp and ordinary adventurers, attempted to materialize the Italian vision of a 
colonial empire. In 1876, Chiarini and Antonio Cecchi (1849-1896) approached 
Ancober in the Ethiopian interior, aiming to conclude friendship treaties with the local 
chieftains.58  
Their example was imitated two years later by Vigoni, Bianchi 59  and 
Matteuchi in neighbouring Dancalia. The often tragic end of the explorers and 
travellers did not hold back Italy's exploration programme in Eastern Africa. Instead, 
it was skilfully used to legitimise Rome's expansionary plans in the Red Sea. The 
newly established kingdom, as the frequency of the missions reveals, had chosen (or 
had been forced to choose as will be seen further on) Eastern Africa to build its 
colonial empire.60 It had now also acquired undeniable rights in the region, since it 
had paid the required death toll and had sufficiently explored it. Secondarily, Italy in 
the last quarter of the 19th century was interested in the coast of Somalia, a fact that 
the exploratory missions of Giuseppe Candeo (1859-1899), Ugo Ferrandi (1852-
1928), Vittorio Bottego (1860-1897), Cecchi, who in May 1885 concluded a 
commercial treaty there, Eugenio Ruspoli (1866-1893) and Luigi Robecchi-Bricchetti 
(1855-1926) attest to.61 The pioneer Leóne d'Avancheres was said to have embarked 
on a missionary mission in the Somalian town of Brava for two years around 1855. 
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Nevertheless the first exploratory recognition of the coast was concluded by the 
admiral and member of the royal family, Tommaso di Savoia (1854-1931), on board 
of the light warship "Vettor Pisani" in 1879.62 Very few Italian explorers headed for 
Tanganyika and the Zambezi River.63 Gradually, as will be seen, the scientific nature 
of the missions would be altered to assert dominance and to set up spheres of 
influence.64 
Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia may have been preferred by the Italian decision 
makers but they did not monopolise their interest. The search for an island in the seas 
of the Pacific and Indian Ocean and its swift capture was imperative.65 After the 
opening of the Suez Canal (1869) shipping companies, mainly from Genoa, wanted to 
connect Italy with the ports of India, China and Australia. For this purpose 
commercial stations, resupply depots and safe ports along the long sea route to the Far 
East were necessary.66 Suddenly, the two shores across the Red Sea gained strategic 
and economic interest. Regions, such as Yemen and, on the opposite shore, Beilul, 
Amera and Sceik Said made up the objectives of the colonialist powers, since their 
ocupation would facilitate shipping and trading between Europe and India.67 Sapeto 
persistently stressed the importance of the region for the budding Italian interests; 
however, when he visited again the location in question in 1869 he discovered that the 
most important locations of the shoreline had been already occupied by Britain and 
France.68  
The new government had also renewed all the trade treaties that the Italian 
miniature states had signed with Asian countries before the Union.69 Italy's meager 
economic interests in the Far East but also in South America, where populous 
communities of Italian immigrants were established, had to be protected primarily for 
reasons of prestige.70 The coveted prestige and the safety of transportations would be 
ensured only by building a large merchant and naval fleet and by controlling ports and 
bases throughout the world, following the British example. Indeed, in the period 
under examination, very few regions of the world were not taken under consideration 
by the Italian explorers. The frenzy, a frequent phenomenon of the New Imperialism 
age, reached to such a point that the Italian government, amid serious internal 
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difficulties, was devising and working out occupation plans of the Philippines, 
Borneo, Patagonia, the Russian Aleutian islands off Alaska, the Falkland islands in 
the south Atlantic, Congo, Libya, south Morocco, the Swedish West Indies71 and 
others locations on a frequent basis. Under consideration was also Lagos in Guinea,72 
the southern part of Greenland73 and the Brazilian coastline.74 Rome was considering 
any available territories in which there appeared to be a power vacuum wishing to 
"avoid missing the dealing of all the cards in the colonial game, before it managed to 
sit down at the table of history."75 Albania and other areas of the Balkans also came 
under the microscope after 1875. In addition to locations with seemingly economic 
potential or of strategic importance, Rome's decision makers also sought places 
appropriate for the establishment of penal (Colonie penali-stabilimenti penitenziari) or 
displacement colonies,76 after the British example.77  
   In 1862, on the occasion of the wedding of Luis of Portugal (1838-1889) to 
the Italian princess Maria Pia (1847-1911), the issue of conceding some African 
territories, Mozambique and Angola, to Italy was discussed for the first time.78 The 
Italian government initiated the negotiations, carrying the hope of gaining an area 
sufficient enough for the establishment of a penitentiary institution. This potential 
domain's legal regime had to be determined entirely by Rome since Italian law 
forbade the confinement of Italian citizens by foreign authorities.79 The Portuguese 
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were not wlling to give up control of territory, and the talks came to nothing. The 
discussions were repeated in 1869, on the initiative if the Prime Minister Luigi 
Federico Menabrea (1809-1896), however, without a substantial result, as the 
Portuguese government was hesitant to renounce even the slightest sovereignty right 
in Mozambique and Angola.  
After a relevant study about determining suitable conditions for the 
establishment of penal colonies, Caranti proposed in 1865 the occupation of the 
Nicobar Islands80 in the Indian Ocean. The initiative did not come to fruition and the 
island's ownership came under British control, as did the other Italian targets in the 
Indian Ocean, the Andaman Islands. An advisory committee 81  under the former 
Garibaldian Gerolamo Nino Bixio (1821-1873), another fervent exponent of 
colonialism, was also sent in 1867 to the island of Sumatra of the Dutch East Indies. 
The plan, which in time fell through, provided for the concession of a part of the 
island from the Netherlands to Italy. Almost simultaneously, Celso Cesare Moreno 
(1831-1901) a vigorous adventurer that came to be a member of the American House 
of Representatives in the 1890's, disgusted by the ill-treatment of his compatriots in 
the US, employed his political skills and influence to establish an Italian colony in 
Sumatra. The project of a military expedition to impose the Italian protection on the 
island reportedly met King Vittorio Emanuele's and Prime Minister Ricasoli's 
approval. However, the inept diplomatic handling of the supposedly delicate issue by 
Foreign Minister Venosta raised international suspicions and alarmed the local Dutch 
authorities. As a result, the Dutch government, the traditional arbiter of Indonesian 
waters, rushed to exert its full political authority on Sumatra by a military campaign 
in 1873-1874.82 In 1868 Commander Vittorio Arminjon (1830-1897) proposed the 
establishment of an Italian colony on the Natuna Islands, in the China Sea, while other 
explorers suggested the Maldives Islands. 
 A year later a naval mission sailed to southern Morocco to examine the 
possibility of using a costal site as a displacement colony under the blessings of 
Menabrea and the Italian consul in Tangiers, Scovasso. The later asserted that the 
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Sultan's government "was used to treating our products and Italians unfairly" and for 
this reason "it was about time to display our war banner" in Morocco. The 
reconnaissance mission sailed along the coast and studied the natural conditions of 
Nun, Sous (Souss) and Tagiakant regions without any noteworthy results. These 
locations were deemed inappropriate and the mission refrained from further action.83 
An exploratory mission in Cambinda, Angola had the same outcome and thus yet 
another opportunity was lost. In 1871 the Italian committee on colonies, a short-lived 
body comprised of experts such as, the former Minister and diplomat Cristoforo Negri 
(1809-1896),84 the politician Giacobbe Isacco Malvano (1841-1922) and the geologist 
Felice Giordano (1825-1892), addressed the British parliament to determine its 
position in case that the island Socotora or Socotra off Somalia, which was also in the 
designs of the Ottoman Empire, was occupied. The island's strategic position forced 
Britain to officially annex it, thus ensuring its smooth communication with India. 
Giovanni Emilio Cerruti, an experienced explorer subsidized by the Italian 
state with 100,000 lire to cover his expenses and bargain with the local chiefs, 
explored various islands of Indonesia and Polynesia and reached as far as Australia 
and New Guinea. On 11 August 1869, he and various members of the Menabrea 
government "convinced of the necessity to establish a colony", concluded a contract 
which assigned Cerruti with the task of finding a locality able to accommodate a 
population of 20,000, almost half of whom would be inmates, in the Polynesian 
archipelago and more precisely in the vicinity of New Guinea. The brigantage and 
gueriglia in the regions controlled by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies until 1861, 
filled Italian prisons with thousands of detenees. More than that, the region had to 
feature a safe anchorage, favourable climate, fertile soil and abundance of water. 
Cerruti had to act within four months of his departure from Singapore and respect the 
Dutch and British sovereign rights in the area. Despite the government's highly 
pretentious demands he discovered locations, in the Celebes and Moluccas seas, 
suitable to accommodate the required population, with relatively mild climate and 
drinking water, whereas in January 1870 in the Aru island complex he concluded a 
treaty granting a limited area to Italy by the local beneficiary. In 1869-1870 acting as 
he reckoned outside of the Dutch zone of interests85 he stipulated concession treaties 
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in various local islands, fulfilled the terms of his contract and enabled the 
establishment of a colony on behalf of the Italian Government. According to the 
contract and the common practice of the time, after the stipulation of the relative 
treaties, an Italian warship had to gain possession of the localities both militarily and 
officially. The act that would render the occupation effective and valid never occurred 
as a result of a misunderstanding and luck of coordination between Cerruti and the 
commander Carlo Alberto Racchia (1833-1896).86 As a result, Italy did not acquire its 
first colony this time either. The Menabrea government fell in 1869 and the following 
of Giovanni Lanza (1810-1882), found the agreements unprofitable and inappropriate 
amid the preparations for the capture of Rome. The reasons of the failure are 
obviously more complex. According to the historian Novero these can be summarized 
in Dutch opposition, British obstructiveness, the government's political, social, 
economic deficiencies, its misguided actions and finally the Italian middle classes' 
lack of interests, means and entrepreneurial spirit. 87  Cerruti didn't lose hope. In 
February 1882 he proposed to Prime Minister Depretis the constitution of a 
commercial and exploratory company in Polynesia in line with the European pattern. 
Fearing that such a step would anger the Dutch and British authorities the government 
did not grant its consent to this proposal.88 Just two years later a more confident and 
potent European state would not concern itself with the potential discomfort of the 
other powers and would formally capture the north east part of New Guinea. This was 
exactly the chasm between the German Empire and the Italian kingdom in the end of 
the 19th  century. 
The venture was repeated by the explorer Federico Lovera di Maria (1796-
1871) and in 1873 by Enrico Alberto d'Albertis (1846-1932) and Odoardo Beccari 
(1843-1920) without significant results.89 The ambitious explorers may have been 
coming into contact with local tribal chiefs and sultans of Indonesia and the 
Moluccas, however, the final decision rested with the Dutch government, nominal 
owner of these territories. The unsuitability of the soil for systematic cultivation, the 
great distance between Italy and New Guinea, which rendered the hypothetical 
dominion practically defenseless and effectively out of control, the refusal of the 
Dutch government to grant even a small part of its rights on the island, were the 
reasons for which the undertaking ran aground for the second time.90 Additionally, 
Beccari explored the archipelago around Guinea, Εlio Modigliani (1860-1932) the 
Indonesian archipelago and Εnrico Hillyer Giglioli (1845-1909) Latin America.91 
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Areas of the Pacific such as Polynesia, a dominion which "in time could turn out to be 
very useful," were also temporarily examined.92 
Special mention, finally, should be made of the case of the British and Dutch-
held island of Borneo, which was portioned in 1824, as well. The US consul in Hong 
Kong leased in 1865 for a ten year use the "most beautiful and fertile part of the 
island," which was managed by the American entrepreneur J. W. Torrey (1828-1885), 
who appeared willing to sublet the area to the Italian commander Racchia.93 While the 
US government did not display any interest in this particular matter, Rome, after 
clarifications of the Dutch and British government, discovered that Torrey was not 
qualified for the favourable resolution of the issue; therefore, it addressed the Sultan 
himself,94 who seemed willing to grant a site with a view to building a correctional 
facility.95 Menambrea's government concealed from the parliament Racchia's mission 
of finding a suitable location for the deportation of the Southerner dissidents. The 
British Colonial Office in July 1870 opposed and finally declined such an eventuality. 
However, it was not entirely hostile to the idea "if the proposed Italian colony were to 
be simply a trading settlement" and "if we are not prepared to expand Trade in these 
rich districts we ought to be glad to see such a Country as that of Italy willing to do it". 
Precisely two years later the Italian ambassador in London sought the British 
Government's consent for a penal establishment in Banggi and a naval base in Gaya. 
Lord Granville George Leveson Gower (1815-1891) the British Foreign Secretary 
rebuffed these proposals. A foreign naval station in Borneo, so "close to the main 
lines of communication in the Eastern Seas" could have a disrupting effect on British 
commerce. 96  Furthermore, the consul of Italy in Singapore was many times the 
recipient of dissatisfaction and distrust mainly from the Dutch authorities, which 
arguably considered that the establishment of a colony of this kind would affect the 
safety of the transportations and commerce in the region. 97  Furthermore, raising 
another flag in Dutch or British territory would cause confusion to the natives and 
Europeans alike.98 The preferable solution for the avoidance of diplomatic friction and 
quarrels would have been to find a location outside Dutch jurisdiction, such as 
Burma. 99  Even the Italian-Burmanese friendship and commerce treaty, signed in 
Mandalay on 3 March 1871 aroused some suspicions to the easily irascible British 
authorities.100 
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Meanwhile, while part of the Italian public opinion, was forming an early 
colonial consciousness (Africanismo), the initially scientific and exploratory interest 
was giving way and gradually being set aside by a policy of interests and expansion. 
The geographical expeditions at the end of the 19th century, based on the ideas of 
civilizing, primacy, racism and vocation were intensified thanks to the organized 
efforts of geographical societies harmonized with the zeitgeist of the time. These 
societies focused their efforts in finding suitable places for the facilitation of the 
Italian economic penetration in Africa's interior and in establishing commercial 
stations and naval bases worldwide. Geographical studies covered this secret agenda, 
generated patriotic impulses and gave rise to the construction of a national identity.  
Colonial ideology was seen as an instrument of modernization, social cohesion and 
nationalization. This is the intellective basis on which "Italy's colonial adventure", 
which was being presented to the people as a fascinating epic and as a means of 
resolving internal problems, was organized and initiated. 101  The emerging public 
opinion now demanded financial opportunities and a better life in distant places, 
keeping pace with the aspirations and the growing interests of the shipping and the 
arms manufacturing industry.102 At this point it should be clarified that the late 19th 
century Italian governments were not able to shape a colonial consciousness or to 
effectively influence the public opinion since they simply did not have the technical 
wherewithal to do so. The telegraph system was not widespread, high illiteracy 
weighed down newspaper, journal and book circulation; budgetary deficiency was 
hampering the educational activities in schools and radio, cinema or other 
"propaganda" means would be discovered and put to use much later. The, initially 
moderate interest of the masses for Africa did not emerge as a product of regulated 
governmental policy but principally as a result of private initiatives by local 
communes, associations and clubs.103 
The first, par excellence, society of this kind was founded in Florence in 12 
May 1867 with the title Italian Geographical Society (Società Geografica Italiana), 
with Negri as chairman. Its stated objectives were the promotion of Italy's commercial 
and naval interests, the facilitation of exploratory goals and the provision of assistance 
to the benefit of Africa's underdeveloped peoples.104 This society organized numerous 
missions in Ethiopia (1876-1891), Tunisia (1875), Morocco (1876) and Somalia 
(1893), representing Italian ambitions and serving as a "useful and patriotic 
enterprise" to the government. 105  It furthermore organized a series of national 
geographic congresses, in which the policies of expansion, the demographic issue and 
scientific disciplines were inextricably amalgamated. As the opening of the Suez 
Canal approached, nourishing aspirations and prospects, Negri accelerated the 
                                                          
101 Randazzo, Roma predona, p. 12. 
102 Surdich, “Il colonialismo italiano, l'imperialismo straccione”, p. 6. 
103 Finaldi, Italian national identity, pp. 197-212. 
104 Giovanni Bosco Naitza, Il Colonialismo nella storia d'Italia (1882-1949), (Florence, 1975), p. 7. 
105 David Atkinson, "Constructing Italian Africa", in Italian Colonialism, ed. M. Fuller, R. Ben-Ghiat, 
(New York, 2005), p. 17. 
63 
 
procedures and presented the society's statute as early as April 1867. On 20 January 
1868 the statute was ratified by the 413 parliamentarians, aristocrats, military men, 
scientists, doctors and explorers that constituted the first members; in just two years, 
in May 1870, their number had ascended to include 1118 members, which shows that, 
to certain social strata, the interest in colonial matters was gradually growing. These 
illustrious members operated as pressure group and cultivated special relations with 
key government officials, aimed at obtaining a privileged treatment for their activities. 
For this exact reason the society's seat was relocated to Rome in early 1872. The very 
first exploration initiative it undertook was the organization of an auxiliary expedition 
to Stella's Sciotel. The colony's precarious state inspired and urged the fellows to "try 
to protect the co-nationals dwelling abroad, and simultaneously to expand the circle of 
the national commerce's influence". The operation was subsided by the state's treasury 
since it was organized in Italy's behalf and "could open the entrance of industrial and 
commercial relations with the rich and virgin lands of Abyssinia".106 The expedition 
led by the explorer Antinori departed on February 1870, but by the time they had 
reached Sciotel the colony was already deserted. Once there, this setback didn't stall 
the mission's information gathering and scientific research. The succession of the 
skeptic Negri by the more resolute Cesare Correnti (1815-1888) signaled a more 
energetic era for the Italian Geographical Society.107 
In February 1879 the Society for the Commercial Exploration of Africa 
(Società d'Esplorazione Commerciale in Africa) was founded in Milan with the 
participation of renowned financial figureheads of Lombardy.108 This organization 
was mainly devoted to the commercial pacifist penetration in a worldwide scale and 
to the exploration of Libya.109Under the auspices of 19th century's Italian industrial 
and political elites, its founder the explorer Camperio put forth an economic 
penetration policy in northern Africa; he even applied to the Ottoman government for 
the concession of 100,000 hectares in the Libyan region of Gebel to enact an 
"agricultural colonization" experiment. Despite the failure of these ambitious efforts 
the association furthermore instituted four trading posts in Massaua, Hodeida, 
Zanzibar and Khartoum. Always under the financial sponsorship of the Milanese 
industrialists it founded the Italian Society for the African trade (Societa italiana per il 
commercio coll'Africa) in the summer of 1880, which in its turn established the 
Commercial Agency of Bengasi and Derna in Libya in 1895-1896. The Italian Society 
for the African trade is considered the first concrete attempt to confer an economic 
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direction to Italy's early colonial expansion. Among its conspicuous individual 
shareholders, the bank of Credito Italiano, the Rubattino company and the Banca 
Generale can be found. Nevertheless the elevated costs and the limited profitability 
possibilities of the Libyan and Ethiopian markets contributed to the bankruptcy of the 
association.110 Situated in Milan, late 19th century Italy's venue of moderatism and 
social liberalism, the Society for the Commercial Exploration of Africa was 
renouncing the "sterile military conquest" and the exacerbated expansion, 
apotheosized by certain circles in Southern Italy. Stereotypically the South, closely 
intertwined with the Mediterranean and by extension with the African region, 
distressed by the demographic problem, is considered adherent of expansionism, more 
pro-colonial than the industrial, economic penetration advocate, pacifist and 
progressive North of Italy.111 For others, the despotic "North" having conquered parts 
of Africa and the South of Italy acted as a foreign occupation force and perceived 
both groups as savages and insubordinate bandits.112    
The African Society of Italy (Società Africana d'Italia), founded in 1882, 
previously known as the Club Africano, with headquarters in Naples, was also 
occupied with the search for arable land and potential colonies for the resolution of 
the economic-demographic problem.113 The "Mediterranean destiny" and the search 
of a "promised land" were promoted by any means possible: geographical and 
ethnological studies, scientific activities, libraries, periodicals and relative 
conferences. The differentiated, more militant approach in regards to colonialism and 
the fact that it received higher state subsidies brought about the dispute and a rivalry 
with the other similar associations.114 As its branch the Society of Colonial Studies 
(Società di Studi Coloniali) based in Florence, was created in April 1884 upon the 
local Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Ministry's and the Agricultural Ministry's 
tributes. Its function and propagandist operations were in line with the main Naples' 
office.   
Similar societies were: the Association of Commercial Geography 
(Associazione di Geografia Commerciale) based in Bari, the Commission for 
Explorations in Africa (Comitato per le Esplorazioni in Africa) based in Turin and the 
Society of Exploration (Società d'Esplorazione) based in Genoa. 115  First the 
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Neapolitan African Society created a center in which colonial propaganda could be 
forged and propagated and in which the products and the tropical colonization 
methods could be studied. The establishment of the Colonial Institute in Naples was 
soon to be followed in Rome, Palermo and Florence. In Rome a colonial museum was 
instituted as part of the botanic institute. In Palermo the city's botanic garden 
transformed into a colonial one and in Florence the formation of an agriculture-
colonial institute was well underway.116Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (1840-1914) 
theories on the unbreakable bond of naval power, commerce and expansion and the 
creation of pro-Navy organizations in England (Navy League), Germany 
(Flottenverein), France (Ligue Maritime  Française) and Spain (Liga Maritima 
Española) arguably influenced the Italians. The Lega Navale Italiana association, 
established in 1897, promoted the idea of the construction of a sizeable commercial 
fleet as an instrument of economic development and prestige.117  
Government support for these initiatives was centralized in a new Colonial 
Office in the 1890s. The creation of the colony Eritrea was accompanied by the 
creation of an office responsible for the colonial matters. In December 28 1893, the 
office of Eritrea and Protectorates, precursor of the colonial office, was re-
inaugurated, a department with a view to address every political aspect of Italy's 
colonies; it was directly dependent to the Foreign Minister and his undersecretary. On 
5 May 1895 a royal decree rendered the office administratively and politically 
autonomous. On 15 March 1896, immediately after the staggering Italian defeat in 
Adua, the office lost a great deal of its previous authority, shrank and finally merged 
with the first division of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 
temporary development highlights perfectly the sense of humiliation, surrender and 
pessimism that possessed Rome after the devastating Adua blow. The Colonial Office 
was restored by a royal act of 2 April1900, which detached the Colonial office from 
the Foreign Ministry and restored it to its former autonomous executive status. One of 
its first acts was a secret agreement signed with the British in Rome on 22 November 
1901 regarding the boundaries of Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The colonial office's 
staff, subdivided in two sectors, Office I Colonial Policy and Office II Colonial 
Administration, enacted various studies, published and preserved the relative 
diplomatic documents and draw up geographical maps. To assist to their extensive 
scope of responsibilities the Colonial Council was inaugurated on 24 May 1903. In 
April 1908 it evolved into the Central Management for the Colonial Affairs 
(Direzione Centrale per gli affari coloniali) and four years later (20 November 1912) 
it developed into the Colonial Ministry.118  
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Industrialists like the ship owning Rubattino company, as we will see, were 
the instruments by which the country would finally acquire the position of power and 
influence. The cotton industrialists, aware of their internal market's saturation, as well 
as their inability compete with foreign firms due to the absence of protective tariffs, 
were captivated by the prospect of finding new outlets in Africa. Others, such as the 
famous Giovanni Battista Pirelli (1848-1932) were interested in importing raw 
materials in the most inexpensive way possible.They were stimulated by the 
statements of politicians like Onorato Caetani (1842-1917), who in 1879 during a 
parliamentary session, referring to Ethiopia's agricultural (cotton) possibilities, added 
that its forests could constitute an inexhaustible "source of extraordinary wealth, 
either by the medicinal and caoutchouc plants' products or by the lumbering of 
various species".119  
The Italians in this period were "passionate with the idea of overseas 
dominions." 120  The newspapers which spread the inquiring and rash spirit of 
adventure to the Italian public were mainly La Gazzetta Coloniale, L'Esploratore. 
Giornale di viaggi e geografia commerciale, L'Italia coloniale,121 Il Giornale delle 
Colonie, L'Italia Nelle Colonie, L'Idea Coloniale, L'Italia Colonizzatrice.122 The most 
influential magazines were the Bolletino della Societa africana d'Italia, the Bolletino 
della Societa geografica italiana and the Rivista geografica italiana.123 
In the eve of the 20th century and under the dictations of the principals of 
modernization and progress, the above mentioned societies got involved in the 
delicate field of public instruction, nurturing a "progressive" model that revolved 
around ethnocentric and nationalistic notions. Under this context the societies held 
geographical-colonial seminars for the public, and a series of expansionist oversees 
oriented education institutions were founded, with the state's cooperation. Turin's 
International Institute, which was founded in 1867 under the auspices of the Foreign 
Ministry, was the first with a colonial character and curriculum. Similarly, in 1869 the 
Oriental Institute was established in Naples. Likewise in 1880 the law faculty of the 
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University of Naples inaugurated a number of colonial related courses, such as: 
international law, commercial and colonial economy, diplomatic history and 
geography. After the example of the Antwerp's Chamber of Commerce, the advanced 
schools of commerce of Venice (1868), Genoa (1884) and Bari (1886) were offering 
courses for the formation of entrepreneurs, consuls and colonial agents. Later, in 
September 1902 a similar commercial university was inaugurated in Milan. In 1889, 
in Rome, the organization Dante Alighieri for "the defense of the national tradition 
and language abroad" was set up. The society was also acting to stimulate the 
transatlantic trade between the metropolis and Latin America, where the most loyal 
consumers of Italian products were located, the Italian immigrants.124 Through the 
construction and preservation of Italian schools abroad, the organization established 
outposts of the idea of the Greater Italy, aimed at "safekeeping the relations of the 
mother country with the compatriots" and advancing "peaceful and commercial Italian 
penetration" to the world.  
In the nation’s elementary and primary schools, world history and geography 
were tought in a way to promote the creation of the Italian identity by projecting the 
dichotomy between the civilized white and the colonized backward “other”, and to 
superinduce patriotic notions. 125  Colonial education in the higher educational 
institutions consisted of ethno-anthopological and climatologic courses, foreign 
languages, politics, economics, "colonial" and "commercial" geography, mineralogy, 
tropical medicine, naval hygiene and "colonization sciences" that were focusing on 
the application of the legislation and the scientific methods in the agricultural-
demographic field. The Minister of Education Nunzio Nasi's (1850-1935) in 1901 
promoted this curriculum to some of the country's universities to "spread a kind of 
colonial education that could better direct the growing movement in many regions of 
our country; an education able to arouse initiatives, responsibilities and ingenuity. 
Because the success of the colonial enterprises demands mainly strength of character 
and knowledge of the world". In conformity to these statements, the economic-
administrative school of the Law faculty in Rome was remodeled into the diplomatic-
colonial school.126  
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According to the politician and journalist Filippo Turati (1857-1932), the 
"African enterprise" is mainly a phenomenon not of capitalism but of militarism, 
harmonized with the aspirations of Italy's royal dynasty, the Sabaudi.127 There were 
also those who really believed that Italy did not conquer, or coerce, but it civilizes. 
The Catholic Church, on occasions was playing a key role to the idea of subordinating 
barbaric peoples to the culturally superior Rome, via its famous newspaper, 
L'Osservatore Romano.128  Catholic nationalism was presenting the inclination for 
colonialism as a pious act, under the guise of humanitarianism and idealism. The 
Church was always ready to commemorate the Italian soldiers fallen in Africa and did 
not express doubts in the righteousness of European expansion, identifying it as a 
mission of progress and enlightenment. As far as the Italian state’s role, however, it 
held a rather ambiguous stance. Many Catholics hailed the prospect of the 
propagation of the Catholic faith in new, distant fields of activity, espousing the 
colonial doctrine. Those however, still unwilling to recognize the "immoral" liberal 
state that violated so defiantly the Papal state's integrity, were anti-colonial as 
colonialism was affiliated to and projected by the usurper Italian governments.129 
These went as far as to interpret the disaster of Adwa in terms of divine punishment 
against the state-denier of ecclesiastical privileges. 130  When, decades later, these 
frictions and discords simmered down the Church, officially and unofficially, 
embraced the colonial enterprise wholeheartedly.131 
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Additionally, Abbot Antonio Stoppani (1824-1891) expressing the views of a 
large part of the clergy stated in 1887: "Civilizing is a most heavy and inescapable 
burden for civilized nations, which is imposed by humanitarianism and justice...Italy, 
is required to do its duty." 132  A different theoretical approach to the Italian 
colonialism was expressed by the Foreign Minister Pasquale Stanislao Mancini (1817-
1888), who in addressing the parliament on 27 January 1885 professed that if Italy 
wanted to become an economic and maritime power it had to participate in some way 
in the colonial race, a vehicle of modernization and prestige.133 The Italians sought 
with victories and overseas conquests to be recognized as a Great Power, to gain 
stature and voice in European conferences through success in Africa. The more 
romantic envisaged the wonders of Africa and claimed that colonialism would end the 
sad phenomenon of slave trading, settle the issue of the arms and liquor trade in the 
Dark Continent, and guarantee mutual economic interests. Colonialism would 
maintain order, protect the lives of European travelers, and spread civilization and 
education. 134  According to others the Dark Continent stood as a source of raw 
materials, a Land of Promise which was able to divert the flow of migration from 
America to Africa.135  
At the opposite end, despite the trend of the time, there were those who were 
treating with caution and skepticism the government's imperialist intentions for moral 
and most often economic reasons (antiafricanismo).136 They expressed doubt in the 
ability to civilize backward peoples, and were troubled about the economic impact 
that the colonial venture would have on the Italian people.137 The "dissidents" were 
arguing that Italy had "Africa at its home"138 and were labelling the expansionists as 
traitors of the Risorgimento ideals.139 The longer the colonial policy did not bring any 
benefits, but rather defeats and disgrace, the more voices calling for abandoning the 
colonial vision would grow.  
What is certain is that there cannot be absoluteness in drawing conclusions 
about a subject so complex and multi-dimensional. The "African tendency", the 
theoretical basis behind Italian colonialism, went through many stages. It evolved 
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from general indifference into a fever of exploration and a spirit of adventure. There 
was the romantic Africanism, inspired by the glorious past, and the Africanism based 
on geopolitical concerns. There was one Africanism that was emanating from 
confidence and enthusiasm and one that was feeding from the fear of exclusion and of 
antagonism or from arrogance. There was even an Africanism which served the 
interests of the developed North and one diametrically opposed, who promised better 
life for the farmers of the South. One with a view to finding fertile land to solve the 
demographic problem and, at the same time, build prisons. There was finally a vain 
Africanism of the royal house of Italy and an apostolic of the Catholic missionaries.140 
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4. Italy’s politico-strategic position in the Mediterranean  
 
   In the wake of the Unification the Italian expansionist designs were aimed, 
as expected, towards the opposite shore of the Mediterranean. The barrage of 
developments that were taking place in this vital area for Rome would shape its future 
alliances and colonial policy in Africa. The fear of French aggression on the coast of 
North Africa drove Rome to the camp of the Central Powers, a diplomatic event of 
colossal importance for Europe's historical evolution until the First World War. The 
disturbance of the Mediterranean balance, when France occupied Tunisia and Britain 
Cyprus and Egypt, caused stress, anxiety and confusion among the statesmen of Italy, 
a fact which is reflected in their subsequent erroneous choices. The frustrations, the 
inability to find a colony in proximity to Italy's geographical area and the diplomatic 
defeats led Rome by inference to the Red Sea and the destruction of 1896. Had Italy 
occupied Tunisia or Libya in the period 1870-1885, could it have avoided the costs in 
blood and money in its attack in Ethiopia? We will never know. In this chapter the 
actions of the Italian governments during the most important Mediterranean crises 
until 1890, shall be examined in an attempt to understand the reasoning and the 
impact of their decisions. The goal is to discover and interpret the underlying causes 
of the Italian colonial phenomenon during the 19th century by shedding light on the 
European diplomatic backstage of the era and by scrutinizing the reasons behind the 
Italian inability to impose its rule over target-areas that were hypothetically within 
reach. The diplomacy and inntiatives of the cruicial Tunisian issue, the Egyptian crisis 
of 1882 and the repeated suggestions to capture Libya will be examined. 
Αs has been seen, all the advantages gained on the battlefield by the Russian 
army during the Russo-Turkish 1877-1878 clash were ultimately nullified by the rest 
of the Great Powers in the Berlin Congress of June-July 1878. The mitigation of the 
"just" Russian demands weighted over Chancellor Bismarck, the chairman of the 
congress, who was supposedly promoting the Austro-Hungarian interests in the 
Balkans. Russia was infuriated by Bismarck's pro Austrian attitude during the Berlin 
conference proceedings, a fact that led the chancellor to strengthen Berlin's ties with 
Vienna via a formal defensive alliance concluded on 7 October 1879.1 Surprisingly 
enough this bold move and the prospect of being isolated intimidated the Russians 
enough to join Germany and Austro-Hungary in June 1881, and in 1884 to renew 
their commitment.2 Maintaining the alliance with the Russian and Austia-Hungarian 
empires at any cost and intimidating or flattering the Third French Republic were the 
central points of the late 19th century German policy. This policy safeguarded 
Germany from any external danger and positioned it in a preeminent international 
role. The profound complexity of the chancellor's calculations and cunning schemes 
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are still fascinating the historians. His flexibility and immediateadjustment to every 
international circumstance to promote German interests from the early 1860s until 
1890 is remarkable. In the late 19th century every power whenever engaged in a 
discord or rivalry from the Mediterranean to the China Sea sought Germany's 
cooperation and approval as a great military power and thus arbiter of the 
international system. The fear of isolation and the aura of German supremacy 
constructed meticulously by Bismarck contributed to this inclination. The chancellor 
in exchange tried to satisfy everyone. For the sake of peace in Europe, Bismarck at 
the time did not nurture any territorial expansion, appeared agreeble to the designs of 
others, and promoted what appeared to him a waste of significant resources; Britain's 
involvement in Egypt, France's in Westerns Africa, Austria-Hungary's and Russia's in 
the Balkans.3 
To some historians Bismarck's objective after the triumph in the 1871 Franco-
Prussian war was to keep France occupied with affairs in areas far away from Europe. 
Favourable relations were sought to soothe the revanchionist spirit; diplomatic 
support was provided to instigate a French strategy of distant and resource- 
consuming overextension away from the German borders. Under this light the 
chancellor's pro French attitude, the policy of encouraging French claims, that reached 
its climax when the ardent colonialist Ferry came to power in 1880, makes perfect 
sense. Characteristically, on 17 December 1885 the island of Madagascar came 
officially under French control. In the previous years and more specifically since early 
1882 when the question of the island's sovereignty came out, Berlin did whatever was 
possible to facilitate the French occupation. Whereas London opposed Paris' claims, 
as the island is situated along the sensitive route to India, Germany accepted 
unreservedly France’s imposed naval blockade and military actions. In another 
occasion, during the 1883-1886 French-Chinese clash over Indochina, Bismarck 
displayed his solidarity to Paris' interests by refusing to intervene when a Chinese 
delegation asked his mediation and by halting the delivery of a German made warship 
to the Beijing government. As for his Egyptian policy, his maneuverings were less 
straightforward and more obscure. In April 1885 his trusty French collaborator Ferry 
fell from office while in Britain the conservative Salisbury came to power making an 
eventual understanding feasible. Unable to decide who to support and without taking 
unduly risks, he silenced the Porte and promoted alternately both French and British 
pretensions upon the North African province.4 In numerous occasions he threatened 
London that he would withdraw his support in Egypt if the German demands in other 
fields were not met.5 In regard to the Tunisian crisis the German support of France 
had a dual scope: to render an Italian rapprochement with France impossible, thus 
laying the groundwork for a future German-Austrian-Italian alliance; and to satisfy 
France, a satisfaction that would eventually isolate it. The chancellor backed the 
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French actions through the German consul in Tunis, encouraged the French consul in 
Berlin Count Saint-Vallier Charles Raymond (1833-1886) particularly in 1879-1880, 
encumbered the Italian pretensions by demonstrating his disapproval of Italian 
initiatives, and finally convinced Austria and Britain that it would be wise to appease 
the French.6 London's persistence in maintaining the status quo and Turkish or Italian 
opposition would not be able to shape the course of events as it will be seen.7 
Tunisia had been a field of antagonism between the Great Powers many times 
before because of its strategic position in the middle of the Mediterranean. Since 1574 
it constituted a dominion of the Ottoman Sultan, however, the great distance from the 
centre of authority, Istanbul, the administrative difficulties and European scheming 
rendered it virtually independent. The autonomous governor bore the title of Bey, and 
his independence demonstrated the loose ties between Istanbul and Tunis. Its 
independence was rendered precarious after the occupation of the neighbouring 
Algeria by the French in 1830 whereas in the East, Libya was under Ottoman control. 
In 1835 the Ottomans tried to restore their absolute rule in Tunisia but failed because 
of the French reactions and thus the province retained the shakyexisting regime.8 
Clearly, the defense of the Bey's freedom by Paris was aimed at serving its own 
interests. Following French "advice", Mohammed es Saddok Bey (1859-1882) 
granted a constitution in 1859, organized a military force and attempted to associate 
his country more closely with the European socio-economic system. 9  Western 
influence prevailed thereafter, promoting modernization which in turn brought about 
the conclusion of loans from European financial institutions.10 The construction of 
railways and ports led the country into bankruptcy in 1869 and placed it under the 
direct control of its Italian, French and British creditors.11 
   For Rome the fate of Tunisia was of such critical importance that it would 
settle the matter of its induction into the circle of the Great Powers. Because of its 
geographic position it was always a reference point and a natural outlet for both the 
residents of Sicily and the fighters of the Risorgimento era, who were searching for a 
safe refuge. 12  More specifically, in 1842 a branch of Mazzini's Giovine Italia 
organization was active in Tunis with the name "Legione Italiana". As the 
revolutionary zeal was cementing, a firearms depot was created in Tunis with the 
purpose of supplying the Sicilian revolutionaries when the time came. After 1850, 
Tunis had become a great center of the Italian revolutionary movement. According to 
Mazzini's plan, as he reported it in 1852, this nucleus would organize an expedition of 
Italian revolutionaries to the opposite shore of Sicily giving rise to an insurrection, 
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through a landing operation similar to Garibaldi's in Marsala 8 years later. Later on, 
during the Italian peninsula's troubled times many immigrated to Tunis, which 
seemed to be a safe haven for the rebels and unwanted or for those who desired to live 
as free men.13  
Hence, numerous Italian protagonists after the Unification as well as the 
general public viewed the expansion of the New Italy in the region as a natural 
outcome. In this way, the African country would be placed under the protection of 
Rome and, in addition, it would supply the Italian industry with raw materials. 
According to the experts and those nostalgic for the Roman rule over ancient 
Carthage, Tunisia would be able to absorb the Italian products and 15 million 
immigrants, and contribute to the country's territorial completion.14 Two important 
factors in Rome's interest was an ambitious policy that wanted as provinces of the 
Italian kingdom all those regions that hostedimportant Italian communities, and on the 
other hand reasons of strategic security in the Mediterranean.15  Consequently the 
protection of the Italian immigrants and the short distance of the Regency from the 
Sicilian shores were additional incentives for the coveted expansion.16 Deputy Abele 
Damiani (1835-1905), colourfully stated in 1879 that Tunisia was still the "last open 
door" for Italian expansion and that it should be part of the new kingdom for 
historical, economic and security reasons.17 
The Italo-Tunisian relations had undergone many fluctuations throughout the 
centuries; from profound animosity to intimate collaboration and vice versa. As early 
as 971, the Venetians had signed commercial treaties with the Tunisians. The rest of 
the Italian states followed suit: Amalfi in 1070, Gaeta in 1100, Pisa in 1113 and 
afterwards the city states of Trapani, Palermo, Livorno, 18  Messina, Salerno and 
Napoli. In comparison the French created their first warehouse on Tunisian soil as late 
as 1577.19 In more recent times, the first Italian school was inaugurated in 1821 which 
constituted the very first public school in Tunisia. At the end of 1833 two Italian 
military officers were employed as instructors for the Tunisian army and on March 25 
1838 the first Tunisian newspaper was published under the title Giornale di Tunisi e 
Cartagine by Italian immigrants. At the same time Italian influence was expanding; 
schools, churches, chapels were erected year after year and Italian monks and priests 
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assumed the responsibility of educating the young immigrants.20 In 1857 an Italian 
post office was established, as a branch of Cagliari's postal department and in 1865 
the Italian telegraph line between Marsala and Bizerte was inaugurated. Five years 
later an old dream of Cavour came true when Palermo was linked with Tunis by sea. 
On 4 January 1864 the Collegio Italiano was established with the Italian government’s 
subsidies. Its mission was to spread the Italian culture abroad. On September 8 1868 a 
new treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation was signed between the two 
parties, a treaty that encompassed all the previous Italo-Tunisian treaties, extended the 
privileges and enhanced the political and commercial activity directed by Rome.21 In 
1877 Tunisia's closest commercial partner was Italy. Out of 207 steamships reaching 
Tunisian ports 102 were Italian and 49 French. As for the sailing ships from a total of 
240,183 flew the Italian flag while only 9 the French.22  
Indeed, the Italian community of Tunisia, mainly of Sicilian origin, numbered 
30,000 people in 1878, and was more populous than all the other European 
communities combined.23 Italians seemed to prefer settling in Tunisia because of the 
relative freedom and advantages for the Europeans under the regime of capitulations 
and the consular protection system. Also their technical skills were far more evolved 
and thus more appreciated by wealthier Tunisians who employed Italians to help build 
public works, and assist in farming and fishing activities. The importance of the 
country to Rome can be illustrated by the persistent efforts of the Italian government 
to control communications, to establish schools, and to build infrastructure and 
railways. Members of the Italian minority worked at the country's custom houses; key 
positions of the state apparatus and services were in the hands of the Italians; the 
Bey's most important consultants were Italian; Italian farmers were cultivating the 
fertile Tunisian land contributing to the modernization of the country; Italian schools 
were promoting and spreading Latin culture. Education, commerce, and the banks 
were largely controlled by Italians and their language was the most prevalent after the 
local Arabic. The Italian minority, with the aid of the Italian government, had 
achieved a privileged position, a fact that gave Rome the right to dream of its 
domination over the country.24 Prime Minister Cairoli said about the matter: "Our 
community in Tunisia is distinguished for its profitable industries, for its business 
initiatives and by a patriotic flame that never burned out. Because of this, the 
government is obliged to protect it in a dual manner; by maintaining political status 
quo favourable to its interests, and by developing its economic and material interests," 
while the Foreign Minister stressed that no important event in Tunisia could "remain 
alien" to the interests of the Italian policy.25 Italy could not allow these colonisits to 
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become alienated from the national body, in such a critical area for its geopolitical 
interests.26 Thus, the Italian ruling class, ideologically charged with visions of destiny 
and of Rome's calling to civilize Mediterranean Africa, developed in the Regency a 
competitive edge, a prominent socio-political position which Paris combated with all 
possible means.27 
Naturally enough the intensity of the Italian activities met with the displeasure 
of the Bey. In 1830 mistreatment and oppression of the Italian community led to the 
intervention of the Piedmontese-Sardinian fleet. When the Italian frigates appeared in 
the waters of Goleta in May 17 the Bey gave in to the Italian demands. This incident 
led, on February 22 1832, to the stipulation of the friendship and commerce treaty, an 
agreement that broadened even further the Italian privileges. The lack of compliance 
to some of the treaty's clauses by the bey was the reason for yet another naval 
demonstration in Tunisian waters that resulted once more with the satisfaction of the 
Italian demands. In 1831 a small Piedmontese boat was seized by the Tunisian 
authorities. The crew was abused and the flag trampled on. Some days after the 
incident a Piedmontese war ship appeared at the same shores to demand moral 
satisfaction from the bey, who eventually gave into the demands. The first dynamic 
attempt to impose and expand Italian influence on the Regency is considered to be 
that of 1844, when the naval fleet of the kingdom of Piedmont turned up menacingly 
in Tunisian waters forcing the bey with this display of power to meet the Italian 
claims. 28  This crisis had broken out in September 1843 when negotiations for a 
commercial treaty between the Bey and the Piedmontese consul broke down in a 
heated argument. The French intervened to resolve the warlike situation while the 
Tunisians were erecting coastal fortifications and preparing to repel eventual naval 
attacks. In January 1844 the Italian commander is said to have been contemplating the 
possibility of a landing operation or even of a naval bombardment but the English 
consul mediated fearing that a belligerent Italian action would provoke a French 
invasion. The conflict was avoided and the issue was resolved diplomatically as 
eventually reason prevailed. The king of Piedmont Carlo Alberto (1798-1849) 
declared that he considered the bey's huge expenses to fortify his shores as sufficient 
punishment. After that incident the bilateral relations became cordial again.29  
The next opportunity to consolidate Italian supremacy in Tunisia occurred 
during the revolution of 1864. The bey's subjugation to his European principals, his 
over-indebtedness, a result of the continued borrowing, and the grim situation of the 
lower social strata led an enraged mob to murder European nationals at El Kef, and 
then to open conflict.30 Italy, Britain and France seeing the until then docile regime 
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being threatened, dispatched their fleets to Goleta with the goal of enforcing order.31 
The allied co-operation suffered cracks due to the different goals of each side. The 
French who had their eye on Tunisia and wished to annex it to their Algerian colony 
proposed the landing and occupation of the country, a suggestion which was flatly 
opposed by the British. At a time when bilateral relations had been disrupted and 
indecision characterized the allied camp, the Italians had a rare opportunity to act and 
to present the Europeans with a fait accompli. The Italian General Staff was working 
on a plan for the capture of Tunis and Vice Admiral Augusto Albini (1830-1909), 
after receiving reinforcements on April 30 and May 12, suggested giving "a political 
character" to the occupation.32 Fearful of a French fait accompli, Albini reflected 
upon the landing and capture of La Goletta and Tunis by an Italian force of 4,000.33 
The plan was never implemented because of the opposition of the other two Powers.34 
In September of 1864 the bey finally brought under his control the rebel territories 
and thus the opportunity was wasted. 
   After the closure of the matter, Napoleon III proposed to Italy the partition 
of Tunisia.35 The French would naturally appropriate the western part and the Italians 
the eastern.36 The government, at the time based in Turin, considered that the proposal 
"was not worth the trouble" and in addition Foreign Minister Venosta claimed that 
Italy "could not allow itself the luxury of an Algeria."37 Despite the negative outcome 
of the matter there were signs of encouraging developments for the Italian policy of 
influence and prestige. Displays of naval power in Tunisia had been carried out in the 
past by the Italian city states. However, it was in 1864 that for the first time a 
concerted intervention of the national fleet took place, even with assistance, with the 
aim of "protecting the life and property of the fellow-countrymen" that were residing 
there.38 The young state revealed its designs in the typical and arrogant way of a Great 
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Power, making it known to everyone that it considered Tunisia a zone of influence of 
fundamental value. So began a period of acute confrontation with France which was 
putting into practice its own expansionary plans in the Mediterranean. 
   In the following years the bey, balancing between the two warring sides, 
managed to maintain the autonomy of his country.39  In reality, neither Italy, still 
unstable and tormented by socio-economic issues, nor France, weakened after the 
1870 Franco-Prussian war, was in a position to proceed withthe military occupation of 
Tunisia. The only thing that they could do was to extend their influence and to put up 
obstacles preventing the other from obtaining the upper hand in the bey's court. The 
Italian position was further improved by 3 more conventions signed in January 1871 
granting a series of new exclusive privileges. These included freedom of action for the 
Italian businesses and a clause awarding to Italy the status of the most favourable 
nation. On the contrary France was investing huge amounts on schools and railroads, 
and saw Tunisia as an extension of Algeria and the Bizerte port as a natural 
supplement to its strategic safety in the Mediterranean. Despite the public outcry that 
"every franc spent in Africa is a step back from the Rhine", Ferry’s vague desire of 
expansion was motivated by international, economic and "Algerian" motives; Muslim 
fraternities operated through Tunisia in Algeria, Libya and Egypt inciting and 
arousing nomad tribes to defy European penetration.40 The regency’s gradual internal 
disintegration and its inability to settle its debt and to subsist on its meager fiscal 
incomecreated the conditions for European interference. Moreover, the state's 
revenues had proved insufficient to repay the interest of the public debt. The Bey's 
negotiations with his creditors resulted in the establishment of a tripartite Italo-
French-English control over the finances of the state on 5 July 1869; this international 
financial commission was to guarantee the repayment of the bey's debt principally 
towards the French bank Erlanger and the Italian Banca Nazionale di Torino.41 Over-
indebtedness 42  and external control meant that the Tunisian government was not 
independent and was acting under the directives of the Italian, English and French 
consuls. Thus a struggle for supremacy began, in which Italy’s well integrated 
commercial predominance clashed with the French organized but indirect policy of 
financial investments. 
In 1868 France seemed to take a short lead when its consul persuaded the bey 
to put up all the country's tax revenue as guarantee for the repayment of loans which 
he had concluded with French financiers.43 Rome and London strongly opposed this 
initiative, and thus the favourable for the French interests’ arrangement was nullified. 
The Menabrea government was keen to exploit this success. On 8 September 1868 it 
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concluded a treaty with the bey which settled to Rome's benefit all the issues between 
them. 44  Italy, under the clause of the most-favoured state, extracted significant 
benefits in the fields of agriculture, fishery, legal rights and shipping.45 The Italian 
community of Tunisia suddenly found itself markedly more favoured and 
strengthened in relation to the rest of the bey's foreign subjects.46 These conjunctures 
and the international developments meant that Italy would be established as a 
Mediterranean force and that it would finally obtain an African dominion. Rome, 
having done what was necessary, seemed at the time to prevail in the struggle with 
France for the influence in Tunisia and was ready to reap the fruits of its labours.47 
The last step that appeared to remainbefore Italy could annex the region or impose a 
protectorate was to overcome the French objections. The Italian government hoped 
this could be achieved through diplomatic channels and the moral support of the Great 
Powers. The last part of the match would be played in the European Privy Councils. 
For this reason it would be useful to mention the diplomatic negotiations and the 
relations of the Great Powers in this period under examination. 
   After the defeat and the humiliation of France in 1871, a power vacuum in 
the Mediterranean was created, a vacuum, that as the British reckoned, could be filled 
by Italy, a state that was well-disposed towards them, with designs in Africa and in 
the Balkans, and the inclination to assume a primary role in the Mediterranean. In 
March 1878 a British delegation proposed to Prime Minister Depretis an alliance, i.e., 
an understanding for the joint "preservation and protection of the commercial interests 
in the Mediterranean and the Straights." In the same period Bismarck, after 
consultation with Vienna, advised Rome to aim its crosshairs on Albania, Libya and 
Tunisia while the Russian diplomat Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883) 
also encouraged Italian aspirations for Albania. 48  It was a unique and historic 
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opportunity, as Italy was in the pleasant position, with the blessings of the European 
governments, of being able to choose its potential dominions, carve out an 
autonomous, dynamic policy and to become a Great Power. At that time, as if by 
tragic irony, the Depretis government fell. All the proposals came to nothing as the 
new Cairoli government zealously dedicated itself to the irredentist issue. 
   The standard demand to give up Trento and Trieste was a thorny issue in the 
relations between Rome and Vienna and consequently between Rome and Berlin, 
because of the German-Austrian alliance of 1879. 49  Italy was focusing on the 
concession of the irredent lands while Paris was seemingly aiming at regaining 
Lorraine and Alsace. But at the same time the French were promoting their expansion 
elsewhere too. Italy's activities and energy were directed mainly on Trieste and 
Trento, leaving France free to act, negotiate and finally obtain assurances from the 
Euoprean powers over control of Tunisia. The new Italian Foreign Minister, Corti, a 
man sceptical by nature, rejected all the proposals for moving into Africa, which 
"could perhaps lead to war," thus withdrawing Rome from the European 
understanding which would divide the plunders of the Ottoman Empire. The British 
and the Germans then turned to Paris, which now seemed to be in a position to 
assume its pre-1870 role.50 In this manner, the diplomatic isolation of Rome came 
about with sad consequences during the proceedings of the Berlin Conference as well 
as during the final stages of the Tunisian issue. Berlin and Bismarck in particular, who 
was following his well-known cynical policy, and London which had seemingly long 
abandoned its traditional policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, 
in order to have the occupation of Cyprus accepted and recognized, offered Tunisia to 
France.51 The Anglo-French approach was then extended to the issues of restructuring 
the Egyptian economy and maintaining the status quo in the Holy Land. The French 
Foreign Minister and later on President of the French Republic William Henry 
Waddington (1826-1894) realized the tremendous benefits of the Anglo-German 
backing and reserved the right to examine the Tunisian issue in due time.52 The shift 
of the European diplomatic climate clearly forebode the Italian defeat. Italy, because 
of the inconsistency of its external policy and of the unfortunate circumstances, not 
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only lost the lead that had so painstakingly acquired in Tunisia but appeared to be 
losing out to a reborn France which additionally enjoyed the support of the rest of the 
governments. 
   When Tunisia "was being gifted" to Rome, during the Congress of Berlin, as 
a counterweight to the disturbance of the balance in the Mediterranean and Europe, 
Italy had refused the proposal. Since it did not occupy Tunisia when it had the 
momentum, it contented itself with strengthening its position and influence, evading a 
direct rift with Paris.53 The only sensible choice that was now remaining to Rome was 
to maintain the status quo.54 Besides, according to the French proclamations, there 
was no latent danger for Italy. The President of the French Republic François Paul 
Jules Grévy (1807-1891) declared: "The issue of Tunisia does not merit losing the 
valuable for us Italian friendship" and Waddington on the same wavelength stated: 
"France does not, nor will it ever contemplate the occupation of Tunisia [as it is] not 
willing to turn Italy into an enemy."55 The latter comfortingly assured Rome that "we 
would never do anything in the Mediterranean without prior consultation with 
Italy." 56 The relaxed Italian government naively trusted the misleading French 
statements about maintaining the status quo in the Regency. The Italian consul in 
Paris, Enrico Cialdini (1811-1892) in 1878 accurately and prophetically said about the 
matter: "to trust is good but to not trust is better."57 
   The idea of a dynamic resolution of the Tunisian stalemate began maturing 
in the minds of the French officials and decision makers. That is why after British 
encouragement, they "suggested" Libya, which will be mentioned further on, to 
Rome.58 The British Foreign Minister, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, third 
Marquis of Salisbury (1830-1903) mentioned potential territorial concessions in 
Africa in the case of a French occupation of the Regency. 59  Cairoli, insistent on 
respecting the status quo, denied every proposal. The timidity, the fear of inducing 
French or Turkish reactions, the complacency brought about by the French officials, 
the inability to comprehend the diplomacy and the parameters of the New 
Imperialism, the policy of "clean hands", would cost Italy once again. The Italian 
public opinion was so profoundly disappointed by the outcome of the deliberations 
during the Congress of 1878 and afterwards, that the Cairoli government was shaken 
and on the verge of dissolution. Waiting and reorganizing seemed as the most 
appropriate tactic before the final clash for the control of Tunisia. Italy did not take 
any decisive action that would directly hurt its relationship with France, and preferred 
to wait for more favourable circumstances, implementing in the meanwhile a program 
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of methodical penetration. Having realized the weakness of the rival bloc the French 
consul in Rome, Emmanuel Henri Victurnien, Marquis de Noailles (1830-1909) 
abruptly changed direction and in October of 1878 declared to his Italian counterpart: 
"Italy cannot dream as far as the conquest of Tunisia is concerned without clashing 
and risking a conflict with France."60 The hitherto moderate and friendly Waddington 
stated that the French government might not be thinking about the occupation of 
Tunisia but, if Italy was seeking to dominate there without prior agreement, France 
would be obliged to prevent it.61 The most experienced protagonists were operating in 
this cynical manner in the age of the frantic imperialism. The Quai d'Orsay boldly 
revealed its intentions and prompted Rome to turn its ambitions towards Libya. The 
French government now considered the Regency an area exclusively of its own 
interests, destined to become part of its African empire, enraging in this manner the 
Italians who for decades were being hopeful of making Tunisia their dominion.62 This 
was the diplomatic and psychological background of the two adversaries during the 
last and more dramatic phase of the Tunisian issue. The two sides might not have 
been level at that particular time but they were certainly equally determined to prevail. 
   After Deputy Giovanni Mussi's (1835-1887) short period in office Licurgo 
Macciò (1826-1905) took over as the new Italian consul. The new consul made a 
great impression when in September 1878 he landed on the Tunisian shores for the 
first time escorted by a marine contingent. Indeed Macciò from the onset of his 
consul’s tenure proposed and pushed forward a series of Italian sponsored public 
works and enterprises such as the construction and extension of a telegraphic line by 
Rubattino despite French protests.63 The landing of the new forceful Italian consul in 
Tunis accompanied by marines; the propaganda from both sides;64 the respects that 
prominent Tunisians paid to the Italian royal family during the latter's tour in Sicily in 
January 1881;65 the plans for the installation of a submarine cable that would facilitate 
the communication between Sicily and Tunisia, were the breeding-grounds for 
quarrels with the French.66 Every occasion was deemed suitable by Macciò and his 
French counterpart Roustan to frequent the bey's court to protest, to flatter, to 
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threaten, to do everything possible to undermine a potential advantage of the other 
side.67  
The Italian government implemented a costly policy in the hope that it would 
ensure predominance in the country, since it considered that its political position there 
was not proportional to the moral and financial aid that it had offered. The spread of 
the Italian culture and language, the manufacture of telegraphs, the establishment of 
post offices and banks, the control of the shipping, the participation of immigrants in 
prominent economic activities, the intrusion in the fields of agriculture and commerce 
were considered legitimate means of dealing with the French peril.68 Paris in turn, 
since it could not invade militarily, invaded administratively and financially acquiring 
mines, lands, railways and harassing any progress of the rival side.69 The Italians apart 
from the French involvement also had to face the obstructionism or the lack of co-
operation on the part of the bey. When they were considering that the Italian 
community was being treated unfairly or was being oppressed they were energetically 
asserting their interests "even with violence...demonstrating that we are among the 
Great Powers of Europe and forcing the bey to respect our rights."70 
   In July 1877, before the sharp increase of the antagonism, the French 
discovered a foothold that in accordance with the rules of imperialism, if there were 
any, could give them the triggering event to intervene in Tunisia. In 1863 a French 
count, by the name of Deveaux Veillet de Sancy, purchased a concession of 1,000 
hectares in Sidi Tabet in which he undertook the obligation to create farms and 
pasture estates.71 However, when the transfer was annulled by the Prime Minister 
Mustafa ben Ismail (1850-1887), since Sancy had failed to meet his commitments, the 
French consul considering the area in question as "French territory" drafted and 
dispatched a 48 hour ultimatum, which in the event of its rejection would give Paris 
the possibility of military action against the Regency.72 This threat to the relief of the 
Italians and much more of the Tunisians did not materialize.  
In 1878, despite reassuring French proclamations, there were suspicions of an 
impending surprise attack by a contingent of the French fleet in the country. Italian 
undercover agents were sent to the Algerian ports and Toulon, from where the French 
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fleet would potentially cast off, to appraise the on-site operations and to report 
anything suspicious. The rumour might not have been confirmed but the Italian agents 
recommended to their government to strengthen the presence of the Italian fleet in the 
Tunisian territorial waters.73 The Italians claimed they were seeking only to maintain 
Tunisia's freedom and to enforce order. They said were not harbouring ambitions 
against the country but if the necessity arose, they would dispatch their fleet to 
safeguard their interests. 74  On the contrary, Roustan in August 1878 laid the 
groundwork for the imposition of a protectorate while French diplomats were already 
considering the possibility of offering to Italy another territory for its activities. 
According to Waddington: "Italy is a very young nation to have precise objections. 
It's not a real policy but a tendency and secret aspirations drawn by reasons of 
Genovese and Venetian tradition...". In May 1880 Paris suggested yet another 
"alliance treaty" to the Tunisian government. Italy to counter these machinations 
approached London, Istanbul and Berlin "selling" its alliance to the higher bidder, to 
whoever could secure Tunisia for it.75 
The most important episode of the Franco-Italian antagonism was the issue of 
the Tunis-Goleta railway, owned by the British company Tunisian Railways. The 
British company, nominal proprietor of the line, facing economic hardships decided to 
concede its rights. In March 1880 the Italian company Rubattino initiated talks and 
reached an agreement with the British for the purchase of the line for a fee of 90,000 
sterling (3,250,000 lire). While the final proceedings were taken care of, the English 
representative was suddenly notified to break off the negotiations and two days later 
the railway was sold to the French company Bona-Guelma. The Italian side naturally 
protested for this slight. The heated reaction of the Italian community and of Italian 
public opinion prompted the Cairoli government to support the Rubattino Company in 
a rivalry that was moving from the economic to the political sphere.76 The matter was 
resolved at a London auction on 7 July 1880, where Rubattino, with the backing of 
the Italian government secured the line for 4,125,000 lire. The company completed 
the purchase of the railway in a climate of national pride and unbridled enthusiasm.77 
The parliament ratified the agreement on 13 July and a week later the Senate also 
gave its consent on the following grounds: this act "will mark a new step towards the 
future to which the traditions of the past (and) the civilizing mission imposed by our 
very geographical position are calling us”. The furious French reaction proclaimed 
explicitly not only the discontent at the status quo in Tunisia, but also France’s 
intentions to become the exclusive ruler of the country. The Foreign Minister Jules 
Barthélemy Saint Hilaire (1805-1895) in regard to the matter accused Rome of 
                                                          
73 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. X, (Rome, 1976), pp. 527-534.   
74 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XIII, (Rome, 1991), pp. 633-636. 
75 Alberto Gioccardi, La Questione di Tunisi: storia diplomatica dal congresso di berlino al trattato di 
Bardo, (Milano, 1990), pp. 55-68, 119. 
76 Ricci, La ferrovia Tunisi-La Goletta, pp. 1052-1053. The efforts of Paris to acquire the railway and 
unite more closely Tunisia with Algeria, thus consolidating its position in North Africa, were 
characterized by the Italians as "national vanity" while the French were characterized as "avaricious". 
See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XIII, (Rome, 1991), pp. 168-170. 
77 Ibid., p. 201. 
85 
 
"aggression" 78  whereas the Italian nationalists exulted: "Rome learnt the road to 
Carthage long before France even existed".79 
In April 1881 the French government found the pretext that it had been 
searching for. The Kroumirs, a nomadic Tunisian tribe skirmished with the Algerian 
provisional garrisons and crossed the borders in search of asylum.80 The French, with 
a view to "enforcing order at their borders", dispatched a military force with 
"provisional" and "limited" objectives.81 Paris notified Rome that this expeditionary 
corps would withdraw immediately after the arrest of the defectors. However Ferry, 
who had previously declared that "we wish for neither the bey's territory nor his 
throne," gave the order to proceed with the occupation of the country's strategic 
locations until the" restoration of order is guaranteed". The French troops occupied 
Bizerte and Tunis, and imposed on Muhammad as-Sadiq Bey (1813-1882) the treaty 
of Bardo on 12 May 1881, which officially turned from then on the country into a 
French protectorate.82 It is rumoured that the occupation took place while two Italian 
war ships remained passive, docked at the port of Tunis.83 Potential British objections 
were overcame as a result of Paris’ reassurance to London that its commercial 
interests will stay intact and that it was not inclined to fortify Bizerte. In any case the 
"British hands" were tied.84 The insurrection that broke out in the southern part of 
Tunisia gave the French the pretext to gradually conquer the entire Tunisian territory. 
On 8 June 1883 the agreement of Mousa completed the establishment of the French 
protectorate.85  The diplomatically isolated Italian government was stunned by the 
barrage of developments and resigned on 13 May 1881 in a climate of crisis and 
national upheaval. All the efforts, the funds, the cultural penetration, the political 
struggles, the commitments, the successes, and the promises collapsed like a house of 
cards in tha face of a single decisive French blow.  
The attempt to carve out an active and expansive policy failed amid booing, 
fury and frustration. Rome acted as a Great Power, clashed on an equal footing with 
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Paris, and seemed, albeit belatedly, to understand the rules of the game. In the end, 
however, theyfailed to obtain any practical benefit. On the contrary, the 
hithertoprivileged position of the Italians in Tunisia deteriorated and their rights were 
checked after the imposition of the French protectorate. 86  The French moved to 
degrade the Italian advantages, starting with the annulment of the 1868 Italo-Tunisian 
treaty. Its second move was the May 5 1883 degree according to which every foreign 
resident was obliged to make use of the French law courts. In 15 September 1885 the 
Italian collective interests were further harmed as a result of another French 
inspiredpiece of legislation. This time the liberty of association was limited and the 
Italian educational institutions and missionary activities passed into the 
protectorategovernment’s jurisdiction.87 With the 4th article of the Bardo treaty the 
French were obliged to respect the previous agreements between the bey and the 
European states. Despite these promises French administration opposed and restrained 
Italian activity and a series of ordinances hithard the Italian associations and 
educational institutes.88 Crispi, reported the violation of the 1868 Italo-Tunisian act, 
through the Italianembassies in Europe on 15 September 1888, and he even threatened 
to impose the same kind of restrictions one every French institution in Rome as 
retaliation. On 17 August 1895 Paris unilaterally abolished the 1868 Italo-Tunisian 
act. The new legal system put forth by Paris regulating the new position and rights of 
the Italian community was amended by the 28 September 1896 Tornielli-Honotaux 
convention. The Italian government had to give up the post offices and railways 
previously acquired in Tunisia andrecognize the French rule in exchange for the 
retention of some of its former privileges.89 The disagreements between France and 
Italy were partially settled with a bilateral treatyin September 1896 that proved 
remarkably durable, although frictions over Tunisia continued until the Fascist 
period.90 
Despite the imposition of the protectorate Italian commercial activities were 
still flourishing: In 1884 and 1885 the number of Italian merchant ships in Tunisian 
ports was 1456 and 2177 in comparison to 833 and 943 respectively under the French 
flag. Furthermore, the immigration flow from Sicily continued at an even larger scale 
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and in 1891 it numbered 40,000 immigrants. 91  French rule meant a mutually 
beneficial peace and a vast program of public works and investments in favour of the 
industrious Italian community such as the defensive works in Bizerte, the extension of 
the railways and the 1887-1893 minesweeping operations. The technical expertise and 
labour work of the Italians were valuable for the development of Tunisia and made 
the most of the French capitals.92 Putting in practice their colonial policy the French 
enacted a program of assimilating the natives and the Italian community alike. As part 
of the assimilation process Paris even employed the Catholic Church, which had great 
influence upon the uneducated working masses. The French did manage to 
monopolize the religious institutions in Tunisia, as the Vatican ordered the Italian 
missionaries in Tunisia to be replaced by their French counterparts, following 
France's declaration of the protectorate. Thus the French through their active clergy in 
Tunisia and Algeria sought to assimilate the Italians and Spaniards in a respectful 
manner and to bring them closer to the French authority under the auspices of the 
pope.93 The scheme to substitute the Italian religious element with the French one in 
the Catholic churches of Tunisia was put forth in collaboration with the Vatican, 
which was always willing to support France diplomatically against the usurper Italian 
government.94 
The popular rage after the Tunisian fiasco translated into riots and anti-French 
demonstrations in all the major cities of Italy while anti-Italian incidents occurred in 
Marseilles as well on 17-18 June 1881. France had not deprived Italy of just a 
dominion, but of a region so crucial for the Italian interests that many believed that 
the country would never be able to recover, to find a place in the sun, between the 
powerful nations of the world. Paris was no longer considered an obstacle, but a 
danger to Italian security. This fear and anxiety was the spark for consequences of the 
greatest importance. What the frustrated crowd was not in a position to know was that 
the largest share of the blame belonged to the Italian government, which made a series 
of diplomatic blunders, and that Tunisia's annexation to France was almost a foregone 
decision, as has been seen, since the Congress of Berlin.95 
    The psychological blow of 1881 was the catalyst that prompted Rome to the 
camp of the Central Empires. Initially, Depretis did not consider the alliance with 
these Powers self-evident. Italy could not break off all diplomatic relations with 
France since 400,000 Italian immigrants were residing there and another 50,000 in 
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Tunisia. Thus Mancini, desiring to maintain some avenues of communication with 
Paris open, proposed the conclusion of a trade agreement which was ratified in 
November of 1881. Sidney Salone Costantino Sonnino (1847-1922), a successful 
economist and a charismatic statesman who served the Italian government in many 
positions until the end of the First World War,96 believed that there was no time for 
vacillation and that "Italy had to decide if it wanted to be worth something in 
Europe."97  It is certain that regardless of which side the Italians tended to align 
themselves with, the other one would be displeased. Ultimately, the whole of the 
political world, the deputies, but also the Dynasty came out in favour of approaching 
Berlin and Vienna. 
   As the Italian-French relations constantly deteriorated amidst the struggle for 
Tunisia, Rome proposed to Vienna in January 1881 a mutual neutrality treaty, with an 
obvious anti French basis.98 Vienna and Berlin felt no pressure to be bound by such a 
treaty since the talks for the renewal of the Three Emperors Alliance, a more 
substantial pact, were well underway. In June 1881, nine years after the signing of the 
first treaty, the new alliance of the Three Emperors between Germany, Austria and 
Russia was concluded. However, during the first months of 1882 the latent Austro-
Russian antagonism in the Balkans came to the surface. The perpetual flaw in 
Bismarck's system reappeared. When a rebellion broke out in Herzegovina and 
southern Dalmatia at the beginning of 1882, the Austrians, alarmed by the 
proclamations of Pan-Slavism,99 suspected Russian involvement. On the opposite end 
Saint Petersburg never forgave Vienna for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1878 and had participated in the new alliance only to avoid diplomatic isolation.100  
The antagonism in the Balkans and the cracks that it was causing to 
Bismarck's edifice was Rome's ticket in the alliance. So, on 20 May 1882 the Triple 
Alliance (Triplice Alleanza) between Berlin, Vienna and Rome, with a five year 
duration, was signed.101 This defence pact had an anti-French nature since with it, the 
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complete isolation of Paris was accomplished. Paris could not approach Russia 
because of its association with the Central Empires, nor Britain because of their 
colonial antagonism. Furthermore, it provided that if Italy was attacked by France the 
two other allies would rush to its support (casus foederis), whereas if Berlin came 
under French attack Rome respectively was obliged to provide military assistance.102 
In the eventuality of an Austro-Russian war Italy was obliged to remain neutral. After 
a special clarification by the Italian side the alliance would not be directed against 
Britain.103 The treaty proclaimed the solidarity of the three governments involved for 
the preservation of peace and it offered Rome the coveted security it was seeking in 
that turbulent period. Italy, directly or indirectly, was securing its territorial integrity: 
assistance in the event of a war with hostile France, moral support for the always 
topical problem of the Vatican and a truce with Vienna for the irredentist issue.104 
Naturally Germany and Austria-Hungary could not care less about Italy's aspirations 
in Tunisia and its interests in the Mediterranean in general; their representatives 
declared that the treaty was to sustain the "monarchic principal" the "social and 
political order" and "universal peace".105 
   To Bismarck the Italian governments were unable to strengthen the 
monarchic principle and had an unstable foreign policy. Furthermore, the Italian 
military contribution and capabilities were at best dubious. What was indeed valuable 
to Berlin was Italy's neutrality in an eventual Austro-Russian conflict, its geopolitical 
significance and the fact that could attract Britain to the Central Empires camp.106 The 
disadvantages of Italy's new diplomatic position were not, of course, negligible. 
Firstly it had to abandon, at least temporarily, the issue of the Italian regions under 
Habsburg control, a fact which was perceived as treason and caused strong discontent 
among Catholics, the Left, but mainly among the Italian right-wing.  In spite of the 
alliance, the frictions for the irredentist zones and the primacy in Albania did not 
fade. 107  Germany's and Austria's adherence to the conservative monarchic values 
formed a hurdle in their relations with Italy. The "radical leftist Italy" was the reason 
for which Berlin was distrusting and avoiding a full co-operation with the Italian 
government.108 Also, there was no mention of protecting the Italian interests in the 
Mediterranean and Africa in the agreement with the Central Empires, a fact that 
demonstrates Rome's anxiety and rush to conclude a treaty at any cost as long as it 
would avoid another slap from France. Indeed, during the last stages of the Tunisian 
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issue but as well as afterwards, a French attack against the Italian frontier was 
rumoured to be likely. 109  Paris, for its part, did nothing to reassure the Italian 
concerns. Instead, it began to fortify the strategic port of Bizerte in Tunisia, 
confirming and strengthening the Italian and British concerns.110  
   Finally, the limitations and the difference of strength between Germany and 
Italy meant that the latter was no longer allowed to pursue an independent foreign 
policy, a policy that, judging by its results, had not been particularly successful. Yet 
the Triple Alliance strengthened Italy's international position in a period of economic 
protectionism, political antagonism and general mistrust. Rome, attached to the 
German bandwagon, may have paid the price of its participation in the Alliance 
however, it had won its security in Europe, a fact which would allow it to embark, 
dedicated and without distractions, upon a policy of expansion in Africa.  
The window of opportunity in the Mediterranean basin was closing. Algeria 
and Tunisia were converted into French dominions and Egypt, as will be seen further 
on, would suffer the British invasion. Morocco and Libya, which is neighbouring to 
Sicily, were being viewed as as potential dominions and were considered by the 
Europeans as "free" despite the nominal Ottoman suzeraintyThe Italians turned their 
ambitions towards the latter, believing that they too, like the rest of the Powers, were 
entitled to expansion and to civilizing work. This time they had to act cynically, 
dynamically and instantly since there were suspicions that sooner or later Libya as 
well would become a French target.111 Tunisia never constituted an Italian colony 
whereas Libya became one only in 1911. The fact that they were not placed under 
Italian rule the period under examination does not mean that these cases should not be 
considered. On the contrary, by considering the ambitions, the processes and the way 
in which the government of Rome handled each case, well-grounded conclusions can 
be drawn and the goal of interpreting the phenomenon of the Italian colonialism can 
be approached more safely. 
   The name Libya used above was not the one utilized by the Europeans of the 
19th century. The word "Tripolitania" was used to describe the western part of today's 
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Libya, which also includes the capital Tripoli. Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan 
formed a dominion under the suzerainty of the Sultan and were perhaps the only zone 
of North Africa for which the European powers had not yet expressed any interest. 
The Ottomans occupied Cyrenaica in 1517 and Tripolitania in 1551, while the 
southern part of the country, isolated and arid because of the Sahara, remained 
virtually inaccessible.112 The Ottoman rule was limited to the coastal areas and large 
cities, and its sole purpose was collecting taxes. The country's administration was 
delegated to local lords under the supervision of a governor (pasha).113 The entire 
country was named "Vilayet of Tripolitania" and that is why the term Tripolitania 
came to describe with the passing of the centuries all three Libyan provinces. The 
economically insignificant and rebellious Ottoman province suddenly acquired 
strategic importance after the French occupation of Algeria. So the High Porte, pre-
empting the Europeans, organized three campaigns after 1835 to fully subjugate the 
troubled region, an objective that was achieved after twenty four years of clashes.114 
The area was well known and constituted a field of antagonism between the Greeks, 
the Egyptians and the Romans since antiquity.115 In the middle of the 19th century it 
was inhabited by rugged nomadic tribes over whom Istanbul exercised sovereignty 
only in name.  
   Because of the climate's similarity with that of Sicily many Italians 
immigrated to Tripolitania too.116 Many of the Italian community in Tunisia, now 
under French control, decided to cross the frontier and resume farming, where 
"millions of hectares of uncultivated land were waiting for the care of our persistent 
farmers". According to others the province more resembled with a large sandbox 
(scatolone di sabbia).117 The country was not exactly the most irresistible attraction, a 
fact that was attested to by the small number of European residents and from the 
minimal capital that had been invested there.118 Yet Rome put in place a policy of 
influence and economic penetration in the region, since as "free", still unaffected by 
European designs, it was there for the taking.  
   Italy could not remain indifferent to any attempt by another Power to capture 
Cyrenaica or Tripolitania, since it was asserting "legitimate rights" there. 119  Its 
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importance for Rome is revealed by the frequent exploratory missions, starting from 
January 1881, which were organized to study its commercial and agricultural potential 
with the Sultan's knowledge.120 In 1882 Italy had lost the opportunity to consolidate 
its dominance over the Mediterranean and thus public opinion and the parliament 
began to demand the colonization of any dominion, an event that would restore the 
international standing of the country.121 So matured the "predisposition", the thought 
that Rome, in the framework of its policy about Libya, ought to act instantaneously in 
the first favourable occasion to avoid yet another unpleasant surprise.122 If this area 
was also placed under foreign control, the financial and strategic position of Italy 
would receive an irreparable blow, from which it might never be able to recover.123 
There were no longer any margins for hesitations, mistaken calculations and clumsy 
moves. 
   In autumn 1884 the Italian General Stuff staff drew up, with absolute 
secrecy, plans about landing and occupying Tripolitania.124 When the Triple Alliance 
was renewed on 20 February 1887 and on 6 May 1891, Italy, still attached to the 
German bandwagon and having partially overcome its francophobia, requested 
favourable clauses for itself or at least more favourable than those of 1882.125 This 
development is explained by the improvement of its international position in the 
meantime.126 Foreign Minister Carlo Felice Nicolis Count di Robilant (1826-1888) 
demanded exchanges in the event of a potential change of the Balkan status quo, thus 
reopening the issue of Trieste and Trento open. 127  To avoid an Italo-French 
understanding, Bismarck and the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary Gustáv 
Zsigmund Count Kálnoky (1832-1898) accepted the Italian proposals for the 
Mediterranean basin too. Berlin and Vienna reluctantly agreed to protect Italian 
interests even with the use of arms in the case of a new French challenge. Italy was 
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now enjoying the security that was necessary for its internal reorganization, although 
its military obligations arising from the Alliance were burdening the state budget far 
too much.128 Rome, having no other choice, and fearing that Tripolitania would meet 
the fate of Tunisia, approached Austria-Hungary, Britain and Spain aiming to 
maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean.129 Salisbury stated that "the day that the 
status quo is altered in the Mediterranean [is the day that] it is necessary for 
Tripolitania to be captured by Italy." To ensure its future consolidation Rome in June 
1898 approached even its great opponent, Paris, offering support in Morocco in 
exchange for freedom of action in Libya.130 Besides, the French had initially "offered" 
the Ottoman province to Italy, trying to restore bilateral relations.131 In this way Italy, 
despite the Porte's irritation, slowly but steadily formulated a policy of economic 
penetration in Libya, a policy that would pave the way for its future occupation. 
Tripolitania, three times the size of Italy, became a constant and fixed ambition, 
which additionally would offer, as it was believed, political balance in the 
Mediterranean, a balance that was disrupted in favour of France and against Italy with 
the treaty of Bardo.132 
   The Italians claimed that they desired only the preservation of the balance 
and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, as it had been agreed upon in 1856.133 If the 
Porte relinquished territories or privileges in the region to any other Power, Italy was 
"obliged to act". 134  Thus the enormous importance for Rome of this vital area 
becomes clear. In 1885 "few are those now in Italy who do not recognize the need to 
make Tripolitania our own." 135  The Italians, by utilizing their hitherto African 
experience, began to address the issue with vigour and suspicion. When in September 
1885 armed clashes broke out between two nomadic tribes on the borders of Tunisia-
Tripolitania, the Italians, anticipating the French might use this as an opportunity, 
rushed to support and expand their co-operation with the pasha of the country as well 
as the Sultan, acting as a counterweight to the French threat.136 With the memories of 
the 1881 setback still fresh, Rome knew in advance that Paris, with the pretence of 
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ensuring order, would send a military force from neighbouring Tunisia.137 After so 
many crises of francophobia and disappointments the Italians understood the methods, 
the tactics that they had to adopt to turn from stooges to protagonists in the colonial 
adventure. Each incorrect handling, each setback, each defeat was a painful lesson, 
the teachings of which they had to implement in other African regions. In regard to 
Tripolitania, however, they did not manage to gain a "dominant influence" and so in 
1884, like in 1878, they remained "with clean hands".138 Because of indecision, the 
unprepared Italian army and the economic difficulties, the Italian governmentdelayed 
taking action in Lybia until 1911. 
   The turbulent two-year period of 1881-1882 when the Egyptian crisis broke 
out shall now be examined. Egypt, because of inconsistent fiscal policy, stratospheric 
expenditures during the campaigns in Sudan and unjustifiable expenses on behalf of 
the khedive,139 found itself at the end of the 19th century in a deplorable financial 
state. The British and the French, anticipating the golden opportunity to subjugate the 
country and primarily to control more directly the Suez Canal, agreed to oversee the 
state finances themselves. Italy attempted to join this control regime which had 
developed into a protectorate, in 1878 and 1879, seeking to safeguard its own interests 
there, but the French reaction ruled this out.140  Because of the stifling European 
suzerainty, in the summer of 1882 a national liberation movement broke out, with the 
military officer Orabi Pasha as the prime mover.141  
      As the danger of military intervention increased, the falterin gnature 
Mediterranean balance was becoming visible. Rome argued that the problem ought to 
be resolved by the internal mechanisms of the Ottoman Empire. The interests and 
lives of the Italian community in Egypt, that numbered approximately 14,000 persons 
consisting the second biggest European community in the country after the Greeks, 
had to be protected. 142  Mancini, who wanted to avoid unilateral military action, 
approached his German and Austrian allies to find a mutually acceptable and 
moderate solution. The indifference of the latter two towards the Egyptian crisis 
became evident during the proceedings of the international conference in Istanbul, 
which was convened precisely to resolve this problem.143 The British Prime Minister 
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William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), encouraged by German support, declined 
every French proposal of co-operation and decided to act unilaterally. So, on 11 July 
1882 the British fleet shelled Alexandria revealing London's determination to become 
the sole ruler not only of the canal but of the whole country. The British late proposal 
for co-operation to Paris was rejected and the perplexed French government ordered 
the withdrawal of its warships from the Egyptian territorial waters, at a time when the 
Sultan suddenly found himself before a fait accompli.144  
   On 26 July the British Foreign Minister, Granville delivered to the Italian 
consul in London an invitation to act jointly and to enforce order in Egypt. Foreign 
Minister Mancini declined, arguing that since the Sultan had pledged to send troops 
for the pacification of the region, Italy had no reason to intervene, upsetting the 
European balance. 145  The opportunity of gaining a foothold in a zone of crucial 
importance in the Mediterranean was lost again. Much ink has been spilled for the 
reasons of Mancini's refusal. It is believed that it would be unwise for Rome to devote 
itself in a campaign of this kind at a time when elections and the reconfiguration of 
the old electoral system were pending. In addition, the Italian Foreign Minister 
hesitated perhaps to assume the initiative without the consent of the Triple Alliance 
members, whose stated position was defensive and conservative, supporting the 
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.146 Of course, Bismarck had previously 
backed the British and French ambitions in Egypt behind-the-scenes. The uncertain 
outcome of the military operations, the French distress, the lack of means, the military 
expenditures and the inability of the Italian army to operate so far away from its base 
weighed in on Mancini's decision.147 The easy victory that the British achieved and 
the subsequent occupation of Egypt proved that the danger and the risk of the 
intervention had been overestimated by Mancini, who, with his unwise action 
condemned Italy to a disadvantageous and problematic position in the Mediterranean. 
The former Minister of Agriculture and Finance, Marco Minghetti (1818-1886) 
declared in October 1882: "I would have liked [to see] the Italian flag wave next to 
the British on the Egyptian coast", while Crispi stated that: "Austria from the Alps to 
the Aegean is blocking our path and in the Mediterranean, Britain and France are 
smothering us."148 The same statesman claimed that the New Italy lacked courage a 
quality that the small Piedmont had more than enough.149  
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   When Mancini's colleagues realized that the campaign did not pose grave 
dangers and complications, the atmosphere became charged with tension with a 
multitude of verbal attacks against him. He defended his positions by arguing that he 
rejected the British proposal on the basis of "respecting the rights of the other states", 
and because of "international law".150 As a scholar and a thinker of the international 
law he placed special importance to the ideals of independence and the principles of 
justice and morality. On 22 May 1884 he stated to the parliament: "I can say without 
hesitation that, as a Minister and as a Deputy I shall always consider unwise and 
harmful the advice to incite Italy, a young nation, that above all else is in need of 
security, of peace, of fruitful activity, of internal stabilisation and of developing its 
means of prosperity and strength, to throw itself into a costly and dangerous 
adventures in areas far away, to initiate what it is customary to be called a colonial 
policy." 151  The same person, in an oxymoronic manner, would later be a prime 
colonial mover, linking his name with a policy of informal or indirect imperialism.152 
As will be seen in the next chapter, his actions were of catalytic significance for 
Italy’s expansion to the Red Sea and the acquisition of its first colony. The name of 
the "humanitarian" Mancini is today interwoven with one of the most resounding 
contradictions of the modern Italian history. 
   Germany was safe and powerful, maintaining friendly relations with 
London, having secured the alliance of Russia and Austria and flirting occasionally 
with France. That is why the Italian alliance took on even less importance, which 
explains the absence of any form of co-operation between the allies during the 
Moroccan crisis of 1884. At that time, once again on the occasion of the actions of 
some rebellious nomadic tribes, Paris demanded the readjustment of the Algerian-
Moroccan borders. The Italians, suspicious and alarmed by the developments, 
considered the French request a pretext for annexing Morocco as well. Berlin was 
indifferent about the matter disappointing the Italians and unwilling to engage in 
quarrels with Paris "because of vague concerns apropos of the Italian interests...in 
Morocco, in the Red Sea, in Tunisia or in Egypt". The relations of the Triple Alliance 
members had reached their nadir.153  
   Morocco, an independent state in the form of sultanate, was one of the few 
parts of African land that had yet to be placed under foreign guardianship. Morocco 
like Tunisia was constantly under threat by its own lack of effective government and 
by the French forces on its Algerian borders. The position of the Europeans in 
Morocco was settled by the agreement of 1880, a result of the Madrid conference,154 
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which was ensuring the economic interests of fourteen states in the country.155 The 
Italian investors had their share of interests too, such as an arms factory in Fès, while 
settlers and funds were progressively pouring in the country. 156  The Sultan of 
Morocco reassured that the Italians, unlike the French, did not nourish expansionist 
designs against his territory fully co-operated with the envoys of Rome at any given 
time.157 Nevertheless, Italy's stance in Morocco was inconsistent. The Italian consul 
Scovasso supported the idea of the state's reformation as a mean to oppose the French 
expansion and influence there. In 1878 though, he sided with the French, an act of 
rapprochement as other fronts were notably more crucial for the Italian interests. As a 
result during the Madrid conference two opposite fronts took shape: the British and 
Spanish were in favour of the modernizing reforms whereas the Italians and French 
were against their implementation. Since Germany for the time being did not harbour 
any special interests in Morocco, Bismarck supported once more the French side, 
irritated by the Liberals’ electoral victory in Britain in March-April 1880. Eventually 
Paris secured all of its rights at the time, expanding its interests in Morocco and by 
extension in the Mediterranean with German and paradoxically enough Italian 
backing.158 France, in dispute with Britain after the occupation of Egypt, seemed to 
value this Italian gesture of goodwill. At that time the President of the French 
Republic Ferry seemed to have proposed for Italy to have freedom of movements in 
Tripolitania as a counterweight to the French influence in Morocco.159 Nonetheless, a 
few years later, when the French cooperation proposals came to nothing, Rome in 
order to maintain the status quo in Morocco and restrain the French aspirations signed 
a similar agreement with Madrid in 1887 and 1891.160  Foreign Minister Mancini 
enjoying the support not of his allies but of Spain and Britain addressed Paris directly, 
making known that Italy was in advance against any plan of a French expansion in 
Morocco. Rome, in any event, could not allow and tolerate "the dominance of a nation 
from Morocco to the Nile", the consolidation i.e. of a lake of exclusive (French) 
interests.161 
   By 1884 Italy had virtually turned into an observer of the Mediterranean 
developments. Russia had acquired territorial footholds and influence in the Balkans 
as a result of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878, Austro-Hungary had occupied 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Britain had won Egypt and Cyprus, France Tunisia, Greece 
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Thessaly, and even Montenegro had expanded its territories by annexing Bar and 
Dulcino (Ulqin). As if that were not enough, Austria-Hungary was having designs on 
Macedonia and Britain was seeking to acquire a port in Asia Minor. The Italians so as 
not to remain "isolated spectators" of the developments and have "all the plunders" 
shared before Italy provided for its interests, approached London with the aim of 
taking joint action in all matters relating to the Mediterranean.162 The rift between the 
Central Empires and Russia on the issue of the predominance in Bulgaria, forced 
Bismarck to seek British friendship. The 1876-1878 exacerbation of the Pan Slavic 
agitation was reignited in 1885-1887 as a result of the Austro-Russian squabble about 
establishing influence upon Bulgaria and coincided with the emergence of a 
revanchist anti German feeling in France triggered by the War Minister Georges 
Ernest Jean-Marie Boulanger (1837-1891). Influential figures at the Russian court, the 
clergy, journalists and writers were asking imperatively for the liberation of the fellow 
Slavs from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian grip. The prospect of a menacing 
encirclement between Paris and Saint Petersburg convinced Bismarck of Rome’s 
importance as a gateway to London's cooperation. The latter was also interested in 
recruiting support, as it was amidst colonial clashes in Africa and Asia.163 Britain, in 
addition to its traditional rivalry with France in Africa and elsewhere, felt threatened 
by the Russian progress in the Balkans and especially in Central Asia.164 So it began 
to co-operate and cultivate cordial relations with Germany and Italy. 165  British 
friendship and diplomatic backing for Italy starts from the period of the Risorgimento. 
Because of the all-powerful British Navy and the vulnerability of its shores, Italy 
could not maintain a hostile attitude towards London in any case. The British 
manifested their friendship, besides the invitation during the campaign in Egypt as 
mentioned above, in the Red Sea as well where, as will be seen further on, it provided 
the bulwark of the Italian foreign policy in the period 1882-1885.166 
   The Italo-British diplomatic contacts from 1882 until 1887 were aimed at the 
joint protection of individual interests in the Mediterranean from the Russian and 
French peril. 167  With Bismarck's blessing, di Robilant proposed to London an 
understanding for the maintenance of the status quo in the Aegean, the Adriatic, the 
Red and the Black Sea, as well as diplomatic support in Egypt in exchange for British 
support in Libya. 168  On this basis, in February 1887 a secret agreement for the 
Mediterranean between London and Rome was signed, which because of the latter's 
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alliance to Vienna, became tripartite in March 1887.169 This was a Mediterranean 
triple alliance, which also bound Spain as a result of the preceding agreements with 
Italy about Morocco and the Mediterranean. The "necessity" of a consortium for the 
defense of the Mediterranean status quo and of the Ottoman Empire in the event of 
war led to the signing of the agreement.170 Germany, now indirectly associated with 
Britain, strengthened its position in relation to the French and the Russians, who had 
every reason to feel threatened. The German danger in Europe and the British peril 
throughout the world during the last quarter of the 19th century, France and Russia to 
come closer to one another and ultimately to enter into alliance in 1892.  
France, witnessing the creation of a common German-Austrian-Italian and 
more or less British front directed primarily against it, sought to destroy the 
threatening arrangement. Paris especially in 1887-1890 chose to attack the soft 
underbelly of the alliance; It withdraw its capitals and assets from Italy, raised its 
customs duties and even implemented a policy of diplomatically backing the Pope in 
his wranglings with the Italian state. Indeed it was rumoured that Pope Leo XIII 
(1810-1903) in his effort to undermine the Italian government promoted the idea of a 
French-Russian-Vatican front. In any case the French bullying had the pontiff's 
blessings. In early 1890 Crispi made an effort to approach Paris on the following 
basis: Italy would cease protesting against the French occupation of Tunis in 
exchange for Paris' recognition of the Italian interests in Eastern Africa. The failure of 
this timid attempt meant that every channel of understanding with Paris was severed 
and thus Rome fell deeper into Berlin's protection.171 
For Italy, the agreement and the consequent system of security meant stability 
and peace and for di Robilant a personal triumph. The representatives of the 
parliament's right and left-wing realized that because of the geographical location, the 
political situation in Europe in the 19th century and the lack of means, Italy always 
had to be allying itself with a stronger state, paying the appropriate price. Amid 
hesitations and reservations they had to surrender part of their diplomatic 
independence, constantly falling in line with Britain or Germany, abandoning 
energetic policies that posed risks. The diplomatic dependance was not conductive to 
a policy of expansion in the Balkans and Africa. The imperialist policy, the "politica 
di grandezza", could come into being only through alliances and external political 
backing.172  The Triple Alliance, though conservative and restrictive, was offering 
Italy a place among the powerful, a regime of security and the necessary prestige, 
which sometimes as a medium and sometimes as an end in itself was paving the way 
for a policy of expansion. A natural consequence of the Italian co-operation with the 
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Central Empires was the rupture with France, with serious political and economic 
ramifications for Rome.173 
   This was Italy at the time that it was implementing its expansionary plans in 
the Red Sea. The characteristics which shaped its foreign and, up to a point, colonial 
policy of this period, were presented in the present chapter. The stress about security 
and balance in the Mediterranean, the British co-operation, the French rivalry, the 
belief about a fair territorial compensation in Africa due to previous failures, the 
ambient atmosphere, the rising nationalism, the sometimes cold, sometimes 
indifferent, sometimes cordial relations with the German and Austrian allies, are facts 
that must be taken into account to comprehend Italian colonialism. 
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5. Eritrea, the first Italian colony 
 
5.1 The establishment of the Italian colony in Eritrea 
 
   During the second half of the 19th century, the opening of the Suez Canal 
shifted the focus of the Great Powers to the Red Sea area, which would become the 
main passage route between Europe and the Orient. The faster and easier 
communication with the Indies and the justified hope that this would bolster and 
stimulate the trade of the West with the rich markets of the East, left no Power, 
country and company unmoved. Therefore, the necessity for Europeans to establish 
commercial stations and to occupy bases between the Mediterranean and the Indian 
Ocean, which would facilitate and strengthen profitable commercial transactions, 
became self-evident. The canal was opened by French workers under the direction of 
Ferdinand Marie Count Lesseps (1805-1894), with the aim of strengthening the 
French trade with the East. 1  The opening of the canal in 1869, a technical and 
scientific achievement of colossal importance, profoundly affected and reshaped the 
relations, policies and destiny of three continents. 
   Already since 1856, the Italian government, still located at Turin, had 
implemented a plan for the expansion of the Genoa port’s capacity in anticipation of 
the sensational opening.2 The Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade sent the 
expert professor, Sapeto to Egypt in 1863 in order to investigate the effects and the 
consequences of the Suez Canal to the Italian economy. After the end of his mission 
he published a book entitled L'Italia e il canale di Suez, in which he summed up his 
positions and advices towards the Italian government: if Italy was to gain a prominent 
position in the world market, it ought to settle immediately the issue of the rail 
connection between north and south, move as quickly as possible to acquire a coal 
mine for the purpose of resupplying the Italian ships with coal en route to the Orient 
and appoint a commissioner to the Red Sea area with the responsibilities of 
facilitating trade relations between the Italian and the indigenous, dispatching a 
flotilla of naval vessels in the waters in questions and establishing a base at Socotra or 
at Suakin, as a commercial station.3 
   Under the influence of these ideas and enthusiasm the plan to acquire a 
station at the Red Sea began to interest the industrial houses of the North, the shipping 
companies and the chambers of commerce, particularly those of the most important 
Italian port, Genoa. On 16 March 1866, during the proceedings of a meeting, its 
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members unanimously declared: "Of course we do not aspire to great conquests, 
which yield results that do not reward the sacrifices. What we want is to put under 
your consideration the benefits that Italy would secure with a harbour at which our 
citizens would be able to find assistance, justice and aid [...]. From becoming 
conquerors of vast expanses to ending up without a port [...] the distance is huge."4 
Thus the ideological basis of a colonialism oriented to establishing naval bases and 
commercial stations is detected and not of a policy of direct control aiming to 
territorial expansion. It was believed that the frantic search for bases and their 
establishment with demographic and commercial goals would elevate the Italian 
prestige and economy. Obtaining stations was not only legitimate but imperative and 
consistent "with the example of other nations and of History".5 In 1863 the Minister 
of Education, Michele Benedetto Gaetano Amari (1806-1889) underlined the 
unprecedented opportunity of consolidating Italy on the coast of the Red Sea and as a 
result expanding the Italian trade to the Arabian Peninsula and Ethiopia.6 Between 
1859 and 1869 Rome had not been officially active in the region. However, as has 
been seen, many explorers had already looked into the commercial and demographic 
features of the area in question and of Eastern Africa in general. In October 1869 the 
plenum of Genoa's Chamber of Commerce suggested again to the government to 
"establish at a Red Sea port, preferably at Sekeira, a trading company, where our ships 
would find coal, security and asylum", whereas that of Venice on 27 September 
suggested Sceikh Said on the left bank of the Arabian Peninsula.7 
In 1868 the Minister of Shipping, Antonio Augusto Riboty (1816-1888) 
invited the Italian shipping companies to put to use every resource to confront and 
cope with the upcoming international competition. The Rubattino Company 
responded positively to the Minister's proposal, suggesting Genoa's connection with 
Alexandria of Egypt and through the Canal, with the ports of the Indies and Far East.8 
From all the shipping companies, Rubattino was the only one that realized and 
exploited in good time the frenzy of the ruling class for the exploitation of the Suez 
Canal. In 1868 the company inaugurated the shipping lane Genoa-Livorno-
Alexandria-Port Said. Subsidized by the state it connected Genoa with Mumbai in the 
spring of 1870 and hoped to promote the Italian trade, until then of minor importance, 
to the East by doing the same with Singapore. Rubattino expanded its commercial 
interests in East Africa, and eliminated the competition under the government's 
                                                          
4Francesco Surdich, "Il colonialismo italiano, l'imperialismo straccione," in Il Calendario, (Sept. 1996), 
p.8. 
5Tomaso Sillani, L'Africa Orientale Italiana e il conflitto Italo-Etiopico, (Rome, 1936), p. 17. 
6Raffaele R. Ciasca, Storia coloniale dell'Italia contemporanea, da Assab all'Impero, (Milan, 1940), p. 
81. 
7Ibid., p. 19. 
8Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 35. The company in question was the one that allowed Garibaldi's 
thousand to "steal" two of its ships for their famous Sicilian campaign in 1860 and the one that was 
involved in the purchase of the Tunisian railway as has been already examined. 
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auspices.9 In reality it was not just the company that benefited from this collaboration. 
The government preferred not to act officially for the occupation of a colony, an event 
that might cause international implications, and masked its actions behind a private 
company, which could lease unhindered any location as a port or as a coal depot for 
its ships, and afterwards cede it with brief and legal procedures to the Italian state in 
return for a fee. 10  The Menabrea government, Rubattino and Vittorio Emanuele 
himself acquiesced and supported the colonial undertaking seeking a "humble 
expansion".11 
  Sapeto, as the expert, and rear admiral William Acton (1825-1896) were 
dispatched to the Red Sea in 1869 to select an appropriate site and find yet another 
"free" area (res nullius). Receiving a state grant of 80,000 lire they departed from 
Brindisi on 12 October and sailed to the Arabian coast where their two most prevalent 
objectives, Khur Amera and Sceikh Said were situated. 12  The two men were 
disappointed when they were informed by the British colonial authorities of Aden that 
the former had been already occupied by the British and the latter by a French 
company.13 The situation in this acrimonious period of the new imperialism was so 
fluid, especially in the area of the Red Sea after the opening of the Canal, that entire 
regions were turned into protectorates and dominions in a blink of an eye.14 Hence the 
mission headed towards the African coast where it located the coast of Assab, which, 
according to Sapeto, was strongly reminiscent of La Spezia and Rio de Janeiro and 
ruled that the site in question was "the most appropriate for our plan of a commercial 
station".15 Furthermore, he determined with a quick glance that the local population 
was peaceful, the access easy, the mooring safe and the water reservoirs satisfying. 
Assab, a communication and commercial hub between Arabia and Ethiopia since 
ancient times, was inhabited by the tribe of Dankali or Danakil, subjects of the Sultan 
of Anfari.16 The major advantage of the region was that apparently it did not belong to 
any Power and therefore its acquisition would not cause reactions, complications and 
confrontations.  
   With the somewhat premature conclusion that Assab could become the 
trading centre of all the surrounding hinterland, which included Tigre, Scioa, Massaua 
                                                          
9Gian Luca Podesta, "Gli investimenti italiani in Africa orientale 1869-1919", Annali dell'Istituto italo-
germanico in Trento, v. 24, 1998, p. 148. 
10Roberto Battaglia, La prima Guerra d'Africa, (Turin, 1958), pp. 82-83. 
11Carlo Zaghi, La conquista dell'Africa, studi e ricerche, vol 1, (Naples, 1984), p. 193. 
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13  Cesare Cesari, Colonie e possedimenti coloniali, cenni storici-geografici ed economici, (Rome, 
1927), 48. 
14 Of course, European presence in the region existed well before 1869. The ports of the Red Sea were 
open to French trade already since 1843. In 1862 the Sultan of Tajura conceded Obock (Djibouti) and 
the hinterland to the French for 50,000 francs. At the opposite shore of the Red Sea, Britain brought 
under its control Perim and the strategically important Aden of today's Yemen in 1839, see Ciasca, 
Storia coloniale dell'Italia, p. 82. 
15 Battaglia, La prima Guerra, p. 84. 
16 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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and Beilul. Sapeto and Acton held negotiations with the brothers Ibrahim and Hassan 
ben Ahmad, who were as they were claiming, the beneficiaries of the rights of the 
location in question.17 With a contract on 15 November 1869 they granted the area 
between the "Lumah Cape and the Ganga mountain", six kilometres long and another 
six wide, to Sapeto for 6,000 "Maria Teresa" coins, i.e. 30,000 lire.18 Moreover, a 
small additional amount was paid as security deposit to ensure that the brothers would 
not to cede the location to another interested party. On 8 March of the next year, 
sailing from Livorno on Rubattino's ship "Africa", Sapeto returned to Assab not only 
to ratify the agreement but also to extend the boundaries of the new colony.19 Three 
days later the ben Ahmad brothers, signed the new contract with the representatives of 
Rubattino and ceded, under the form of a lease, the surrounding islands as well for 
800 additional "Maria Teresa" coins.20 In addition to the adjacent islands, the coast of 
Buia was also acquired while part of the territories belonging to the Sultan of Raheita 
fell into the Italian sphere of influence; Raheita would formally become an Italian 
protectorate much later in March 1880.21The Italian company was now in position to 
utilize the coast as it wished since it was its undisputed ruler, proving "to the world 
that the Italians were not only playing the leading part in brave and useful 
undertakings but they also knew to honour them!" 22  This time the fall of the 
Menabrea government and the assumption of power by Lanza did not have a negative 
effect.23 On 13 March the Italian flag was raised in the sky of Assab amid gun salutes 
from "Africa". By 1870 Assab had cost Rubattino, essentially the government, 
104,100 lire from which 51,100 for the costs of travel, 41,200 for the payment of 
Sultans and 12,000 for the services of Sapeto.24 
   The baseless enthusiasm was succeeded by doubts, criticism and 
reservations. At a time when General Bixio was pressuring the government to proceed 
to the official occupation of Assab 25  Rome dispatched to Rubattino's base a 
consultative committee of experts, which taking into account all the parameters 
adjudicated that at the given time the founding of a colony would have no practical 
value for the Italian state.26 Assab seemed unsuitable as a penal colony or as a market 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 86. 
18 Giorgio Rochat, Il colonialismo italiano, (Turin, 1974), p. 20. 
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for the Italian agricultural goods. 27  The explorer Carlo Guarmani (1828-1884) 
declared: "For me it is impossible for Assab (to become) the trading station of Scioa, 
impossible as a market, it is worth absolutely nothing." 28  The above view was 
espoused by other explorers too. Representatives of the Left opposed the undertaking 
not only for ideological reasons, but for practical ones too, such as the burdening of 
the state budget without any tangible benefit.29 According to others "Assab would 
never be a port to compete with Aden's commercial importance, let alone overcome 
it" and "Assab had no value, neither for the caravans nor as a commercial station nor 
as a market for Abyssinia."30 Ethiopia, which was supposed to be absorbing the Italian 
products and exporting its own, was the "most wretched country of Africa" and did 
not possess huge gold, ivory and coffee reserves as the Europeans believed or as they 
wanted to believe. 31  Critics of the plan to officially occupy Assab reasonably 
wondered why, if it had such a great strategic and economic value, as Sapeto and 
Bixio were maintaining, it was not already occupied by the other Powers. The 
majority of the anti-Africanists claimed that political colonies was an outdated 
ideological construct of another era, and agreed with reservations only to the 
establishment of commercial or naval bases. 
Opinions about Assab diverged. Some believed that it was worth the trouble 
and the expenses of converting it into a harbour and a trade centre in view of the 
upcoming economic boom that the opening of the canal would yield.32 Also it could, 
with the appropriate work and the construction of docks and naval facilities, become a 
foothold and a resupply base for the expeditionary missions and economic 
undertakings in Eastern Africa.33 Sapeto in his book Assab and its critics, which was 
published in 1879, defended his choice, characterized the criticism as excessive and 
presented the region as rich in sugar, coffee, cotton, wheat, ivory and tobacco. The 
only thing that was needed for the promotion of the Italian products in the interior was 
opening up and protecting a road network. The connection to the heartland, the 
strategic position of the dominion and the active involvement of Italian businessmen 
would turn Assab into a transit trade centre of Eastern Africa and Yemen. If this 
objective was unattainable and utopian, it could at least yield coal depots and thus 
assist Italian merchant vessels and warships. Sapeto, exalting the strategic-
geographical value of the region also added: "[...] the European power that will make 
                                                          
27 A traveler-journalist deemed it as sandy, extremely hot and "horrendous", lacking wells, pastures, 
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Friday, 16 January 1885, p. 1. 
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Abyssinia an ally or dominate it, will become the controller of Red Sea's commerce 
and of continental Egypt's commercial destiny".34 Assab according to others "had a 
fascinating future", was the "seed from which the tree of the second Roman Empire 
would grow" and the foundation stone of the colonial structure, which "would bring 
honour to New Italy." The Italian vice-consul in Aden, Giuseppe Biennenfeld Rolph 
(1838-1913) asserted in January 1872:"[...]a lot has been written and said on Assab, 
but noone rightly appraises this port's importance in terms of commerce[...]. 
Assuredly when the Somalis and the Abyssinians feel secure to find customers for 
their products, they will more willingly go to Assab sparing many days of travel and 
find protection in the established government [...] it would be a real pity if the Italian 
government abandoned this project for long; Assab belongs to Italy and Italy has to 
extract the best profit for the expansion of its commerce. Therefore, I invite the entire 
Italian commercial sector to ask from the government the completion of what has 
been started, taking quickly and efficiently Assab's possession [...]".35The more ardent 
imperialists foresaw the creation of a military base, a correctional facility or of an 
agricultural colony, where Italian citizens would find land under the state's protection 
in a relatively short distance and not in faraway Argentina and Australia.36 
This interpretation was rejected by the critics of the undertaking because of the 
climate, the barren land and the lack of water. Indeed, the region was arid, sparsely 
populated and had no road network so that it would be connected with the mainland.37 
According to Commander De Amazaga, who was sent in September 1879 to study 
Assab's potential, it was not suitable for a military, penal or agricultural colony but 
only for a naval or a commercial base.38 The surrounding area, Dancalia, was also 
infertile and poor and clearly not lending itself as a market of products as the more 
optimistic were hoping.39  Ezio De Vecchi, (1826-1897), general and chief of the 
Army's topographic institute after an inspectional mission in 1871 concluded that for 
a series of practical reasons Assab could not render itself suitable for a naval or 
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penitentiary colony.40 The same pessimistic judgment was shared by the explorer 
Cerruti; nevertheless he sided in favour of the coast’s definite acquisition.41 
   Few were those who found some usage value in the dominion and believed 
that it could actually contribute to the growth of the economy and the expansion of the 
Italian trade.42 Its more ardent supporters were the shipbuilding companies, the Court 
and the Army. In reality the ruling class was hardly preoccupied with the economic 
penetration of the African hinterland or with the safe anchoring. It was aspiring only 
to the acquisition of prestige through civilizing, conquering, fighting crime and 
battles. The quest for prestige, the humiliations such as that in Tunisia, the boredom 
after the turbulent period of the national rebirth and the enormous proportions that the 
immigration problem was taking influenced their position. 
      Ten years after the purchase of Assab nobody knew how to put it to use or 
what status it should be under (protectorate or territorial annexation), while the calls 
about its minimal value and its abandonment were growing in number. The coast 
remained unexploited and the only visible sign of Italian presence was the sign 
"Rubattino Property purchased on 11 March 1870."43 Furthermore, the company that 
held the title of the coast's ownership did not utilize it, preferring the ports of Aden or 
Gedda for resupplying its ships.44 Neither Rubattino, nor the government, influenced 
by the indifference of the public opinion, was paying the agreed annual amount to the 
Sultan of Raheita for the use of the areas surrounding Assab.45 One could further 
argue that the Italians chose to act at the worst possible time. No matter how subtly 
and quietly they were operating in the Red Sea, their activity could not go unnoticed 
since the entire world had literally turned its gaze there after the opening of the Suez 
Canal. 
   The inaction, the disagreements and the dissent were not the only hurdles 
that the Italian government encountered. Egypt was the first to have noticed the Italian 
actions. On 29 April 1870, four days after Sapeto's departure, the ship "Khartum" 
landed Egyptian troops on the coast of Assab. They threatened and physically 
assaulted the local indigenous people they came upon, under the pretext of 
insubordination and co-operation with the Europeans. Rome demanded the 
withdrawal of the Egyptians and Cairo, in its turn, called for the evacuation of the 
area and the restoration of the status quo. The Italians responded that the transfer of 
Assab to Rubattino was valid and legal.46 They added that Egypt was in no position to 
                                                          
40Natili, Un laboratorio coloniale, p. 34. 
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raise claims because the Porte, its overlord, never had sovereign rights over the 
coastline. Therefore, the Porte could not raise any claims either, other than religious.47 
While the future of the location hung in the balance a nerve-racking diplomatic 
conflict between Rome, Cairo, Istanbul and London began. Someone aptly stated that 
Italy's greatest expenditure, regarding Assab, was the paper used to defend Italian 
claims.48 
   Egypt, an autonomous entity before the British conquest, was maintaining 
expansionist designs on the whole of Eastern Africa. Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and 
the entire coastline up to the Horn of Africa were in the sights of Khedive Ismail 
(1830-1895), the unfit successor of Muhammad Ali Pasha al-Mas'ud Ibn agha (1769-
1849). The obstacle of the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia was impenetrable for the 
Egyptian army and formed the bulwark against the Egyptian imperialist expansion. 
Cairo moved diplomatically and militarily to sever the flow of supplies and weapons 
to Ethiopia and isolate the country, with the ultimate aim of subjugating it. Istanbul, 
the formal suzerain of the coastline from the period of its conquest by the Ottomans in 
the 16th century, had transferred the jurisdiction of Zeila and Beilul to Cairo with 
firmans in 1866 and in 1873.49 Cairo managed to control a large part of the Sudanese 
hinterland and the whole of the coastline from Suez to Berbera in the south, by 
installing outposts and garrisons. The Egyptian government in an attempt to 
discourage Rubattino, founded the "Administration of the Red Sea coast" and 
appointed its deputies to all the coastal cities in an attempt to affirm its rights in the 
region. The encirclement of Ethiopia was a fact and war was inevitable. The military 
operations between 1873 and 1875 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the 
Ethiopians. Τhe consequences of the Ethiopian triumph radically altered the balance 
of power. The failure and the destruction of the Egyptian army also meant the 
deterioration of its already anaemic state finances. 50  For Ethiopia the unexpected 
victory translated into maintaining its independence, rallying against external enemies 
and strengthening the central rule of Emperor Yohannes IV (1821-1889). The 
Ethiopians after their victory reasonably believed that the territories they had detached 
from the Egyptians now belonged to them. At the end of the 19th century, when Italy 
was acquiring rights on the Red Sea's coastline, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Istanbul and of 
course London had a say in the region.51 
   The attitude of the involved parties towards the Italian intrusion ranged from 
distrust to outright hostility. Rome, naturally, addressed London for mediation and 
diplomatic support. The British, initially opposed to any rival presence in the Red Sea, 
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notified the Italian side in 1879 that the coastline belonged directly to the Porte and 
indirectly to the khedive.52 Officially, Britain was respecting the rights of the Porte 
even though in practice it was the first to infringe on them and had no interest to 
intervene in favour of Rome in the Italo-Egyptian sparring. Britain maintained a 
predominant position in the Red Sea, the "sensitive chord" of its Empire, and viewed 
with concern the Italian progress.53In order to safeguard its position in Aden, it was 
opposed to the establishment of yet another European colony in the area. 54  The 
Italians however, claimed they were seeking cordial relations with the British to 
achieve close co-operation in economic and "humanitarian" areas. 55  Additionally, 
British backing would be useful in the dispute with Cairo which, hostile to any 
European intervention in its domestic matters, had turned towards Paris in 1881 in 
search of allies.56 The Egyptian initiative failed because at that point in time the 
French had every reason to urge the Italians away from Tunisia and towards Eastern 
Africa. It seems that the British, considering the Italian presence in Assab dangerous 
and wanting to protect their Indian empire, were raising hurdles, shielded behind the 
governments of the Sultan and of the khedive. It is not coincidental that when they 
changed attitude and started to co-operate with the Italians all the protests subsided as 
if by magic.  
The firm position of Benjamin Disraeli’s conservative government that Assab 
belonged to Egypt was deconstructed when he was succeeded by Gladstone with 
Granville as the Foreign Minister.57 When the French colonial antagonism intensified 
and the situation in Egypt and in Sudan started to unfold ominously for the British, 
they decided conditionally to support Italy seeing it as a weak but potentially useful 
ally for their interests in Eastern Africa. 58  A docile and co-operative Italy was 
certainly preferable to the rival France in the Red Sea. Perhaps they realized that 
Rome and Assab would never be in a position to remove London from the dominant 
position that it enjoyed in the region.59 Τhe conditions set then by the British for the 
acknowledgement of Assab were that it was never to be converted into a military 
base, that the hinterland or the adjacent islands were not to be fortified and that it was 
to serve only commercial purposes without "any political value".60 Cairoli confided to 
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the British ambassador in Rome on 19 April 1880: "Assab will never be a government 
dominion of military nature".61 British tolerance had been secured. In the summer of 
1879 the government, convinced that it could draw from Assab, with relatively 
limited expenses, considerable economic benefits, allowed Rubattino to reoccupy it 
after approximately ten years of inaction.62 On 26 September a state official was sent 
to the site as Italy's consul.63 Everything indicated that it would not be long before the 
dominion was officially annexed by Italy. Two events of crucial importance, at Beilul 
and Raheita, accelerated the events. 
Between 25 and 30 May 1881 the secretary of the Italian commissioner, 
Giuseppe Maria Giulietti (1847-1881) set off from Assab escorted by twelve marines 
and travellers, with the aim of penetrating and exploring the mainland.64 At a distance 
of five days from Beilul the mission was ambushed by a local tribe and neutralized. 
The event itself troubled the Italian public opinion but it was the manner with which 
the government chose to handle the issue that infuriated it. The new Depretis 
government (after the fall of Cairoli due to the Tunisian fiasco) and the Foreign 
Minister Mancini asked the Egyptian authorities to investigate the matter and to arrest 
the culprits, recognizing indirectly Egyptian jurisdiction in the region and ruining the 
Italian prestige in Europe and Africa. 65  The Egyptian authorities accepted but, 
desiring themselves the withdrawal of the Italians, did not dedicate themselves to the 
search of the perpetrators with zeal,66 according to eyewitnesses’ accounts. Thus the 
poor results of the investigation did not satisfy the Italian government.67 
   A few days later Egyptian troops threatened Raheita, south of Assab, with 
the goal of restoring it to the authority of the Egypt's khedive.68 The Sultan of the 
region had accepted the Italian protection and thus Rome tried to preserve the 
"independence" and the territorial integrity of its protectorate. 69  The goal was 
ultimately achieved; Raheita remained within the Italian sphere of influence but at the 
expense of Italy's moral and political standing in the Red Sea. 70  Even though it 
dispatched warships to the region, it entrusted the resolution of the matter to the 
British authorities, a decision which was also strongly criticized. To combat such 
phenomena and to strengthen its position Rome had to finally annex Assab, gaining 
legitimacy and voice in the proceedings of Eastern Africa. 
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   Britain acknowledged the Italian rights on Assab, under the aforementioned 
conditions on 16 February 1882. Egypt and the Ottoman Empire unable to oppose 
Britain did not react initially, and later accepted the Italo-British agreement.71 Italy 
recognized the Porte's rights on the whole of the Red Sea's African coastline except 
for Assab and the surrounding area and the Egyptians-Ottomans acceded to "the 
purchases, made by the government of his Excellency's, the King of Italy between 
1870-1880 on the coast of Assab with every subsequent right of full ownership, 
legality and sovereignty."72 Since the diplomatic difficulties were overcome the path 
was now paved for the official acquisition of the colony by the Italian government. 
On 10 March 1882, with a regulation which could be considered as the first colonial 
law of New Italy, Assab's ownership passed from Rubattino to the Italian state for 
416,000 lire, an amount that was representing all the operating costs of the dominion 
in the preceding decade.73 Assab gave Italy the opportunity to put into practice its 
plan of "civilization and peace". The more realists viewed the purchase as the first 
step towards a disaster since with it "Italy was falling into a trap" and could no longer 
turn back.74 The parliament approved the bill with 147 votes for and 72 against. The 
Senate seemed more indecisive but eventually gave its consent to the act of birth of 
the Italian colonialism with 39 "ayes" to 32 "noes".75 On 27 April the parliament 
approved with 20 votes for and 18 against the military expenses of the colony and in 
the following year dispatched the first core of soldiers.76 
On 12 June 1882, Mancini presented the "report on the legal charter of Assab" 
to the parliament. According to it the government ought to promote those conditions 
of prosperity and education that would allow in the future the implementation of the 
Italian legislation, the growth of trade and the safeguard of peace and justice.77 In this 
context the Italian chargés d'affaires78 to the Red Sea had to maintain friendly and 
commercial relations with the tribes of the hinterland, by signing agreements, and to 
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respect the morals, the customs, the needs and the religion of the local population with 
a view to achieving equality and freedom. Furhtermore, Mancini called the 
indigenous inhapitants of Assab "fellow citizens", and suggested that there be political 
representation for them in the Italian parliament, a measure liberal and progressive. 
Mancini claimed his sole ambition in the region was to turn Italy's name into a 
"synonym of integrity and conformity to the law, of good faith to issues, of conscious 
respect for justice and laws [...]".79According to the Italians, their presence in the area 
of Assab was beneficial not only for the local population but also for all the nations.80 
On 5 July 1882 Assab was proclaimed an Italian territory under the "Legal 
proceedings for Assab" law, as proposed earlier by the Foreign Minister Mancini on 
June 12 in the parliament.81 This royal act reserved for the government total executive 
control, and gave the Italian parliament legislative authority over the colony. Signed 
by King Umberto Rainerio Carlo Emanuele Giovanni Maria Ferdinando Eugenio di 
Savoia (1844-1900), who had inherited the throne after Victor Emmanuel's passing in 
1878, the act also asserted that Assab would be governed by a civil commissary under 
the supervision of the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry had to enact public works, 
stipulate trade and friendship agreements with the tribes bordering the colony, 
establish a customs free port, guaranteed international shipping, and promised to 
abstain from imposing of any kind of fiscal contributions from the natives for 30 
years. As for Assab's juridical sector, the laws, penal codes and legal provisions of 
metropolitan Italy were uniformly applied;82 for instance, the Italian updated 1889 
penal code was applied identically to the Red Sea possessions. Furthermore, the 
commissary had to appoint a magistrate, specialized in Islamic legislation and 
customary law in order to operate in the name of the King of Italy.  
Opposition deputies, like Cesare Parenzo (1842-1898), criticizing colonial 
rule, claimed that peoples are not for sale or purchase and that the acquisition of 
Assab consisted a clear inconsistency with Italy's "Risorgimental", emancipative 
values. Indeed, due to the dynamic opposition the act barely passed from the 
parliament. 83 
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The first commissary of Assab, Giovanni Branchi (1846-1936) assumed his 
duties right after Sapeto's recall on 9 January 1881,84 but was officially nominated  
later that year. 85  He and his successor Giulio Pestalozza handled the immediate 
problems of the colony and took steps to organize public security by establishing a 
police force, exploring the surroundings, expanding the port installations and setting 
up an elementary health care service.86 After the annexation, expanding towards the 
hinterland was next in line, before the British or the Egyptians could eventually act; 
Although Assab by 1885 had developed sufficiently to be able to support up to a 
thousand inhabitants, it would not be safe and profitable without a sizeable expansion. 
Pestalozza and the explorer Luigi Pennazzi (1839-1895) advocated publicly for the 
strengthening of the Italian possessions in neighbouring Aussa and Scioa.87 Hence, 
the Italian officials called for strengthening the outposts’ defensive strength, while the 
government assured the British, the Ottomans and the Egyptians that they were not 
doing a military build-up.  
 
It was at this point that rule over the outpost was transferred from civilian to 
military authories. Assab's security was entrusted to a Defence Command captain who 
came to head the civil services as well, annulling the role of the civil commissary on 
November 5 1885. He, in his turn, had to answer to the Supreme commander, 
supervisor of all military forces in Africa. The 21 May 1885, n. 3132 law, regarding 
the application of the military law in Assab assigned jurisdiction to the newly 
instituted military court of the colony, revoking the authority of the "military 
territorial" court in Bari over legal affairs in Africa.88 Finally, long-term plans for 
developing Assab into a commercial centre required investments, since "without 
sacrifices there are no gains"89 However, as we will see Rome was unable to attract 
substantial private capital.  
 
      Summarizing, as has been seen, Italy did not find breathing space next to 
the other Powers in the strategically important Mediterranean and its its leaders felt 
the country needed to to discover other fields of action. Italy was expelled in one way 
or another and had to turn its gaze to the Red Sea. There it was entangled in an 
                                                          
84According to the colonel Frigerio (Galeazzo Frigerio 1805-1891) Sapeto's arrogant behavior caused 
suspicion and distrust to the neighboring tribes in Assab and he had to be dismissed, see AUSSME D4 
Eritrea, folder 45, n. 46/a, Assab, February 4 1881. 
85Branchi acted as Assab's commissary from January 1881 until 1884 (1881-May 1882 and December 
1883-August 1884). The command of the troops as well as other administrative services were carried 
out by: Carlo De Amezaga from December 1879 until July 1880, officer Frigerio from July 5 1880 
until 1884 and diplomat Giulio Pestalozza (1850-1930) until January 1890, when the Italian 
possessions were unified administratively and politically. 
86Cesare Marinucci, "L'Amministrazionecentrale coloniale dall'acquisto di Assab alla costituzione del 
Ministero delle Colonie" in L'Italia in Africa, serie giuridico-amministrativa, v. 1, (1869-1955), (Rome, 
1963), p.5.     
87Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp.164-165. 
88Mellana, L'Italia in Africa, p. 28. 
89 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XII, (Rome, 1987), pp. 501-502. 
114 
 
extremely complex situation where property rights were disputed by at least two 
countries. On the home front discord and confrontations delayed Italy's consolidation 
at Assab for about ten years. The least that one would expect was that all these efforts, 
expenditures and consultations would have been rewarded with a colony rich in raw 
materials and profitable for the Italian trade. But that was not the case. Assab in 1881 
was an insignificant village of one hundred and sixty residents (11 Italians, 55 Arabs, 
93 Danakil and Indian) that was suffering, according to Guarmani, from a lack of 
infrastructure, arable land and water, whereas the climate and the aggression of the 
surrounding tribes would impede the living conditions of future settlers.90 Whether or 
not the Italians acted wisely by selecting the African coast of the Red Sea as their first 
colonial effort, will become perceivable further on. 
   The Italian government, before taking further action on other locations on 
the African coast of the Red Sea such as Zula, Beilul and Massaua, wanted to know if 
the British posed any objections.91 At the same time the Italian diplomatic authorities 
in Istanbul were trying to persuade the Sultan to accept the Italian presence. They 
were arguing that since the Egyptians could not control such a vast area and they were 
withdrawing, the more favourable and preferable presence for the Ottoman interests 
on the shores of the Red Sea was the Italian.92 The designs and the processes for the 
acquisition of Beilul and Massaua, the preservation of the Raheita protectorate,93 the 
expansion towards the hinterland for the elimination of all possible threats (Egyptians, 
locals but mostly French) was Italy's response to the French advances in Obock 
(occupation of Angar, Ras Ali) and to the British policy of expanding to the finest 
locations of the coastline.94 As far as Zeila is concerned, the Italians claimed that 
criminal raids by local tribes had been carried out against an Italian expeditionary 
mission in 1873 gave them cause to advance into the area. Ten years later the area 
came under the control of the British in an attempt to "rescue" it from the lurking 
French danger. For the same reason London urged Rome to acquire Beilul.95 On 16 
November 1884 Rome reached to an agreement with Cairo, after British mediation, 
for the capture of Beilul, and Mancini, in co-operation with the Minister of Shipping, 
Benedetto Brin (1833-1898) set in motion the plan for the city’s occupation. The 
presence of Egyptian soldiers would have been a complication, with the possibility of 
causing an embarrasement in front of Italian and European observers, but the 
agreement with Cairo and the Egyptians’ subsequent departure averted such an 
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eventuality. One hundred marines landed from the warship "Castelfidardo" and 
captured the city without incident on 25 January 1885.96 
Beilul, however, was not enough to satisfy the Italian ambitions. The murder 
of the explorer Bianchi in October 1884 and the threatening French presence in the 
region stirred the press and public opinion’s interest in the region.97 The strategy of 
establishing a coastal maritime and commercial base was being replaced by a more 
expansionist, militaristic policy which aimed to take as much territory as possible and 
move into the inland territories.98 The Italians, wishing to make both Zeila and Harar 
their dominions, inevitably clashed with the French ambitions.99At the time the two 
provinces were considered, with a dose of exaggeration and enthusiasm, richer "than 
California and Australia" and pillars for the establishment of "a great colonial empire 
which would be based on the migration and the increase of the white race population 
and the creation with it of new Italian centres, similar to those of the British in Canada 
and Australia."100 Mancini, after after failing to secure the two regions diplomatically 
in November 1884, raised the issue again and in the following year, he extracted 
British consent to a possible Italian occupation in the event that the Porte acquiesced. 
Ultimately, the second attempt also came to nothing with Zeila and Harar passing 
under British and Ethiopian jurisdiction respectively.101 
Britain, alarmed by the French captures of Ras Ali and Angar, in September 
1884 suggested to the government of the Sultan the occupation of the territories that 
the Egyptians were already evacuating since August. The French conquests south of 
Assab naturally put Rome on alert.  The decision to intervene quickly and decisively 
to pre-empt some unpleasant surprise on behalf of Paris was reached.102 The refusal or 
the inability of the Porte to occupy the coast, the withdrawal of the Egyptian 
garrisons, and the reluctance of the British to further commit themselves in the region 
bred fears that perhaps another Power would take advantage of the favourable 
circumstances.103 Some Italians saw taking this opportunity to expand as essential, 
both as a matter of prestige and a matter of Assab's security.  London, as revealed by 
the proposal that it had addressed to Istanbul, would prefer that neither the threatening 
France nor the ambitious Italy further solidified themselves in the Red Sea.104 Since 
the Ottomans were unable to assert themselves there due to a lack of means and 
resources, Britain then favoured Italy, a state which did not constitute a threat, and 
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whose interests, in addition, served and coincided with its own. On the opposite end, 
Rome put into practice its expansionary designs strengthened and encouraged by the 
British support. Thus a close Italo-British co-operation was born which, as it has been 
seen, was extended to a number of issues.105 The British Foreign Minister declared to 
the Italian ambassador to London, Salone Costantino Nigra (1828-1907): "the British 
government does not want to occupy the port of Massaua in the Red Sea. It does not 
want to leave it in the hands of barbarians or to the discretion of a rival state. It 
proposed or it will propose to Turkey, a sovereign power, to capture it. If Turkey runs 
into difficulties, would Italy be able to occupy it itself?"106 As Egypt was not in a 
position to guarantee the safety of the European citizens in Africa, Mancini, under the 
pretext of the explorer Bianchi's murder implemented the plan of capturing Massaua 
to "raise the prestige and the supremacy of the Italian flag in those waters."107 British 
consent had been already secured on 22 December 1884. Public opinion was 
emotionally charged108 and the Press equated the Italian soldiers en route to the Red 
Sea with the one thousand Garibaldians that landed in Marsala of Sicily on 11 May 
1860.109 The stage had been set. 
The contingent of 805 soldiers under the supervision of Colonel Tancredi 
Saletta (1840-1909) supposedly had the mission to reinforce the garrison of Αssab. 
Casting off from Naples and stopping over at Messina, from where it picked up the 
experienced explorer Cecchi, and thereafter at British held Suakin, the force sailed to 
Assab. Just before the fleet approached the Italian colony, the orders were changed 
and it was commanded to sail to Massaua. The Italian government acted under a cloak 
of secrecy to avoid the reactions of rival Powers. It also acted hastily and unorganized 
as the mission sailed without interpreters and maps of the area. When the Italians 
eventually landed at Massaua, the British authorities provided Saletta with a map of 
the region and pointed out the Egyptian positions, greatly facilitating his task.110 
Encouraged by the British support, the Italians informed the Deputy commander of 
the Egyptian forces in Massaua that any resistance was futile. On 6 February Admiral 
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Caimi stated: "The Italian government, a friend of Britain, Turkey, Egypt and not any 
less of Abyssinia ordered me to proceed to the occupation of Massaua's centre." 
Saletta was instructed by Rome to avoid any diplomatic misunderstanding or clashes 
and to collaborate with the local authorities.111 The occupation was completed under 
the passive hostility of the Egyptians. The matter was temporarily settled by using the 
model of the dual ownership (triple-if the Ottoman suzerainty is taken into account) 
with the grotesque sight of hoisting two different national flags in the town, the 
Egyptian in the Egyptian camp and the Italian in the governor's palace. It is indeed 
difficult to find in the history of colonialism an event so inglorious and so 
manipulated by another Power.112 Britain had directed the episode from start to finish, 
having offered Rome a region which did not belong to it, mediating diplomatically, 
proposing the regime of dual ownership and after the end of the operations reassuring 
and assuaging the Ottoman protests. 
   The port of Massaua, was considered the gateway to the mainland, the site 
that whoever was seeking the sovereignty or the imposition of a protectorate on 
Ethiopia, had to control. The city's strategic position which was further enhanced and 
amplified by the later British withdrawal from Sudan and it could be used to actively 
penetrate economically the hinterland. Its capture therefore, caused strong reactions 
on the part of the Great Powers and Istanbul. The latter handled the matter as it had 
handled earlier Anglo-French conquests in the area of the Red Sea, i.e., by making 
representations and protesting officially.113  Without the requisite military force to 
support its demands, its protests were not taken into account by the British and Italian 
diplomats. When the Italian expansion engulfed neighbouring Arafali too, on 10 April 
1885, the Ottomans again dispatched official protests but to no avail. Granville argued 
that the responsibility burdened the government of the Sultan because it had rejected 
the British proposal of replacing the withdrawing Egyptians with Ottoman troops. In a 
climate of distrust and concern bolstered by rumours and the proclamations of the 
Press, the Ottomans feared that after Beilul and Massaua they would lose Tripolitania 
as well. The Italians reassuringly stated that they respected the rights of the Ottomans 
in the region, that they acted in the Red Sea region for peace and security reasons and 
that they had no intention to challenge the authority of the Sultan. In reality they did 
exactly the opposite. Italy had learned "the methods of the imperialism" from the 
other Powers.114 
   The threat to the Ottoman integrity and the close Anglo-Italian co-operation 
alarmed Berlin. In the event of a war between Britain and Russia, an extremely likely 
eventuality at the time due to their Asian antagonism, Italy's position would be 
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delicate. If London asked for Italian assistance Rome had to participate in the dispute 
dragging along its German and Austrian allies in a bloody and undesirable war against 
Russia.115 Bismarck, displeased by the fact that the Italians not only did not consult 
him before they acted but did not even notify him of their intentions, said on the 
matter: "Italy's action may threaten Ottoman integrity and European peace." 116 
Perhaps the greatest concern of Vienna and Berlin was the weakening of the Italian 
forces in Europe and consequently of the Triple Alliance's military force due to 
Rome's African adventures.117 In Austria-Hungary, the only ones who interpreted the 
Italian actions in a positive light were those that wanted the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire in order to forward Austrian territorial expansion farther east, 
towards Thessaloniki.118 Paris, as it was coveting Massaua, supported the Ottoman 
requests, supposedly respecting the sovereign rights of the Sultan and in co-operation 
with Russia called for the issue to be resolved with an international conference, which 
would examine in its entirety the issue Egypt-Suez Canal-Red Sea and would have as 
its primary objective the removal of Britain from Egypt.119 
Rome's alliance with Vienna was sufficient cause to justify the hostile attitude 
of Saint Petersburg towards Italy’s African campaign. According to some researchers 
Russia sought to impose a "religious protectorate in Ethiopia", a plan that took a blow 
after the occupation of Massaua.120 Russian envoys had been striving to prove that the 
Orthodox and Coptic Christianity had narrow, trivial differences.121 In the context of 
this policy Saint Petersburg dispatched to the Ethiopian court a religious-military 
mission under the military officer Nicolaj Ivanovic Acinov in 1885. The Russian 
interest in Ethiopia was said to go back to the early 18th century. This interest 
gradually amalgamated in religious initiatives during emperor Yohannes's reign and 
reached its apogee when Acinov sought a suitable point to establish a Russian colony 
in the Red Sea region, only to be obstructed by London and Paris.122 Actually it was 
the Ethiopians that proposed the Russian installation in the Danakil province, seeking 
out diplomatic and material support against the European encirclement.123 
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In the above equation the Ethiopian factor has to be considered too. Mancini 
did not give particular importance to the protests of the local emperor, Yohannes, 
because he considered that the Ethiopians preferred being neighbours to the Italians, 
rather than the Egyptians. In any event, the "barbarian" Ethiopians would never be in 
a position to threaten a "modern European nation".124  Ethiopian rights upon Μassaua 
had been recently secured with the Hewitt treaty (after the British envoy who drafted 
it), on 3 June 1884, between Ethiopia, Egypt and Britain. According to the contents of 
the treaty, Emperor Yohannes would occupy Sanhit and Kassala, in today's Sudan, 
and would secure his country's replenishment from the single port in the area still free, 
that of Massaua. 125  Ethiopia in exchange ought to facilitate in every way the 
withdrawal through its territory of the Egyptian troops, which were hastily evacuating 
Sudan because of the Mahdist danger.126 Rome guaranteed to respect the tripartite 
agreement and Ethiopian sovereignty. 127  However, by landing on the coast, the 
Italians were automatically violating the terms of the treaty without even informing 
the rightful beneficiary of the region, Ethiopia.128 Britain, by offering the city to Italy 
in 1885, was the first to ignore the treaty which had been signed on its own initiative 
just a year before. 
   Finally, discontent and protests about the Italian establishment in Massaua 
came from a rather unexpected direction. The fact that Greek ship owners and traders 
were operating successfully in Eastern Africa should not cause surprise. 129  The 
lawlessness and the lack of a strong authority in the Red Sea during the previous 
centuries favoured Greek business activities, a fact which changed after 1885 causing 
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the dissatisfaction of the Theodoros Deligiannis’ (1820-1905) government.130  The 
Greek Foreign Minister, Stefanos Dragoumis (1842-1923), asked the Italian 
government for explanations about the abolition of the capitulations' regime, the new 
legal status and the jurisdiction in the area.131 The diplomatic and legal representation 
of the Greeks but also of other Europeans, who were operating in Eastern Africa, had 
been undertaken, until recently, by French diplomats. The French, taking advantage of 
the Greek government's inability to intervene, had or were alleged to have the 
responsibility of the local Greeks' legal protection. Nevertheless, the Italian 
authorities could no longer "accept from the consul of France a request in favour of 
the Greek citizens."132 They also wanted direct co-operation with the Greek side to 
cultivate friendly relations and were refusing to accept "the protection of Greek 
interests by the commissioner of France". When the Efimeris (Greek newspaper) 
inveighed against the Italian action in Massaua with "vile attacks" and using a "very 
hostile" vocabulary, the Italians found themselves in anawkward position. The Italian 
predominance in the area filled with "envy" the French, the Greeks and the Russians 
who immediately put into practice their intrigues in Ethiopia!133 The absence of an 
official representative of Greece hampered co-operation and made every issue, even 
of minor importance, difficult to resolve.134 Despite the French involvement the Greek 
government after an "outstanding" exchange of diplomatic notes and in accordance 
with the provisions of the Berlin conference, accepted the Italian sovereignty in the 
new colony.135 
   Because of the explosive situation in Sudan under revolt, the idea of 
intervening on that front too started to mature in the Italian parliament. Italy by 
helping the British in the war against Mahdi could conquer locations of the Sudanese 
mainland and expand its dominance.136 King Umberto, apropos of this, spoke of "the 
great benefit of a prompt intervention in Sudan alongside the British".137 Of course 
the British had yet to formally suggest an allied Anglo-Italian co-operation for the 
relief of Egyptian garrisons in Sudan. The only one who mentioned such a campaign 
was the British consul in Rome John Saville Lumley (1818-1896), influencing public 
opinion and Italy’s political leadership. Through a bilateral alliance Rome would 
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ensure British friendship and guarantee its interests in the Mediterranean and Africa 
without additionally compromising its obligations to the Triple Alliance. Thus, 
Mancini ordered Nigra to communicate to Granville that "if Britain launches an 
appeal asking for our co-operation, we are ready to agree without any gain."138 The 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs was dreaming about expanding beyond Massaua 
and conquering Sudan, using the excuse of providing a "humaritarian act."139 Perhaps 
regretting his mistakes in 1882, and sensing the press's pressure, he was trying to 
approach Egypt and the Mediterranean from another route, from the south.140 The 
conquest and the elimination of the Mahdist danger, imposition of a protectorate in 
Ethiopia, and expansion towards Somalia seemed in his eyes, feasible eventualities.141 
The only detail that Mancini did not calculate was that the British parliament never 
sent an invitation to Rome for co-operation in Sudan and that apparently it was in no 
hurry to resolve the critical situation there.142 The British refusal disappointed and 
cancelled Mancini's ambitious plans to replace the Egyptians in Sudan and capture 
Khartoum or Kassala.143 Italian benevolence if not servitude came to nothing.144 The 
British government by ordering the evacuation of Sudan, through the House of Lords 
act on 11 April 1885, was rendering it res nullius, maintaining the possibility, in due 
course, to attempt its recapture.145 In 1884-1885, Granville and Gladstone, rather than 
seeing the Italians consolidate themselves there threatening Britain's position in 
Egypt, preferred to abandon Sudan and the Egyptian soldiers to the mercy of the 
Mahdists146 Mancini, at any rate, did not give up nurturing the hope that sooner or 
later the British would ultimately seek the Italian collaboration.147 
   Sufficient information was provided above, to allow a first attempt at 
interpreting Italian colonialism and its contradictions Italian colonialism, violated the 
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self-determination principle, which Mancini had zealously supported just a few years 
before.148 When he was reasonably accused of contradiction, since his proclamations 
were hardly reminiscent of the law professor who until recently was delivering 
speeches in favour of the peoples' independence and self-determination, he 
highlighted the existence of two colonial systems. He disassociated the old 
colonialism of the Spanish and Portuguese, which was based on murders, devastations 
and religious persecutions, from the colonialism of the second half of the 19th 
century, which had a "completely different nature". Thus he defined the modern 
relationship between colonialist and colonized as "protection". This relationship was 
"legitimate in the international community, just as the relationship of protection is 
legal in private law: protection of the incompetent due to age or also because of 
intellectual weakness."149 In addition, he viewed the colonies as a solution to the 
emigration problem given that "deceit and sometimes death" was awaiting Italian 
immigrants in distant lands under foreign governments.150 Although in March 1883 he 
had argued that "our national unity is too young to be able to cause, even when justice 
favours us, any sort of danger and opportunism" and that "Italy owes its existence to a 
great principle, the principle of non-intervention", by 1885 he was a leading voice in 
processing and put forward an expansionist rhetoric based on a civilizing mission, so 
useful as an alibi for the colonialists. In theory, the Italian Foreign Minister was 
agreeing to the establishment of commercial colonies as markets for the Italian 
products that would serve as an opportunity to bring "peace and civilization" activities 
to completion.151 In practice though he never prevented territorial expansion in Africa. 
Instead, as has been seen, he backed behind the scenes, as well as diplomatically, 
every kind of political or commercial expansionist activity, such as Bianchi's and 
Rubattino's.152 
   Mancini daydreaming that he would turn African territories into Italian 
dominions "without reactions and clashes, without side effects and without serious 
sacrifices", laid the foundations of an extensive colonial programme.153 Some of his 
objectives were Sudan, the coastline of the Red Sea, Zeila and Harar in the African 
interior and Somalia.154 Perhaps it this was not a contradiction on Mancini’s part, but 
rather his plan all along, the implementation of which only awaited more favourable 
                                                          
148 Mancini, influenced by the liberal ideas of Mazzini, interpreted the principle of nationality as the 
"reasonable basis of human rights", see Emilio Gentile, La Grande Italia, the myth of the nation in the 
20th century, trans. S. Dingee and J. Pudney, (Madison, 2009), p. 23. 
149Τullio Scovazzi, Assab, Massaua, Uccialli, Adua, gli strumenti giuridici del primo colonialismo 
italiano, (Turin, 1996), pp. 96-97. 
150 Ibid., p. 95. 
151Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 123-124.  
152Ibid., p. 171. 
153Palamenghi-Crispi, L'Italia coloniale, p. 95. 
154Giglio, L’impresa di Massawa, p. 51. Later on, the Italians set their sights on Cameroon, Tanzania 
and other African regions, see Piero Foscari, Le aspirazioni coloniali dell'Italia, (Rome, 1919), pp. 3-7. 
For the designs on the French Djibouti, see D'Agostino Orsini, Le "aspirazioni Nazionali" Gibuti, 
(Milan, 1939). 
123 
 
conditions. 155  The conditions matured and the conjunctures ultimately presented 
themselves. The triggering factors included: a) the vacuum of power in Sudan and the 
withdrawal of the Egyptians, b) the outbreak of the colonial antagonism with Paris, 
after the fiasco of Tunisia, c) the European frenzy to acquire colonies, d) the never-
ending quest for prestige, e) the ambitions of King Umberto, f) the interests of the 
military and of the industrialists, g) the flourishing economy "finanza allegra", more 
illusive than real, h) the assassination of Italian explorers, i) the pressure exerted by 
the Press and the public opinion, j) the violence against Italian citizens in Tripolitania. 
All of the above prompted Mancini to implement his expansionist plans between 
October 1884 and January 1885.156  When he had refused the British proposal of 
collaboration in Egypt, he had done so in the name of humanism and because of his 
aversion towards rash adventures. Two years later he himself pulled the strings for the 
capture of Μassawa and became the warmest supporter of Italian expansion in Eastern 
Africa, in such a way that "the start of Italian imperialism bears a name: Mancini."157 
After so many failures and lessons he had become an outstanding student of the 
British masters, dedicated to the "Grande politica coloniale" and convinced that Italy 
should not "remain alien to the magnanimous struggle" of the "civilizing mission".158 
Italy, because of the circumstances, decided to proceed to conquests in Africa. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs invented a link between the Risorgimento and the 
"civilizing mission", and deliberately misinterpreted the principle of ethnic groups, so 
that it would serve the purposes of the Italian expansion, and set the theoretical bases 
for what was to come: "Not conquerors, not teachers, not innovators but friends and 
aid givers...this is our programme for Assab."159 Assab and Massaua would pave the 
way for further conquests in Somalia, in Ethiopia, in Harar, in Aussa.160 The plan of 
the colonial expansion had been already etched out. 
   In 1885 an unprecedented event took place, which in conjunction with the 
opening of the Suez Canal would constitute the catalyst, the decisive factor of Africa's 
partition. With the occasion of the Berlin conference (November 1884-February 
1885) all the European powers occupied themselves with a colonial race for the 
acquisition of coastlines and islands until then overlooked. 161  Spain, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Russia, the United States, the 
Ottoman Empire, Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Italy and France participated in 
the conference with the stated aim of normalizing the status of Congo and regulating 
the shipping on the Congo River. During the proceedings of the conference the 
principle of the effective possession (Uti Possidetis) was adopted according to which, 
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any state was in a position to declare an area as its colony only if it had signed treaties 
with the local chieftains, had raised its national flag there and was proving through 
policing and administration that it effectively and efficiently controlled the colony. If 
the colonial Power was failing to meet these obligations, the region could be claimed 
by someone else. As a result of the conference Portugal, Britain, France and Germany 
operated at such a frenetic pace in the field of colonial expansion, that nowadays there 
is talk of a Scramble for Africa. Italian prestige took a heavy blow when the country 
was not initially invited to participate in the colonial conference, as the worthless 
Assab did not provide sufficient cause of presence in comparison to the Powers that 
were empires.162  
On 1 January 1885 the newspaper Il Diritto argued that 1885 would be the 
"year of boldness" and the fate of Italy as a Great Power would be settled. Former 
Garibaldian Crispi said on the matter: "Italy came afterwards and wants [...] to hastily 
gain on Britain, France, Germany, Belgium [...] Belgium? Is it ever possible for 
Belgium which does not have ancient Rome in its genes to have more colonies than 
Italy?"163 At least Italy was now in "the Red Sea with the force of arms and a voice 
that resonates again in the world that says: ‘The sons of Rome are returning to an 
ancient sea that is their own’."164 In the parliament, Deputy Attilio Brunialti (1849-
1920) spoke in a similar way in June 1885: "To make it known, particularly in Africa, 
that there is an Italy in the world. That it knows to enforce respect for its name and 
interests when it is necessary and knows to do it even if it has the cost of some spilled 
blood even if it has the cost of other more serious sacrifices". The memory and the 
nostalgia of the heroic struggles during the Risorgimento encouraged an emotional 
support for Rome's civilizing fight against barbarity. It was only right, they thought, 
for the homeland of Columbus and Marco Polo 165  to once again become a 
conqueror.166 
   There were a variety of views about expansion in Italy at the time. The 
"pacifist" Mancini stated on 5 April 1884: "Italy has no direct and exclusive interests 
of its own, but only general interests of humanitarianism and civilization", even 
though later on, he instigated and orchestrated the campaign to take Massaua. The 
alibi of fighting against barbarity with missionaries and explorations as intellectual 
means was ingenious.167During the 7th of May parliamentary session, when Deputy 
Antonio Oliva (1827-1886) defended Mancini's actions, Deputy Ruggiero Maurigi 
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(1843-1919) claimed that "no one knows how and why we went to Massaua." Rocco 
de Zerbi (1843-1893) responded that Italy established itself in Massaua to "plant a 
picket for the future" and Crispi supplemented that if it was up to him Italy would 
never have occupied Massaua but since it had, it should retain it.168 The organization 
"Cross of Savoy" appealed to Colonel Saletta "to show to those barbarians that Italy is 
truly civilized, that it is strong in Europe, that it is great in the world."169  
The initial search for commercial stations evolved into territorial expansion 
and this in turn into extreme militarism and insatiable appetite for conquests. Even 
developmental and prosperity projects were taking on a military character. The 
construction of an "economic railway" from Massaua towards the hinterland had, 
according to Mancini, "a military purpose, to facilitate the access of our soldiers to all 
the parts of the region, where their presence could be requested to guarantee public 
order."170 Furthermore, military operations in Africa were considered by the Foreign 
Minister a useful exercise for the Italian armed forces: "Rather than absolute passivity 
in the thankless sluggishness of the camp [...] better to move [the army], to go outside 
the country, to become acquainted with other peoples, to train and to become 
accustomed in an useful manner to that sort of life to which, from one day to the next 
it could be summoned, in the service of the country." When in June 1887 the Italian 
army clashed with local tribes in the outskirts of the colony, Mancini, besides being a 
populist, proved to be a militarist as well: "The new Italian army of today, comprised 
of soldiers from all the provinces of the peninsula, is an army loyal to its duty and 
contemptuous of life not only when it comes to defending the ancestral lands, like 
Leonidas at Thermopylae, but also when it is about to be faithful to its duty and far 
away from all eyes is called to defend the honour of the flag and of the Italian arms: 
Our soldiers from any province are like this, they die fearless and sacrifices their 
liveds for the homeland."171 
      The Italian military tradition, intertwined with the militaristic character of 
the dynasty of the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, made its reappearance in Africa in 
the late 19th century. It is noteworthy that Piedmont-Sardinia, having undertaken the 
task of Italy’s unification, was often called “Prussia of the South”, a characterization 
that also accurately depicted the primary importance that the kingdom attributed to the 
military. The Italian dynasty of the Sabaudi, with a dose of conceit and megalomania, 
was always encouraging military expenditures and the building of warships as 
instruments for future conquests;172 conquests that would bring glory and prestige to 
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the Italian crown.173 King Umberto, the "machine gun king" (re mitraglia) passionate 
about his house's military tradition and ardent promoter of the expansion of the Army, 
saw colonialism not as an end in itself but as a way to exalt Italian prestige 
internationally. It is striking that his wife, Queen Margherita Maria Teresa Giovanna 
(1851-1926) was also an advocate of militarism, a widespread concept among the 
European ruling classes of the late 19th century.174 
Another factor which should not be taken out of the equation of Italian 
colonialism is the position that the Vatican held in regard to the colonial venture in 
Africa. The Catholic clergy, who had influence and voice, acknowledged western 
Christian civilization as the sole civilization on earth. Christianity, although born in 
the East, matured and developed in the West. Harmonized with this doctrine many 
Catholic missionaries, convinced of their intellectual superiority, were contemptuous 
of those who had not managed to reach their own cultural level. Civilization, 
according to them, had the right to be enforced on the savages even by force to 
"subjugate the course soul to the civility of European civilization." But not only on 
the savages. The entire East, even the Christian one, seemed in the eyes of the 
Catholics in decline, degenerate, bankrupt spiritually, morally and intellectually. The 
Catholic clergy, partaker of the Italian governments' ideas about the calling, espoused 
the ideological construct about the civilizing mission and spiritual primacy, becoming 
their most loyal accomplice. Despite their political differences in Italy, the state and 
the papacy seemed to co-operate harmonically in Africa. Missionary expeditions with 
the goal of proselytizing and expanding Italian influence continued unabated from 
1830 up until the period of decolonization.175 
Putting aside theoretical schemes of a more general nature and before drawing 
precarious conclusions the Catholic Church's activity should be traced explicitly 
within this study's specific framework. The first apostolic magister of Eritrea and the 
person whose tenacious efforts formulated and affected decisively the colony's formal 
structures as well as a wide range of everyday life aspects was Michele da Carbonara 
(1836-1919). He not only initiated missionary activity but by closely collaborating 
with the colonial authorities he promoted the Italianization and the Christianization of 
the local masses. He assumed his position on 9 December 1894 shortly after the 
Propaganda Fide, the Catholic Church's council responsible for missionary work, 
proclaimed Eritrea an apostolic prefecture separate from the Ethiopian vicariate in 
which it hitherto belonged. This stratagem, a product of Crispi's negotiation with 
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various papal representatives from December 1894 until January 1895, yielded 
benefits for both sides. Italy through the Vatican's recognition and co-operation made 
a decisive step towards the consolidation of its rule internationally. As for the latter, it 
broadened its spiritual authority not only in the colony but to the vast region which 
fell under Italian influence as well.176 Under Carbonara's meticulous direction the city 
of Keren became the operations centre of the Eritrean mission from where he directed 
and oversaw the three missionary centres and the 29 chapels. He founded two 
orphanages, numerous educational facilities, a typography and two preparatory 
clerical schools in his administrative capital which was conveniently away from the 
interventions of the colonial governor, situated in Massaua.177 Carbonara also opposed 
human trafficking still taking place in some parts of Ethiopia and Somalia. The first 
official Italian antislavery act was issued in May 1886; its first implementation took 
place three years later when missionaries and colonial personnel jointly undertook a 
series of antislavery operations. The first step towards the Italianization of Eritrea 
using religious means was the expulsion of the French missionaries, active in the area 
even before the Italian landing and supported diplomatically by Paris. 178  Their 
eviction would eradicate the confusion of the local population, discard the French 
influence and machinations, and promote the Italian culture and rule in the area. The 
government, alongside some Catholic actors who were favourable towards expansion, 
put forward the project of the nationalization of the religious missions in the colony. 
Thus, on 22 January 1895 Crispi officially expelled the French missionaries on the 
grounds of conspiracy, hostile propaganda and incitement of the 1894 revolt in 
Acchele Guzai. 179 In addition, their lands were confiscated by the colonial 
government.180 
Carbonara resolved to more "aggressive" tactics of proselytism in contrast to 
the previous lazarist (French) methods of teaching. Many natives adopted Catholicism 
as a way or a tactic to gain land, privileges, and an elevated status amidst the newly 
established social and political order. Likewise, the Italian missionaries’ sincerity can 
be doubted, since they resided and exercised their duties in the wealthier, fertile and 
economically most prominent Eritrean regions. 181  Although the missionary 
proselytism was especially aggressive, and was a product of the coordinated policy to 
impose western social patterns upon the Eritreans, it can be argued that some measure 
of goodwill played a part in the series of infrastructural works. 
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Italian colonialism will have devastating effects upon the native's social 
structures, traditions and beliefs. From the start, however, it did make at least token 
attempts to respect some of those traditions and beliefs.182 A 5 July 1882 law declared 
that Assab population's (Amhara-Tigre) religious beliefs and civil laws would be 
protected, as long as they were "compatible with Italian legislation and civilization" 
and did not undermine the "universal morality" and public order notions in the colony. 
This is considered by some a progressive act of religious tolerance. Theoretical 
equality and respect of the native cults ensured essentially the principle of the 
freedom of worship. Italian authorities preserved as far as possible the customary 
native laws. When the colony expanded, incorporating culturally diverse territories, 
the same protection was afforded to the rest of the colony’s population that adhered to 
the Islamic law (Koran-Sunnah). Moreover, aspects of the hinterland's civil law such 
as the "Fetha Nagast" (King's laws) and Chebre Neghesti (King Υohannes' political 
constitution) were retained. Every tribe (Cumana, Maria, Beni Amer, Bogos, Mensa) 
practiced a distinct pattern of local organization based on its religious and political 
beliefs, material sufficiency, social background, economic practices and level of 
subsistence. Consequently, each region's customary law was maintained after subtle 
revisions to facilitate intra-community relations, to preserve the traditional social 
structures as much as possible and to promote a constructive interaction between 
colonizer and colonized.183 
   On 30 June 1887 Mancini defended his actions to the plenary session of the 
parliament, stating: "We really had thought, gentlemen, that while in Europe we 
would not be able to raise our flag above more than one hectare of land without 
shedding tonnes of blood, that while in Asia there are two giants, Russia and Britain, 
that do not leave room for a third one, that while the Monroe doctrine does not allow 
any Power to set its foot in America, there is only Africa [...]."184 The acquisition of 
colonies, at a time when the European powers were expanding insatiably all over the 
world, was considered an issue of security, of survival. In its attempt to find breathing 
space Rome had changed its policy radically. It had abandoned the independent, 
behind the scenes and more subtle policy of economic penetration and influence, 
which had failed in the Mediterranean. It was now setting in motion a policy of 
expansion and conquest under the auspices of an allied power, putting the search for 
commercial bases and markets for its products on the back burner. Besides this 
change of direction, the geopolitical centre of interest also shifted, from the 
Mediterranean to the Red Sea and from the Northern to Eastern Africa. To justify this 
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switch, the "pro-Africanists" were proclaiming the strategic importance of the Red 
Sea for Italy, stressing that this was necessary and complementary to the 
Mediterranean balance and security.185 In reality, as it became apparent, Rome was 
forced to turn to the still "free" Eastern Africa, where French rivalry seemed less 
pronounced and where British co-operation could yield benefits without great 
sacrifices, after the failures in the Mediterranean. The answer to the reasonable 
question as to why Italian colonialism took place at the end of the 19th century does 
not lie only in the manifestation of the British co-operation from 1882 onwards. 
Circumstances such as the opening of the Suez Canal and the colonial conference of 
Berlin were the catalysts which prompted all the Powers to turn to the conquest of 
overseas territories. Italy, always seeking to be accepted by the Powers, to have a 
voice and equality in European matters, had to imitate them, even if its fiscal situation 
and level of industrialization were not comparable to theirs. 
   The choices of the Foreign Minister were not applauded by all politicians. 
The left-wing of the parliament in particular did not wish to sacrifice the traditional 
Mediterranean policy and was accusing the government of betraying the ideals of the 
Risorgimento, 186  i.e. the ideals of justice, freedom and self-determination. The 
pointless waste of money in faraway adventures at a time when the Italian economy 
was in need of strengthening and reorganization, the "spirit of subordination" towards 
the British,187 the lurking danger of a conflict with Ethiopia and the lack of confidence 
in the government's course of action were factors that influenced the "anti-
Africanists". They would not find any usage value and were negative and pessimistic 
with regard to the future of the colony.188 For them Italian security was not bound so 
self-evidently with the campaigns in Africa.189 The lawyer and politician Parenzo 
stated after the official acquisition of Assab: "I would never want the national flag to 
fly over foreign territory without the willingness of the population that resides 
there." 190  The socialist politician Andrea Costa (1851-1910) after the first Italian 
casualties in Africa exclaimed the historic "not a man, not a penny" for the African 
                                                          
185 Barrié, Italian Imperialism, pp 547-548. The Italian public opinion was expecting the carrying out 
of a landing in Tripolitania. Instead of that Mancini was drawing up plans for Eastern Africa. See 
Battaglia, La prima Guerra, p. 178. 
186 Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 65. 
187 Despite the "moral" satisfaction of capturing Massaua, Mancini did not manage to avoid criticism 
that Italian colonialism had simply become a kind of "British sub-imperialism". See Romano, 
L'ideologia del colonialismo italiano, p. 27. The French press also severely criticized the Italian 
violation of the Sultan's African rights described Rome's endeavour as a "tipping policy" subsisting on 
British benevolence. See, "Bollettino Politico", L’Osservatore Romano, n. 27, Wednesday 4, February 
1885, p. 1. 
188 Battaglia, La prima Guerra, p. 215. 
189 According to some dissidents the "colonial delirium" and "the craze for colonies and barbarian 
possessions, we owe it to the southerners, who having always been slaves of the one and the other, are 
now looking forward to torment anyone in any way without ever having independence or regional 
government [...]", see Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
190Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 122. 
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venture. Another Deputy maintained that the "Mediterranean is our goal and must be 
the sole concern of the Italians."191 
   Mancini, on his part, was presenting the mission to the Red Sea as an 
excellent opportunity for Italy. The civilizing mission there was a continuation and an 
integral part of the European policy: "[...] the real and the important objective of the 
Italian policy must be the Mediterranean. But why do you not want to acknowledge 
that in the Red Sea, the nearest to the Mediterranean, we can find the keys to the 
latter?"192 This historic expression allows for two interpretations. Italy through the 
British co-operation in the Red Sea would elicit the protection and the guarantees it 
required to safeguard its interests in the Mediterranean. Perhaps with the word "keys" 
he meant that Italy would unlock the Mediterranean door by occupying the Red Sea 
shores, Sudan, Egypt and ultimately Tripolitania.193 Despite the reassuring nature of 
Mancini's statements, Italian soldiers were regularly sent to distant areas on the altar 
of the glorious mission for the Mediterranean and Civilization.194 With completely 
insufficient preparation and means, without colonial-tropical experience, and without 
adequate supplies, the Italian troops were sent to an environment hostile in every 
aspect, to be sacrificed for the illusion of power and the deceptive vision of a colonial 
empire harboured by the government and some classes of Italian society. 
   Despite the difficulties, the delays and the reactions, by 1885 Italy was in 
possession of its first colony (colonia primogenita). While Assab remained under the 
direction of the royal commissaries, Massaua, initially under a mixed Italo-Egyptian 
administration and situated among hostile powers had to be directed in a more firm 
and assertive fashion.195 With the royal ordinance of 5 November 1885 the general 
commander of the Italian troops in Africa assumed full command of every juridical 
and administrative authority in the colony. In regard to his military duties he had to 
answer to the War Ministry; any other issue had to be approved by the Foreign 
Ministry in Rome. In the following months, the naval command office was instituted 
in the city and a civil, a commercial and a penal court were established. When the 
colony found itself under a state of emergency due to the ongoing war with Ethiopia 
and distressed after a woeful debacle in January 1887, the balance of power shifted 
towards the War Ministry. The Italian government recognized the critical condition 
and bestowed the Supreme Commander with even more extraordinary powers with 
                                                          
191Giglio, L’impresa di Massawa, p. 77. 
192Romano, L'ideologia del colonialismo italiano, p. 27. 
193Battaglia, La prima Guerra, pp. 117-118. 
194Marina Pieretti, "Ripercussioni interne ai fatti di Sahati e Dogali dalle carte della Questura di Roma 
(Gennaio-Febbraio 1887)" in Fonti e problemi della politica coloniale italiana, (Rome, 1996), p 336. 
195The socialist newspaper La Tribuna criticized and noted the administrationalchaos of Massaua, see 
La Tribuna, "La nostra situazione a Massaua (note riassuntive), Sunday 23 August 1885, n. 231. 
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the 17 February 1887 ordinance.196 This chain of events was repeated during the 
escalation of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in 1895-1896.197 
The area between Massaua and Assab to the south, on the borders with the 
French Djibouti, 1,000-kilometres long, was now being controlled by Rome. 198  
Under its rule had been placed the tribes Saho, Dankali, Baria, Kunama and other, of 
various religious doctrines, an amalgam which numbered 200,000 indigenous peoples 
in 1890.199 The Italian dominions were officially designated as "Italian Possessions 
and Protectorates in the Red Sea" and they consisted of the Assab possession, the 
Massaua possession and the protectorates over Habab, Danakil and Raheita.200 On 1 
January 1890, by royal decree number 6,592, the old and the new Italian dominions in 
the Red Sea were united, establishing the New Eritrea colony. According to this the 
colony had an autonomous budget and administration; the governor controlled all the 
military forces in the Red Sea and was being assisted by three Italian advisers at the 
recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were acting on royal 
mandate. These advisers covered internal affairs, finances and public works, and 
agriculture and commerce. The governor was answerable to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with regard to the civilian administration, to the War ministry for military 
matters and to the Maritime ministry for nautical issues. The January 1890 ordinance, 
replaced ostensibly the previous military oriented administration with a more 
conventional, civil one. Nevertheless, in practice, every colonial governor up to 
Ferdinando Martini (1841-1928), originated from the army. Specifically, the first 
colonial governor from 1 January 1890 until 30 June 1890, was General Alessandro 
Baldassarre Orero (1841-1914)201; from 30 June 1890 until 28 February 1892 General 
and Left wing Deputy Antonio Gandolfi (1835-1902); from 28 February 1892 until 22 
February 1896 General Oreste Baratieri (1841-1901); from February 1896 until 16 
December 1897 General Antonio Baldissera (1838-1917) and finally, at least in 
regard to this study, Deputy and Minister Martini, from December 1897 until to 25 
March 1907. Before the formal establishment of the colony in January 1890, the city 
of Massaua was administered by the following commanders: officer Tancredi Saletta 
(1840-1909) from 5 February 1885 until 14 November 1885, major general Carlo 
                                                          
196AUSSME, D4 ERITREA, folder 41, Rome, April 17 1887. The Commander concentrated every 
vestige of politico-administrative authority in his hands and was given liberty to proclaim a state of 
emergency in any part of the colony and impose the military penal code at will.  
197Marinucci, "L'Amministrazione centrale coloniale", pp.7-8. 
198 The Italian flag was planted in Arafali on 10 April, in the Dahalac or Dahlac islands on 8 June, in 
Edd on 23 June, in Madir or Mader on the 24th and in Hawakil on the 26th. Two days later the 
protectorate over the coast of Machanile was proclaimed, see AUSSME, D4 ERITREA, folder 45, n. 
193, July 9 1885. 
199  Cesari, Colonie e possedimenti coloniali, pp. 94-97. 
200 Romain H. Rainero, Pietro Toselli un peveragnese nella storia: della colonizazione dell'Eritrea all' 
Amba Alagi, (Peveragno, 1996), p. 26. 
201 Governor Orero submitted his resignation since his discords with Crispi and the diplomat count 
Antonelli (Pietro Antonelli 1853-1901) were unbridgeable. See Antonello F. M. Biagini, La Questione 
d'Oriente Del 1875-'78 Nei Documenti Dell'Archivio Dell'Ufficio Storico Dello Stato Maggiore 
Esercito, (Rome, 1978), p. 366. 
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Genè (1836-1890) from 15 December 1885 until 18 March 1887, Saletta again from 
18 March 1887 until 10 November 1887, lieutenant general Sandro Asinari di San 
Marzano (1830-1906) from 10 November 1887 until 1888, Baldissera until 20 
December 1889 and Orero from 20 December 1889 until 31 December 1890. 
 
      On the day that the colony was officially founded, "a special budget of the 
Eritrea colony" was presented to the parliament.202 Public safety, penal system, public 
education and commerce were all upgraded and experienced a relative growth. 
Despite the colony's financial straits, the government put forward a series of 
construction works aiming at the development of the region's infrastructure and 
communication network203 such as the construction of bridges, the expansion of the 
road network,204 the engineering of the railway line between Massaua and Saati205 and 
the erection of administrational offices, public edifices and instructional facilities. The 
27 kilometre long Massaua-Saati railway was constructed between October 1887 and 
March 1888 and cost almost 3 million lire. The project was realized as a means of 
promoting Italian commerce and authority to the internal regions, but mostly for 
military reasons and with the funds of the 1887-8 "military reinforcements in the coast 
of the Red Sea" budget. Despite the projected designs for another railway in 1894, 
financial strains and the bellicose situation postponed any analogous initiative until 
1907.206 State sponsored schools were founded in Massaua, Cheren, Asmara, Assab 
and Archico whereas church operated schools were erected in Belesa, Gheleb, 
Zazega, Asmara and Monculo.207 As expected the main priority of the teachers' and 
clerics’ educational program was the instruction of the Italian language to the young 
natives willing to embrace the recently imposed Italian rule.208 Elementary schools 
under the direction of the nuns of the Order of Saint Anne were founded in Cheren 
(1895), Asmara (1898), Saganeiti (1904), Ghinda (1906), Addi Caieh (1908) and 
Addi Ugri (1909).209  Since the colonial administration was constantly lacking the 
funds to regulate and organize the educational program it was obliged to cede the 
                                                          
202 Indicatively in 1892 the expenditures under the supervision of the governor for the public works, the 
army, the post office and the installation of telegraphs amounted to 8 million lire. 
203 For example, the Engineering corps of the Army was investigating the possibility of enlarging 
Archico's docking facilities, an enterprise that was certain to improve Eritrea's maritime 
communications. See AUSSME, L-7 Eritrea, folder 84/8, Massaua, 17 May 1887. 
204Ibid., folder 132/18, n.4533/54 Massaua, 17 December 1889. 
205 Ibid, folder 133/9, Report Ferrovia Massaua Saati-Amministrazione, Rome, 8 September 1887, 
pp.1-4, Ibid., folder 133/8, Report Ferrovia Massaua Saati-relazione, Rome, April 1888, pp. 3-15 and 
Ibid, folder 133/2, Report Ferrovia Massaua Saati, pp. 1-5.  
206Francesco Schumfer, "Del problema ferroviario; con speciale riguardo al sistema finanziario piu 
adatto alla costruzione di ferrovie nelle nostre colonie- Eritrea", Istituto coloniale italiano, Atti del 
secondo congresso degli italiani all'estero, relazioni e comunicazioni, vol. 1 part 2, Conference, (Rome, 
11-20 June 1911), pp. 1155-1159.  
207 AUSSME, L-7 Eritrea, folder 132/13 , n. 19355, Rome, 27 December 1888, Ibid, folder 132/13, n. 
823/193, Rome, 12 September 1887. 
208 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Amministrazione civile della colonia eritrea, 1894-1895: documenti 
diplomatici presentati al parlamento italiano dal ministro degli affari Esteri (Blanc), (Rome, 1895), 
pp. 119-122. 
209AUSSME, L-7 Eritrea, folder 132/1, Massaua, 10 December 1888. 
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education initiative to the monks, nuns and missionaries.210 Even a local newspaper 
began its circulation as soon as 1891.211 
The customs reforms, the researches for the benefit of the agriculture, the 
construction of warehouses and docks, always under a condition of containing 
spending, boosted the local economy albeit only slightly. The reason behind this rapid 
but limited growth was that "our occupation was not repressive but of social progress 
and prosperity" and that the population of Eritrea "has absolute confidence in the 
current protection [...]". On 6 February 1891 Antonio Starabba di Rudini (1839-1908), 
who was theoretically hostile to colonialism,212 replaced Crispi at the premiership. 
The new premier marked a period of a more economic and rational management of 
the colony. During that time new provisions were proclaimed such as the one of the 
25th of January 1891 that founded a "sanitary council" and a Registry office. That 
year’s royal act of October the 1st both amplified the governor's powers and rendered 
him directly accountable only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the 
governors had in their hands full administrative, juridical, political and military 
authority; they issued laws, established courts and imposed new taxes upon the 
natives almost arbitrarily. Still, the colonial administration did not achieve a large 
degree of amalgamation since numerous agencies were still dependent on diverse 
authorities. Characteristically, the management of Massaua's naval station and all its 
facilities continued to be under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Ministry. The 28 
February 1894 act, n. 68, transferred every financial obligation (military expenses, 
colonial personnel stipends) to Eritrea's independent annual budget, a move that 
aimed at lightening the government's monetary obligations and rationalizing the 
colony's administration.213 It also meant that the governor was no longer accountable 
to the three ministries. Eritrea, not having a determined administrative-political 
system, cannot be categorized as a "crown colony" directly administrated by the 
                                                          
210Governor Martini’s belief that mixed Italian-native school classes would undermine the dominant 
race's prestige clashed with Carbonara’s Christian ethics. His disapproval led to the interim solution of 
setting up separate school classes in the big urban centres and mixed ones in the areas sparsely 
populated by Italians. See Dirar, "Collaborazione e Conflitti", pp. 175-177.   
211Eritrea's weekly official gazette the "Corriere Eritreo" commenced its circulation on June 12 1891. A 
few months later, on 4 November 1891 in Massaua another newspaper the L'Eritreo was published for 
the first time. See Romain Rainero, I primi tentativi di colonizzazione agricola e di popolamento dell' 
Eritrea (1890-1895),(Milan, 1960), p. 71. 
212In May 5 1891 he exclaimed in front of the parliament: "I have never been an advocate of the 
African endeavour; I have not and I do not regret it. But I recognize that the great sacrifices, the 
expenses undertaken have produced some results. Italy's political situation drew advantages: our 
influence in the Orient has been augmented. I have to recognize that, but I urge the africanists to not 
insist in over stretching the enterprise". See La Colonia Italiana in Africa, p. 165.   
213Marinucci, "L'Amministrazione centrale coloniale", pp. 10-13. Rome's aspiration was for Eritrea to 
develop into an autonomous self-sufficient possession. In order to achieve that the colony had to stop 
relying on the government's subsidies and start developing based on internal production and taxation. 
Before the Italian installation in Eritrea the local tribes had to pay numerous heavy taxes to Ethiopia's 
central government. Characteristically the population residing in the province of Tigre was compelled 
to attribute various customary dues as well as a land tenure tax, an army maintenance tax and other 
informal monetary contributions. On 4 August 1894 another royal ordinance gave to the governor of 
the colony the right to adjust the subjugated regions' fiscal contributions at will. See Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri, Amministrazione civile, pp. 65-70. 
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metropolis nor as an autonomous "self governed colony" according to the British 
paradigm. Whereas the colony enjoyed a distinct administration that could levy 
taEritrea, did not have a fixed administrative-political system annalagous to 
established colonial models. It cannot be categorized as a "crown colony" directly 
administrated by the metropolis, nor as an autonomous "self governed colony" 
according to the British paradigmxes or negotiate trade agreements without Rome’s 
consent, in regard to impeding legislation and the financial policy it had to follow 
Italy's lead.214 
 
At this point it would be appropriate to examine closely the administration and 
the true function of the colony, keeping in mind that most of the following 
information has derived from official, state and ministerial reports and studies. 
Following Eritrea's official founding act, a royal ordinance on 6 September 1890, n. 
7126 that was actively promoted by Crispi gave birth to the Colonial Officers 
Corps.215 This ostensibly specialized staff was composed predominantly by military 
officers whose central main motives were the prospect of profit and an instinctive 
attraction to "exotic" and exciting places.216 The 23 May 1884 royal act established in 
Assab a Harbour Master office and on a later date (January 1885) a post office 
authorized to function as a telegraphic agency under the supervision of the Royal Post 
General Direction. Shortly after the occupation of Masssaua another ordinance (19 
February 1885) declared the establishment of a military fund office soon to become 
the colony's treasury, a post office, a civil commissariat and a customs office. During 
the 1887-1888 period a Harbour Master bureau was additionally founded along with a 
mortgage office in Massaua. Alongside the supreme governor of the colony the 
general secretary position was instituted with the task of directing every civil service, 
and unifying under its authority the political and administrative affairs of Eritrea (25 
January 1891 act). Eventually its role was gradually downgraded under the weight of 
the governor's extraordinary powers and assumed a secondary auxiliary function. 
However, the Governor's competences were separated according to the 1 October 
1891 law, n.583; the governor, under the authority of the Foreign Ministry, 
maintained the right to handle the colony's (internal and external) policy and to 
employ the army for "political purposes", whereas the commander of the troops, 
subordinate to the War Ministry, had the general command of the armed forces in 
Eritrea.217 The deployment of the troops and matters that concerned the railway, the 
                                                          
214Antonio Colonna di Cesaro, "Del regime doganale nei rapporti fra le colonie e la madrepadria (in 
generale)", Istituto coloniale italiano, Atti del secondo congresso degli italiani all'estero, relazioni e 
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216 They were generally untrained and unfit to assume their administrative duties at least in comparison 
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telegraphs and the police ought to be mutually agreed upon by the two prevalent 
authorities.218 
The royal act n. 68 of 18 February 1894 provided for the creation of a unified 
autonomous administration under the immediate supervision of the government. 
Furthermore, every expense, besides an annual subsidy granted by Rome, had to be 
covered by the colony's revenues. Finally, the military and civil administrations were 
merged into one under the governor. As the colony expanded the need to broaden its 
jurisdictional competences and impose its political and military control upon the 
newly conquered territories appeared. 219  Additionally, new lodging and hygienic 
facilities had to be erected in order to accommodate incoming military 
reinforcements, especially in the 1895-6 period when the Italian military activity in 
East Africa reached its peak. The fact that at that time the state provided 
approximately 10,000,000 lire to balance Eritrea's budget comes as no surprise. The 
colonial sanitary council and the hygiene commission were mainly responsible for 
matters of public health, whereas public security was entrusted to the royal military 
corps of the Carabinieri. Likewise, the telegraphic communication of the colony's 
main cities with the outside world was the responsibility of the army’s engineering 
corps.220 Other institutions and administrative authorities were: the finance office, the 
technical office responsible for the maintenance of streets and the erection of public 
works and the state assets office. The 22 May 1894 royal act regulated the 
responsibilities and powers of the Eritrean chamber of commerce (instituted on 26 
February 1893) which had to promote the Italian trade and shipping in the region and 
facilitate the development of the colony in the most efficient way possible. This 
office's operational activities were supported by the customs' and trade revenues under 
the direction of the Foreign Ministry. In February, the Town Hall Commission was 
founded too. The central treasury of the African Troops responsible for the payment 
of the military personnel's wages was situated in Naples; in 1893-4 a treasury was 
also based in Massaua acting as a general accounting repository for the colonial 
administration.221 Massaua's chamber of Commerce was replaced by another auxiliary 
and consultative to the colonial governor, institute called the Council of Commerce, 
on 11 July 1901.222 Before the arrival of the Italians, the various territories of East 
Africa formed a discreet economic-monetary zone, centered around Ethopia.  
Financial transactions in this zone were conducted in general with the Austrian Maria-
Teresa coin. Rome hampered the circulation of the coin, and introduced the new 
Eritrean coin (tallero Eritreo) on 10 August 1890. Given the native's distrust and 
                                                          
218ASMAE, ASMAI, position 3/5, folder 36, n. 3916, 26 July 1891. 
219 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Amministrazione civile, p. 5. 
220 Naturally the Army's engineering corps was primarily employed at constructions pertaining to the 
colony's defence, such as fortification and trenches. See AUSSME, L-7 Eritrea, folder 84/9, n. 86, 
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221 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Amministrazione civile, pp. 9-24. 
222 Marinucci, "L'Amministrazione centrale coloniale", p. 22. 
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disregard of the new monetary system the government struggled with monetary issues 
for several decades.223 
Eritrea with the 24 May 1903 law, n. 205, "gained" its legislative and 
administrative autonomy slipping from the metropolis' tight executive and political 
dominance. The innovative step was the creation of the Colonial Council, an 
administrative and advisory board that interceded between Rome and Massaua and 
was the medium through which the Italian government and the parliament oversaw 
the colony. On 22 September 1905 Eritrea's administrational system was altered once 
again. The whole spectrum of the colony's executive and legislative competences 
were divided between the Governor, the Administrative Council, the newly founded 
Governmental Office and the various bureaucratic inspectors and the local residents, 
authorized representatives of the Italian rule in every corner of the colony (Harar, 
Adwa, Let Marefià and Baso). The governor remained the undisputed source of 
authority in Eritrea, being in control of the colony's political and administrative 
functions and responsible for its budget. The 1905 ordinance regulated family 
relations, private property, commercial transactions and among other provided for the 
elimination of the practice the slavery. 224 
In order to obtain a more comprehensive, wide-angle prospective on Eritrea's 
role and nature during its adolescence, the early formative years, its legal-justice 
administration regime should be examined as well. Massaua, following decades of 
Ottoman and Egyptian rule, in January 1887 according to official reports did not 
                                                          
223Eritrea's troubled monetary policy epitomizes impeccably the Italian authorities' indecisiveness and 
confusion, expressed in a variety of ways throughout their early colonial endeavour. In the Red Sea's 
African coastline two currencies were presumptively in use: the Egyptian coin, fallen in disuse after 
Cairo's strategic withdrawal from the area and the Maria Teresa currency issued by the Austro-
Hungarian mint in Trieste. The Italian government in order to address the urgent practical issues in East 
Africa and obligations such as the local chieftains' payments, acquired a reserve of one million coins. 
Rome had to adopt and use a currency whose value fluctuated depending on the crude silver's unstable 
commercial value, not to mention the double headed eagle engraving on the coin symbolizing the long 
hated Austrian Empire. With a view of terminating this embarrassing dependency the state mints of 
Milan and Venice were planning to pay a manufacturing tribute to the Austro-Hungarian authorities 
and obtain the rights to produce the coin. Eventually, in 1887 the Italian government intervened and 
cancelled the purchase operation on the grounds that an independent state cannot use symbols and 
depictions of other states. Following the failure of the undertaking on August 10 1890 the tallero 
Eritreo was finally issued. It was a silver plated coin corresponding to 5 lire, convertible into the 
national currency and indirectly into gold. The reluctance to discard altogether the Maria Teresa coin 
and the choice to issue the new coin with a lower silver consistency than its predecessor, foreshadowed 
the abortion of this endeavour as well. Under those circumstances the Maria Teresa remained the 
prevalent coinage of the colony despite the fact that Rome desired, for reasons predominantly related to 
national prestige, to substitute it with a national one. An Italian but in every other respect identical to 
the Austrian, coin would be welcomed and easily accepted by the native populations. The new tallero 
d'Italia was officially issued by the royal act of 31 May 1918. It was similar to the Austrian one except 
the inscription "Regnum Italicum" on the one side and the Sabaudan crowned eagle on the other. 
Despite all these long-lasting efforts the original Maria Teresa currency was never effectively 
"expelled" from the colony and continued to circulate to a certain degree up to the 1930s. See 
Francesco Severio Caroselli, "La nostra politica monetaria nella colonia Eritrea", in Atti del primo 
congresso di studi coloniali v. VI sezione V: economica-agraria, (Florence, 1931), pp. 314-331. 
224Marinucci, "L'Amministrazione centrale coloniale", pp. 23-26. 
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possess any juridical institutions to speak of.225 Despite this deprecatory statement a 
certain administrative system was in effect before Italy's arrival there: there was a 
fiscal system, a commercial court and a penal and civil court.  Even so the Italian 
decision makers chose not to employ some of these long-established institutions, even 
on a temporary basis. They abolished them altogether and substituted them with 
Italian military oriented, oppressive canons.226 
 
Immediately after the capture of Massaua, Italian authorities had to operate 
under the pressure of the Egyptian presence, the Ottoman obstructions and the French 
vice-consulate's protests, that represented the French but also the Greek government, 
in regard to the preservation of the profitable capitulations regime in the city. The first 
step in the direction of the Italianization of the juridical authority and by extension a 
decisive development towards the transformation of the disputed territory into an 
Italian colony was the replacement of the Egyptian court by an Italian civil and 
commercial one, competent to adjudicate criminal cases too. The foreigners and the 
natives juristically were subject to the military court, although native Muslims could 
always resort to the local qadi or mufti who judged in accordance to Islamic law. 
After 1885 the religious judges were appointed by the colonial authorities. This 
arrangement came into revision when the new Celli regulations, by the name of the 
legislator, were presented before the Italian parliament on 30 June 1886. A three 
member civil, commercial and correctional court was founded in Massaua; its 
authority covered the entire colonial territory. It had the possibility to impose penalty 
fines of up to 1,500 lire. Likewise, the newly instituted Judge office could arbitrate 
less significant crimes (misdemeanors and legal disputes) committed by Italian, native 
and foreigners and sentence them to pay fines up to 500 lire. As for the more serious 
offences there was the Appeal Court of Ancona. The military court, naturally operated 
under the army's penal provisions, and had the ability sentence imprisonment of up to 
three years. When the colony was proclaimed in a state of war in 1887, the 
Investigation Commission, a new military juridical institution was established. The 
Celli ordinance was in effect for 8 years, until 1894, and demonstrated that "time and 
good administration, especially judicially, will prove to the natives the convenience of 
being directly administrated by Italian civil servants".227 
 
The Qadis, who addressed religious, personal and family matters and the 
Italian penal code that regulated the commercial, penal and civil affairs formulated the 
juridical regime of the Muslim tribes around Massaua. When the colony expanded 
(Keren-Asmara) to incorporate Ethiopian-Christian populations, the need for a new 
                                                          
225The serious disputes among the natives were informally solved by force and the law of vendetta 
ruled instead of a uniform penal code, making Massaua and the surroundings a chaotic and lawless 
place before the arrival of the Italians. See William Cafforel, "La Legislazione dell'Eritrea" in L'eritrea 
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legal framework appeared. The Italian government, lacking the necessary resources 
and having declared the colony in a state of war (2 May 1887) entrusted the 
administration of justice to the local nobility and to the military authorities. Hence, 
the Commission of Arbitration and Reconciliation (Commissione di Arbitrato e 
Conciliazione), presided by a military captain and two officials, was inaugurated in 
the zones of Keren and Asmara. The Courts' competences came under revision by 
Baratieri in November 1891 but remained militarily oriented. The fixation with 
authoritarian military law was a residue of the Italian 1861-1865 "brigandage" civil 
war and of the self-evident for the (northern) Italians axiom that the "culturally 
inferior" populations understood only brutal and terror inflicting punishments.228 War 
related violations, such as raids, looting or treason, committed either by Italians or by 
natives, were accordingly penalized via: execution, imprisonment, penal servitude, 
fines, flogging and deportation. Governor Orero in order to end the paradox of non-
combatants receiving military trials attempted to reduce their number and influence 
by merging the military and the war court into a single institution on 1 January 1890. 
Attempts were undertaken to rationalize and resolve decisively the civil-military 
juridical conflict. After many adjustments and proposals the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs suggested the retention of the native courts in Asmara and Keren, the legal 
equality for every person in the colony, the maintenance of the natives' mainly 
religious customs, the guarantee of everyone's personal liberty, the establishment of 
the juridical institution of the advocate, a judge (for penal and civil matters) and the 
institution of a penal and civil court. On 1 July 1896 two new arbitration courts were 
founded upon governor Baldissera's initiative in Adi Caieh and Adi Ugri as a way of 
imposing the colonial penal code and concurrently the Italian control and prestige to 
every corner of Eritrea. On the occasion (August 1896) the governor drew up a set of 
juridical adjustments. The most substantial point was the removal of the act of 
thievery committed by non-military personnel from the military courts’ jurisdiction.229 
 
Crispi did not bring Eritrea's inaugural law of January 1890 to the parliament 
and expose it to criticism by arguing that the colonial territory does not constitute 
national territory and therefore the parliament could not voice their ideas let alone 
interfere to the colony's administration. During Crispi's rule the parliament was often 
sidelined especially in matters that were certain to arouse a lot of opposition; the 
deputies had to read the newspapers to find out the latest developments in Africa. In a 
dictatorial manner he avoided the awkward discussion and the parliamentarian 
“interpretations” regarding the colony's constitution. Thus, he imposed his own vision 
about the colony's future as an agriculture outlet, creating the office of colonial 
advisor for agriculture and commerce and managing to silence the opposition's (anti-
                                                          
228Matteo Sisti, Lotte sociali in Eritrea dall'occupazione di Massawa alla costituzione della "National 
Confederation of Eritrean Workers", (Rome, 2010), p. 23.  
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colonialists) inevitable objections. 230 The programme concerning the colony is 
summarized in 10 points:  a) search for the most fertile areas in the region, b) 
expropriation of the land by the Italian state, c) granting arable lands to the Italian 
settlers that would arrive and settle in Eritrea, d) concessions and facilitation of all 
kinds to the Italian immigrants and settlers, and e) their protection from any external 
danger, f) connection of the immigrant settlements with the main road arteries, g) 
diversion of the rivers, where this was possible, to enhance the agriculture, h) aid, 
support and even advices to newly arrived settlers about life and agriculture in Eritrea, 
(i) well-intentioned and continuous monitoring of the Italian families in colony, and 
finally (j) meeting the educational, religious and medical needs.231 The actual usage 
value of the colony is ascertained according to this programme. Eritrea was 
earmarked to resolve the demographic-migration problem 232  and, secondarily, the 
financial one exclusively through agriculture. All the former proclamations and 
theories about a displacement colony, commercial station or naval base were no 
longer taken into account by the Italian leadership. 
The colony formed the tip of the spear for new conquests in the mainland, i.e. 
in Ethiopia.233 The broad powers and the nature of the governor's authority gave a 
military character to the colony. Besides, the largest part of the dominion's budget was 
being absorbed by the military expenses. The author Edoardo Scarfoglio (1860-1917) 
aptly ascertained that a colony of military nature does nothing else but conduct war. 
Crispi, after the death of Depretis, took over as Prime Minister in 1887 (whereas 
Mancini was succeeded by di Robilanton 18 June 1885) and presented his colonial 
programme to the parliament as "one of the most memorable acts of our country." The 
policy of small sacrifices in men and money in return for huge advantages was voted 
for by 193 deputies while 55 opposed it. 234  Sonnino, visiting Eritrea in 1890 
determined that the climate was tolerable, the settlers safe, the communications secure 
and the land arable. Part of his assertions were undoubtedly true. The issue that the 
Italian colonialists would myopically not settle, refrained from facing or simply were 
not able to resolve was the lack of enterprising activity and capital.235 The programme 
of the colony and Rome's aspirations were meaningless without funds. Neither the 
glorious conquests, nor the imposition of the superior Italian civilization on the 
Africans, nor the attainment of the goal of equality with the other colonial powers 
would be able to compensate for this deficiency. 
                                                          
230 Gennaro Mondaini, La legislazione coloniale italiana nel suo sviluppo storico e nel suo stato attuale 
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5.2 The function and early administration of Italian Eritrea  
 
   At the time when the Italians began to take an interest in the region, Ethiopia 
was a vast but poor country with numerous internal and external enemies. Because of 
the outdated feudal system that was in effect there, the strongest local lords-princes 
(Ras) who were harbouring ambitions for the Ethiopian throne were rising in revolt 
and gaining their independence often immersing the country in bloody civil clashes. 
In addition to the internal turmoil the King of Kings (Negus Negesti), Emperor 
Yohannes faced, as has been seen, the Egyptian attacks, the European scheming and 
subsequently the devastating raids of the Mahdists.1  In this complex and chaotic 
situation the Italian factor was also added after 1885. 
   The hitherto friendly relations with Italy were abruptly disturbed when the 
Italian contingent occupied Massaua, a port that according to the Hewitt treaty 
belonged, with its heartland, to Ethiopia. The Italian guarantees about Ethiopia's 
unhindered supply with weapons and supplies through this port did very little to 
reassure the emperor,2 who added yet another dangerous opponent to his extensive list 
of enemies.3 Martini, future governor of Eritrea, was the first to realize that the Italian 
presence in Massaua was inescapably predetermined to drive both sides into conflict. 
Crispi officially disapproved of a war with Ethiopia, but he also did not want Italy to 
remain "inactive", "in a passivity" dangerous to "our name and our honour". On 14 
June 1887 in view of the military expenditures in Africa, a bill for the government to 
borrow an amount to the tune of 20 million lire was presented to the parliament. 
Despite the objections of the Left the bill was approved with 317 "ayes" and just 12 
"noes". Every member of the Senate also voted in favour.4 The representative of the 
Extreme Left (Estrema Sinistra), Edoardo Pantano (1842-1932) argued that the Italian 
economic interests and the civilizing mission were incompatible with the African 
venture of the Crispi government while Costa demanding the return of the Italian 
                                                          
1 The country thanks to its effective military organization had in the past warded off almost all the 
raiders and now under Emperor Yohannes was taking steps slowly but steadily towards the 
modernization and the consolidation of a strong central authority. The military successes against 
heathen African tribes in conjunction with the Christian tradition (the Ethiopians had adopted 
Christianity since the 1st century A.D. and they were Copts), made the subjects of the emperor proud 
and indomitable fighters. From all the "underdeveloped" peoples of Africa the Italians chose to 
challenge, and were partly pushed to do so, the most war-experienced and battle-hardened. See Silvana 
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which the Ethiopian arms were crushed was the Anglo-Ethiopian war of 1867-1868. Italy did not take 
advantage of the experience of its partner in Africa, Britain, since being arrogant and confident about 
its success, it never asked for British assistance either at an advisory or at a technical level. 
2 The emperor accused in a letter the Italians for not respecting the Ethiopian sovereignty, the trade 
concessions and the Hewitt treaty. See ASMAE, ASMAI, position 3/3, folder 19, London 12 January 
1888. 
3 Richard Pankhurst, The Ethiopians, (Massachusetts, 1998), p. 171. 
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soldiers from the Red Sea stated: "I see the flag of my homeland above battlefields for 
freedom and independence, I see it in the civilizing missions that always elevate the 
nation closer to the heights of the ideals, I do not see it, I cannot see it in the African 
ventures".5 
Thus, immediately after their consolidation on the shoreline the Italians 
implemented a policy of expansion towards the hinterland, towards the Ethiopian 
plateau, an objective seemingly feasible at the time when the emperor was setting as 
priority the tackling of the Mahdist danger. Italy in the midst of this fortunate for itself 
conjuncture had the possibility to bolster its position and to expand without great 
sacrifices.6 Despite the voices of the opposition within the Italian parliament about a 
meaningless expansion without an economic reasoning, the government, in search of 
successes and stature, attempted to exploit to the fullest the Ethiopian weaknesses and 
the internal conflicts between the feudal lords and the emperor for its own benefit. In 
its effort to attract with gifts and pay-offs allies and accomplices against Emperor 
Yohannes, Rome collaborated with his rival for the crown, Ras Menelik or Menelik 
Sahle Maryam (1844-1913). The following day after the capture of Massaua, army 
units, without encountering any particular problems, overran Otumlo and Monculo 
and a few months later (June 1885) Sahati or Saati and Wi'a expanding the Italian 
sphere of influence 30 kilometres in the mainland. 7  The Italian troops were 
supposedly serving defensive and peacekeeping purposes.8 In this manner the quest 
for fertile lands and Africa’s economic penetration turned into a policy of territorial 
expansion under the auspices of Britain.9 
   Menelik, king of the Scioa province (Showa or Scioa) in central Ethiopia, 
typically a vassal of the emperor (officially since 20 March 1878) but practically 
independent, grasped and skillfully exploited the political and economic antagonism 
between the European powers at the time of Africa's partition. Menelik, displaying 
diplomatic skills not dissimilar to Bismarck's, was able on one hand to strengthen his 
position by receiving supplies and weapons from the Europeans and Egyptians and, 
on the other hand, by performing a balancing act and taking advantage of the disputes 
between the Powers, to maintain the independence of his region; independence 
guaranteed and "subsidized" by the colonialists at the expense of their own 
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expansionist plans.10 All the Powers without exception rushed to conclude treaties of 
friendship and co-operation aiming at a privileged position in a vast and strategically 
important area. The French in constant search of an ally against British interests 
stressed the "deep sympathy" that they were harbouring towards a "proud and brave" 
nation. Queen Alexandrina Victoria (1819-1901) sent a recorded message with the use 
of a gramophone to Menelik revealing the British friendship and goodwill towards 
Ethiopia. The Russians by underscoring the close relations between the Coptic 
Ethiopian and the Orthodox Church and by sending impressive gifts to Addis Ababa 
tried to integrate the country into their sphere of influence. Belgium hastened to 
establish diplomatic relations with the Ethiopian court as well.11 
   The king of Scioa, seeking funds to equip his army and pay tribute to the 
emperor, began predatory raids south of his kingdom against settlements (in the 
region of Gala) within the ambiguous Ethiopian borderline and beyond. Even though 
he feared his overlord's reaction, he developed relations with European traders and in 
1876 he came into contact with an Italian exploratory mission. That was the Chiarini-
Antinori mission, the first of its kind in Scioa that resulted in the concession to the 
Italians of a 95 hectares expanse in Let Marefia as a scientific-research center.12 In 
March 1883 Menelik and the Italian diplomat Antonelli officially signed a trade 
agreement, based on the most favourable nation clause and resulted in the connection 
of Scioa to Assab and the delivery of 2,000 Remington rifles to the Ethiopian side. It 
was later ratified (21 May) as the 10 year treaty of friendship and commerce. 
According to it, Scioa had to use the port of Assab (and not the French one in Obock), 
the rights (right of access, religious freedom, free trade) of the Italians in Scioa and 
those of the Scioans in Italian soil would be safeguarded and the Ras was given the 
possibility of using the Italian diplomatic avenues. 13  Exchanging diplomats was 
agreed as well.14 These developments and the failure of a similar commercial mission 
by Matteucci and Bianchi to the lands controlled by the emperor's forces in 1878 
slightly alarmed Yohannes. 15  When the Italians began expanding towards the 
mainland with British assistance and impeding the Ethiopian resupply via Massaua, 
Yohannes, already dissatisfied with London because of the violation of the Hewitt 
treaty, realized that vindication could be found only by resorting to arms.16 The 23 
April 1885 Ferrari-Nerazzini appeasing mission, aiming at convincing the emperor 
that the capture of Massaua took place as an action to pacify and contain the 
Mahdists, had ambiguous results.17 Menelik, for the time being, did remain loyal to 
the emperor; however, he kept a sympathetic neutrality towards the Italians and every 
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other European power as well, as he had every reason to maintain friendly relations 
with them.18Although he also sensed the Italian danger, he was aspiring to Rome's 
support and he cynically used it to claim the Ethiopian throne and to equip his troops. 
Simultaneously, he was collaborating admirably with the French as well. The French 
arms trade between Djibouti and Ethiopia was so profitable that it covered with ease 
the maintenance costs of the Djibouti colony, urging Paris to become more active in 
order to ensure that this commercial avenue remained open at the expense of the 
Italian interests.19 
When the Italians advanced in the interior installing advanced outposts at 
Sahati, the nominal leader of the region neighboring to Massaua, called Mareb-
Mellasc, Ras Alula Abba Nega (1827-1897) sent a telegram-ultimatum demanding the 
withdrawal of the Italian troops from his territories. In the skirmish that followed the 
Ethiopians were easily rebuffed 20  and the Minister of War, Ettore Bertolè-Viale 
(1829-1892) announced with satisfaction that the occupation was completed without 
any problems.21 But the obscure Sahati or Saati was not sufficient and the conquest of 
the area beyond was deemed necessary for the safety of the Italian dominions. Zula 
was captured on 1 September and Ua-a on 23 November according to the orders of 
the Supreme Commander in Africa, General Carlo Genè; Ras Alula once more asked 
for the evacuation of these positions but to no avail. Genè replied that he carried out 
the aforementioned captures out of friendship for the Ethiopians and to facilitate 
trade. Emperor Yohannes, convinced by then that the Italians came to Ethiopia as 
conquerors stated in his letter to Menelik: "...they are not a serious folk, they are 
meddlers and all this has to be the work of the English. The Italians did not come to 
these parts because they lack grass and pastures in their country, but they came here 
out of ambition, to expand because they are many and not rich...with God's help they 
will leave humiliated and unsatisfied and with their honour lost in front of the 
world."22 He also invited Menelik to stop collaborating with them and join him in his 
effort to repulse them. Menelik, interested in maintaining the italo-abyssinian rift 
shared the contents of the letter with the Italian authorities, namely with the diplomat 
Antonelli.23 
In 1886 Crispi in the plenary session of the parliament placed the issue on a 
fresh footing: "We have been at Assab. We refused to turn Assab into a military base. 
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We must therefore defend Assab from our position in Massaua."24 Thus, the Italian 
troops that were stationed in Massaua had to face the Ethiopian challenge since "it 
was neither decent nor possible to be withdrawn in the face of threats." Initially, they 
approached the tribe of the Habab, hostile to Alula and Emperor Yohannes and placed 
it under their protection.25 On 26 January 1887 a force of 500 men under Lieutenant 
Colonel Tommaso De Cristoforis (unknown-1887) en route to Sahati was ambushed, 
encircled and annihilated by Alula's 10,000 men at Dogali. Upon word of this disaster 
Genè withdrew the garrisons of Sahati, Ua-a and Arafali.26 
The complete destruction had a major impact on the Italian public opinion. 
The myth of the Dogali heroes, who like the Risorgimento patriots had sacrificed 
themselves for the glory of Italy, was created and spread. After the capture of 
Massaua and especially after the Dogali defeat, far more people than the already 
"colonial conscious" explorers, servicemen and industrialists, started taking some 
interest in Africa being more susceptible to patriotic, pro-expansion oratory.27 The 
press inflated and endued with respect and admiration the most tragic time of the 
Italian arms in Africa until then, moving the whole country.28 However, the radical 
and democratic press, and the left wing deputies attacked fiercely the African policies 
of the government. The platonic discourses in regard to the future of Assab some 
years earlier evolved, through Dogali, into acute confrontations. The tragic event 
confirmed that a social class opposed to the "africomania" had been formed, initially 
indifferent but gradually, hostile to the notion of expansion and willing to contest and 
criticize the very validity and motivation of the prevalent colonial ideology. Many 
dissident servicemen and public servants were perceiving a transfer to the 
"horrendous Africa" as a punitive demotion. 29 The Emancipation newspaper, 
ridiculing the bombastic declarations about the "national virility" and the "right of the 
powerful" noted sarcastically: "[...] what a honourable game is to occupy, to attack a 
port and whatever country, to establish oneself as an overlord or a thief and fight the 
natural native reaction with every possible means of destruction given by the art of 
war."30 According to the editor Italy should have taken care of other priorities in the 
internal front before engaging in an unreasonable war. Deputy Costa, convicted twice 
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during this period as a "rebel" by Rome's courts, once more served as the opposition's 
spokesperson: "Stop this crazy and criminal undertaking; withdraw our troops from 
Africa". This view was shared by numerous citizens, who set up democratic and 
"garibaldian" anticolonial committees, in many Italian cities at the time.31 Besides 
Africa, the programme and demands of these assemblies usually revolved around the 
repression of the democratic ideals, the social problems, the opposition to the Triple 
alliance and the state's religious policy. The Milanese "Committee for the withdrawal 
of the troops from Africa" condemned the colonial undertaking and declared in its 
manifesto: "Calling the African venture a civilizing enterprise, in the holy name of 
civilization is distorted; civilization is not imposed by force or violence; the sense of 
public and civil morality is corrupted by arousing enthusiasm for vendetta and 
conquest; the welfare and prosperity of the country is ruined by promoting an unjust 
and cruel war". Democratic associations in Livorno and Siena defending the nominal 
right of every people to exist protested officially to the government against "these 
assaults upon the peoples' liberty that even though they were barbarians they could 
not and should not be deprived of their most sacred rights." Along these lines the 
liberal Deputy Alfredo Beccarini (1826-1890) and 17 of his colleagues signed and 
presented to the government a petition for the renounce of any kind of aggression in 
Africa, in May 1888.32 The publisher of the Milanese newspaper L'Italia del Popolo, 
Dario Papa (1846-1897) defined his countrymen African tendency as a nuisance 
without reason. He based his insightful assessment upon the state's precarious 
financial position, the immigration hemorrhage, the "southern" problem, the people's 
excessive religious adherence, the illiteracy and the dreadful living conditions. Under 
this prism Italian socialists’ and the African "enemies’" demands appear to be the 
same: public education, work, emancipation. Referring to the latter Papa claimed: "I 
tell you, as far as the Abyssinians are concerned, as barbarous and miserable as they 
are, I have only sympathy considering them as defenders of their country… that they 
are defending their country".33 
Even more interesting was the Catholic Church's moral support to the colonial 
policy, through liturgies, speeches and commemoration ceremonies, despite the 
permanently tense relations with the "usurper" government in Rome. Clergyman 
Conforti while giving funeral rites for Dogali's victims asserted: "The great God, in 
these times, desired to give to the world a sacred taste of the Italian valour [...] He 
desired to demonstrate that Roman blood is still running in our inflamed veins." On 2 
March professor Risicato, while giving a speech about Dogali in the church of the city 
of Campobasso, suggested: "24 centuries have already passed while civilized 
humanity waited for this glorious event. Thermopylae and Dogali, Leonida and De 
Cristoforis, here gentlemen, was accomplished the world's greatest epopee" In Parma, 
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bishop Miotti maintaining that Dogali should be an example for the younger 
generations, argued: "Ιn your hands lies the destiny of our beloved motherland. God 
and motherland, God and people, this is your outcry, the goal of your efforts." Finally 
reverent Anzani, in the Campi Salentino region, commented that the Italian soldiers 
spilled their blood on barbarian soil to promote the pure and true Christian faith.34For 
some Catholic circles the government had stained the "glory of Dogali" by hiding the 
truth and not assuming the responsibility for the tragedy. 35 The rivalry for some 
disputed lands between Eritrea and Ethiopia had turned into contempt and hatred for 
the savage heathen Abyssinians. Just two years after the occupation of Massaua, 
Rome went to war with Ethiopia.36 Italy had to react dynamically and to avenge the 
destruction of Dogali as soon as possible, proving that it was a Great Power. 
Initially 5 million lire were made available. On 14 June another 20 million lire 
were dispatched along with reinforcements and battleships in the Red Sea "for 
military action to be carried out in Africa". A few days earlier Crispi stated in the 
parliament: "Barbarians only understand the might of the cannon; well then, this 
cannon will thunder at the right time and we hope that it will signal our army's 
victory." 37  Di Robilant's departure from office and the death of Prime Minister 
Depretis, in 1887, left the foreign ministry and the premiership of the country in the 
hands of Crispi. During his time total military expenditures, just in the two year 
period of 1888-1889, reached the unfathomable amount of 560 million lire whereas in 
1880 they were estimated at 256 million lire. 38  The Minister of Public Works 
Giuseppe Saracco (1821-1907), worried about the 1888-1889 budget's declination by 
488 million lire, suggested the abandonment of Massaua to Crispi in order to avoid 
"the nightmare of a new surprise that would cost to the mother land, blood and 
money."39 Crispi was adamant. The battle at Dogali was the catalyst, the turning point 
that pushed Italy deeper in the colonial path and set in motion all the mechanisms 
which would lead to the battle of Adwa.40 The defeat wounded the national feeling 
and made public opinion more prone to the demagoguery and nationalist bravado of 
the Prime Minister. Crispi's authoritarian style of governing41 and his foreign policy 
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that was unbeknown to the parliament or contrary to its views, did not particularly 
trouble the public opinion that was now demanding conquests, victories and a large-
scale war in Africa. Encouraged and certain about the outcome of the war Crispi 
demanded for the cessation of hostilities, an official apology from the Ethiopian side 
for the events at Dogali, the recognition of the Italian protectorate over the Assaorta 
and the Habab, the annexation to Eritrea of the Sahati and Sanahit regions and finally 
the conclusion of a new treaty of friendship, peace and trade between Rome and 
Addis Ababa. Yohannes reasonably considered the Italian demands to be excessive 
and requested the return of Massaua and the lands of the Βogos tribe in Ethiopia.42 
The gap was unbridgeable. 
   The mediation of the British diplomat Gerald Herbert Portal (1858-1894) 
failed to smooth over the situation and the negotiations came to nothing.43 The events 
that followed are known in the Italian historiography as the First War of Africa (Prima 
Guerra d'Africa).44 In charge of preparing the colony for war was Saletta who had 
been promoted to the rank of general. He had only just returned from India where he 
had been closely observing the British organization of the native troops; 45  he 
proclaimed Massaua in a state of siege and ordered a coastal naval blockade to cut off 
possible incoming supplies to the Ethiopians.46Under his orders telegraphic posts 
                                                                                                                                                                      
distress caused by the daily life hardships, the miserable working and living conditions, the social 
injustice, the exploitation and the economic stagnation. In the spring of 1893 the Fasci multiplied and 
united the workers, farmers, craftsmen, merchants and even students in a common cause through a 
series of strikes against the central authority. The Prime Minister, suspecting Franco-Russian 
involvement, reacted dynamically by mobilizing the army, stifling the revolt and severely punishing the 
perpetrators. See Battaglia, La prima Guerra, p. 565. This "Crispi dictatorship" lasted a total of 6 years. 
He served as President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1887 until February 
1891 and from November 1893 until March 1896, years in which the commercial antagonism with 
France and the economic crisis were heightened. In the two years that he spent in the backstage, di 
Rudini and then Giovanni Giolitti (1842-1928) came to power. J.L. Miège, L'Imperialismo coloniale 
Italiano dal 1870 ai giorni nostri, (Milan, 1976), p. 47. In 1893 the Italian people’s lack of confidence 
to the unified state, to the political system and to the institutions necessitated the assumption of power 
by a strong and centralized government. Crispi took over the role of the "socialist dictator" in co-
operation with the Minister of Treasury, Sonnino. With the suspension of the parliamentary 
proceedings in 1895, the economic protectionism and the opportunistic foreign policy he managed to 
turn workers, farmers, industrialists and the middle class into his enemies. At the end of his tenure, he 
was drawing support only from the pro-monarchist, conservative and Catholic circles. At the time, few 
viewed sympathetically his internal line of action, let alone his costly, conceited African policy. See 
Francesco Barbagallo, "Da Crispi a Giolitti. lo Stato, la politica, i conflitti sociali" in Storia d'Italia, 
Liberalismo e Democrazia 1887-1914, ed. G. Sabbatucci, V. Vidotto, (Bari, 1995), pp. 35-44. 
42 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 
43 Pankhurst, Ethiopians, p. 172. 
44 The plan of the military operations was orchestrated by the Italian General Staff. According to it the 
dispatch of 8,000-10,000 men to the front was not enough to bring about peace and tranquillity on the 
borders of the Italian colonies. Simultaneously, Rome had to conclude alliances with the local tribes, 
collaborate with the Muslims in Sudan and instigate riots in the interior of Ethiopia. The military 
obligations in Europe, stemming from the agreements of the Triple Alliance, did not allow the 
commitment of the entire Italian army in Africa. See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XX, 
(Rome, 1988), pp. 519-522. 
45Ministero della Guerra, Storia Militare della Colonia Eritrea, p. 98. 
46AUSSME D4 ERITREA, folder 41, Massaua, 23 March 1887 and ASMAE, ASMAI, position 3/3, 
folder 22, Massaua, 1 May 1887. 
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were erected, the accommodation capacity was expanded in sight of the arrival of the 
expeditionary corps and two underground wires were installed between Assab and 
Massaua for the "continuous and daily telegraphic communications with our brothers 
of the Army and the corps that defend our flag's honour in Africa".47 An effort to 
tighten the relations with Rome's African "allies", the subjugated tribes Cafel and 
Habab was also undertaken in order to diplomatically and politically isolate Emperor 
Yohannes. In this light the Antonelli-Menelik alliance treaty was signed in Addis 
Abeba on 20 October 1887.48 
In December 1887 Rome sent to Eritrea General di San Marzano to lead the 
troops (roughly 18,000 men landed in Massaua between 9 November and the end of 
December) that would take up the annihilation of the Ethiopian army. On 1 February 
1887 these forces captured Saati and, after erecting fortifications and trenches 
positioned themselves defensively.49  Yohannes deployed his army opposite of the 
Italian positions but did not attack fearing the losses that the Italian defensive 
arrangement, the "maginot coloniale" would inflict. 50  The emperor watching his 
numerous army (80,000) running out of supplies and the Italians not daring to exit 
their fortifications was forced to abandon the battlefield and to move against the 
Mahdists.51 At the time Ethiopia was attacked from every direction. Yohannes had to 
contain the Italians on the coast, reduce the danger from Sudan and impose himself 
over the feudal lords of the country and in particular over the ambitious Menelik. 
Since the Ethiopians withdrew from the battlefield, the victory automatically and most 
importantly bloodlessly belonged to the Italian side.52 After this development, Rome 
acquired freedom of action and the possibility to expand its influence in the region 
undisturbed with the contested areas coming under Italian control.53 Italy had won, 
had increased its prestige and had expanded in the hinterland untroubled. As a peace 
treaty with Yohannes was never-signed, it would continue to expand unimpeded until 
the violent closure of 1896.54 
   In July 1888 Menelik assured Count Antonelli that he had now revolted 
against the emperor and asked for weapons and munitions. At a time when Yohannes 
                                                          
47Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp.264-265. 
48By this agreement, clearly directed against Yohannes, the Italians recognized Menelik as a sovereign 
power in Ethiopia in return for a promise "to aid the government of his Majesty the King of Italy in all 
circumstances". The Italians would also abstain from any new annexations and they had to hand out 
5,000 rifles to Menelik, who in his turn promised not to use them against the Italians under any 
circumstance. See Marcus, "Imperialism and expansionism in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900", p. 424.  
49Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 286. 
50Franco Bandini, Gli Italiani in Africa, storia delle guerre coloniali, (Milano, 1971), p, 65. 
51 Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 70. 
52 Some circles though lamented the lack of a harsh retribution to the Ethiopians since the outcome was 
not adequate to the "nation's moral and pragmatic" interests. See "Bollettino Politico", L’Osservatore 
Romano, n. 82, Thursday, 5 April 1888, p. 1. 
53Cesari, Colonie e possedimenti coloniali, p. 71. 
54Sahati and Ua-a were recaptured and other regions followed suit. See Cosimo Caruso, Ricordi D' 
Africa (1889-1896), (Rome, 1939), p. 12. 
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was prioritizing the combating of the Mahdists, an alliance of this sort and a civil war 
in Ethiopia was fully serving the Italian interests. 55  Antonelli advised the Italian 
government to supply Menelik with the necessary armament and to draw up plans for 
the occupation of Asmara. Once the army of Scioa assaulted the imperial army or the 
capital, the Italian troops from their staging positions in Eritrea would be providing 
assistance as soon as possible. However, when the weapons did not arrive in Scioa on 
the agreed date, Menelik entered into a round of negotiations with Yohannes to defuse 
the crisis. Eventually Antonelli arrived in Ethiopia bringing 10,000 rifles, but at the 
moment the outbreak of an intra-Ethiopian conflict, i.e. a civil war was unrealistic. 
Numerous vassal princes rushed to assist and to place themselves under the orders of 
Yohannes for the cause of defending the Christian empire against the followers of 
Mahdi. The Italians putting the missed opportunity behind them continued their 
advance in the interior while Ethiopian troops, with Yohannes in command, headed 
towards Begemder.56 
Despite the German concerns that the war between Ethiopia and Italy could 
affect the European balance, 57  Crispi during this period was enjoying a relative 
support from the Allies and from Britain, a fact which allowed him to set increasingly 
more ambitious goals. He also appeared to enjoy a certain liberty of action from the 
parliament.58 The main characteristics of his premiership, populism, authoritarianism 
and the co-operation with the Crown were complementing in a perfect way his 
ambitious African policy, which among other things seemed to distract the Italian 
public opinion from the economic problems and the unemployment in the interior.59 
Hailing from the ranks of the Left, like Mancini, he was aspiring to make Italy a first 
rate colonial power. Unlike however, his predecessor he was not taking into account 
the potential consequences, acting arbitrarily and irresponsibly. To achieve this goal 
the Italian leaders orchestrated and followed two "programmes". The policy oriented 
to Scioa (politica scioanna) was making provisions for the full co-operation and 
alliance with Menelik via gifts, weapons and diplomatic support as means of 
expanding the Italian influence on the mainland. This policy of indirect imperialism, 
which Antonelli had already set in motion, could bring about economic and political 
                                                          
55 The Italians were forced to seek Menelik's alliance because of the uncompromising and hostile 
attitude of Yohannes. Because of this alliance the title of "traitor" would be conferred upon Menelik by 
his fellow countrymen.  
56Μarcus, History of Ethiopia, pp. 86-87. 
57 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 269. 
58Ibid., 297 The African developments seemed to captivate the majority of the Italian parliament. 
During the 12 May 1888 discussion just 1/8 of the deputies railed against the San Marzano expedition, 
whereas a year later (7 May 1889) the socialist anticolonial opposition was nowhere to be found. It is 
striking that a few years earlier many deputies had not given their consensus for the nationalization of 
Assab; as for the expedition for Massaua, a sizeable one third of the chamber was against it. 
59 Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 72. 
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benefits without bloody sacrifices in a peaceful and subtle manner.60 Its inspirer was 
trying to convince the Italian government of the benefits of the plan, which aimed to 
making Ethiopia its stooge without bloodshed. Indeed, the relations of "sincere 
friendship"61 with Scioa took on a special importance for Rome since in this manner 
the French influence would be limited, Massaua would develop economically and the 
final victory over Yohannes would be brought forward. 62 As part of this policy 
Antonelli, on 22 January 1889 delivered 5,000 rifles and ammunitions to Scioa's new 
capital, Addis Abeba. At the opposite end, there were the supporters of the policy 
orientated towards the rich province of Tigre (politica tigrina). Their main 
representative was Baldissera, the new commander of the Italian troops in Africa 
since April 1888. In charge of the troops (approximately 6,000) that remained after 
the withdrawal of San Marzano’s expeditionary force, he carried out a plan that 
entailed alliances, the use of divide and rule tactics and expansion. This forceful line 
of action, contrary to the politica scioanna, dictated the occupation by military means 
of the zone around Eritrea and either the expansion up to Tigre or the creation of a 
buffer state in the region to safeguard Eritrea's territorial integrity. This policy, 
naturally, was being held in high esteem by Rome's military and imperialist circles. In 
reality, as demonstrated by the frequent diplomatic contacts of Antonelli with the king 
of Scioa and the occupation of Keren and Asmara respectively in May and August 
1889, these policies were followed simultaneously with disastrous results.63 
With the occupation of Asmara, on 4 August 1889, the colony was expanded 
up to the Mareb River and the Ethiopian mainland. Keren, 64  a location which 
according to the Hewitt treaty was Ethiopian territory, was "liberated", according to 
Baldissera's statement, without the knowledge and therefore without the consent of 
the parliament. 65  From that moment on, the easy victory and the euphoria that 
followed allowed the Italian militarists to turn their gaze towards Tigre and Adwa.66 
What they did not seem to realize was the fact that these "successes" were not down 
to meticulous planning or the capability of the Italian arms but to Ethiopia's failure to 
react vigorously at that moment in time.67 When farther expansion to the west was 
determined unprofitable, the Italian colonial army, comprised of African Askari 
soldiers, turned towards Sudan; Africans were employed insead of Italians to avoid 
the turmoil that a potential second Dogali would cause. The anarchy that prevailed 
                                                          
60 Perticone, L'Italia in Africa, la politica, p. 31. Under this perspective the development of trade 
relations was preferable to the violent civilizing with the "cannon and the bayonet". See Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXIII, (Rome, 1995), p. 479. 
61 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XVII-XVIII, (Rome, 1994), p. 5. 
62 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XV-XVI, (Rome, 1993), p. 132.  
63 Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 72. 
64Commissar Branchi pretended that Keren was fertile, with a climate resembling that of Palermo and 
could easily become an outlet for the Italian immigrants and a starting point for the later subjugation of 
Ethiopia. See ASMAE, ASMAI, position 3/4, folder 30, Rome, 29 April 1889. 
65Perticone, L'Italia in Africa, la politica, pp. 31-32. 
66Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 75. 
67Rochat, Il colonialismo, p. 25. 
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there allowed Baldissera to proceed unimpeded to the occupation of Ocule Kasai and 
of Sarae, successes that were inflated by the Italian press. 68  Baldissera's plan 
regarding Sudan was the imposition of a protectorate upon a confederation of 
dependent buffer states, a regime that would guarantee the Italian security and 
influence upon the whole region.69 
   The period of the first 20 months of Baldissera's military administration was 
apparently the happiest of the colony.70 The military successes and the consolidation 
of the Italian sovereignty and influence on the Ethiopian hinterland in conjunction 
with the security of the border, the relative prosperity and the development of the 
infrastructures, within certain financial limitations, bode a healthy future for the 
Italian dominions. The colonial army was reorganized, hospitals and aqueducts were 
constructed and the port of Massaua was extended, while good neighbourly relations 
were maintained with the surrounding tribes. However, on 1 August 1888, the Italians 
occupied the neighbouring village of Zoula, proving that the colony, even though it 
was not yet officially founded, had primarily a military character and operation. 
Indeed, Eritrea by becoming the spearhead of the Italian expansionism in Africa was 
constantly under military law and in a state of war, absorbing in parallel huge 
amounts for its fortification and security.71 So that the colony would not be totally 
sustained at the expense of the Italian state and to find the necessary resources to 
carry out his grandiose plans the governor often levied extraordinary taxation. The 
additional taxation caused the indignation of the local population and of the foreign 
traders, including the Greeks who were operating in Eritrea.72 
   Despite the military successes and the conquests that Crispi was 
appropriating and crediting himself with and despite the favourable developments in 
Ethiopia's interior, the situation in Eritrea was hardly idyllic. The unfortunate Livraghi 
incident and the dispute between Baratieri and Leopoldo Franchetti (1847-1917) 
would prove the fundamental weaknesses of the Italian colonialist system. The 
Livraghi scandal concerned the criminal activities of Dario Livraghi, captain of the 
colonial police, andof his partner, secretary of the office for colonial affairs, Eteocle 
                                                          
68Cesari, Colonie e possedimenti coloniali, p. 76. 
69ASMAE, ASMAI, position 3/5, folder 25, n. 3424/81, Rome, 11 November 1888. 
70 Baldissera at that period did not serve as governor of the colony although he behaved as such. He 
was the head of the Italian armed forces in Africa with broad powers and he had the first and the last 
word on the issues of Eritrea. He had the power to issue laws and to even expel anyone that seemed to 
be opposed to the Italian dominion. See Eteocle Cagnazzi, I nostri erroti, tredici anni in Eritrea. Note 
storiche e considerazioni, (Turin, 1898), pp. 86, 192-193. Thus is illustrated the military’s domination 
over the politicians in the colony and the latter's pushing aside. 
71The colony cost 114,300,793 lire for the period from January 1885 until June 1891. 109,179,174 
weighted upon the War Ministry and the rest upon the Maritime and the Public works ministry. Ibid., p. 
153. 
72 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 300-301. Tax oppression and the draining of the resources of the 
colony's residents did not cease with Gandolfi being replaced by Baratieri in the administration of the 
colony. The replacement had come about because of the fall of the di Rudini administration and the 
ascension of Giolitti's government (15 May 1892).  
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Cagnassi who, with the connivance of the governors of Eritrea, had murdered until 
1891 12 noblemen and 800 indigenous people under the mere suspicion that they 
would desert and potentially betray the Italians.73 When the Italian authorities ordered 
the conduct of an investigation, the two criminals disappeared. The results of an 
investigation conducted during April and May 1891 compromised Rome and put it in 
a difficult position. The perpetrators were sentenced for 16 of the 800 alleged murders 
and were never arrested. The only ones found guilty and punished accordingly were 
two officers of the native police corps. The military officers and the governors Orero 
and Baldissera were not convicted for "few abuses". The latter admitted during an 
interview: "It is true that I ordered the execution of 8 or 10 natives without asking the 
verdict of the martial court" since the colony "was not at all calm". He added: "It was 
necessary to invoke terror to keep those barbarians subjugated." As for the future of 
Ethiopia: "the goal to reach [...] is the seizure of the entire Ethiopia; the means: the 
roman style military colony. Abyssinia has to be ours because this is the destiny of the 
inferior races: the blacks vanish little by little and we bring the civilization in Africa 
not for them but for us." 74  The sweet-sounding proclamations about justice and 
equality were meaningless in practice since the law not only did not treat equally the 
Italians and the Africans but allowed the former to treat the latter like their animals.75 
The colony besides a prolific region full of prospect and hope for the Italians was also 
a place of abuses, torture and ill-treatment for the natives. These facts have been 
questioned and denied by some historians who claimed that justice was impartial, the 
abuse incidents were limited, and the executions, always after a trial, justified.76 
Someone would expect that these grave incidents were sure to arouse the 
anticolonial outcry and fierce accusations from the socialist, republican and radical 
deputies. Unfortunately, as the parliamentary discussion about the African expenses 
of 29 April-6 May 1891 reveals (196 for and 38 against) the left wing of the 
parliament was fragmented and unable to form a concrete common front against the 
nationalist-africanists.77 Even their emblematic leader Turati an ardent advocate of 
isonomy and self-determination argued that for reasons of prestige and since Italy has 
already spent 120 million lire there, Eritrea should not be abandoned. The socialists 
plunged deeply into Italian social issues and they overlooked the misery and 
degradations taking place in Africa. In practice many of them were not opposed to 
expansionism; they felt uneasy about the state's expenditures and only assaulted the 
government's policies to politically oppose Crispi's despotic regime. The Marxist 
                                                          
73Sisti, Lotte sociali in Eritrea, p. 29. 
74Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p.441 
75Ibid., pp. 436-437. Angelo Del Boca in his revealing book Ιtaliani brava gente?Un mito Duro a 
morire has treated in detail the issue of the Italian colonial administration's impunity and brutality on 
the indigenous. In this book he describes the miserable detention conditions of the indigenous held as 
political prisoners in the Nocra island prison, during which most perished by hardships and 
punishments, demolishing the myth of the "milder" and "well-intentioned" Italian colonial rule 
compared to that of other nations. 
76De Stefani, Adua nella storia e nella leggenda, pp. 219-220. 
77Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp.439-440. 
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theorist Antonio Labriola (1843-1904) also did not rail against the colony and the 
exploitation and oppression that it was standing for. On the contrary, he gave rise to 
the socialist colonialism concept, proposing that Eritrea should become an experiment 
of de facto socialism and collectivization.78 Martini who was a Deputy at the time, 
asserted: "Whoever says that we have to civilize Ethiopia is lying. We have to 
substitute race for race: either this or nothing [...] to our work the native is a 
hindrance; well, we have to, willingly or not, hunt him, help him to vanish, like 
elsewhere the redskins, with all the means that civilization, instinctively hated by him, 
has to offer: the recurrent cannon  and the long lasting brandy."79 
The land management issue has to be addressed with explicit attention since 
finding arable land for Italy's redundant proletariat class was the much advertised 
incentive of the early Italian colonialism. The inaugural law of January 1890 was 
deemed as unpractical and was abolished in September 1891. The three member 
advisory council made decision making more complicated and did not guarantee the 
orderly communication of each respective part. The agriculture and commerce advisor 
had to address the issues of: defining state property, encouraging commerce, 
agriculture and industry, keeping secure the trade routes and stipulating agreements 
with the colony's neighbouring tribes. The authority to conclude agreements was later 
(29 September 1890) transferred to the Governor. This occasion led to the creation of 
the Colonization Office. Still the establishment of a new civil authority in Eritrea did 
not result in the complete revocation of the military one as Scarfoglio revealed on 5 
January 1890. Thus the simultaneous coexistence of the military and the civil 
authority cancelling each other out, was maintained. Besides Crispi himself admitted 
on 23 April 1890: "It has never been my intention [..] to institute in Eritrea a purely 
civil government [...]." A fact that even Menelik was well aware of; on 26 March 
1890 he wrote: "The government that sits in Massaua is a soldiers' government [...]."80 
According to the royal ordinance of 19 June 1890 the experienced81 Deputy 
Leopoldo Franchetti was appointed the first colonization commissary. His position's 
subordination to the Governor's office would create many obstacles and controversies 
as his challenging task, finding suitable outlet for Italy's ever growing population, 
required the utmost degree of support and autonomy. On the contrary Governor 
Orero, not willing to allow Franchetti a free hand on a series of colonial policies, 
attempted to hamper his powers by creating two corresponding offices to weaken his 
authority.  
                                                          
78Ibid., p. 363 
79Ibid., p. 455. 
80Rossini, Italia ed Etiopia, p. 25. 
81In 1876 alongside Sonnino he surveyed the conditions of Italy’s internal colony, Sicily and pubbished 
his findings. See Alberto Aquarone, “La ricerca di una politica coloniale dopo Adua. Speranze e 
delusioni fra politica ed economia” in Publications de l'École française de Rome, no. 1, Vol. 54 (1981), 
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Crispi believed that Eritrea had to provide arable land so that the emigration 
wave would be channeled into the Italian Africa.82 Thus, the specialist on agricultural 
affairs Franchetti was sent to the colony. According to the relative decree he was 
authorized to secure land for agricultural purposes, to intervene where he deemed 
necessary and to enter into agreements with the natives.83 
The occupation of Keren and Asmara in 1889 meant Eritrea's expansion to the 
fertile Ethiopian plateau and its definite orientation towards a policy of obtaining 
cultivable land. Commander Pietro Toselli (1856-1895), a resolute believer in the 
"moral duty of the civilized nation to drag the inferior one towards progress" 
commented on the subject: "our firm occupation of a point in the Abyssinian plateau 
corresponds to an economic need of the colony; it gives us a way to effectively 
practice surveillance and [exercise] sovereignty upon the friendly tribes; [it] facilitates 
the recruitment of irregular troops, whose build up will permit the diminution of the 
European troops; [it] provides for the health needs of the occupation army; and [it]  
preserves the commercial roots of the colony with the mainland. All this without great 
military risks."84 
 
Some sporadic investigative inquiries on the land tenure methods forwarded to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set the wheels in motion. Crispi immediately 
(November 1889) pressed the War Ministry to formulate the general lines for this type 
of concessions while Baldissera had declared a month earlier that every previous 
transaction without Rome's consent concerning the colony's estates between 
Europeans or natives were considered void. The land was to be reserved for Italian 
private or collective agricultural activities as a way to relief the demographic-
economic problem of the metropolis, since between 1887 and 1891 approximately 
717,000 Italians were estimated to have left their country. Naturally, before that, a 
series of issues regarding the provisions of the lease had to be settled. For this purpose 
in November 1889, months before his formal appointment, Franchetti was sent to 
Massaua in an exploratory mission. As a result of this brief research he shaped a 
positive opinion about the colony's economic development85 but he also stressed his 
concern in regard to the confiscation of the natives' property; their land was to be 
reserved for the Italian immigrants. Ultimately it was decided that the colony's 
government would have the responsibility of determining which terrains could be 
offered for cultivation to the natives and under which conditions. Since this obstacle 
                                                          
82Perticone, L'Italia in Africa, la politica, p. 34. Crispi stressed: "Eritrea has to be principally an 
agricultural colony and it is necessary to support the initiatives of individuals, granting them land and 
encouraging and assisting them in working and cultivating...". See Carlo Matteoda,"Il pensiero dei 
pionieri sulla valorizzazione economico-agraria della colonia Eritrea" in Atti del primo congresso di 
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83 Rainero, I primi tentativi di colonizzazione, pp. 12-13. 
84Ibid., pp. 30-34. 
85 Franchetti was convinced that Eritrea held encouraging prospects and could absorb part of Italy’s 
immigration flow. See Leopoldo Franchetti, "L'Italia e le sue colonie", conference held in Venice in 28 
March 1914 and Milan in 4 April 1914, (Rome, 1916), p. 9.  
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had been taken care of, Franchetti undisrupted devoted himself to his first colonizing 
experiment. It consisted of dividing 1000 hectares to 50 farms and offering them and 
the requisite equipment to 50 Italian families (presumably to carefully chosen families 
of ex servicemen) that were to administer the entire estate in a military manner.86 
 
An example of the collective capitalistic agricultural activity that was 
implemented in Eritrea was the "Società Reggiana per l'Africa". 87  Five Italian 
entrepreneurs having previously accumulated a capital of 25,000 lire instituted the 
aforementioned association with the intention of obtaining vast stretches of land from 
the colonial government free of charge. Subsequently they would implement a type of 
intense cultivation mobilizing the local labour force under Italian direction88 After 
agricultural experiments and relevant studies produced satisfying results the 
association formally requested the concession of 5 thousand hectares in Keren on 28 
February 1890. Deputy Franchetti, distrusting this kind of large scale "capitalistic" 
ventures urged Rome to reject the proposed plan altogether. Having been deprived the 
government's moral support the disenchanted members dissolved the association and 
left the colony. Franchetti after the assumption of his duties as the agriculture and 
commerce director initiated studies on the colony's most fertile region, Asmara and 
promoted the idea of a proportionally small-scale colonization at the area, 
encouraging individual "proletariat" settlements at the expense of massive capitalistic 
enterprises. He strived to reserve the most fertile land for the incoming families and 
provide them with favourable conditions, such as perpetual land ownership, as he was 
particularly averse to a policy that would lead to the potential establishment of 
latifundia and could destabilize the entire colony. By claiming the apparently 
abandoned land and by interfering with the local land ownership system known as 
Shehena or Diesa, Franchetti inevitably infuriated part of the native population. De 
Zerbi in 1890 prophetically warned that the land-man relation in East Africa was so 
crucial that any effort to separate them would threaten the very foundations of the 
                                                          
86The desirable type of the immigrant was that of the soldier-colonist who would defend the colony 
when the need arose, according to the government's orders. See Stefano Bellucci, "Colonial Ideology 
versus labour reality: a history of the recruitment of Italian workers to the colony of Eritrea, 1890-
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88Most of the time, cheap native workforce was preferred by the entrepreneurs and colonial  military 
authorities, a fact that led the Italian construction (roads, ports, railways) workers, that came to the 
colony in search of employment to protest to the government and ask its intervention in 1900. Many of 
them remained unemployed and had to repatriate. In 1899 when a private company sought to start a 
coffee plantation in Eritrea, instead of Italian work force, it "imported" and employed 25 workers from 
Yemen, who were reputed to be more experienced in growing coffee. See Bellucci, "Colonial Ideology 
versus labour reality", pp. 296-298.  
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Italian colonialism. 89  Franchetti was also quite unreasonably worried that Greek 
entrepreneurs, through possibly French bank loans, would end up owning the colonial 
property.90  
 
Among other provisions the June 1890 parliamentary law provided for the 
concession of state land, previously declared as available by the government to 
private citizens and associations for agricultural reasons. None of these concessions 
could exceed the limit of 10,000 hectares; as for the associations it was explicitly 
emphasized that they could not maintain possession rights for more than fifty years. 
Franchetti was placed as the director of this endeavour; he was entitled to negotiate 
with the petitioners and cede up to 100 hectares. In the case of larger terrains he had 
to consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally he was granted extended 
powers to facilitate the completion of his task, a fact that irritated the colony's new 
governor Gandolfi, who as a man of a military background was eager to reduce the 
Deputy's autonomy.91 
 
Under the act of the 25th of January 1891 the authority of the General 
Secretary for civil affairs was placed under the governor's jurisdiction, whereas 
Franchetti was at the head of the colonization office as he was appointed the colony's 
Agricultural Counselor. The reestablishment of the respective authorities was not able 
to eliminate the antagonism between Gandolfi and Franchetti. Franchetti pressed on 
with his proposals anyway. By classifying the land in two categories, in terrains for 
the indigenous and terrains for the Europeans he acted in favour of the natives and 
immigrants alike. He also proposed the concession of 30 hectares and 2,000 lire to 
every immigrating family, an amount that was to be gradually repaid to the state. It 
goes without saying that the governor harboured diametrically opposing ideas. It is 
also obvious that the new governor Baratieri (28 February 1892) maintained his 
predecessor unrelenting line.92 
 
This quarrel, the Cagnassi-Livraghi scandal, the financial situation of the 
colony and the precarious balance between the politica tigrina and the political 
scioiana put Eritrea in upheaval. Di Rudini's, sound administration and efforts to 
reduce the colony's running costs did not manage to restore tranquility in Eritrea. This 
is why, on 12 November 1891 a 12 member royal commission, was appointed with 
the purpose of investigating the real conditions of the colony and report on them to 
the parliament.93 The commission reached Massaua, to assess the colony's agricultural 
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potential and concluded that Eritrea not only could be economically viable and 
autonomous, but above all it could absorb the Italian immigration flow. These goals 
would be achievable as long as: the colony maintained its current boundaries and 
harmonic relations with its "neighbours", the communications were secure, the 
colony's revenues were invested in public works, the private initiative was promoted, 
a technocratic civilian government was introduced, justice and personal liberty were 
guaranteed, a rationale regime regarding estate property was founded, the agricultural 
experiments were continued and an agricultural society composed by landowners was 
created. The commission furthermore, concluded that the colony was still in no 
position to accommodate large numbers of Italian immigrants since the basic 
infrastructure for their subsistence was absent. The commission's members studied the 
soil, carried out experiments in Asmara, Gura and Godofelassi (February 1891) and 
sided with the governor, highlighting the need to promote both state sponsored and 
spontaneous-individual immigration simultaneously.94 
On 15 May Giolitti succeeded di Rudini. The new Foreign Minister Brin on 29 
June 1892 entrusted to another special committee, in which Franchetti participated, 
the assessment of the land property and the terrain concession methods in the colony. 
Although on 19 January 1893 its estimations and proposals were approved by 
governor Baratieri, he never seemed to take them in consideration. By then used to the 
hostile conduct of the military element, Franchetti at last implemented his immigrant 
influx project. On 16 November 1893 the first nucleus of immigrants arrived and 
settled at Godofelassi, Asmara and Gura.95 The colonization office provided them 
with a subsistence amount in advance (to be repaid with a 3% yearly interest) and 
granted to each family, depending on the age, gender and number of family members, 
from 8 to 25 hectares under the condition that they would remain there and cultivate 
the land for a duration of 5 years.96 Subsequently, the estate's ownership would be 
legally transferred to them permanently. The government was obliged to supply the 
immigrants with drinkable water, means of production, equipment and medical, 
religious and educational services. On the other hand the families had to procure for 
themselves a starting fund of 2,500-3,500 lire in order to cover the first "expenses of 
establishment".97The auspicious arrangement of these families, ten in total, consisting 
of 29 men, 15 women and 17 minors in Eritrea motivated a jubilant Franchetti to 
exclaim that "the immigration in the Eritrean plateau will become, after the end of the 
experimental period, dense enough in a short time". His optimistic expectations about 
the colony's future and his views clashed with Baratieri's standpoint on the 
colonization question and caused Franchetti’s resignation. Thus the Governor 
managed to concentrate in his hands the relative authority and with his 25 April 1895 
decree to consolidate his ideas, as well his personal ambition. He assumed the 
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complete direction of the matter and demoted the Colonization office, which became 
a subordinate secondary institution under his oversight. 98  He managed to obtain 
Rome's approval for his plans; he founded 5 new offices: the predominant politico-
military office, the central administrative office responsible for the budget and taxes, 
the office of civil affairs responsible for the telegraphic, customs, hygienic, religious 
and educational function, the office of state lands and the legal office run by the fiscal 
lawyer of the colony.99 He imposed a police state and put himself on the top of it. He 
organized the native military forces (Ascari),100 he issued laws on religion, public law 
and state property and he got involved with the colony's fortifications and defense 
works. Thus, he transformed Eritrea to his personal dominion and created for himself 
a 10,000 army to use essentially at his will.101 
 
According to Baratieri's views the commander had to be the colony's decision 
maker and the sole person in charge. He also maintained the view that the land in 
question should be leased or sold to anyone that could afford it. In contrast with 
Franchetti's organized plan, the new governor acted as he saw fit, expropriating land 
from the indigenous inside and outside the colony's borders and making them 
reminisce the days when they were under Ethiopian or Egyptian rule.102 Baratieri 
bearing in mind the security of the dominions and not the efficiency of the production 
or the fair distribution of the land undermined the activity of Franchetti's Office of 
Colonization and, being responsible for every matter of Eritrea, issued his own 
simpler rules regarding the concession of terrains. Franchetti's system was more 
complex; according to him the director of the colonization office should have enjoyed 
the same institutional rank as the royal commissaries and should have had absolute 
control over the State Property Office (Ufficio Demaniale),103 the Concessions Office 
and the Land Register Office (Ufficio del Catasto). Furthermore, he classified the 
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arable areas into: family estates (up to 20 hectares), permanent concession lands, 
temporary concession lands, leased fields and lands for which permission for 
temporary farming was issued. Certain rules and size restrictions should apply for the 
potential buyers. In comparison Baratieri's system appears to be more simple and 
capitalistic whereas Franchetti pushed forward for a methodic, more scientific 
colonization under the state’s protection. In any case Baratieri abolished the 
Colonization Office on 30 June 1895.104 
The resolution of the migration-demographic problem, one of the ideological 
pillars of Italian colonialism, was abandoned permanently in 1895 and did not 
preoccupy the Italian decision makers again in the 19th century. The organized on a 
scientific basis settlement of immigrants that Franchetti was pushing through 
demanded funds, which the Italian government was not prepared to make available 
and thus stimulus was given to the voluntary settlement-colonization (colonizzazione 
libera).105 According to other scholars, Franchetti's programme was doomed to failure 
from the beginning because of the drought, the unsuitability of the terrain, the lack of 
means and the coordinated reaction of the natives. The failure cannot be interpreted 
solely as a personal antipathy or a lack of co-operation between Gandolfi and 
Franchetti as the next governor too, undermined the work of the latter. The problem 
had deeper roots. It concerned the eternal struggle between the political (civile) and 
the military (militare) element in the colony and the prevalence of the latter over the 
former. The Italian bureaucracy and militarism prevented the completion of a project 
that was beneficial for the country. Eritrea was run by the military, oriented towards 
expansion and war, concealed as "civil government". The military in Massaua and 
Rome did not consent to the intervention and the coexistence of the political factor in 
the colony; there could be no coexistence between these two opposing trends. The 
militaristic inclination of the Italian colonialism meant that all the proclamations 
about peace and civilization were hypocritical and designed only for the domestic 
audience, since in practice the Italians went to Africa with the aim of fighting, 
conquering and subjugating. The two incidents, the systematic homicides and the 
"land" quarrel were cited in an attempt to disclose the objectives and the real 
intentions of the Italians in the framework of their colonial venture. It is now obvious 
that the fanfares about justice, security, and governing according to the law were 
cheap ideological constructs of the Italian side in an attempt to justify its expansion at 
territories on which it did not have any right. 
As the Italo-Ethiopian war was still raging, Yohannes turned its attention 
against the irregulars of Sudan. In Metemma, on 8 March 1889, the Ethiopian army 
suffered a terrible defeat by the Mahdists and the emperor was killed to the great 
sadness of the Ethiopian people, Menelik excluded. Without delay, he gathered 
troops, occupied the ancient capital of Gondar and was proclaimed King of Kings on 
25 March 1889. Antonelli, who for years was cultivating friendly relations with the 
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king of Scioa aiming at privileges and the increase of the Italian influence, was 
witnessing his policy triumph. Thus, delighted and equipped with a new treaty106 he 
met Menelik, now emperor, at Wachale or Uccialli in Italian, where the most 
controversial agreement of the Italian colonial history was signed on 2 May.107 The 
treaty of "mutual peace and friendship", the first concluded by Menelik as emperor 
and an equal of King Umberto, contained favourable provisions for both sides. 
   Rome was recognizing Menelik as emperor of Ethiopia and guaranteed to 
him, with article 6, his unhindered supply through the Italian colonial territory. The 
Italians with article 3 were pocketing the Hamasen province and were expanding their 
influence even deeper in the Ethiopian hinterland.108  According to article 19, the 
treaty would be translated in Italian and in Amharic, official language of Ethiopia, and 
the two "versions" would have the exact same effect and importance. However, the 
most important point is the contested article 17. The Ethiopian text acknowledged to 
the emperor the possibility to communicate with foreign governments through the 
Italian government. The corresponding part of the Italian text meant that Menelik was 
obligated to make use of the Italian services.109 A state that consigns its diplomatic 
relations to the government of another state is automatically equaled to its 
protectorate. 
   Antonelli in a deceitful and pathetic manner, attempted to fool Menelik, who 
did not speak Italian, in the hope that by the time his stratagem was revealed Italy 
would be in such a position of diplomatic power internationally that the emperor 
would be forced to accept the fait accompli.110 Being unaware of the danger, Menelik 
sent to Italy his cousin Maconnèn Uoldemicaèl (1852-1906) to negotiate the details of 
the Uccialli agreement. He met with Crispi in Naples, who again recognized Menelik 
as emperor of Ethiopia in exchange for the acknowledgement of the Italian interests in 
the Red Sea.111 At Naples the issue of a common currency for Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
the establishment of an Italian bank in Addis Ababa and a loan of four million lire to 
Ethiopia were agreed. The loan would be provided by the Banca Nazionale with an 
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interest of 6%; until its repayment Italian authorities would collect the proceeds of 
Harar's customs. With article 10 of the supplementary treaty, Menelik and the 
subsequent Ethiopian leaders were bound to respect the regulations in question.112 
Within 10 days from the signing of the treaty, Crispi, impatient and excited, 
had notified all the European capitals that Menelik would settle all his issues with 
them through the Italian government. It is noteworthy that he referred to Menelik as 
king of Ethiopia and not as emperor, as he was officially recognized by the treaty. In 
accordance with article 34 of the General Act of the Berlin conference he 
communicated the developments insinuating the imposition of a protectorate on 
Ethiopia without making use of the term.113 The term protectorate was not of course 
included in the treaty of Uccialli or in its supplementary of Naples. Most European 
governments unreservedly accepted Crispi's declaration and acknowledged that this 
manipulation automatically meant the loss of Ethiopia's independence. By the time 
Maconnèn returned from Italy, Menelik had already begun to discover Antonelli's 
cheap ruse.114 
   The British and the German government replied to the telegrams that the 
emperor had sent to the crowned heads of Europe, inviting them to attend his official 
coronation ceremony, that they could not accept messages from him directly but only 
through the Italian government. 115 Menelik, dumbstruck by the replies, was 
immediately backed by the governments of France and Russia, which at the time had 
already laid the foundations of their future alliance, claiming that the Italians had not 
announced with clarity the imposition of the protectorate nor were they in a position 
to control effectively such a vast area.116 Menelik encouraged, implemented a policy 
of co-operation with Paris and made known to the Italian government in February 
1893 that he would denounce the treaty internationally.117 In June 1894 he did so but 
only after he had received the munitions and armaments promised to him by Rome, as 
an attempt to appease him. France naturally, never recognized the treaty of Uccialli 
and continued through the colony of Djibouti and its governor Léonce Lagarde (1860-
1936) to strengthen militarily and diplomatically Ethiopia.118 Paradoxically, Italy in 
an attempt to appease the emperor sent more weapons and ammunitions than any 
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other Power. This armament would be turned against its supplier with mathematical 
certainty.119 
   France, amid a tariff war with Italy, was appearing as protector of the 
Ethiopian independence whereas diplomatic support to Addis Ababa was offered by 
Switzerland, Greece, Belgium, Russia and Denmark.120 France has been battling the 
Italian interests in Scioa for many years121  and its Press was propagandizing and 
inveighing against the Italian action in Africa. 122 A rare speck of understanding 
appeared during the French-Italian talks about the demarcation of their respective 
spheres of influence in Eastern Africa in May 1891. When di Rudini declared the 
renewal of the Triple Alliance in June, Paris broke off the negotiations, proving that 
Paris' benevolence in Africa was merely a machination to inflict cracks and rifts to the 
menacing coalition. 123 The Italians suspected French involvement and support to 
"anarcho-liberal" movements taking place within the country aiming to undermine the 
government.124 Menelik reciprocating the support he was receiving, granted to the 
French a license to construct a railway from Djibouti to Harar, which would render 
the Italian railway linking Massaua with Tigre practically useless.125 The economic 
interests of Paris126 in Ethiopia and the opposition to any movement of the British or 
of their mouthpieces in the area,127 was sufficient to convert the French into Rome's 
sworn enemies. Under the framework of their common policy of expelling the British 
from the strategically important Eastern Africa the French and the Russians attacked 
the Italian interests too. The frequent attacks of the French press against Crispi, the 
threats, the protracted customs' war, the abuse of Italian workers in France,128 the 
supply of Ethiopia with modern war material and the burdened past excluded any 
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possibility of political co-operation between the two sides.129 Italian consultants were 
no longer admitted in the imperial court after French instigation while French 
missionaries had been already expelled from the Italian dominions, as already 
mentioned.130 The Italian diplomats daydreaming, believed that there was no reason 
for concern as the German speaking allies were being indifferent to the issue, Britain 
had accepted the protectorate and Russia seemed "passive". The only loose end 
therefore was to find the golden mean with Paris, while the Ethiopian factor did not 
seem to be taken into account!131 Thus it was during this inopportune time that the 
Italian decision makers did not hesitate to request, the concession of Djibouti as 
compensation for the Italian relinquishment of Tunisia and their recognition of the 
French protectorate there.132 
   The most surprising fact is the factual and dynamic Russian involvement in 
the matter. Nikolay Stepanovich Leontiev (1862-1910), a Russian military officer 
who participated in several missions to Ethiopia, promised Menelik that he would 
mobilize the whole of Europe against Italy and that his country would declare war to 
Rome.133 As a matter of fact, between 1879 and 1899 three Russian missions arrived 
in Ethiopia with military, medical and scientific goals. The Russian penetration 
crystallized into the construction of hospital units, pharmaceutical depots, and 
dispatches of military advisors, instructors and armaments.134 At the time there were 
mentions of imposing a spiritual protectorate in Ethiopia or at least establishing a 
Russian colony in the Red Sea, the new Moscow, as a naval trading centre, a mainstay 
for the Russian trade in the East. The news that Russian troops would be recruited 
voluntarily to serve in Ethiopia, probably in a policing role, caused concern to 
Rome.135 The support to Addis Ababa and the refusal to accept the Italian allegations 
about a protectorate are interpreted in one manner: the Franco-Russian agreement was 
not aiming just to halt the Italian influence in Ethiopia. Its target was the British 
interests and the indirect weakening of the Triple Alliance, which was threatening and 
putting Paris’ and Saint Petersburg’s positions in Europe at risk. 
   The only ones who apparently still supported or tolerated the Italian policy 
were the British. They were promoting diplomatically the Italian positions and were 
collaborating with Rome because of the fear of an Italo-French understanding. When 
Italy during the fighting with the Mahdists raised claims in Sudan, the bilateral 
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relations experienced an unprecedented coldness, compared to the admirable 
collaboration of the years 1884-1885.136 In spite of whatever reservations, the chargés 
d'affaires of the two states clarified and divided the respective spheres of influence in 
Eastern Africa on 27 September 1890. 137  The British acknowledged the Italian 
interests in Ogaden, Somalia, Kassala and the Ethiopian regions. In addition, besides 
the recognition of the protectorate, the British stipulated three more protocols with the 
Italians, with which they were guaranteeing the individual interests and their African 
dominions' borders on 24 March 1891, 15 April 1891 and 5 March 1894 
respectively.138 Furthermore London, via Salisbury, allowed the use of the port of 
Zeila by the Italian Army, when the latter was working on a plan to surprise and flank 
the Ethiopian army.139 The moment Menelik was informed about these machinations  
he consigned a letter to Europe's sovereigns and governments proclaiming the 
independence of his country and defining his realm's frontiers: from the upper Nile to 
Somalia and eastwards up to the Red Sea's coastline. Menelik's declaration was most 
welcome for Crispi; after all it farther extended the borders of Rome’s protectorate.140 
   Menelik, the former ally and collaborator of the Italians, began to tighten his 
ties with his vassals, seek allies, equip his army and approach the European 
governments. Both parties directly involved, had realized that confrontation was 
inevitable and were preparing as best as they could for the upcoming clash. The 
colony of Eritrea, in a state of war, and the Empire of Ethiopia were now seeking a 
pretext, even an insignificant one, to finally resolve their differences.141 Strangely 
enough, the Italians were the ones who rendered the treaty of Uccialli a dead letter by 
advancing beyond the agreed borders during Maconnèn's stay in Naples.142 There 
were many in Ethiopia accusing Menelik of treason because, irrespective of article 17, 
the treaty officially ceded Ethiopian territories to the Italian colony. The emperor had 
made some modest concessions but refused to concede the boundary of Mareb that 
Rome explicity demanded. In reality, Menelik immediately after his ascension to the 
throne in 1889 and amid pandemics and famine in his country was not in a position to 
resist the demands of his hitherto benefactors. His first task was the consolidation and 
recognition of his rule and after that the expulsion of those preying on Ethiopian 
independence. He may have been the head of an impoverished and war torn state but 
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not challenge the clause of Uti Possidetis. See Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 354. 
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that did not mean that he had to consent to every Italian request. Besides, as the 
Emperor of Ethiopia he could rally more than 100,000 men under his banners in times 
of need. Equally important is the fact that by then he possessed a powerful modern 
arsenal. 
Instead of being prudent someone could claim that the Italians did everything 
in their power to infuriate Menelik. The new governor Orero, organized and carried 
out his plan of capturing Adwa, the capital of the Tigre region. Wanting to achieve a 
success for the Italian arms on the 26th of January 1890, the anniversary of Dogali, 
and without consulting Rome, he ordered 5,000 metropolitan and native troops to 
violate the Ethiopian frontier. He recalled his troops shortly thereafter, without 
achieving anything more than making a demonstration of power, offending the 
Ethiopian patriotism and overriding his superiors. In addition, while Menelik was 
unwilling to recognize the Mareb boundary for the Italian colony, Orero, disregarded 
the protocol and approached Mangascia, the governor of Tigre in order to promote the 
Italian demands.143 As this was not enough, the colony's authorities were backing 
morally and materially the tribes that revolted against the newly crowned emperor.144 
As an act of reconciliation Rome sent to Scioa the diplomat Augusto Salimbeni 
(1847-1895) in June 1891 with the impossible task of convincing Menelik to accept 
the Italian seizures and article 17 of the Uccialli treaty. When he failed he was 
replaced by the man that for years cultivated cordial relations and exerted influence in 
Scioa, Antonelli. He stated that Italy had to proceed to the temporary occupation of 
the territory up to the river Mareb for pacification reasons and he even accused the 
Ethiopian interpreter for the misinterpretation of article 17. As a result by February 
1891 Menelik had banished every Italian from his court.145 The following diplomatic 
missions fared no better. 
On 28 February 1892 upon Gandolfi's departure his vice governor Baratieri 
assumed the rule of Eritrea. Likewise, when Giolitti fell from office on 15 December 
1893 on account of the full-blown crisis in the economy and in Sicily with the Fasci 
insurrections, the overweening Crispi took charge once again. Even though Baratieri 
was nominated by di Rudini, he and Crispi complemented and admired each other. 
They formed a duet that would prove to be explosive and disastrous for Italy. The first 
fruit of their special understanding was at Sudan's expense. In December 1893 a 
10,000 strong Sudanese army invaded the colony's territory but was repelled with 
heavy losses. Baratieri after consulting only with Crispi and and overstating the 
impending danger launched an attack on Kassala, one of the operation centres of the 
Mahdists in Eritrea's northern region. On July 17 1894, after a skirmish, the Italo-
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eritrean forces breached, plundered and burned the city in a civilizing mission against 
the afro-arabian obscurantism as the governor perceived it. It was not a preventive or 
a punitive attack. The region was annexed and the half destroyed city fortified. 
Internationally it provoked the British distrust and resentment, as the region was 
geostrategically important to London; militarily it was a mistake since it contributed 
to the further dispersion of the Italian forces (the colony was initially 86 square 
kilometers and now it surpassed 150) and commercially it did not make any sense 
seeing that Sudan was the most destitute zone of Africa.146 It appears that this was an 
expansion for the sake of expansion, the practical articulation of aggressive instincts 
and colonial atavism.  
   As has been seen, the commanders of Eritrea Gandolfi and Baratieri did not 
espouse the Franchetti model, 147  an organized and reasonable manner for the 
management of arable lands. The expropriation of the land of the indigenous in order 
to be given to the Italian settlers without a system and the heavy taxation, which 
served mostly the military purposes of the colony, displeased the local populations. 
Even the most faithful and well-intentioned collaborators of the Italian administration 
after the loss of independence, of property and of the right to exploit land started to 
become distrustful towards it.148 In theory, the Italian sovereignty would ensure the 
prosperity, the security and the fundamental rights of Italians and Africans. In practice 
it was based on racism, 149  exploitation and oppression, as every other colonial 
authority.  
Bahta Hagos (unknown-1894) was the lord of Acchale Guzai in Tigre and 
until then a collaborator of the Italians.150 Outraged by the stolen property and the 
violation of the rights of his people, he rose up against the Italian colonial power on 
14 December 1894. Moved by the looting of his people's land, the contempt, the 
oppression, the taxes and the unreasonable prohibitions, he declared at the eve of his 
uprising: "I have liberated you from the government that came from the sea to strip 
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you, to take your land, to prohibit the cultivation of the land [...] to prohibit the 
lumbering of the woods". Together with other prominent lords he asked Menelik's 
forgiveness for his earlier defection and took up an armed struggle against the 
conquerors.151 Moreover he reached out to Mangascia and the Mahdists, aspiring to 
organize a campaign that would drive back the European peril.152 The rest of the Tigre 
lords seemingly were maintaining friendly relations with Baratieri, but at the 
suggestion of the emperor, they were conspiring against the Italian presence in 
Eritrea. Bahta Hagos besides carrying out acts of sabotage against the Italian colony, 
he engaged in skirmishes with the Italian troops, ultimately though he was defeated.153 
In December 1895 Baratieri, who with his land tenure measures had pushed the 
natives to revolt, sent Toselli beyond the borders of the colony, to mop up the 
remaining revolutionary pockets. After killing the leader of the uprising on 18 
December (Battle of Halai), he finally squashed every hotbed of resistance, violating 
however, once again the Ethiopian frontier.154 As if that were not enough the Italian 
troops advanced in neighbouring Tigre, where they seized the holy city of Adwa and 
engaged in skirmishes with the remnants of the insurgent units that had now resorted 
to guerilla tactics. The Italian government recalled Baratieri to Rome, realizing the 
recklessness of his policy. This development however, did not prevent the annexation 
of the Tigre province to Eritrea.155 After 6 years of sporadic clashes, the occupation of 
Adwa was the event that roused Menelik and convinced him that he had to mobilize 
the entire nation against the Italian threat. As far as the revolution of Bahta Hagos is 
concerned, it can be claimed that the oppression of the indigenous and the erroneous 
land policies led Rome to the Tigre invasion, the overextension and the deadly trap of 
Adwa. 
   Crispi showed slow reflexes to the diplomatic frenzy that was developing 
against the Italian plans and did not realize in time the turn for the worse and the 
danger that threatened Rome. The insistence on two parallel but incompatible 
policies, one focusing on European balance which advocated the participation to the 
Triple Alliance, the other aiming to expanding in Africa, were preventing Rome to 
realize that it had got into a difficult and disadvantaged position.156 The easy victory 
of the Italian army at the battles of Senafe and of Coatit, on 13-14 January 1895, 
against the insurgent forces of Mangascia, made the military command of Eritrea even 
more reckless and arrogant. In their mind these victories had proved to the world and 
"also to the barbarians that we are strong and powerful."157 During Baratieri's visit to 
Rome in order to exert pressure and obtain supplies, money and reinforcements he 
was received with honours proper to a national hero. The africanists were delighted, 
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the parliament promoted him to the rank of lieutenant general and the King rejoiced: 
"the Italian army's victories in Coatit and Senafe consist a new triumph of civilization 
against barbarity". Despite Sonnino's arguments on the financial burden of the state 
budget, Crispi backed up the general, en route to the elections (26 May-2 June 1895), 
since the Prime Minister was in desperate need of new victories, conquests and 
diversions. In his April 1895 telegram he prohibited Baratieri from abandoning any 
place previously occupied by the Italian forces and urged him to push forward, to 
Tigre.158 Baratieri's right hand man in Africa, officer Tommaso Salsa (1857-1913) 
attested: "No other place in Africa and I would say in the world can be available, like 
Abyssinia, for the relocation of our excessive population and it would be a great error 
if, in front of an expense of few millions, Italy were to lose many certain advantages". 
This assessment was espoused by the upper classes and reflected their viewpoints at 
the time of the expansionist paroxysm. Baratieri after a meeting with Crispi, the 
Minister of the Treasury Sonnino and Foreign Minister Alberto de Blanc (1835-1904) 
obtained promises concerning the dispatch of two battalions in Eritrea, an enlarged 
war budget of 14 million lire and the right to enlist further regiments from the 
colony's native population. Blanc revealed his pro-colonial views during a 
parliamentary debate on 14 June 1895. On that occasion he assured the deputies that 
the government intended to make Eritrea an asset for the motherland, that Kassala was 
acquired as an act of solidarity to the British and that the capture of the province of 
Tigre would contribute to the security of the colony.159 
The colony certainly could not cover the grave expanses of a protracted war 
without resorting to state sponsorship. In 1893-1894 the expenses of the colony were 
estimated to 8,700,000 lire of which some 7 million were dedicated to military related 
expenditures. In 1894-1895 Eritrea's revenues were estimated to approximately 1.5 
million lire deriving from customs' fees, taxes, proceeds from the postal and 
telegraphic services, tributes. The fiscal year 1895-1896 the colony registered 
1,634,000 lire of revenues and expenses of 1,731,000. Despite the predictions and the 
official calculations, during the warring period the actual spending rose to roughly 15 
million annually, a burden shared principally by the War and Shipping Ministries. 
Minister Sonnino lamented the state budget registering a deficit of around 50 million 
lire each year. The financial black hole of Eritrea exacerbated the situation. Between 
1882 and 1895 colonial spending, including Somalia, accounted for precisely 
180,312,040 lire; in 1898 it reached the astonishing amount of 370,868,000. Crispi in 
the aftermath of Coatit congratulated Baratieri and urged him to proceed to the 
mainland since "it would be negligence" not to, but the rest of the cabinet was well 
aware of the country's financial limitations.160 Someone could argue that if the thorny 
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problem of the campaign's financing and by extension the main obstacle of the Italian 
colonialism was somehow resolved Rome would have put forward a plan of 
unfathomable expansion towards the Ethiopian mainland. Judging though from its 
limitedf inancial, military and administrative capabilities the safest course of action 
was the renunciation of the protectorate and further expansion, the reconciliation with 
Menelik and the beneficial lasting peace.   
The debacle at Amba Alagi, on 7 December 1895, when 30,000 Ethiopians 
under Maconnèn isolated and annihilated every single one of Major Τοselli's 2,300 
men, was suppressed and did not trouble the Italian leadership to the extent that it 
should have.161After all the Italian nationals that perished numbered just 40 soldiers 
and officials. The plan of Ethiopia's conquest was not formulated by the Italian 
government and parliament but it was the result of Crispi's discussions with 
Baratieri.162 The former without being aware of the situation in Africa and being 
unable to curb his impatience urged the general to mobilize and to attack: "In your 
hands lies the honour of Italy and of the Monarchy", "time is running out to the 
benefit of the enemy" and "the government has sent you everything you asked in men 
and weapons. The country is expecting another victory and I expect it to be an 
authentic one, one to settle once and for all the Abyssinian issue. Be careful of what 
you do. It involves your honour and the dignity of Italy."163After the defeat the 
parliament approved (158-36) Crispi's plan for total war and the reinforcement of the 
colony. In vain Costa backed up by protestors attacked Crispi for his manipulations 
and lies, exalted the fraternity between nations, supported Ethiopia's right to exist and 
denounced the mandatory civilizing with "the stick". 164  Internationally, the Amba 
Alagi defeat was greeted with enthusiasm by the Russian and the French press 
whereas the allied German and Austrian ones sympathized with Italy's latest 
humiliation.165 
   Arrogant and certain of the upcoming success of the Italian arms the Prime 
Minister had already drafted the peace treaty that he would enforce upon Menelik. In 
accordance with it, the province of Τigre would be annexed to Eritrea, Harar would be 
converted into an Italian protectorate, and the country's foreign relations would be 
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controlled by Rome while an Italian "adviser" would be installed in Addis Ababa.166 
Crispi defended the validity of the treaty and was seeking the punishment of the 
Ethiopians defectors, who, in his own world view, owed obedience and submission to 
Rome.167 His inordinate, to the limits of paranoia, passion prompted him to propose 
the capture of the French dominions in the Red Sea, i.e. the start of a European war to 
cut off Ethiopia's resupply. Fortunately, his German and Austrian allies proved more 
reasonable and rejected the plan. Even though Kálnoky, the representative of Austria-
Hungary had every reason to push Italy towards Africa, away from the contested 
Adriatic, he did not wish to involve his country in the Italo-French conflict.168 Prince 
Chlodwig Carl Viktor Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1819-1901), the German Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, was also not excited about the prospect of an African war with 
severe consequences in Europe, which would certainly weaken Italy and by extension 
the Triple Alliance.169 Baron de Blanc added his voice to those who were arguing that 
Italy must withdraw from an alliance that did not offer any support to colonial 
matters.170 
The last noteworthy clash before Adwa, took place in January at Mek'ele 
where the Italian garrison of 1,300 men was put under siege for 45 days by the 
Ethiopian forces. Due to the exhaustion and the lack of munitions and water they 
surrendered the fort and retreated. 171  Menelik, in all probability, acted with 
magnanimity in order to drag the Italian side to the negotiation table. Even at the 
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eleventh hour Italy's fate had not been sealed. After negotiating with Menelik 
Antonelli, who was now vice secretary of the Foreign Ministry, advised the Italian 
government to accept the treaty in its Ethiopian version until more favourable 
conditions were presented. Crispi however, insisted on the imposition of the 
protectorate since any other solution would compromise Italy's honour and prestige. 
Menelik having the numerical and strategic advantage in the field seemed inclined to 
negotiate whereas Baratieri and Crispi amidst worrisome developments (desertions of 
Ascari and revolts in the army's rear) were always disdainful of the Ethiopian 
determination to resist and of their military capabilities and presumed that the negus 
was just stalling. The negotiations finally broke down in February with the sole 
culpability of the Italian Prime Minister.172 The press that was favourable to Crispi 
described the siege as a heroic episode where in "a perimeter of 700 meters the 
prestige of the Italian army but also the valour of the nation were defended." Every 
other voice was practically silenced by the totalitarian Prime Minister: the dissident 
journalists were expelled from Eritrea, soldiers' mail was withheld and Baratieri's 
reports were off limits for deputies and even government Ministers.173 
   The Italian army of Africa numbered 30,000 Italian white soldiers and 
15,000 Askari. With these forces Baratieri overpowered the Mahdists in Agordat, on 
20 December 1893, and occupied the province of Kassala in July 1894, as has been 
already mentioned. At Adwa, on 1 March 1896, this army would have a clearly much 
more difficult task against 100,000 war-experienced, motivated and well-equipped 
men of the emperor. The Italian army fortified defensively expecting to fend off with 
ease the uncoordinated and disorganized attack of the Ethiopians. When this did not 
happen Baratieri under severe pressure and urged on by his overconfident generals 
ordered his army to advance. The lack of communications, of maps of the area and of 
proper logistics, the belief that an European army could not possibly be defeated by 
Africans, the underestimation of the enemy, the lack of terrain reconnaissance, the 
false information that the Ethiopian "allies"174 were spreading in the Italian camp 
caused the disaster. The Italians columns, misguided, with no idea of the enemy's 
positions, size and fire-power were soon outflanked. The skillfully executed flanking 
attacks against the Italian flanks and the courage of the Ethiopian soldiers, who were 
fighting for the protection of their homeland, brought about the collapse of the Italian 
front.175 The remains of the Italian army176 took refuge in Eritrea, where they fortified 
themselves. Another 2,700 (1,900 Italians and 800 Ascari) were made prisoners. 
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Menelik instead of pursuing the retreating Italians and attempting to capture Massaua 
participated in a thanksgiving religious ceremony and declared a day of national 
mourning. Lord Salisbury, witnessing the Italian defeat that would jeopardize the 
British interests in the area ordered the Egyptian army in Sudan to march and "relieve 
the pressure on the Italians" on 12 March.177 London's colonial and foreign offices 
were startled by Menelik's victory and afraid that he may attack the British 
possessions in Somalia and Sudan-Egypt in an anti-European crusade. 178 
   Even at that time a devastated Crispi was planning feverishly a second 
campaign, gathering troops at the port of Naples,179 but the Italian people humiliated 
and discouraged, demanded the disengagement from the African front.180 Suddenly, 
ordinary citizens realized that they were being systematically deceived by their 
government and that the newspaper articles about exploits and successes had nothing 
to do with reality. The infuriated mob turned against the culpable, the Crispi 
government, and went so far as to chant slogans such as "Viva Menelik", "Αbasso 
Crispi" (down with Crispi), "Abasso gli africanisti" and "Abasso l'esercito" (down 
with the Army). In Naples the police could not control the thousands of demonstrators 
and at Pavia the mob, by putting up barricades, prevented the passage of troops to the 
ports.181 Heavy clashes took place in the same city and at Milan heated incidents led 
to the loss of human lives. Arrests, demonstrations and clashes with the police took 
place in all the major cities: Turin, Milan, Cremona, Ferrara, Palermo, Rome, and 
Ancona. The crisis took such proportions that the king feared the total collapse of the 
institutions and of the monarchy.182 The newspapers supporting Crispi were bluntly 
accusing Baratieri for the disaster. The rest of the press urgently demanded the recall 
of the troops and the Prime Minister's resignation. The outcry, the strong reaction 
sfrom the public and the lack of support by the Crown led to the fall of the Crispi 
government on 5 March 1896 and to the assumption of power by di Rudini five days 
later.183 
The new Prime Minister, in contrast with Crispis' megalomania, followed, the 
"politica di raccoglimento", a "mild" and prudent policy for Eritrea. In accordance to 
the new policy, any act of hostility towards Ethiopia had to be avoided, any cause of 
friction had to be eliminated, the protectorate claim was nullified and the military 
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expenditures of the colony had to be reduced.184 Also, a diplomatic reconciliation with 
Paris was attempted.185 The reduction of costs was of paramount importance since the 
amount of 15 million per annum for the colony during the Crispi period, was a burden 
hard to bear for the Italian economy. So it was decided to increase the taxation and to 
reduce the garrison forces of Eritrea.186 Di Rudini did not seek to avenge the defeat187 
and to give continuation to a conflict that, besides its dignity, had cost Italy 200 
million lire. Despite his conciliatory program, announced on 17 March, di Rudini just 
a week later asked with a bill 140 million lirefrom the parliament to be spent on 
military preparations in case that the peace negotiations broke off. After Baratieri was 
put on trial on 5-14 June, and subsequently found as "incompetent", if not downright 
guilty, by the military court of Asmara, the new Prime Minister nominated general 
Baldissera as the new colonial governor. Having at his disposal more than 40,000 men 
and 1,300 officers and aspiring to make amends for the defeats, he engaged 
immediately the Mahdist forces threatening the north frontier of the colony.188 
Rome's chargé d'affaires Cesare Nerazzini (1849-1912) arrived in Addis 
Ababa on 6 October 1896 and after 21 days of negotiations signed in the name of the 
King of Italy, a peace treaty with the Empire of Ethiopia. Italy recognized the 
Ethiopian independence, annulled the treaty of Uccialli and undertook the obligation 
to concede Eritrea to Ethiopia in the event that its abandonment was decided by the 
Italian parliament; on 22 May 1897 the deputies rejected Eritrea's relinquishment with 
222 voting against the proposed liquidation and 140 for. 189 The amount of the 
indemnity and the definition of the new borders were to be determined "in a friendly 
manner" within the following year according to the treaty's article number four.190 The 
prolonged negotiations were complicated. Menelik asked the new treaty to be written 
in French as well to avoid a new Uccialli, a large reparation since Italy was the 
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aggressor and another 12 million lire for the release of the Italian prisoners. Nerazzini 
in his part claimed that Italy had lost a battle not the war and since the Ethiopians did 
not occupy any Italian land paying compensation was out of the question.191 The 
single benefits that Rome extracted from the peace treaty was the return of the 1,900 
Italian prisoners192 for a total of 4,5 million lire and the assurance that Nerazzini 
elicited from Menelik that he would not accept the protection of any other Power. 
Additionally, the two men signed a commercial treaty on 24 June 1897 that mutually 
guaranteed the most favourable nation clause, provided for the exchange of 
diplomatic representatives and obligated both governments to improve the 
commercial routes between their respective possessions.193 
   In Italy on the day after the disaster the voices about withdrawing from 
Africa (ritiro dall'Africa) were growing at the expense of the "war in-depth" 
supporters (guerra a fondo), who were demanding to take revenge and to defend the 
Italian honour. On the opposite end, the socialist deputies demanded all together the 
abandonment of the colony or its sale to a private company. The more moderate 
suggested the adoption of a pacifist line of action in regard to the policy that Eritrea 
had to follow in the future.194 What is certain is that di Rudini and the Crown were not 
prepared to abandon the colony definitively. 195  According to the newspaper 
Messagero on 10 March 1896: "We were wrong to go to Africa, but now that we are 
there, we have to remain and to remain firmly, otherwise we will make such a 
miserable, such a wretched impression as a nation, that we will become the laughing 
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stock of Europe and we will no longer find a Power to take us seriously" and "our 
honour enforces us to avenge our fallen brethren in Africa." According to the view 
that was echoed by di San Giuliano and Sonnino, "we will never be able to protect our 
prestige in Europe if we let ourselves be defeated in Africa".196 
   Italy was practically the only European country to come out at a loss from 
the Partition of Africa, in which it had participated to earn the respect of the other 
Powers. According to Sonnino not only it did not acquire prestige but it "somewhat 
lowered itself in the world's estimation."197 Italy had not spread civilization in Africa 
but had exported its own underdevelopment. Either way the conquest of Ethiopia was 
an objective incompatible to the Italian recourses and capabilities. 198  The long-
standing dream of an Italian empire was wiped out within a few hours in the hills of 
Adwa, giving a resounding slap and inflicting a powerful shock mainly to the pride 
and the psyche of the Italian nationalists. The successful war and the conquest of 
Libya in 1911 would free Rome from the burden, the disrepute, the guilt and the 
syndrome199 of Adwa.200 15 years had to pass before the Italians would dare to fully 
reactivate themselves dynamically and autonomously in the colonial arena. In any 
case, on 13 December 1906 di San Giuliano and the representatives of Britain and 
France did agree to respect the Ethiopian integrity, but they made provisions for the 
distribution of the country into spheres of influence.201 
   The unforeseen victory of Ethiopia over European colonialism had a 
massive impact in the world. The success gave hope, pride, inspiration and an 
example to all the peoples who were under foreign domination. Adwa became a 
symbol of equality and justice against subjugation and racism. The joint resistance of 
Muslim and Christian Ethiopians in defence of the ancestral lands sent a message of 
unity and defiance. The victory promoted the idea of Africa's freedom, as Japan’s 
victory over Russia in 1905 had respectively promoted the independence of Asian 
peoples. Menelik's success practically meant the recognition of the independence of 
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his country from all the Powers.202 On 30 January 1897 he concluded with France a 
secret defence treaty against the common British peril in Eastern Africa. Menelik also 
recognized the port of Djibouti as Ethiopia's official trade outlet and reaffirmed his 
support to the 1894 French plan for the establishment of a Djibouti-Addis Abeba 
railway.203 On 14 May 1897 London recognized Ethiopian independence, settled the 
border issue between British Somalia and Ethiopia with Menelik, formulated a 
common policy against the Mahdists and signed a commercial treaty. 204  Istanbul, 
Saint Petersburg as well as the Mahdists rushed to sign treaties of trade and friendship 
with Addis Ababa. Furthermore, Ethiopia was not just situated along the route to 
India but placed at a strategic position, valuable for the Europeans, across the German 
axis of interests between Cameroun-Zanzibar and the French one between Congo-
Djibouti.205 In this way Ethiopia not only remained independent during the Scramble 
for Africa but it also elicited favourable settlements from the colonial powers. Its 
borders were safeguarded and recognized in 1897 by the British and the French, by 
the Italians in 1900, by the Anglo-Egyptians in Sudan in 1904, and by the official 
administration of British Kenya in 1908.206 
Crispi has always been antagonistic and openly hostile towards France and an 
ardent advocate of the Austo-German-Italian alliance. His fall from office, as a result 
of the Adwa disaster meant that a fruitful Italo-French rapprochement was now 
feasible. The reconciliation, after two decades of tariff war, political clashes and 
rancour affected the colonial field as well. Indeed, Foreign Minister Venosta reached 
an agreement with his French counterpart Théophile Delcassé (1852-1923) first 
verbally in June 1898 and then officially in December 1900. Rome was free to act in 
Libya whereas Paris would enjoy a "free hand" in Morocco. In regard to the Italian 
colonial policy in general, it was now evident that structural and radical changes were 
necessary. It was perhaps wiser for Rome to return to the familiar Mediterranean or to 
expand commercially in North and South America. The increase of the Italian 
influence in the Balkans and the Middle East also offered financial and political 
benefits. Albania or Libya were certainly feasible prizes and more obtainable than 
Ethiopia. In any case, approaching Ethiopia, through economic penetration, industry 
and commerce could bring more tangible results.207 In relation to Adwa a new period 
dawned for Eritrea. The Italian decision makers were puzzled about which direction 
the colonyshould finally follow: exploiting raw materials (colonia di sfruttamento), 
colonization (di popolamento), agricultural settlement (colonizzazione agricola) or 
commercial penetration (penetrazione commerciale)? 208 The question of partially 
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abandoning the colony's territory, retaining only Massaua as an open port or 
converting it into a displacement colony was also on the table.209 After Adwa the legal 
status, function and future of the colony were uncertain. 210 The eventuality of 
abandoning Eritrea for which money and blood had been shed, was finally rejected by 
the Di Rudini government. The desired and most acceptable option was the 
conversion of costly Eritrea into a colony self-sufficient economically and militarily. 
   The status of the colony was officially altered after the passage of the new 
organic law in 1898, which in practice replaced the military administration with a 
"civil" one. The civil commander of the colony was dependent only on the ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and was responsible for the exercise of executive power. Nominated 
with royal decree on 30 November 1897 the new civil governor or "special royal civil 
commissary" of Eritrea, Martini, sailed from Naples on 29 December.211 Upon arrival 
he found that he had to completely reorganize the administration and that he had to 
enforce order, discipline and most of all frugality. Inspecting the facilities he 
discovered camps and buildings of military use capable of accommodating 30,000 
men and huge quantities of useless products. 212  As if that were not enough, the 
economic value of Eritrea was minimal while the continuous disappointments were 
exceeding Rome's hopes and initial ambitions by far; Massaua's commercial traffic 
was mediocre. 213 There were no funds for the modernization of the agricultural 
production and the strengthening of the industry, whereas the cultivation of coffee and 
cotton was not profitable and efficient. Besides, according to, rather exaggerated 
estimates of the era, 7/10 of the colony's expanses were covered by desert. Finally, it 
did not possess raw materials and after 25 years of Italian domination it was nothing 
more than a "title of expenses without significant corresponding financial and political 
                                                          
209 Luigi Capucci, "La politica italiana in Africa", Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti, n. 154 
(August 1897), p. 549. 
210 Domenico Primerano, "Che cosa fare dell'Eritrea?", Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti, n. 
155 (Octomber 1897), pp. 615-616. 
211 Guazzini, Le ragioni di un confine, p. 15. 
212Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 751-752. During his investigation Martini discovered 60,000 
unused shoes, salt for 9 years, wine for 3 years, coffee for 52 months, sugar for 22 months, rum for 2.5 
years but "not one kilometre of railway". When he discovered that thousands of lire were spent on 
futile inspections of fortifications he erupted. The "thugs and idiots" of the military with wastefulness 
and excesses of all kind had driven the colony to the brink of disintegration. See Ferdinando Martini, 
Diario Eritreo, vol. 1, (Florence, 1941), p. 30. 
213The colony's commercial traffic was relatively elevated in 1888-1889, due to the military operations 
and can be summarized in the following figures: At Massaua in1887 the imported goods' value was 
8,457,355 lire, in 1888 11,316,936 and in 1899 11,913,874 lire. The majority of these imports came 
from Asia (52.1%) and Africa (almost 30%). The overall value of the commercial transactions of 
Massaua’s port in the 1890s was stable at around 9 million lire. For example it was 9,017,417 lire in 
1893 and 9,606,966 in 1894. Its main exports and apparently the most promising Eritrean cultivations 
were that of tobacco, coffee, corn, wool and pearls. For the detailed list of Eritrea's commercial 
provisions see Italia: Governo dell'Eritrea, Codice di commercio per la Colonia Eritrea, (Roma, 1909), 
pp. 140-153. 
178 
 
use for the homeland"; Eritrea had immediate need of skilled labour, of educated 
people and of capital injections to become profitable.214 
The inherent deficiencies of the Italian economy, which was not unified or 
potent internally, was lacking both private and public funds and entrepreneurship and 
was suffering from the foreign antagonism, were projected upon the economic 
direction of the colony from its inception to Martini's assumption of power. To make 
matters worse for Eritrea, the various governments never undertook seriously the 
establishment of a regular maritime connection between the colony and the Italian 
ports.215 As a result foreign companies (Österreichischer Lloyd) established the line in 
question, an event that hit hard any potential Italian trade undertaking. In 1883 an 
Italian company with a capital of 600,000 lire interested in exploiting the Assab salt 
pits was obliged to renounce its activities because of the absence of sufficient 
maritime connection. The absence of credit institutions in Eritrea, meant that those 
willing to invest and operate there had to turn to the British bank in Aden. In addition 
the coinage problem, the endless military operations and the political insecurity 
exacerbated the already grim situation. In 1894 Baratieri's effort to upgrade the Italo-
Eritrean textiles' trade through the erection of protective tariffs for the foreign 
products resulted in "boosting" the Italian exports to the colony by just 0.18 %..216 On 
the contrary Martini's initiatives gave an encouraging rise to Eritrea's financial 
activities. In spring of 1900, after having invited a British expert to examine the 
mining possibilities of the colony's subsoil the "Eritrean Association for the gold 
mines" was set up, sponsored by two separate investment groups and the Italian 
Commercial Bank. The same bank subsidized the "Italian Pearl Association" a 
company hoping to manage the monopoly of the colony's pearl cultivation. Both 
initiatives failed miserably. Martini was further disillusioned and disappointed when 
the "Italian Association of the Eritrean salt pits" was disbanded in 1905 after a short 
period of operation when the research for guano deposits led to nothing. Despite the 
fact that Eritrea noted some relative economic progress after 1898 the agricultural 
society "Association for the Cultivation of Cotton in the colony Eritrea", formed in 
1904 by Milanese industrialists, that had been conducting agricultural experiments in 
the Agordat region, was forced to abandon the undertaking. After four years of 
promising results the personnel's technical errors and the oppressive tropical 
conditions halted the operation. The unsuccessful undertakings expanded in Ethiopia 
as well. The Italo-Belgian "Joint-Stock Company of the Uollega mines" with an initial 
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capital of 1 million francs in spite of the Foreign Ministry's and the Credito Italiano 
bank's backing, failed to meet its shareholders expectations. The same fate was 
suffered by "The Past Mareb Syndicate", which was founded in 1903 to exploit the 
Ethiopian mines of Tigre, and to enhance the Italian influence on the province that 
was adjacent to Eritrea.217 
  Before the disaster of 1896 Martini was opposed to the expansionist 
policy,218 as he considered that colonies were a luxury for a poor country such as 
Italy. He disregarded the colony as a demographic outlet and its economic value and 
questioned the motives of the government.219 After Adwa he ruled out any eventuality 
of conflicts and expansion by trying to "save what could be saved", laying the 
foundations of a virtuous administration, which in Eritrea had never taken place, and 
by retaining the territories that were acknowledged to the colony by the treaty of 
Addis Abeba.220 The "prudent" policy under new administrative bodies found the 
parliament in agreement (242 for, 94 against). Upon Martini's assumption of duties it 
decided to help rebuild the colony with 140 million lire (214-57).221 With the new 
charter the governor reduced military spending to a minimum and tried to revive the 
colony by gaining the trust of the indigenous and the foreign. Furthermore, he 
denounced any aggressive move towards the hinterland and worked zealously on 
maintaining friendly relations with the surrounding tribes. He embarked on the 
gradual demobilization and the rational "normal" administration of the colony. The 11 
February 1900 ordinance finally subjected the military function to the civil one. The 
governor remained subordinate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs but he also came to 
be the definite supervisor of the colony's navy and army commanders. After 
reorganizing the colony, rationalizing the operational services and abolishing many 
inessential offices Governor Martini proposed to Rome a reassessment of Eritrea in 
consonance with among other the following proposals: the supreme authority should 
lie with the governor, a 10 member advisory board, the Colonial Council should be 
founded as well as an accounting office, the capital should be transferred to Asmara, 
the colonial territory should be partitioned into 7 commissariats and 4 residencies 
(regions to be handled by Italian supervisors-residents) and the civil servants should 
be appointed with more demanding criteria.222 
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In this process not only the Courts but every obsolete by then, militarily 
oriented function and service had to desist. On 10 May 1898 he dissolved the military 
courts of Keren and Asmara and twenty days later he abolished the wasteful military 
commands. On 29 June 1898 he divided the colonial territory into four administrative 
regions: Asmara, where he moved the capital in 1897 for geographical and climatic 
reasons, Assab, Keren and Massaua. They were to be administrated juridically, 
politically and executively by the regional commissaries. They had the responsibility 
of directly levying the taxes, issuing notarial certificates, regulating educational 
activities, managing the colony's land property and moderating the hygienic services, 
in cooperation with the newborn Sanitary Council and the Provincial Sanitary 
Direction (30 May 1903 "regulation for regional commissaries and for the 
residencies"). Moreover they had to oversee, study and collect information on the 
populace under their supervision.223 Martini furthermore introduced the concept of the 
regional magistrates, who exercised their tasks in collaboration with the nobility and 
the local chiefs. On 24 November 1898 he commented on the subject: "I am sure that 
the concept of entrusting the regional courts' presidency to professional magistrates 
will meet the approval of your Excellency (Foreign Minister Canevaro) who should 
not forget that ten years of occupation in the plateau have gone by fruitlessly in 
relation to the study of habits, customs and laws of the various peoples that live there, 
habits, customs and laws that should have provided precious elements for the creation 
of the basis of a local legislation...."224 The replacement of the military staff by a more 
competent colonial bureaucracy, the abolishment of redundant commissions and the 
establishment of civil courts in Asmara and Keren on April 1899 led to the institution 
of a bipolar juridical regime: one for the Italian and the assimilated citizens and one 
for the natives on 9 February  1902.225 Public works like the extension of the railway 
line were entrusted to an engineering association located in Asmara, relieving the 
army's engineering corps.226 The civil governor absolutely convinced about the work's 
utility he pressed and secured king Umberto's support with respect to the projected 
connection of Massaua with the Ethiopian plateau. 227  Hence, 10 years after his 
appointment Martini managed to demilitarize Eritrea and bring peace to the region.228 
Martini was officially the first Italian commissioner who met with the Ethiopian 
emperor after Adwa in 1905, and it was during his time and more specifically on 24 
June 1897 that Nerazzini signed a commercial treaty with Menelik. 229Admirably 
enough, when in 1898-1899 the province of Tigre was under a revolutionary upheaval 
against the Ethiopian central government the Italians refrained from any kind of 
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underhand involvement.230 The policy of maintaining friendly relations with Menelik 
seemed to pay off on 10 July 1900 when the emperor satisfied the Italian pretensions 
by setting the border on the Mareb-Belesa-Muna 231  line and when he ceded the 
Cumana region to Eritrea in May 1902.232 As a result of the Italo-Ethiopian trade 
agreement signed in 1906, Italy gained the right to install trade posts in Adwa, Gondar 
and Borumieda and to erect a telegraphic line between Eritrea and Scioa. However, 
the Djibouti railway and the economic penetration that it had afforded subsequently to 
the French and the local chieftains' distrust limited the contested Italian initiatives.233 
Martini also signed the treaty of delimitation of the Eritrean-Sudanese frontier with 
the governor of the Anglo-Egyptian Suakin, Parsons on 7 December 1898; a treaty 
that after the elimination of the Mahdist peril ensured the pacification of Eritrea's 
northern border.234 
Inspired by the British penal code applied in Sudan, Martini put forward in 
1903 a legal code more in line with local customs and tradition and less bureaucratic 
and inflexible as the previous ones. The sentences were taking in consideration the 
perpetrator's age, religion, tribe and family status and were classified into death 
sentence, flogging, fine and imprisonment; excluding the latter, they all were 
practicable and endorsed by the Koran and the Ethiopian customary law. As for the 
civil affairs, the metropolitan code was uniformly applied under some revisions and 
suggestions from Eritrea's religious and secular local leaders. Martini's objective was 
to abbreviate the juridical procedures and render the proceedings simpler and more 
efficient through the close collaboration of the relevant offices.235 Public security and 
the crackdown of the looting raids in the colony's interior was entrusted to the 
Carabinieri police corps. The Assaorta region for instance, was pacified after the 
arrests of criminals and rebels that had been engaging in anti-Italian guerilla warfare 
in the mountains since 1896. Prior to this development the area was passable only 
with an armed escort. Many of the perpetrators were pardoned and allowed to return 
to their respective villages.236 The implementation of the justice system was applied in 
every corner of the colony and improved. The Carabinieri corps operated in places 
inhabited by Europeans. Wherever that was not the case the regional commissaries 
ensured the impartial application of the law.237  In regard to religious matters the 
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Italian authorities, respecting the local Muslim and Christian beliefs,238 negotiated 
with the Patriarch of Alexandria, the chair of the Christian-Coptic creed, the 
nomination of an archbishop for the colony. As a result in 1904 a new archbishop 
moved in creating nevertheless a doctrinal and practical confusion of competences 
and hierarchy with the Catholic authorities.239 
During Martini's administration the colony became self-sufficient, sustaining 
every kind of public function and infrastructural construction upon its own means; the 
state though had to assist the colony in terms of military spending, which although 
limited, did not cease to exist. According to official records the state's contribution 
was steadily diminishing: from almost 43 million lire in 1896-1897 and 15 in 1897-
1898, the balance sheet gradually descended to an average of approximately 8 million 
during the 1898-1903 period. From 1903 until 1907 Eritrea's financial liability to the 
state came to amount to no more than 6.5 million lire.240 In 1897 cotton yarns were 
imported from the United States, India and England. In contrast in 1906 from the 3.4 
million worth of imported cotton, 2.7 came from Italian industries. Since 1900 the 
colony was unable to provide agricultural products for exportation and it was roughly 
then when the internal production managed to satisfy the colony's consumption. 
Indeed, from the sixteen Italian agricultural families that had settled in Eritrea after 
Franchetti's attempts fifteen had repatriated.241 Martini finally halted the boundless 
appropriation of the natives’ land that was a constant source of discontent and 
resistance during the period 1893-1895. Granting plots of lands to Rome’s Africans 
subjects in a rational way finally guaranteed Eritrea’s internal pacification. 242  In 
addition Martini, acknowledging that the colony’s blunders partially originated by the 
low level of the incoming settlers set some limitations to Italian immigration with his 
February 22 1898 degree. The aspriring colonizers disillusioned by Eritrea’s 
conditions often lost their interest in agriculture and abandoned their estates and 
equipment granted to them by the colonial authorities. According to the governor’s 
law the newcomers had to be equipped with enough money (250 lire) to make the 
return trip in case they decided to repatriate. They also had to exhibit a certificate, 
provided by their town halls in Italy, which attested that they had the necessary means 
                                                          
238Martini scolded Carbonara when the latter lamented the former's approval for the construction of a 
mosque in Cheren in 1899. See Ibid., p. 541. 
239 Ministero delle Colonie, Relazione sulla colonia Eritrea, pp. 20-22, 30. 
240Ibid., p. 42. Indicatively the overall state expenses in Africa during the previous years were: 34 
million lire in 1868, 44 in 1881, 49 in 1882, 95 in 1886, 114 in 1887, 157 in 1888. See Alessandro 
Schiavi, Dall'Eritrea alla Libia; gli insegnamenti di trent' anni di colonizzazione italo-africana sul 
Mar Rosso, (Milan, 1912), p. 10. Other scholars, set these figures noticeably higher: 80-90 million 
since 1881, 116 in 1883-1883, 121 in 1883-1884, 132 in 1884-1885, 131 in 1885-1886, 126 in 1886-
1887, 175 in 1887-1888 and 289 in 1888-1889. See Rainero, L'anticolonialismo, p. 206. 
241 Martini not only did not commit himself keenly to the immigration-agricultural issue, but his 
administration seemed to dispel the longstanding myth of Eritrea as an immigration outlet. See Del 
Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 755. 
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to settle in Eritrea. On September 8 1898 Martini decided to expel 10 Italian laborers 
whose presence was deemed detrimental for the colony.243   
On 22 June 1898 Martini visited an experimental estate of 90 hectares in Adi 
Ugri only to discover that the farms were deserted and the crops (coffee and olives) 
were far from fruitful. To boost local production, in concert with the customs’ 
director, he proposed the imposition of high tariffs to the agricultural products that 
were imported in the colony, such as barley. He raised the duties for foreign flour and 
alcoholic products but facilitated, by lowering the ad valorem tax, the importation of 
Italian products, except of the agricultural ones.244 To avoid the antagonism from 
colonial-metropolitan products and to boost exports, 245  Martini did not impose 
protectionist tariffs nor permitted a generic laissez faire; instead he examined the 
potential and profitability of every product on a case by case basis. The ominous 
situation was reversed the following years to the extent that Eritrean wheat was 
imported to Italy under the regulating law of 18 July 1904.246 
A scientific investigation of the colony's soil and its capabilities that took 
place in 1901, revealed that the cultivation of tobacco, a much appreciated commodity 
in Europe, was feasible. In regard to the mining policies, Martini also regulated the 
exploitation of the colony's subsoil in May 1903, in line with the British methods. He 
classified it in three categories: soil that was to be exploited under investigative 
permits lasting one year, soil for which there would be research permits lasting two 
and potentially three years and lastly soil for which mineral concessions would be 
granted with a duration of fifty to eighty years.247 During Martini's final years as 
governor (1903-7) the navigation and commercial traffic in Massaua constantly rising 
and benefiting the Italian agricultural and industrial sectors. Eritrea was importing 
Italian wine, olive oil and manufactured products whereas it exported cotton, tobacco, 
leathers and rubber among other products. The imports were regulated by the 
September 1903 and the September 1904 royal decrees.248 Confronting the colony's 
perpetual problem, the orderly and mutually profitable management of the estates, 
Martini made clear that Eritrea's land was property of the royal Italian authorities. 
However, these were regulated in accordance with local traditions and sense of 
justice. In 1907 he proposed the distribution of Eritrea's cultivable land: 3,420 
                                                          
243 Ibid., p. 302. 
244 Martini, Diario Eritreo, p. 201. 
245Deputy Parenzo, even before the capture of Massaua, had warned the government that the products 
of an agricultural colony would undoubtedly antagonize the Italian ones. See Arbib, "La questione 
d'Africa alla Camera Italiana", p. 220. 
246Penne, Per l'Italia africana, p. 43. 
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hectares in the plateau to be granted to Ethiopian cultivators, 5,339 in the lowlands to 
the Muslim tribes, 8,400 to industrial associations, 2,500 to Italian immigrants.249 
   Coming in, Martini found a colony morally and materially abandoned, poor, 
destroyed after 10 years of military administration and conflicts, threatened by the 
Mahdists and the Ethiopians, undermined by the European intrigues, tormented by the 
uncertainty and the unreasonable economic practices, "without resources, energy, 
life". When he departed, in 1907, Eritrea was territorially secure and financially 
stable. The balance sheet, excluding the military expenses which were regulated by 
Rome, was for the first time positive 250  and the administration, based on local 
principles and justice, exuded respect and trust.251 The inhabitants of the colony were 
peacefully cohabiting alongside the Italian officials and workers252 while the rivalry 
between civil and military authority, so harmful for Africans and Italians, had been 
eradicated. The disgrace of Adwa began to fade and the Italian prestige increased due 
to the complete administrative, economic and legislative reorganization of Eritrea. 
Furthermore, business activities were encouraged 253  and infrastructure, such as 
railways and public works, grew. Finally, it can be ascertained that the governor had 
performed a small miracle by maximizing the exploitation of the colony’s 
commercial, agricultural and industrial possibilities.254 This miracle was perhaps the 
proof  that the colony, under serious and prudent management, could be profitable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
249 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
250 The average amount of the colony's fiscal revenue (manufacture, municipal and commerce taxes) in 
the period 1902-1907 was approximately 100,000 lire. See Ibid., p.161. 
251Martini, Nell'Affrica italiana, p. 82. 
252The European and Italian workers and craftsmen that desired to try their luck in Eritrea had to have 
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activities with the Yemen coast across the Red Sea. See Luigi Villari, "The Italian Red Sea Colonies", 
Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society, 14/2 (1927) p. 122. 
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6. The establishment of the Italian colony in Somalia 
 
   Somalia extends from Djibouti in the north to Kenya in the south. It is also 
called Horn of Africa, as it is washed by the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.1 This 
strategic location had attracted from the 15th century the interest of the Portuguese 
explorers but ultimately it came under Ottoman suzerainty in 1586. During the 16th 
and 17th century the Portuguese were established on the Somalian shores on the 
Indian Ocean, a fact which distressed the Sultanate of Muscat, in today's Oman. The 
Arabs in 1698 set the objective of expelling the Europeans from the African coast and 
until 1729 the Portuguese influence was limited to the port of Mombasa. In 1872 the 
Sultan of Zanzibar, realizing the power vacuum in the region, expanded his influence 
in the territories around Kismayo. Three years later, as part of Khedive Ismail's 
imperialist policy, the Egyptians occupied for three months the location but the 
British reaction returned the southern coast of Somalia under the sovereignty of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar. Thus, he in 1880 had the nominal control of Lamu, Mogadishu, 
Mombasa, Kismayo and Barawa.2 
   The Italian involvement in southern Somalia dates from the second half of 
1884. It was then when Mancini authorized the specialist explorer Antonio Cecchi to 
go to the region for a "confidential mission of intelligence and research" and if there 
were no obstacles to proceed to the "occupation or at least to the consolidation of an 
Italian protectorate."3 The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs promoted the idea of a 
treaty with Zanzibar aiming at the concession of some coastline location to Italy.4 In 
1885, as a result of the European antagonism in the context of Africa's partition, 
Cecchi faced a complicated and potentially dangerous situation. Germany and Britain 
in 1884-1885 were clashing diplomatically for establishing their influence on Sayyid 
Barghash bin Said Al-Busaid (1837-1888), Sultan of Zanzibar and typically suzerain 
of Somalia's coast. The Germans, through the German East Africa Company (Deutsch 
Ostafrikanische Gesellsaft), having consolidated their position in Tanganyika, were 
seeking to expand further north at a time when the British set as their priority in the 
                                                          
1 The unusual morphology of the Somalian coasts may hinder the attempt to study the facts that took 
place there. It should be clarified that in this study the southern coast of Somalia on the Indian Ocean 
shall be examined, that which attracted the Italian interest. The Red Sea shores constituted the French 
(colony of Djibouti) and the British Somalia. 
2 Sindacato italiano arti grafiche, a cura del Ministero delle Colonie, Oltre Giuba. Notizie raccolte a 
cura del Commissariato Generale nel primo anno di occupazione italiana (1925-1926), (Rome, 1927), 
pp. 152-154. 
3 Mancini was supporting exploratory missions "in the direction of another region of Africa, to areas 
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made a fertile ground for activities, including agricultural, of the Italians." Thus, Cecchi was sent to 
ascertain the political conditions at the coastline of Somalia and the possibility of utilizing the rivers 
there as trade routes to the mainland. See Tommaso Palamenghi-Crispi, L'Italia coloniale e Francesco 
Crispi, (Milan, 1928), p. 192  
4 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XVI-XVII, (Rome, 1994), pp. 846-847. 
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area the imposition of an protectorate on Zanzibar. Rome, which had yet to appoint a 
consul to the shores of the Indian Ocean, was in no position to collide with these 
superpowers.5 At that time Italy, although it did not have financial interests on the 
Indian Ocean shores, wanted to assume the role of a colonial power in the region, 
equivalent to that of Britain and of Germany. 
   Cecchi's mission to the Sultan's court ended with the signing of an 
agreement of "friendship and commerce" on 28 May 1885. This guaranteed the 
favorable treatment of the Italian citizens in the Sultan's dominions and the equal 
treatment of his subjects to the territories under Italian control. The exchange of 
consuls, the ability of the Italians to acquire property in Zanzibar and the most 
favoured nation clause for Italy were additionally granted. 6  Even though Sayyid 
Barghash seemed willing to proceed to territorial concessions to Italy, the matter did 
not have a positive outcome for Rome. His inability to act independently due to the 
Anglo-German pressure and the ambiguity as to which territories actually belonged to 
him and which did not, were the suspending factors. A few days later he withdrew his 
offer. The new Foreign Minister, di Robilant advised Cecchi to refrain from any 
action "that could appear hostile" and to "do nothing which could displease the 
Germans". The negotiations and the talks about the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 
1887 were in progress and di Robilant wanted to avoid disputes with the ally country 
at all costs. Cecchi departing from Zanzibar headed with the ship "Barbarigo" at a 
location called Juba (Giuba), where he discovered "rich commercial resources". At the 
time of his empty-handed return to Italy, Britain and Germany, putting their 
differences aside, signed a treaty of co-operation for Eastern Africa. With the treaty of 
October 1886 the ownership of Tanganyika was being officially acknowledged to 
Germany whereas the British were occupying Uganda and Kenya.7 
   In 1885 very few Italians were residing in Zanzibar and in its continental 
dominions. The trade between Italy and the African horn was in the hands of a single 
man, the businessman Vincenzo Filonardi (1853-1916). With the assistance of the 
Bank of Rome he founded the company "V. Filonardi & Compagnia" with an initial 
capital of 180,000 lire. His commercial activities were profitable and due to the 
                                                          
5 Αngelo Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale Dall'Unità alla Marcia su Roma, (Rome-Bari, 
1976), pp. 234-235. The Germans, initially, did not wish to see yet another antagonistic power acquire 
bases in Somalia. See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXII, (Rome, 1994), p. 142. 
Afterwards, having ensured for themselves Tanganyika, they seemed more conciliatory towards the 
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6  Gustavo Chiesi, La colonizzazione Europea nell'Est Africa, Italia-Inghilterra-Germania, (Turin, 
1909), p. 88. 
7 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 236-237. On August 1885 German warships threatened to shell 
Zanzibar if the Sultan did not recognize the German acquisitions in the hinterland. In October of the 
same year Berlin and London agreed to recognize the Sultan's sovereignty over just a few locations of 
Somalia. On 4 December the Sultan accepted the Anglo-German demarcation of his dominions and the 
occupation of Kenya and Tanganyika. See Robert L. Hess, Italian colonialism in Somalia, (Chicago, 
1966), p. 17. 
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influence that he was enjoying in Eastern Africa he was appointed consul of Italy in 
Zanzibar, at the suggestion of Cecchi.8 
   Filonardi, realizing from close proximity the fear and the hatred that the 
Sultan fostered for the Germans, believed that "not only would the latter be satisfied if 
Italy occupied the area of Somalia but that he would wholeheartedly support it". 
Indeed, Sayyid Barghash, to compensate for the Anglo-German presence in southern 
Somalia, offered Kismayo to Italy. The offer was similar to the one he had made to 
Cecchi 18 months before. The Sultan was aspiring to turn one Power against the 
other, but he was dissatisfied when the Italian representative assured him that Rome 
was not willing to act dynamically in the context of its colonial policy. So, he 
withdrew his proposal and another opportunity was missed. On 15 May 1888 
Filornardi, now arbiter and exponent of the Italian colonial policy in the Indian Ocean 
requested a hearing from the new Sultan I bin Said Al-Busaid (1852-1890). His 
request was not granted because of the festive season of Ramadan, during which 
every official activity is traditionally suspended. The consul perceived this as an insult 
to the person of the King of Italy and demanded from the Sultan the concession of 
Kismayo9 to satisfy the Italian government.10 Sayyid Khalifa did not give into the 
pressure although Filonardi broke off diplomatic relations between Zanzibar and 
Italy.11 
   In the next year, after lengthy negotiations between Crispi and Salisbury, the 
golden mean was found.12 The Anglo-Italian agreement of 3 August 1889 resulted in 
Rome acquiring Somalia's ports, with the Sultan's acquiescence. The coastal location 
is called Benadir (country of trade) and it includes the ports of Merca, Brava, 
Mogadishu and Uarscheik.13 The Italians were consolidated in this area in the late 
                                                          
8 Ibid., pp. 16-18. Filonardi laboured not only for the benefit of his homeland but also for his own gain. 
If Italy was eventually consolidated on the coast of Somalia, he would draw and secure significant 
financial benefits. Wishing to expand his commercial activities in Eastern Africa and to safeguard the 
financial interests of his company there, he tried to keep Rome's interest for the region at a high level. 
9 In the Italian planning, this particular port would constitute a replenishment station and a coal depot 
for the Italian naval and merchant fleet. See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXVII, (Rome, 
2000), pp. 405-406. 
10 The only way the Italian side could be satisfied, according to the Italian consul, was a formal written 
apology of the Sultan to the king of Italy accompanied by territorial concessions. See Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXII, (Rome, 1994), p. 39. The Sultan sent the letter, but refused to give up 
part of his territories. See Ibid., p. 43. 
11 Hess, colonialism in Somalia, p. 19.  
12 Salisbury, repeatedly assured the Italian diplomats that Britain had no objection to a possible Italian 
penetration in Somalia. Moreover in 1889, he stated: "Italy would be welcome in Somalia. Britain is 
happy to have Italy as neighbour, I am not saying in relation to the indigenous tribes that trade slaves, 
but preferable to other nations." See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXII (Rome, 1994), pp. 
260-267. Furthermore, he had personally promised that he would do everything possible so that Rome 
would acquire Kismayo. See Ibid., pp. 124-125. 
13 In their effort to make their presence in Somalia more tangible, Italians dispatched a naval mission in 
Uarscheik, the last Benadir port still unvisited, on April 1890. The result was two dead and several 
wounded from the landed contingent by the ship Volta. Filonardi, returned and occupied the territory 
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19th century setting as their goal the penetration of the hinterland.14 In addition to the 
usual aspirations, settling immigrants and creating commercial stations, Somalia had 
for the Italians an additional significance. The new colony had enormous strategic 
importance since from there Rome was in position to "encircle" and to apply pressure 
to the long-standing objective, Ethiopia.15 According to a member of an exploratory 
mission to Benadir: "It is pointless to think that we can civilize this people, the issue 
is to get them to behave and this is done only by shooting or with the cane, on a case 
by case basis." In Somalia i.e., the Italians would not implement their selfless 
beneficial work but they would use the country as a "bridge towards Ethiopia".16 
   The agreement of 1 July 1890 between Britain and Germany, with which 
Zanzibar was turned into a British protectorate, accelerated the procedures and 
facilitated the Italian plans. 17  More specifically, the agreement granted the 
strategically important island of Heligoland and a sphere of influence in Tanganyika 
to Berlin for the British protectorate in Zanzibar and Kenya.18 The Imperial British 
East Africa Company, beneficiary now of Benadir, transferred it directly to Italy 
under a sui generis subletting regime. Crispi's policy after the signing of the protocol 
with London, in March 1891, for the demarcation of the individual dominions, 
appeared to triumph.19 The always co-operative British recognized the protectorate 
over Ethiopia, in accordance with the Italian version of the treaty of Uccialli, the 
occupation of Benadir and the joint possession of Kismayo. Crispi's replacement, di 
Rudini, although anti-Africanist, did not break off talks with the British about 
Somalia. In March and April 1891 he concluded agreements with the diplomat 
Frederick Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood, 1st Marquis of Dufferin (1826-1902) for the 
demarcation of the spheres of influence in Eastern Africa.20 
   The diplomatic frenzy had not ended. After the Sultan was informed of the 
fate of his territories, the Italian commissioner Cottoni concluded with Portal, the 
British representative of Zanzibar's government, another act of transfer, that of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
between Uarcheik and Obbia, acquiring on 14 March 1890 by treaty with the local chieftains the 
strategically positioned city Atlaleh. Before his departure, he raised the Italian flag, renamed the city to 
Itala and appointed an ascari garrison to maintain public order in the name of the Italian king.          
Chiesi, La colonizzazione Europea, p. 93  
14 Fabio Grassi, Le origini dell'imperialismo italiano: Il ''caso somalo" (1896-1915), (Lecce, 1980), p. 
38. 
15 Nicola Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana, (Bologna, 2002), p. 85.   
16 Alessandro Aruffo, Storia del colonialismo italiano da Crispi a Mussoloni, (Rome, 2003), pp. 42-45. 
17 For the further study of the articles of the Anglo-German treaty of 1890 see H. Romain Rainero, Il 
colonialismo, Il nuovo mondo industrale, gli stati nazionali e l'espansionismo coloniale, (Florence, 
1978), pp. 43-44. For the whole spectrum of the East African German-British negotiations see Jonas 
Fossli Gjersø, "The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884–95", The Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43/5 (2015), pp. 831-860. 
18 William L. Langer, La diplomazia dell'imperialismo (1890-1902), v. 1 (New York, 1935), pp.18-19. 
19 Carlo Rossetti , Manuale di legislazione della Somalia Italiana, documenti diplomatici e inedici, vol. 
1, (Rome, 1914), p. 11. 
20 Hess, colonialism in Somalia, pp.  28-32.  
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Benadir to Italy in August 1891. The government of Giolitti, in power since May 
1892, being indifferent about Somalia, suggested the transfer of Benadir to Filonardi's 
company. It also dispatched two agents (Lovatelli, Incoronato) to Africa to gather 
information about the situation there. The results of the investigation were ambiguous. 
According to the reports Somalia was fertile but not suitable for an immigration 
colony. Its tropical climate permitted the Europeans to work as "supervisors and not 
as workers". Finally, whereas the cultivation of cotton could form a source of income 
for the colony, the inadequacy of its ports made maritime trade precarious. 21  As 
happened previously in Assab, many questioned the real commercial value of the 
region ports' that in 1895 registered only 306,442 Maria Teresa coins worth of transit 
value.22 
   The government did not wish to become involved militarily and financially 
in Somalia too. So, it turned to the British model, of the indirect imperialism, 
according to which a company assumed control of the wealth-producing resources of 
the colony, with the obligation to administer it fiscally and politically.23 The success 
of the venture was being guaranteed by the legitimate expectation of profit and after 
that by the investment of funds. The Italian government, planning in 1889 the creation 
of a "Società Italiana per l'Africa Orientale" but being financially unable to sustain it, 
transferred to Filonardi's company the administration of Benadir for three years with 
the prospect of renewal for another fifty.24 The company, reminiscent of Rubattino's 
role in Assab, was receiving annually a state subsidy to the tune of 300,000 lire and 
was required to assume the administration, pay the wages of the "public" servants and 
see to the infrastructure and the defence of the colony. In addition, it had to pay to the 
Sultan of Zanzibar an installment worth 160,000 rupees every year as a kind of rent. 
After the end of the proceedings, the Il Matino, newspaper of Naples, in exultation 
wrote that "Italy managed to fulfill its duty and its interests in those areas as a 
civilized power with insignificant costs."25 
   Foreign Minister Felice Napoleone Canevaro (1838-1926) disappointed by 
the developments in Eritrea, stated to the parliament on 28 March 1899: "The 
                                                          
21 Ibid., p. 48. 
22 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 432. 
23 The Italian government chose the indirect system of governance "considering it to be not only the 
most economical but also the least jeopardizing from international perspective and the most suitable for 
a peaceful penetration." See Grassi, Il caso somalo, p. 107. The companies covered the government's 
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protectorate over Ethiopia and the territories of Benadir managing all their wealth-producing resources. 
See reference of the newspaper Sunday Night, ASMAE, ASMAI, position 55/4, folder 22, Rome 
without date. 
24  Cesare Cesari, Colonie e possedimenti coloniali, cenni storici-geografici ed economici, (Rome, 
1927),  pp. 113-114. 
25 Francesco Surdich, "Il colonialismo italiano, l'imperialismo straccione," in Il Calendario, (September 
1996), pp. 17-18.  
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(colonial) administration through a company is the best guarantee against the 
inclination towards military enterprises." 26  However, according to the subsequent 
governor of Somalia, Giacomo De Martino (1868-1956) the Italians at Benadir, 
between military domination and gradual penetration by peaceful means, chose the 
former. 27  They resorted to the easy solution of using their weapons for law 
enforcement, for safeguarding the trade, for the administration of justice. It was, 
indeed the easy solution, given the coexistence of different tribes and the apparent 
lack of a single national conscience in Somalia in this period. The absence of 
coordinated resistance made Rome's conquering task infinitely more feasible 
compared to the situation encountered by the Italian imperialists in Ethiopia. Thus, 
already by 1899 (officially on 7 April 1899), Filonardi had imposed the Italian 
protectorate on Obbia28 and Majerteen.29 The protectorate over the Mogadishu city 
and surroundings was proclaimed in March 24 1891.30 In this manner he extended the 
borders of the second Italian colony (secondogenita), whose administration he was 
given for exactly 3 years, from 16 July 1893 to 15 July 1896. 
   The first act of the Filonardi administration was indicative of what was to 
come. On 10 October 1893 an Italian officer was murdered in Mekra by a native. The 
culprit was arrested, mutilated and the town, where the unfortunate incident occurred 
was bombarded by Italian warships.31 Despite the knowledge of the country and its 
conditions and in spite of the vigour and the capabilities of the governor, the company 
was a financial failure. The costs of the colony, especially those regarding Benadir's 
defence, were hard to bear. Just the rent that the company was paying to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar was absorbing 60% of its budget. Filonardi appealed to the ministry of 
Foreign Affairs so that it would renegotiate the amount of the rent, but without 
result. 32  The company failed miserably to meet the financial, military and 
administrative needs of Somalia. The expert Angelo Del Boca laid the issue on its 
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proper foundation: "If, on one hand, the choice of the government not to take on 
financial and military obligations in Somalia seems reasonable, on the other hand it 
shows a large dose of irresponsibility, because the Filonardi Company did not possess 
the necessary funds or the experience or the organization to govern a colony, which 
after the ephemeral presence of the Egyptians and the Zanzibari, was in chaos and 
misery, where a large part of the land remained unexplored and justice was 
administered by corrupt cadis."33 Regarding the exercise of the justice in Somalia the 
Sultan of Zanzibar entitled the Italian authorities in 1901 to administer legally the 
north part of the country regarding the offenses committed by Italians or other 
foreigners.34 In the south part of Somalia the Sultan had already implemented some 
kind of elemental penal code. In Merka, Brava and Mogadishu the Italians were 
authorized to put in use the consular law (extraterritoriality) for their subjects, the 
Muslim law for the natives and regarding the other regions Rome had to formulate the 
correspondent norms.35 
   In 1896 the rental period was expiring and the government had to decide in 
what manner it would manage Benadir. The removal and replacement of Filonardi's 
company was considered to be practical, with the aim of reorganizing and exploiting 
financially the colony. So, instead of abandoning Somalia, Rome appointed there yet 
another private company, also a confused mixture of public and private elements.36 
The new company had the stamp of Cecchi. He was in Milan, fishing with 
indefatigable efforts for prospective investors, by advertising Benadir's commercial 
possibilities. The defeat at Amba Alagi caused temporary hesitation and indifference 
on the part of the latter, but just three months after the defeat of Adwa and the fall of 
the Crispi government the company was founded with the title "Società Anonima 
Commerciale del Benadir" on 25 June 1896.37 Due to the public opinion's opposition 
to colonial adventures or its indifference after Adua the first law regarding the 
subsiding of the colony took three years to be ratified by the parliament in November 
29 1899.38 
   The industrialist Giorgio Mylius (1870-1935), one of the founders of the 
company and a relative of Cecchi, visited the colony in 1895 to determine the 
possibility of growing cotton. He was persuaded that Somalia could supply with raw 
                                                          
33 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 568. 
34 Vincenzo Mellana, L'Italia in Africa. Serie giuridico-amministrativa v. 2, L'amministrazione della 
giustizia nei territori oltremare tomo I, l'amministrazione della giustizia in Eritrea e in Somalia (1869-
1936), (Rome, 1971), p. 178. 
35  Ibid., p. 182. 
36 Hess, colonialism in Somalia, p. 178. 
37 The new company was supposed to replace immediately the Filonardi Company at Benadir. Because 
of difficulties and delays it assumed effective administration of the colony on 1 January 1900, a fact 
that attests to the total anarchy that for four years ruled in Italian Somalia, an indirect result of the 1896 
defeat. See Marcello Pivato, La nostra colonia del Benadir, (Venice, 1914), pp. 14-15. Typically, the 
company of Benadir became owner of the territories there in 1899, following a decision by the 
parliament (173 for 151 against). See Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 777. 
38 Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 777. 
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materials the Italian textile industries and left convinced of the practical benefits of 
the venture. The merchants and manufacturers of Milan, trusting Mylius' associates, 
contributed 30,000 lire to the initial capital of the company.39 The Italian government 
entrusted the company of Benadir with the possession and use of public lands, with 
the right to regulate customs duties and with the exclusive rights to the mines of 
Italian Somalia. The company was required to "develop socially and economically" 
the colony, to settle the issue of justice, as well as the problem of slavery, alcohol and 
firearms trading, in accordance with the decisions of the Berlin and Brussels 
conferences.40 It also had to maintain in the colony a security force of 600-700 men, 
pay the rent to the Sultan of Zanzibar and the agreed amounts to the chieftains under 
protection, maintain the infrastructure and regulate the postal services.41 The new 
administration had to undertake a series of public and dock works and set up the 
maritime connection with Zanzibar, Massaua and Aden.42 Of course, in spite of the 
above obligations, the priority of the company was the consolidation of an 
administration tailored to the industrial requirements and the cultivation of cotton. 
   Despite the grandiose designs and the given shortage of funds and of the 
company's financial capabilities, Cecchi, upon assumption of his duties, had even 
more ambitious plans. The new governor, now established in Mogadishu, under the 
supervision of the Italian consol in Zanzibar, was visualizing the creation of a 
profitable and powerful colony. He insisted on the importance of acquiring the 
harbour of Kismayo, on maintaining friendly relations with the neighbouring local 
populations and on the need to occupy Lugh, a key point for controlling the Juba 
plain. The capture of Kismayo could cause British discomfort, so the conquest of 
Lugh was considered more feasible. The explorer Vittorio Bottego was put in charge 
of the mission. En route towards the objective he was killing indiscriminately the 
indigenous and in fact 25 Somalis are estimated to have been slain during the first 
day. A lieutenant, member of the mission, mentioned about the raid: "We shoot 
anyone we see, arresting women and the elderly."43 The "glorious" operation ended 
with the occupation of the site and the expansion of the Italian influence to the 
surrounding areas.44 
                                                          
39 Αquarone, Dopo Adua: politica, p 63. 
40 Grassi, Il caso somalo, p. 102. Throughout this period Italian, British and French diplomats were 
meeting together and were concluding agreements about the ban on arms trafficking in Eastern Africa. 
See Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.D.I., vol. XXII, (Rome, 1994), p. 295. 
41 Giovanni Bosco Naitza, Il Colonialismo nella storia d'Italia (1882-1949), (Florence, 1975), p. 78. 
42 Gian Luca Podesta, "Gli investimenti italiani in Africa orientale 1869-1919", Annali dell'Istituto 
italo-germanico in Trento, v. 24, 1998, p. 173.  
43 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 571-573. 
44 In 1895 the Sultan of Lugh, Ali Hassan Nur, asked for Italian protection and promised to facilitate 
the flow of commercial goods towards the ports of Benadir. Furthermore, he granted to the Italians the 
right to build a fortress and raise the Italian flag at any point of his territory as well as the use of the 
mines and of the cultivable expanses. See ΑSMAI, folder 8, package 84, without protocol number, 
Lugh 4 December 1895. 
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   Two months after taking office Cecchi was murdered by natives. 45  Two 
retaliation expeditions were organized in December 1896 and March 1897 against the 
villages that deemed culpable for the assassination.46 Emilio Dulio (1859-1950) took 
over as governor with extraordinary powers for the punishment of those responsible. 
The murder of Cecchi but also of Bottego by indigenous amplified the voices calling 
for the withdrawal from Somalia and put di Rudini's government in a difficult 
position, facing now one more African tragedy.47 As if that were not enough, at that 
time the gritty Muslim tribe of the Uadan revolted. They felt that the structure of their 
ancient economical-social system was being threatened, as they watched the Italians 
tear apart the traditional institutions of the Somalian tribes in an attempt to harmonize 
the country with the agricultural requirements of modern Europe. The activities of the 
Catholic missionaries and the criminalization of slaveholding and of the buying and 
selling of slaves, practices accepted and self-evident for the Somalis, did not leave 
margin for negotiations. The hostilities broke out in 1896, opening a second African 
front for the Italians and continued unabated until 1897. The Italians responded with 
savagery, not only to squash the defection but also "to avenge Cecchi's murder". The 
destruction of the Uadan villages and the poisoning of their wells did not particularly 
trouble the Italian parliament. It was there when on 4 May 1897, Foreign Minister 
Venosta stated: "The guilty tribes were known: we therefore needed to punish them to 
avenge our dead, to not recognize rights to the barbarians, to prevent other murders" 
and what was needed "was a clear civilizing act to Benadir to punish in a manner 
capable to set an example to those unscrupulous barbarians." 48  The Uadan were 
ultimately subdued and their leaders agreed to acknowledge the unobstructed 
movement of products in their territory and the right of the company to build 
fortresses in their lands.49 
   In the first years of Benadir's administration by the manufacturers of Milan 
the results were disappointing. The company of Benadir succeeded only in 
establishing a sanitary service, inviting an expert to draw up a land evaluation and 
colonization program and stipulating a convention with the Deutsche Ost-Africa Linie 
for the monthly connection of Benadir with Aden and Zanzibar.50 The Italian Somalia 
did not evolve into a commercial hub of Eastern Africa, since neither funds were 
invested there nor public utility works were constructed. The ports remained 
                                                          
45 Guido Corni, Somalia italiana, vol. 2, (Milan, 1937), p. 14. 
46 Massimo Gaibi, Manuale di storia politico-militare delle colonie italiane, (Rome, 1928), pp. 128-129. 
47 The military adviser of the colony called for the exemplary punishment of the perpetrators "for the 
dignity of our flag, for the stature of the Italian name, but also for the safety of our dominion in these 
shores." See Grassi, Il caso somalo, pp.  43-44. 
48 From these statements is discerned the belief that the "superior" race, in this case the Italian, can and 
should impose by force its values and morals on the "lower" ones. These proclamations come in 
contradiction to the previous theories about a civilizing mission and a well-intentioned rule. After the 
cessation of hostilities the Foreign Minister was overjoyed with the victory since in this manner the 
remaining populations of Benadir were "sufficiently impressed". See Ibid., pp.  73-76. 
49 Ibid., pp. 69-80. 
50 Podesta, "Gli investimenti italiani", p. 174. 
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insufficient, the road arteries inadequate, the industrial units non-existent. 51  The 
tropical climate and the frequent phenomena of violence were forcing the few Italian 
settlers52 to remain in the big coastal cities and not venture to head in the mainland 
where, in any case, the Italian influence was superficial.53 90% of the colony's budget 
was being absorbed by military expenses, at a time when the parliament was 
indifferent to the future of Somalia.54 The accusation by the Il Secolo newspaper that 
spoke of the tolerant attitude of the Italian colonial authorities towards the 
phenomenon of slavery were added to those about economic malaise, 
underdevelopment, lawlessness, opportunism, judicial and administrative 
inadequacy. 55  The opinion of the experienced explorer Robecchi-Bricchetti is 
enlightening: "The company which was never subject to any control on behalf of the 
government, and on the contrary was left by the latter to its own devices, even if it 
said that it was doing so, did not know how to carry out until now any public or 
private project, not a house, not a lodging, not a warehouse, not an anchorage, not a 
shelter just like it did not know how to set up a school, an asylum, a hospital, a 
pharmacy, or ultimately, any institute, even in a embryonic state, to improve the 
conditions of that populace". He also concluded that Somalia is unable to absorb 
sizeable portions of Italian immigrants since it did not possess fertile land or pastures 
like Lombardy's and the Somalis were bellicose and used to "primitive" means of 
production.56 He, after a survey to the biggest Somalian cities in 1903 discovered that 
the 1/3 of the inhabitants were actual slaves. Until 1905, when the contract between 
the company of Benadir and the Italian government was expiring, no projects had 
been completed for the benefit of the population of Somalia. It was missing any trace 
of a judicial system, any type of security for the commerce and the safety of residents 
and any modicum of virtuous governance. The colony of Somalia existed only on 
paper. 
   Benadir's tragic situation and the scandals about the brutality and the 
preservation of the slavery institution in Italian lands forced the Giolitti government to 
act, even with a considerable delay. In 1904 it entered into negotiations with the 
government of Britain and of Zanzibar, so that it would take over itself the 
administration of the troubled colony, simultaneously putting an inglorious end to the 
ambitious experiment of indirect imperialism. On 13 January in London the Italian 
                                                          
51 Plans for a railway from Brava to Afgoi or Afgooye, a line that would cost 8 milion lire, were on 
paper. The proposed enterpirise would contribute to the pacification, the transit trade and the economic 
development of the region. See Andrea Maggiorotti, "Del problema ferroviario; con speciale riguardo 
al sistema finanziario piu adatto alla costruzione di ferrovie nelle nostre colonie-Somalia Italiana", 
Istituto coloniale italiano, Atti del secondo congresso degli italiani all'estero, relazioni e comunicazioni, 
vol. 1 part 2, Conference, (Rome, 11-20 June 1911), pp. 1186-1190.  
52 From the thousands of Italian immigrants that were swarming to America and Australia only 13 
individuals had settled until 1903 in Benadir. See Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 781. 
53 Αquarone, Dopo Adua: politica, p 63. 
54 Labanca, Oltremare, storia dell'espansione, p. 90. 
55 Αquarone, Dopo Adua: politica, p 67. 
56 Luigi Robecchi-Bricchetti, "La Somalia Italiana", Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti, n. 124, 
(July, 1892), pp. 331-339.  
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government, by paying out the amount of 144,000 pounds, undertook the 
administration "of the cities, the ports and the territories of Benadir". After the 
liquidation of the Benadir company the government undertook the direct 
administration of the colony in February 14 1905; on June the parliament (157-71) 
and the senate (73-15) ratified the proceeding. It took three years for the first state 
organic law to be voted and implemented in Somalia.57  
Still, Somalia, in need of generous investments, did not improve significantly. 
The docking, public security and maritime communications problems remained 
unsolved.  The Italians hesitated to outlaw the institution of slavery, fearing not 
without cause that it would lead to uncontrollable consequences, made some efforts to 
squash this inhumane practice.58 Under the pressure of the public opinion and the 
press's denouncements banned slavery with the March 1903 decree. The new 
administration immediately faced the revolution of the dissatisfied by the Italian rule 
Bimal tribe, which was smouldering in the Italian lands since 1904. The severe 
conflict expanded to British Somalia too and absorbed exorbitant amounts and men 
for the final enforcement and consolidation of peace. In 1905 the Bimal laid siege to 
the Italian city of Merka for 9 months, only to be repelled by general Gherardo 
Pantano’s (1868-1937) reinforcements in January 21 1905. After the defeat the 
insurgents turned for support and military supplies to Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah 
Hassan (1856-1920), the Mad Mullah as the British called him, already in guerilla and 
sacred war against the Ethiopians and the British in northern Somalia. Starting from 
the spring of 1901 the authorities of British Somalia had undertaken a series of 
military campaigns to limit his national liberation movement. Their Italian 
counterparts, still numb after the 1896 defeat, refused to participate, restricting their 
action in giving the British contingents free access through Obbia. Mullah after his 
encirclement retreated temporarily to Nogal, a territory within the Italian sphere of 
influence, in March 1905.59  
The belligerent situation in Somalia proved that the days that the Italians could 
preserve their influence, retaliate and pacify the coast through feeble military forces, 
small scale expeditions and naval bombardments were over. The April 5 1905 
ordinance appointed an executive board and a civil government position with 
extraordinary military powers. Precisely three years later the Italian possessions were 
unified in a single colony under the name of Somalia Italiana. The conquest of the 
hinterland was deemed as indispensable in order to broaden Italian influence and to 
                                                          
57 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, pp. 801-802. 
58 The April 20 1903 act gave to the governor the ability to establish courts, to operate under the 
general antislavery acts agreed in Bruxelles and not under the local Muslim one, in order to eradicate 
legally the human trafficking phenomenon in Somalia. It furthermore gave him the potentiality to 
declare the colony under the state of war as applied to Eritrea and to regulate the penitentiary's 
functions. See, Mellana, L'Italia in Africa, pp. 186-187 
59 Del Boca, Gli Italiani in Africa, p. 800. 
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ensure the colony's security and its agricultural-commercial development. 60  The 
colony's budgetary increment and a vast program of mercenaries' enlistment to the 
colonial forces were accordingly decided.61 
   As has been seen from the above, Italy tried to adopt a different modus 
operandi of colonial administration but the undertaking failed again. Neither the direct 
government administration attempted in Eritrea nor that through private companies 
produced the desired results. The common ground of the two failures and their 
common denominator was the lack of funds, means and experience. Rome's 
uncoordinated and fragmentary movements in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean 
were the result of instability, uncertainty and confusion. The Italian government, 
having undertaken in Eritrea more commitments than it could manage and amid a war 
of attrition, wished to disclaim its responsibilities in Somalia. After the developments 
in Ethiopia, the Italian economy could not withstand another black hole, which would 
absorb voraciously men and funds for the satisfaction of the Italian prestige. The 
constant armed conflicts of the militaristic regime in the colony of Eritrea, the defeat 
of 1896 and the anti-Africanists' and socialists' reactions forced the government to 
move behind the scenes in Benadir, from a position of security. Always with British 
aid Rome, rather than withdraw from Africa forever, considered appropriate to create 
another colony in 1889. Evading the responsibilities arising from the sovereignty over 
a nation, it contributed greatly to the underdevelopment of the Somali population. 
This fact hardly troubled the Italian imperialists, who, in any case, were seeking only 
one thing, adventure, conquests and prestige. This is precisely the mentality that 
contributed to the final bankruptcy of the Italian colonial system. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
60 During the first "direst rule" years the colony constituted a commercial failure. The overall transit 
trade taking place in Italian Somalia's ports was slightly but insufficiently increased. As for the 
agricultural sector, from 11 estate concessions to Italian immigrants, 7 were rapidly abandoned in 
1907-1909. See Ibid., p.828. 
61 Ibid., p. 806. 
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7. Italy and the scramble for China 
 
The Adwa syndrome, weighed upon Italy's ruling class and stalled a decisive 
large scale operation for 15 years, when finally Italy occupied Libya in 1911. Of 
course, in the meantime, and despite the Adwa debacle's political and psychological 
repercussions the Italians continued the pursuit for colonial gains. Having suffered 
heavy losses and humiliation, and undergone a certain loss of prestige, the 
governments that followed Crispi, abandoned the independent, dynamic policy aiming 
to Italy's colonial expansion. Still in shock and fearing justifiably that another disaster 
would seal the fate of the nation's efforts to reach new heights and be recognized as a 
Great Power, they transformed Italian colonialism into a subtler, mild tempered 
policy. From then on Italy would always act collectively, in accordance and 
collaboration with the other Powers. Such was the case with China, in 1898-1901. An 
intervention or an expansion could not be justified as there was an absence of 
significant economic interests there. Still, with the Great Powers being commercially 
active and in possession of colonies in the Far East, Italy had no choice but to follow 
their lead. 
On 2 February 1866, the corvette Magenta under captain Vittorio Arminjon, 
sailed for the Far East with the goal of establishing regular diplomatic and eventual 
commercial relations with China, Burma, Korea and Japan. The voyage was the by-
product of a 1865 parliamentary inquest on the "oriental commerce", the economic 
possibilities that the Far East had to offer to the nascent Italian industry. The outcome 
of this survey stressed the necessity of strengthening the economic ties with the Far 
East, as other western states had already done and of installing official consular 
authorities. Moreover during that period the sericulture industry in Europe, was going 
through a grave crisis due to a mysterious epidemic, that decimated the required 
silkworms. In the 1850s Italian cocoon production was second only to the Chinese 
and up to 1876 it had generated profits of 281 million lire according to an official 
agricultural report. 1  Foreign Minister Venosta, considering the domestic silk 
industry's needs for the importation of low-priced and healthy silkworms, convinced 
the Prime Minister La Marmora to order the dispatch of a trade mission in China and 
Japan. The few Italian traders and individuals operating in Japan were until that time 
under the jurisdiction of the French consul. Magenta thus, apart from botanical and 
entomological goals had a crucial political mission.  
The treaty of Yeddo (Edo) was signed on 25 August 1866 and provided for the 
exchange of plenipotentiaries, the installation of consuls in the Japanese ports open to 
foreign trade, their free transit in every part of the country and the positioning of a 
general agent in Tōkyō. Italian visitors were not allowed to leave the agreed ports. 
The Italians' extraterritoriality (exception from the local authority's legal system) and 
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religious freedom were guaranteed, in line with the other Western-Japanese unequal 
treaties. In case of shipwreck the Japanese authorities were obligated to assist the 
castaways regardless of the port’s availability. The financial part of the treaty, 
regarding the imposition of commerce regulations and duties on silk and tea would be 
revised in Yokohama on 1 June 1869. An additional Italian-Japanese commerce treaty 
was signed in 1894.2 The first Italian ambassador in Tōkyō, Vittorio Sallier De la 
Tour3 urged his government to send a naval squadron in Yokohama in 1868 because 
"[...] I am well convinced that in this manner we would have every mean to organize 
and establish an Italian colony (community, editor's note) that would compete with 
those important ones in the South America".4 Count Litta, ambassador from March 
1873 to October 1874, asserted: "I think that a naval station in Japanese waters would 
not be excessive".5  
On 26 October 1866, Arminjon signed a similar treaty in Beijing, composed 
by 9 commercial regulations and 55 articles. Article 54, the most essential one, 
secured for Italy the most favoured nation clause, opened 9 Chinese ports to the 
Italian trade and permitted the installation of  Florence's (at that time the capital) 
representative in Beijing. In February 1871, Carlo Alberto Racchia commanding the 
corvette Principessa Clotilde concluded a trade treaty in Rangoon, as has been already 
seen. This treaty boosted substantially the presence of the Italian trade in Burma, as is 
demonstrated by the number of Italians ships that docked there. Whereas 50 made 
their berth there in 1871 and 78 in 1872 the figure rose to more than 200 in 1873. 
Nevertheless, when British and German shipping companies commenced operations 
in those waters, the antagonism proved overwhelming for the Italian trade still 
conducted by vessels powered by wind rather than steam.6  
Rome enjoyed a short period of "primacy" in Japan and not just due to the 
profitable trade: Italy imported silkworms, rice, porcelain and ceramics while 
exported to Japan coral grains, butter, gun powder and quinine. Raffaele Ulisse 
Barbolani (1818-1900), the Italian ambassador in Japan from 1877 to 1882, 
witnessing German prince Albert Wilhelm Heinrich’s (1862-1929) visit to Tōkyō to 
decorate the Japanese Emperor in 1879, contacted urgently the Italian government so 
                                                          
2 Efforts for the conclusion of a trade agreement had been undertaken in 1861 and 1863 by Cristoforo 
Negri, always eager to promote the Italian trade in the Orient, without tangible results. Again in 1863 
Costantino Nigra, the Italian ambassador to Paris tried to conclude a similar treaty with a Japanese 
delegation there, thus sparing Rome the expenses of a mission to Japan, but to no avail. The 1866 
convention can be considered a great success if the fact that at the time Italy was involved to the 
Austro-Prussian war is taken into consideration. See Romano Ugolini, "Lo Stato Liberale Italiano e 
l'eta Meiji, Atti del 1 Convegno Italian-Giapponese di studi storici", Conference, (Rome 23-27 
September 1985), p. 134.  
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that it would respond accordingly and safeguard its influence. Thus, on 8 August 
1879, Tommaso, duke of Genoa visited for the second time (the first in 1873) the 
Japanese court bearing honorary medals for the Emperor, who, by boarding the Italian 
ship Vettor Pisani, completed an act of historical importance: it was the first time that 
a Japanese Emperor set foot "abroad". The historic event took place on 7 January 
1881. Initially at Nagasaki and later (24 November) in Yokohama Tommaso was 
received with the highest honours, symbol of mutual respect and benevolence. The 
duke entered into personal friendship with numerous members of the government and 
the court during his stay augmenting the Italian prestige and reputation. Barbolani, the 
architect of the visit's great success also organized the Duke's trip to Korea to 
investigate the possibilities of its market and Taiwan to ascertain its value as a 
potential Italian colony in a two-fold exploration-reconnaissance mission.7 
The bilateral relations were further stenghten when the Italian prince received, 
in 1882, a Japanese delegation in Italy and when in 1884 three Italian artillery officers 
were requested and dispatched to supervise the organization of Ōsaka's arsenal.8 In 
Tōkyō a Fine Arts school, in which Italian artists taught, was established in 1876. For 
prince Arisugawa Taruhito (1835-1895) Italy was the friendliest foreign power in 
1883 while for Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru (1836-1915) in 1887, Italy was "a real 
friend, without concealed intentions and the Great Mother of the Western nations 
from whom they should search for examples". Arusikawa visited Italy from 2 to 12 
August 1882 as a member of a military mission. In Japan in 1888, under his aegis, an 
Italian-Japanese society was created to promote the bilateral relations, the mutual 
knowledge of the two civilizations and the study of the Italian language.9 During the 
"golden age" of the Italian-Japanese relations, an illustrious delegation, the Iwakura 
mission, organized by the statesman Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883), was dispatched to 
Europe and U.S. The mission visited Italy on May and June 1873. The tour lasted two 
years, during which the delegation studied every aspect of modern states' organization 
imaginable (administration, education and legal system, prisons, factories, mines, 
shipyards and so on). Under the previous shogunate regime, voyages abroad, 
undertaken by a small number of politicians, servicemen, intellectuals, merchants or 
students were infrequent and sporadic.10  
The aforementioned ambassador De la Tour, had witnessed the turbulent 
political situation that resulted to the Shogun's overthrow. Unlike his European 
colleagues he did not choose sides. His non-intervention, was a clear political 
statement: Italy was liberal, sympathetic to a newborn fellow nation that presented a 
certain structural similarity and respected its independence. His successor Fe' 
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d'Ostiani (Alessandro Fe' d'Ostiani  1825-1905), proposed and promoted the Italian 
liberal state as the model to be followed and by the late 19th century some Japanese, 
terrorized by the warmongering western regimes, seemed to be attracted to it. 
Furthermore, Fe' d'Ostiani, during his mandate declared that he was disposed to 
review the unequal treaties, something that no other western authority was willing to 
discuss.11 The enlargement of the state and the capture of Rome on 20 September 
1870, the most prestigious and holly city of the Western world proved that Italian 
unification was a successful endeavour and a suitable role model for Japan according 
to the Italian diplomats. It also confirmed that Italy in order to promote its 
modernization and prosperity did not hesitate to clash even with the influential 
traditions of the past such as the Catholic Church.12 
Japan a "latecomer" state looked for models of organization and 
modernization paradigms amidst the late 19th century industrial and imperialistic 
world order. It seemed to have found them in Italy and Germany, which were equally 
young and thus faced initially, mutatis mutandis, similar administrative and political 
challenges. The Japanese 1868  experience, the amalgamation of the until then semi-
autonomous domains in one state under a new supreme authority is definitely 
reminiscent of the mid 1850s Prussian and Piedmontese struggle to unite the 
numerous principalities, kingdoms and free cities in the German world and in the 
Italian peninsula respectively. Moreover, the inexperienced ruling classes of Japan, 
distressed by the pressure and aggression of the Western colonial Powers also in Asia 
sought allies. Early German and Italian governments appeared to be more pacifist and 
liberal compared to the expansionist French and Russians.13 Under this point of view 
the Risorgimento ideals of emancipation and self-determination had an auspicious as 
well as a symbolic impact to certain progressive Japanese ruling classes, which were 
still taking shape. Rome, appeared able to assist Japan in its challenging 
modernization process in the 1870s-1880s, since its own inherent internal deficiencies 
                                                          
11In 1873 the Italian and the Japanese authorities negotiated a treaty according to which Italian citizens 
would obtain the right to freely travel throughout the country in exchange for the revision of the 
extraterritoriality principle. The Powers, unwilling to relinquish their privileges opposed and practically 
forbade the undertaking. Kavalam Panikkar, Storia della dominazione Europea in Asia dal cinquecento 
ai nostri giorni, (Turin, 1958), p.222. 
12 Romano Ugolini, "La missione Iwakura in Italia: l'inizio del periodo aureo nelle relazioni italian-
giapponesi (1873-1896)" in Il Giappone scopre l'Occidente: una missione diplomatica (1871-73), ed. 
K. Kaikan, (Rome, 1994) pp. 32-35. 
13 Germany was not so benevolent as the Japanese had initially thought and its participation to the anti-
Japanese Triple Intervention in 1895 surely attests to this notion. During the Japanese civil war of 
1868-1869, Max von Brandt (1835-1920) the German consul in Beijing and later in Tōkyō, proposed to 
his government the capture of Hokkaido or any other territory in case that the Japanese state collapsed. 
Bismarck at the time, was still unwilling to engage in hazardous colonial ventures and rebuffed the 
proposal after considering the operational limitations. The choice to not intervene was a well calculated 
political move and not a display of Germany's cordiality. Despite the Japanese admiration of everything 
German, Bismarck described the Japanese rural population as "a bunch of semisavages with murderous 
instincts" and he refused to recognize the formal equality of the two imperial families. See Bernd 
Martin, Japan and Germany in the Modern World, (Oxford, 1995), pp. 29-32. 
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were unknown to Tōkyō. Italy did not represent a direct threat to Japan's sovereignty, 
since it was not a major military power a fact that reassured Tōkyō of the friendly 
unselfish Italian intentions. The common path towards industrialization and similar 
"historical, economic and political situation"14 created in both sides a sensation of 
trust and mutual understanding. The fact that Japan like Italy was militarily vulnerable 
from the sea, as it possessed an extensive coast line that required coastal fortifications, 
gave rise to a series of military-scientific missions to Italy. In 1885 the Tanaka 
mission visited La Spezia's dockyards and maritime facilities and in March 1887 
Admiral Saigō Tsugumichi (1843-1902) visited Italy to inspect defensive and artillery 
installations. In August 1877 the Japanese government wary that its foreign legal 
advisors were in fact serving their individual states’ interests in Japan, rather than the 
Japanese, like for instance the German Heinrich Philip von Siebold (1852-1908), 
sought the services of an impartial expert and asked in a confidential manner the 
transfer of an Italian jurist to Japan. When Prince Tokugawa Iesato (1863-1940) 
directed the question to the Italian Foreign Ministry, Crispi suggested and sent in 
January 1889 the law professor Alessandro Paternostro (1852-1899). He contributed 
to the development of the internal Japanese legislation and even authored the 
Emperor's speech for the inauguration of the parliament.15 On 25 November 1884 the 
newspaper Jiji shimpō praised Italy for its institutions and its liberal ways in contrast 
to the German oppressive political system. 
   Progressively though the Italian silk trade lost its impetus and the value of 
the mutual commercial transactions declined. In the 1890s the perpetual deficiencies 
of the Italian economy and the Adwa defeat, a year after Japan's victorious emergence 
from the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), reduced Italy to a second grade power in the 
Japanese eyes. 16  In 1895 the ardent advocate of expansionism, Crispi allegedly 
approved the installation of a maritime connection from Naples to Yokohama and the 
establishment of trade stations in Hainan and Taiwan.17 It was too late.18 Everyone in 
Japan could sense the antithesis between Garibaldian ideals and dominance over 
African and Asian populations. The commercial decline and the African 
developments harmed irreversibly Japan's admiration for Italy. Thus the once cordial 
relations eventually grew cold and Rome turned its gaze towards Beijing. It would be 
                                                          
14 Zavarese, "Commercio e Diplomazia", p. 140, 148. 
15 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
16 Paoletti, La Marina Italiana in Estremo Oriente, pp. 21. According to the historian Ugolini early 
Italian-Japanese relations can be classified as following: 1861-1873, when the mutual relations were 
exclusively dictated by commercial interests, 1873-1896, the "gold" period, during which the common 
adversity towards the French and Russian expansion shaped the two states' political alignment and  
finally 1896 and beyond when the relations downgraded to a phase of disinterest. See Ugolini, "Lo 
Stato Liberale Italiano e l'eta Meiji", pp. 132-133.  
17 Ibid., pp. 146-147. 
18 A Ministerial committee had approved the connection of Italy with Yokohama as early as 1877 and 
the Rubattino company appeared inclined to complete it in 1879. The inherent Italian obstructiveness 
and financial insufficiencies undermine the creation of a stable diplomatic-consular network and 
hindered the maritime connection project. See Zavarese, "Commercio e Diplomazia", p. 137. 
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there, where in 1899-1901 the Japanese foreign policy, after having dispersed any 
utopian illusions and having espoused the disciplines of colonialism would 
collaborate with the Italian one, as equal rapacious partners. The last glimpse of an 
understanding, a remnant of the golden diplomatic period was the fact that Italy was 
the third power after Great Britain on 16 July 1894, and USA on 22 November, to 
abandon its privileges abolishing the unequal treaties on 1 December 1894. 
At the time foreign relations with Qing China (under the Qing or Manchu 
dynasty) were regulated by two unequal treaties, the peace treaties of the first (1839-
1842) and the second Opium wars (1856-1860). The 1842 treaty signed in Nanjing 
was the first to open five Chinese ports to western trade impose a fixed trade tariff in 
these ports. Moreover, it granted a 21 million silver dollars indemnity and ceded 
Hong Kong to the conflict's victor, the British Empire.19  A year later the British 
acquired the most favoured nation clause for their commerce in China (treaty of 
Bogue) and extraterritoriality for their nationals operating there. Subsequently the 
United States in July 1844 and France in October 1844 signed identical parasitic 
unequal treaties and obtained every privilege the British had acquired.20 The second 
Opium war, between China and a British-French-Russian-American consortium, was 
fought in two distinct phases and it resulted in a series of peace agreements. The June 
1858 Tianjin treaty opened another 11 ports, permitted to the four foreign powers to 
erect embassies (legations) in Beijing, to navigate freely on the Yangtze River, to 
enter in the country's interior and forced China to pay indemnities to Britain and 
France. The treaty of Aigun in 1858 and its supplemental one two years later ceded 
the left bank of the Amur River and a region of Manchuria’s Pacific coast to Russia, 
where the city of Vladivostok would be built. Despite the armistice the military 
operations continued, to China's detriment, until 18 October 1860 when the 
Convention of Beijing brought the war to an end. The Convention opened the port of 
Tianjin to the foreigners, ceded Kowloon, the hinterland opposite to Hong Kong to 
Britain, and legalized the despicable opium trade. 21  More importantly it granted 
unlimited religious freedom which signified civil equality for the Chinese Christians 
and freedom of action for the European and American missionaries. As all this was 
not enough, the Taiping revolution or, more precisely, civil war raged from 1850 until 
1864 and resulted in total devastation and a number of deaths that astonishingly rose 
above 20 million. 
The Tianjin treaty provisions reduced progressively China into an easy prey, a 
vast field for illegal activities, abuses and adventurism where the legitimate 
                                                          
19 Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of 
the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forces Her Gates Ajar, (Chapel Hill, 1997), p. 
392. 
20 Paul H. Clemens, The Boxer Rebellion, a political and diplomatic review, (New York, 1915), pp. 20-
22. 
21 For the deplorable effects of British Opium upon the Chinese population and the conflict it caused 
see W. Travis Hanes, Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars, The Addiction of One Empire and the 
Corruption of Another, (Naperville, 2002). 
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government's sovereign rights were systematically violated by the colonial powers. 
Through economic penetration, as in the case of the Americans, (open door policy)22 
or by threats and resorting to violence (gunboat diplomacy)23 China had taken the 
place of the Ottoman Empire as the international's system "great patient". European 
communities exploiting their commerce and residence permits in Nanjing, Canton, 
Amoy, Hankow, Ningbo and other cities, established courthouses, boroughs, public 
security and sanitary services thus creating states within the state. In these settlements 
the Chinese administration and laws were unenforceable. 
Besides the settlements the colonial powers possessed the so-called 
concessions, scattered along the Chinese coastline. 24  In the 1850s-1860s British 
merchants decided to address the trade deficit with China as the value of British 
exports to China was immensely inferior to that of the imports by pressuring their 
government to "obtain access generally to the whole interior of the Chinese Empire", 
which meant the imposition of a sphere of influence at least up to the Yangtze 
valley.25 Unsurprisingly though China, couldn not at the time absorb both the British 
and the German (second in commercial activity) industrial surplus production. Since 
the trade activity yielded no profits the Powers sought investment opportunities that 
subsequently would allow them to exert an even tighter political control and 
demanded railway, navigation and mineral concessions, among others. China was not 
carved up by the Powers as was Africa. Nevertheless foreign citizens, adequately 
protected by the treaty port system and convinced of their civilization's moral and 
material superiority built factories, instituted banks, 26  ran steamships, published 
                                                          
22The note of the American Secretary of State John Milton Hey (1838-1905) to the Powers, on 6 
September 1899, was suggesting trade with China on an equal basis. The proposal implied the integrity 
of the Chinese state and recommended the "equality of treatment as to harbour dues and railroad 
charges in the various spheres" and the non-interference with any treaty-port or vested interests of the 
sphere of interest or leased territory of any Power. See Clemens, The Boxer Rebellion, p. 37. 
23 Since the article 52 of the Tianjin treaty permitted the navigation of the Yangtze River the foreign 
warships could monitor, control, bombard or threaten to do so cities even in the deep Chinese 
hinterland. 
24 Settlements were foreign zones, spontaneously created and implanted in a Chinese city. China had 
the nominal sovereignty of the territory in which foreign residents and natives were situated. 
Nevertheless, they were answerable only to the locally elected foreign administration. In contrast, the 
concessions were the result of the Chinese government officially consigning to a foreign state a 
territory in perpetuity. According to the German juridical doctrine a concession could be considered 
completed or not, depending on the foreigners' potentiality to acquire or lease propriety. See Ludovica 
De Courten, Giovanni Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente 1900-1901, (Rome, 2005), pp. 92-
93. 
25 This measure would somehow drive the Chinese to buy more British products. For the details of the 
British trade’s value in China during that period see J. Y. Wong, Deadly dreams. Opium, Imperialism 
and the Arrow war (1856-1860) in China, (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 333-365. 
26 Since 1848 the Oriental Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 
were operating in China. The Deutsche Asiatische Bank was established in 1899 in Shanghai with the 
participation of the Deutsche Bank. In the same year the Banque d'Indochine opened a branch in 
Shanghai; in 1896 the Russo-Chinese Bank was inaugurated, mainly with French capital. See Ludovica 
204 
 
newspapers, administered the post and supervised the operation of the customs.27 
Westerners did not content themselves just by the semi-colonial exploitation of the 
Chinese territory; they pushed for more by penetrating the dependency of Manchuria 
and by signing commercial treaties with Korea in 1876 and 1882, a nominal vassal of 
Beijing.28 
The greatest plague for China was the missionary activity, which intensified 
after the opening of the country's interior in 1842. The 1860 agreements gave to the 
missionaries legal protection and the possibility to buy property and erect buildings 
anywhere in the empire and not just to the treaty ports. The political, commercial and 
in a lesser degree religious activity was a valuable instrument in the hands of the 
consuls and their respective governments; even the assault or murder of the 
missionaries was covertly welcomed as long as it led to more concessions and 
privileges. Hobson notes that the unfortunate Chinese watched with distrust and 
anxiety first the arrival of the missionaries, whose "Church was an imperium in 
imperio", then of the consul and finally of the invading armies. It was not a mystery 
that the local authorities hated29 these apparently devout people who by exercising 
military and political power, through their consulates and gunships, used the Chinese 
that had converted to Christianity to exert pressure upon the Qing government and to 
promote their country's interests.30 In 1867 when a British evangelist establishment in 
Yangzhou was set on fire the British consul accompanied by four warships demanded 
and achieved the local magistrate's dismissal. Likewise when two French missionary 
buildings were sacked, Paris' consul ascended the Yangtze Riverwith two warships 
and boldly threatened and humiliated the Chinese viceroy in Nanjing. It was common 
practice for the French apostolic authorities to protest and ask for reparations from the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zongli Yamen) every time they encountered an 
obstacle in regard to their "religious" activities.31 Lorenzo Maria Balconi (1878-1969) 
who would become vicar in Nanyang in 1901 documented that the missionaries in 
China "almost always combined their apostolic missions with the survey of the 
regions they passed". Father Geroni acted accordingly when in a voyage to Shanxi 
took notes on the possibility of exploiting mines and on the Chinese army barrack's 
location. Another Italian vicar, father Scarella admitted that he held powers equal to a 
"provincial governor".32 For Hobson the "predatory expeditions" to impose commerce 
                                                                                                                                                                      
De Courten, La marina mercantile italiananellapolitica di espansione (1860-1914), Industria, Finanza 
e Trasporti Maritimi, (Rome, 1989), p. 258. 
27 Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842, pp. 394-395. 
28 Panikkar, Storia della dominazione Europea, pp. 192-202. 
29 The diplomat Manfredi Gravina di Ramacca (1883-1932) who in 1905 would become vice consul in 
Shanghai, wrote: "Missionaries are without doubt the main reason of the Chinese hatred for strangers 
all together [...] religious propaganda as is conducted today, constitutes without doubt a mistake, 
because it is a continuous reason for turmoil in the foreign-Chinese relations". See De Courten, Sargeri, 
Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente, p. 59. 
30 Ibid., p. 53. 
31 Panikkar, Storia della dominazione Europea, 187. 
32 De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente p. 77. 
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by force, the violent exaction of commercial and political concessions as punishment 
for sporadic acts of retaliation, the exchange of missionary blood for the opening of 
new ports, territories, access routes, the assumption of political authority and the 
arrogant and extensive use of the right of extraterritoriality, aptly demonstrated the 
historical falsity of the pretexts that animated and regulated Christianity's foreign 
policy.33The Chinese were astonished to see Christian clergymen making use of 
diplomacy and force to outpace and compete against their counterparts from other 
nations.34 
In regard to the ecclesiastical antagonism, France was the only one among the 
four Powers that was allowed to retain an embassy, a permanent representation, in 
Beijing after the Opium Wars, as was the only Catholic one, as has been already 
examined. Although Spain (1864), Belgium (1865), Italy (1866), Austria-Hungary 
(1869) had also signed treaties with the Chinese Empire, Paris had commenced 
regular diplomatic relations earlier and thus enjoyed a kind of religious predominance. 
With the 1858 treaty of Tianjin 35  and the subsequent of 1860, Beijing officially 
recognized Paris’ right to protect the missionary missions, a development that was 
certain to promote French influence in the Orient.36 French consular authorities in 
China issued the required travel documents to the missionaries aiming at preaching in 
the interior; all the missionaries therefore, regardless of their nationality had to 
acquire a Chinese-French passport. The Holly See amidst its struggle against the 
usurper of the Pontiff's spiritual and worldly patrimony, the false secular Italian state, 
turned repeatedly for support to Paris. The latter, always eager to exert a prestigious 
and at the same time universal religious primacy under the Pope's auspices, 
maintained cordial relations with him that were mutually beneficial. The French-
Vatican secret alliance was in function anti-Italian and by consequence against the 
menacing Triple Alliance. However, as a result of the cessation of Bismarck's internal 
anti-ecclesiastical policy (kulturkampf) in 1880 some Curia (Vatican's advisory and 
administrative bureau) members began to see in a positive light the German and 
Italian policies as a counterweight to Paris' asphyxiating preponderance. In any case, 
the Vatican, lacking alternative choices, entrusted the protection of the missionary 
missions in Asia primarily to France, from the 1850s until the beginning of the 20th 
century.37 
                                                          
33 John A. Hobson, L'imperialismo, ed. L. Meldolesi, (Milan, 1974), p. 204.  
34 Ibid., p. 257. 
35  The 1858 agreement explicitly asserted that: the Chinese officials could not intervene in the 
propagation of the Christian faith and in the erection of religious buildings (article 9) and the 
missionaries, bearing the appropriate documents, were able to undertake their work in every part of 
China (article 13). See Lodovico Nocentini, "La Francia e i nostri missionari in Cina'', Nuova Antologia 
di scienze, lettere ed arti, n. 165  (June 1899), p. 495. 
36 De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente pp. 60-61. 
37 Since Russia was orthodox, Britain and Germany mainly protestant, Spain and Portugal exerted 
meager influence on colonial matters and Vatican's relations with Italy were initially hostile (but more 
sympathetic in Africa), Paris was conscious and confident of the Popes' preference. See Luciano 
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Timoleone Raimondi (1827-1894), the apostolic vicar of Hong Kong in 1874 
stated: "It is absolutely necessary to make clear to the Chinese that Catholics are not 
just French but from any nation". The first Italian Minister Plenipotentiary in China, 
Ferdinando De Luca, taking advantage of the Tonkin war (1884-1885), visited in 
1884 many Italian missionary missions and delivered to their members, documents 
that would distinguish and freed them from the French jurisdiction. On 15 September 
1884, he communicated officially to the Zongli Yamen his decision to assume, 
without intermediates, the complete protection of the Italian missionaries in China. 
This development met the approval of the Foreign Minister Mancini and, as expected, 
the wrath of the French ambassador in Beijing, Jules Patenotre (1845-1925). On 15 
March 1885 the Chinese ambassador in Rome reassured Mancini that "there have 
been given renewed orders to the provincial authorities to considerably protect the 
Italian missionaries". Likewise, in January 1886 the Germans instituted the apostolic 
vicariate of Shantung, where the first German bishop in China was placed. The 
independent actions of the Italians and the Germans were condemned by the still pro-
French Vatican.38 
As a result of the Sino-French war that led to the concession of northern 
Vietnam to Paris with the treaty of Tianjin in 1885, and the resulting resentment, the 
Chinese approached diplomatically the Holly See. Their proposal, backed by the 
British, was the inauguration of a regular representation mission, virtually an 
embassy, of the Vatican in Beijing (Apostolic Nunciature) so as to nullify the French 
Christian protectorate. Apropos, Pope Leo XIII assembled the cardinals' congress on 
15 March 1886. During its proceedings, several, mostly Italian, cardinals argued that 
Paris "uses the protectorate as a weapon, as an instrument to increase its national 
influence in the Orient" and that "France desires to maintain the protectorate for 
political purposes". Cardinal Wladimir Czacki (1834-1888) represented the pro-
French section of the council. On 11 April 1886 the Holly See opted for the middle 
way solution. It communicated to the Chinese and French authorities that it could not 
ignore Paris' actions for the sake of Christianity and its privileges; however, it 
nominated the cardinal Antonio Agliardi (1832-1915) to represent the Vatican and 
erect an embassy in the Chinese capital. Upon being made aware of the decision, 
French Prime Minister Freycinet threatened to sever bilateral relations in case the 
Nuncio left for China. In front of an ultimatum such as this Pope Leo was forced to 
put off the undertaking in September 1886 sine die.39 
Still in 1888 the Vatican, through the Propaganda Fide congregation, 
confirmed the institutional equality of the missionaries assigned to the Chinese 
provincial governors and the French spiritual protectorate in the Orient. This 
declaration sparked vivid protests from the German delegation to the Zongli Yamen. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Trincia, "La Santa Sede tra attivita missionaria e interessi delle potenze europee in Estremo Oriente", 
Annali dell'Istituto italian-germanico in Trento, v. 24, 1998, pp. 260-261.  
38 Ibid., pp. 262-263. 
39 Ibid., pp. 270-272. 
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Many Italian missionaries despite the fact that they were no longer obligated to carry 
the French passport did not really wish to discard it. French warships and consulates 
in any part of the country seemed to offer adequate protection while French financial 
support and even gifts were irresistible incentives.40 Inaugurated in 1887 in Florence, 
the National Association for assisting Italian Missionaries, except its declared 
objective, attempted to promote national consciousness and the Italian presence in 
Asia and Africa. Successful propaganda would give rise to the Italian prestige and 
influence simultaneously hampering Paris' prominent position. In the spring of 1888 
Crispi claimed: "Only the Italian government has the right and duty to protect its 
citizens abroad" and the "The king's government will recognize the passports that 
non-Italian authorities issue to Italian citizens in China no more and I believe that I 
can count on the Imperial Government to consider these passports as invalid and by 
consequence useless". In May, as a response to Crispi's pleads, Vatican's mouthpiece, 
the Propaganda Fide urged every missionary operating in China to recognize and 
respect Paris' protectorate. On 11 February 1890 it communicated to Raimondi, the 
most active vicar combating French influence, that the Italian missionaries could not 
accept any subsidy and concession from the Italian state and that they were not 
allowed to enact or even honour official visits to Italian officials and royalties. This 
“blockade” was maintained even after Crispi's dismissal when the French-Italian 
relations arguably improved. The issue returned to the scene after the Boxer Uprising 
(1899-1901) when the Chinese indemnity to the missionaries had to be distributed to 
each nation's individual representatives. Apparently Paris could not claim the entire 
amount for itself. Nonetheless three years would elapse before a new Vatican 
congress addressed the matter on 21 January and 4 February 1904. The right to 
protect its religious servicemen was finally acknowledged to Rome, enhancing its 
influence. The missionaries were entitled to choose for themselves in which authority 
they desired to belong.41 
On August 1894 the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895) started over the 
question of the independence of Korea, for centuries a tributary to the Chinese court.  
Japan, which previously had signed itself three unequal treaties with Korea (1876, 
1882, 1885), adopting the imperialist powers' methods, aspired to place the country 
under its influence. Deeply concerned about its strategic security, Meiji Japan was 
anxious to evade the colonial grip stretching menacingly around it. Its military 
prevalence during the South Manchuria campaign demonstrated the astonishing 
results of its modernization and at the same time Qing China's inability to catch up. 
The Shimonoseki peace treaty concluded on 17 April 1895, obliged China to 
recognize Korea’s independence, grant an indemnity of 200 million taels, and cede 
Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liadong peninsula; the former was restored to China 
for a further 30 million taels under unrelenting pressure by Russia, France and 
Germany on 23 April. The Chinese government, lastly, conceded the most favoured 
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nation clause to Japan and opened another four ports to trade. Being incapable of 
satisfying the war reparations, Beijing resorted to foreign lending, compensating the 
powers with mineral, railway and territory concessions.42 
The apparent feebleness of the Chinese attracted and brought out the innate 
rapacious propensity of European imperialism. Saint Petersburg, put in motion an 
informal colonization programme in Northern China, through political and economic 
penetration, carved out by the Finance Minister Sergei Yulyevich Witte (1849-
1915).Through the medium of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, created in 
1896 as a branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank, the Russians undertook the construction 
and operation of a line that would link the Trans-Siberian railway, initiated in 1891, to 
Vladivostok. In 1898 they secured Chinese consensus to extend the line, across 
Manchuria and the Liaodong peninsula to Port Arthur and the Dairen port, both of 
which were granted under a lease to the Russians. As expected cities, such as Harbin 
and entire regions that were situated along the line were transformed into exclusive 
Russian economic zones where, Russian authority was enforced by courthouses and 
consulates.43 The Russo-French Entente, officially in effect since the 4th of January 
1894 as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance, but essentially to check Germany's 
politico-military predominance, expanded in the Orient as well. Indeed the Russians 
in the North and the French from their Indochina colony seemed to have encircled 
China placing it in a vice. 44  Aiming to enlarge their sphere of influence in the 
southern Chinese province of Yunnan, which was adjacent to Indochina, French 
policy makers devised plans for a railway to connect the two regions and leased 
Guangzhou Wan (Kouang-Tchéou-Wan) as a military base in 1898. In response the 
British pushed on to solidify their primacy in the Yangtze valley, the hinterland of 
Shanghai. In the summer of 1897 they obtained Chinese permission to open to 
western trade the Hsi Chiang river (Xi river), in June 1898 they acquired the New 
Kowloon area for 99 years and a month later they leased Weihaiwei. Paris perceived 
these actions as a provocation and exerted pressure to the Chinese government for the 
extension of its proposed railway up to Nanjing (part of the presumptive British 
sphere of interests), more mineral concessions in Guangxi, Yunnan and Guangdong 
and the Chinese commitment that they would never cede the island of Hainan to 
another power.45 The Qing administration very reluctantly46 had permitted to foreign 
companies to construct two railway lines: from Canton to Hankow and from Hankow 
to Beijing. The former was built by the American Development Company and the 
latter by a French-Belgian consortium, subsidized by the Russo-Chinese Bank. The 
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Hankow to Beijing line raised suspicions of an eventual threat from the Manchuria-
Tonkin axis, a Russo-French strategic coup aimed at London, which perceived the 
concession as a hostile act and threatened Beijing with the use of force. 47  On 1 
November 1897 two German missionaries were killed in Shandong. With that pretext 
the Germans claimed and acquired not just the port-town of Qingdao but the adjacent 
50 kilometre zone expanding their control in the whole region. The Powers pushed 
forward in the interior, having as a start line their concessions, to secure exclusive 
rights and spheres of influence: the Germans in Shandong, the British in Yangtze, the 
French in the southern provinces bordering Indochina, the Japanese in the zone 
opposite to Taiwan (Fukien),48 and the Russians in Manchuria.49 The partition was on. 
After all the havoc the Minister of the Zongli Yamen, decided to draw the line and in 
December 1898 communicated to every consulate that the sell-out had come to an 
end. That was the moment when Italy chose to act.50 
As for Italy, its inherent organizational and financial difficulties were apparent 
in China as well with the absence of sufficient consular representation and of an 
adequate information network. 51  During the third quarter of the 19th century 
Piedmont (after 17 March 1861 the Kingdom of Italy) occasionally entrusted the 
protection of the sparse Italian citizens in the Orient to British consuls and merchants 
operating there. Having London's consent, Cavour between 1858 and 1860 nominated 
the merchants John Dent and James Hogg as Piedmont's authorized consuls in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai respectively. The latter was to be replaced by Lorenzo Vignale in 
1869. The consulate in Tianjin had always remained vacant until it was merged with 
the Shanghai one with a royal decree on 28 February 1884. Another decree that of 18 
April 1901, reinstated it as a consulate along Canton's and Shanghai's representation 
offices. In 1886, Sonnino, at the time a Deputy, commenting the eventuality of 
erecting a legation under a minister-plenipotentiary in Beijing insisted: "I think that 
we are still very poor to permit to ourselves a great luxury which does not offer an 
equivalent profit". The Italian legations in Beijing were established in 1889 under 
Lorenzo Friozzi di Cariati, Alberto Pansa52 and Alessandro Bardi.53 Giuseppe Salvago 
Raggi (1866 -1946) was appointed as secretary in May 1897 and then, after a brief 
intermission when ambassador Renato de Martino took charge as Italy's 
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48 Tōkyō’s interest for the region was concretely verified when, during the 1900 turmoil, it dispatched 
forces with the purpose of protecting its few nationals in the region. See "I Giapponesi ad Amoy", 
L’Osservatore Romano, n. 201, Friday-Saturday 31 August-1 September, p. 2. 
49 Clemens, The Boxer Rebellion, p. 36. 
50 Paoletti, La Marina Italiana in Estremo Oriente, p. 25. 
51  Alessandro Vagnini, L'Italia e l'imperialismo giapponese in Estremo Oriente. La missione del 
Partito Nazionale Fascista in Giappone e nel Manciukuò, (Rome 2015), p. 16. 
52Pansa recorded on 4 June 1892 that at the time 4 ships of Italian ownership were docking in Chinese 
ports in contrast to the 8862 British, 1290 German and 226 Austro-Hungarian. See Rosaria Quartararo, 
"L'affare di San-Mun. Un episodio dell'imperialismo coloniale italiano alla fine del secolo XIX", Clio 
Rivista trimestrale di studi storici, 33/3 (1997), p. 226.  
53 Until then Holland, Belgium and the U.S. leased their embassies in Beijing while France, Germany, 
Japan, Russia and Spain fully owned theirs. See De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo 
Oriente, p. 86. 
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plenipotentiary in April 1899, as director of the legation. He would go on to command 
Italian Somalia (1906-1907). In November 1900 Raggi informed the Foreign Minister 
Giulio Prinetti (1851-1908) about his intention to enlarge the Italian legation so that it 
could accommodate Italian troops in case of turmoil. In September 1901 he succeeded 
in expanding the Italian territory by 59 square kilometres.54 
In 1890 the Italian commerce in China was not even recorded in the relative 
statistics. In spite of ambassador De Luca's pleads dating as back as 1881, the sole 
maritime connection linking Italy with China, from 1893 onwards, was enacted by the 
company Navigazione Generale: from Genoa to Bombay and from there, through 
Singapore, to Hong Kong. Yet some sporadic entrepreneurial initiatives took place. 
The Peking Syndicate of mixed Anglo-Italian capital was inaugurated in 1896 with 
the goal of making the most of eventual railway and mining concessions in Northern 
China. The Italian partners of the company ended up relinquishing all its stocks to the 
British. The Italian industrial Consortium for the commerce with the Far East 
(Consorzio industriale Italiano per il commercio con l'Estremo Oriente), created in 
Milan in 1896, sustained by industrial and shipping cycles, established agencies in 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, among other important trade centres. In any case, the 
association failed to promote the Italian economic interests in China and proved 
unable to generate substantial profits. A society with identical objectives, the Italian 
industrial Union for the exporting commerce (Union eindustriale Italiana per il 
commercio d'esportazione), was established in Turin in 1897. Soon afterwards it 
declared the bankruptcy of its Shanghai branch. The Foreign Ministry, hosted on its 
grounds an industrial conference on February 1898, with the twofold aim of 
advertising investment potentials and of examining the most befitting way to increase 
the Italian transit trade in the Orient. The discourse was downgraded to a trivial 
conversation of wishful thinking and impractical proposals. A few scholars and 
orientalists and some exploration and geographic associations, such as the Italian 
Geographical Society, were the only parties to demonstrate a concrete interest for the 
Far Eastern markets.55 
During the Sino-Japanese conflict, cordial relations with Tōkyō 56  and 
economic aspirations in China propelled the government to declare its neutrality. 
Foreign Minister Alberto Blanc, after some assaults on Christian citizens and 
missionaries, which took place in 1891 and 1893 adopted the British line of action 
and sent the torpedo boat Umbria to China on 10 October 1894 "for the protection of 
the nationals" and to "demonstrate the national flag in those regions, rarely visited by 
national, mainly war, ships". Umbria's captain Alessandro Bertolini reported to the 
Maritime Minister that he had decided to send on shore 11 marines because he had the 
                                                          
54 The problem became urgent when, between 28 August and 1 September 400 Italian marines arrived 
in Beijing, from the ships Vettor Pisani and Fieramosca. Ibid., pp. 86-87, 122. 
55 De Courten, La marina mercantile, pp. 259-265. 
56 Blanc on 7 April 1895 stated that it would be in Italy's best interest to back Japan since "Italy is 
enjoying special sympathies in Tokyo". See De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente, 
p. 18. 
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information that "the other powers had also disembarked military personnel with the 
same purpose, which was protect their legations". Rome, in its effort to establish a 
role in the colonial arena and participate in a possible partition of China, acted 
alongside and in a similar manner to the other powers regardless of the feebleness of 
its position.57 
Towards the end of the 19th century just 280 Italians were residing in China, 
200 of which were missionaries. There were 9 Italian commercial firms operating in 
the country in contrast to the 402 British, 76 French and 70 American. These 
estimations by Lodovico Nocentini (1849-1910), a sinologist and for a brief amount 
of time consul in Shanghai, were accompanied by the following statement made in 
September 1895: "It is necessary that Italy affirms and stabilizes commercial interests 
to extract, along the other powers, the advantages that will be obtainable by the new 
agreements (Shimonoseki treaty, editor's note) because if it did not, it could not take 
part in the powers' common action and it would find itself almost excluded from a 
rich field for its commercial activity or it would participate but for the sake of others 
and not for itself'". Francesco Gavotti, the new commander of Umbria, referring to the 
important traffic centre of Shanghai, argued in June 1895: "Besides we don't have in 
those regions permanent Italian residents, save from rare exceptions; there are Italian 
missionaries and nuns sufficiently numerous, but these invoke the French protection 
[...]". The lack of a robust Italian presence in China did not discourage Canton's 
consul general Eugenio Zanoni Volpicelli (1865-1936). In an 1898 memorandum, he 
admitted the British and German organizational and economic superiority but he also 
highlighted the future potential for the Italian industry: "Our few countrymen 
scattered along the coastline and especially in Shanghai, are employees, shopkeepers 
or spinning mill workers. The flow of imports and exports to and from Italy, is limited 
and is conducted by foreign intermediaries; therefore, it is not listed as Italian 
commerce in the customs authorities' statistics [...].  However, if one considers that 
China and Japan are the silk countries par excellence, which is one of our principal 
products, it is evident that the progress and even the agitation of these markets, should 
greatly concern us". Lamenting the absence of Italian postal services in front of 
international competition, he finally concluded: "The Italian flag here is unknown or 
close to that".58 
The Italian colonial Association of exportation (Societa coloniale Italiana di 
esportazione) and even some deputies, observing the "scramble for China", were 
criticizing the modest, cautious Italian stance. For the liberal Deputy Antonio Teso it 
was time for the  Foreign Minister Visconti Venosta to carve out a more dynamic and 
aggressive policy, following the powers’ paradigm. Allegations of delay 
notwithstanding, Venosta did indeed examine the possibility of increasing Italian 
prestige in China. On 23 April 1898, during a parliamentary debate, he revealed his 
agreement with the Maritime Minister, to dispatch warships in Chinese waters to 
                                                          
57 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
58Ibid., pp. 21-22, 25. 
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promote protection and "national dignity", especially "when other nations' flags are 
present". On 23 March the Naval Division for the Far East was assembled, containing: 
the cruiser Stromboli as flagship, and the ships Marco Polo, Elba, Piemonte, Etna, 
Carlo Alberto and Liguria. During the Boxer uprising the Naval Division was 
disbanded and superseded by the Naval Oceanic Force, formed by the cruisers 
Stroboli, Vesuvio, Vettor Pisani, Fieramosca. In January 1898, Venosta in his 
correspondence to Raggi, inquired about which place would be suitable for Italy to 
find an expanse "in correlation" with the powers' actions. The ambassador, conscious 
about Italy's lack of means, experience and of concrete interests59 and witnessing from 
up close the intensity of the foreign economic-political rivalry responded that at the 
time an occupation would be inappropriate and unjustified.60 He was subsequently 
dismissed. In any case Venosta, before his own replacement by Canevaro on 29 June 
1898, dispatched the cruiser Marco Polo, under the command of captain Incoronato, 
to study the coastline for a suitable port. After surveying the coastline he indicated the 
bay of Nimrod (Sansie Kiang), 60 kilometres south of Ningbo, within the British 
sphere of influence. Rear admiral Camillo Candiani concurred with Incoronato and 
organized two "scientific-exploratory" marine expeditions in the interior to Zhejiang 
under the suspicious gaze of the Japanese, also interested in the location.61 
In November 1898, Marco Polo's captain reported to the Maritime Minister 
that the location San Mun or Sanmen Bay, south of Nimrod was appearing to be the 
only "occupiable" space for "reasons of political nature" south of Beijing.62 San Mun 
                                                          
59 Rosaria Quartararo insisted that late 19th century Italy was in no position to expand its authority 
overseas. Slow industrialization meant that Italy did not export manufactured products and capitals nor 
needed the importation of raw materials. Instead Italy, was the recipient of capitals and foreign 
products since domestic production was unable to satisfy the needs of its own expanding population. 
Moreover, at the time, few Italians were embarking in financial activities in China and a port or coal 
base was not necessary to Italian shipping since it still had not transitioned to steam ships. See 
Quartararo, "L'affare di San-Mun", pp. 468-475. 
60Raggi in June 1900 replying to Venosta asserted: "We do not intent to enact neither a policy of 
expansion in China, nor an adventurist policy [...]. He also suggested to the government to stop its 
survey for a colony and concentrate its efforts to expand Italian financial interests since "if China can 
never become an outlet for our workers' immigration, it could be one for our mechanics, engineers and 
Italian businessmen and it could be a market for our products". Nocentini was arguing as early as 
December 1884: "Planting the Italian flag [...] in those Far East provinces could secure several 
industries of ours, already existent and flourishing, against any dangerous competition. On this matter 
we should not attribute any less importance than we do to the search for new outlets for our commerce, 
since our products are not yet very redundant to need urgently many ports [...] instead today it seems 
more necessary to guarantee against any development, the existence and prosperity of our industries, 
which can be the only source of safe and profitable commerce". De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe 
in Estremo Oriente, pp. 36-38. 
61Ibid., pp. 31, 36-45. 
62Raggi, mysteriously embracing the idea of an Italian colony, collected information and favourable 
foreign opinions about a possible Italian action in San Mun and reported on 22 November 1898 to De 
Martino: "[...] since the chosen bay does not communicate with any power except England, the royal 
government would not raise any objections to these plans and it (England, editor's note)  could even 
welcome the idea of our occupation of the bay of San Mun if it was informed and given reassurances 
which I think (is something editor's note) Germany did as well at the moment of the Kiao-Ciao 
occupation". See Laura Rampazzo, Un pizzico d’Italia nel cuore della Cina: la concessione di Tianjin, 
Master's dissertation, University Ca' Foscari, (Venice, 2011), p. 18.  
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and the Zhejiang hinterland seemed fertile, rich in silk, rice, grain, densely populated 
with temperate climate and could function as coal replenishment base. 63  Foreign 
Minister Canevaro, through the Italian ambassador in London De Renzis, in 
December 1898 contacted his British counterpart Salisbury to ascertain London's 
standpoint in the event of an Italian action in China. Salisbury, ever friendly, 
welcomed the news and theoretically backed Rome's initiative providing that it would 
not, under any circumstances, cede San Mun later to another power or resort to the 
use of force for its acquisition; a scenario that would have intensified the partition of 
China. On 2 and 21 February 1899 he gave his consent, for the bay and for the 
southern part of the adjacent hinterland, provided that the Italian action would not 
harm the British interests in Zhejiang.64 The Italian-British shady alliance in Africa 
was now revived in the Orient: British policy makers, since Rome could not pose any 
threat, appeared sympathetic to the Italian governments, which in exchange were 
acting as London's docile collaborators. In addition Rome was convinced that Britain, 
Germany and the U.S would not oppose a peaceful Italian penetration. 65  The 
Japanese, according to the national press would accept the Italian initiative as an act 
of kindness to London. In reality, Tōkyō preferred an Italian settlement there in 
comparison to a menacing military or naval base belonging to one of the 
superpowers. 66 Canevaro, encouraged and determined, ordered ambassador De 
Martino in late February to present to the Zongli Yamen an official note demanding, 
firstly the lease of San Mun with a view of establishing a naval base and secondly the 
recognition of the Zhejiang province as an exclusive Italian sphere of influence. The 
note was presented on 4 March 1899.67 The Chinese authorities rejected the demand, 
by declining to respond and urged the Italian side to withdraw it on the basis of the 
"hitherto existing relations of friendship and trust between the two states". On 8 
March the Italian Foreign Minister authorized De Martino to present an ultimatum 
that upon its expiry (four days) would lead to the capture of the location by Italian 
forces commanded by captain Incoronato, disembarking from the vessels Marco Polo 
and Elba. The attitude of the British ambassador in Rome was perplexing. On one 
hand he made clear that violence would not be tolerated; on the other he confided to 
Canevaro that the British ambassador in Beijing Claude Maxwell MacDonald (1852-
                                                          
63 Lodovico Nocentini, "Attraverso il Ce-Kiang", Nuova Antologia di scienze, lettere ed arti, n. 167 
(Octomber 1889), pp. 521- 523.  
64Rampazzo, Un pizzico d’Italia nel cuore della Cina, pp. 19-20. 
65 Ibid., 21. 
66 Quartararo, "L'affare di San-Mun", pp. 480-492. 
67  Four days later, the Prince of Naples and future king Vittorio Emanuale III (1869-1947) writing to 
general Egidio Osio (1840-1902), claimed: "[...] I am very content that measures are taken to have a 
base for our Far East commerce, commerce that represents interests already substantially important and 
can only increase; any site in China will be a thousand times better than the entire of Ethiopia". See 
Paoletti, La Marina Italiana in Estremo Oriente, p. 27. On 19 July 1900, King Umberto visited Naples 
to greet the departing Italian troops en route to China, as he did in the past for the African expeditions. 
It would be his last time as he was assassinated 10 days later. See De Courten, Sargeri, Le Regie truppe 
in Estremo Oriente, p. 251. The Italian expeditionary force in China was comprised by an infantry 
battalion, a riflemen (bersaglieri) battalion, a machine gun battery and an engineers' detachment, 
sustenance and sanitary squads, numbering 1882 soldiers and 82 officers. See Rampazzo, Un pizzico 
d’Italia nel cuore della Cina, pp. 29-30. 
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1915) was instructed to support the Italian actions in San Mun. After the first 
rejection, which was perceived in Rome as an offence Salisbury urged Beijing to 
satisfy the Italian demands. The British authorities in London and China however, 
were opposed to the submission of any ultimatums. So Canevaro issued the order for 
the ultimatum to be withdrawn; an order never received by De Martino who presented 
it only to be rejected once again. The incident was made known worldwide by the 
Reuters news agency and the German and the British ambassadors in Rome demanded 
explanations from Canevaro on 11 March. Although he denied the facts, in May 1899, 
he was dismissed amid severe taunts in the parliament. Despite the humiliation68 and 
the international isolation, the negotiations were resumed but restricted just to the San 
Mun coast. In any case they yielded no tangible results. Canevaro was replaced by 
Venosta upon the cabinet reformation of May 1899 and De Martino by Raggi as the 
general ambassador in Beijing. 69  The new Foreign Minister made a final effort, 
enquiring about the possibility of an Italian settlement in Ningbo but failed all the 
same.70Another profound wound was opened, at a time when any other eminent 
nation obtained whatever it desired in China. In Italy the colonialists, ashamed and 
hungry for international recognition, felt that a great chance for Rome's affirmation as 
a Great Power was lost. Diametrically opposite was the anti-colonialists' reaction. 
According to them Italy in China had avoided the international complications and 
expenses or another Adwa.71 For the Chinese that sensed and profited from the Italian 
relative weakness, it was the first time they successfully stood up to European 
imperialism as did the Ethiopians mutatis mutandis three years earlier. 
On 11 June 1898 the Chinese Emperor Guangxu (1871-1908), issued a series 
of progressive reforms, effecting the public education and military sectors, 
encouraging the establishment of railways and newspapers and liquidating corruption. 
These progressive reforms aimed at eradicating China's economic stagnation and 
military-organizational inferiority in front of the Western ominous challenge. 
However, these measures were to meet resistance. The emperor's aunt, the dowager 
Cixi (1835-1905), had been increasingly bringing together and representing the 
isolationists, the ultraconservative cycles of the court. On 22 September she 
overthrew the legitimate ruler and reversed his reforms, known as the "hundred days". 
The emperor was imprisoned and since his successor was underage, Cixi seized 
supreme authority. The dramatic events and the new government's xenophobe, anti-
foreign stance emboldened, the secret societies in China, which were already 
                                                          
68  The event caused such a despicable impression that its records were concealed even by the 
parliament. Prime Minister Giolitti admitted in his memoirs: "That whole affair, in fact, had no other 
result but a waste of several millions and a national humiliation; inadequately begun, it was afterwards 
abandoned in such an undignified manner that later, when the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was discussed, I felt obliged to advise the Minister not to publish the relative documents for the sake of 
piety towards the fatherland; which the Minister accepted.". See Uros Urosevic, "Italian Liberal 
Imperialism in China: A Review of the State of the Field", in History Compass, n. 11/12 (2013), p. 
1072. 
69 Paoletti, La Marina Italiana in Estremo Oriente, pp. 26-28. 
70Rampazzo, Un pizzico d’Italia nel cuore della Cina, p. 25. 
71 Quartararo, "L'affare di San-Mun", p. 493. 
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widespread. These popular organizations had been opposing and undermining the 
ruling Qing dynasty until the 1880s. Since their eradication was proved futile, the 
conservative Beijing Ministers and provincial governors approached and supported 
the destitute Chinese masses turning them against the foreigners, especially against 
the missionaries and the Christians, who were perceived to have brought on the 
country's degradation. Manipulated by the government for its own ends, the 
"Righteous and Harmonious Fists", known as Boxers in the West, modified their 
slogan "Down with the Qings and the foreigners" to "Protect the Qings and 
exterminate the foreigners".72 
The attacks on Chinese converts in May 1899 did not alert the foreign 
diplomatic missions. They only started realizing the grim situation after the 
assassination of a British protestant missionary on 31 December 1899. Initially 
demanding to the Zongli Yamen the banishment of the group, the consuls eventually 
called for their states' intervention, through a common naval demonstration. Rome, 
London, Berlin, Washington and Paris dispatched warships to Dagu, the closest port 
to Beijing whereas the French bishop Pierre Alphonse Favier (1837-1905) opted on 
19 May for the disembarkation of fifty French soldiers to protect a Catholic cathedral. 
Ambassador Raggi on 9 March: "If the situation does not improve, it would be 
appropriate a demonstration, with the ships of the five interested powers". The tension 
in Beijing escalated and on 28 May 1900 the ambassadors jointly decided to request 
military and police forces from their governments while the British landed troops in 
Tianjin.73 Between 30 May and 1 June the international fleet landed approximately 
400 men in Dagu, among them 39 Italian marines and two officers under Captain 
Federico Paolini from the ship Elba. The clear-cut goal was to reach the Beijing 
legations that were undefended and isolated due to sabotage on the Tianjin-Beijing 
railway that had taken place on 5 June. 74  The expeditionary force reached and 
fortified the legations' district while on the same day 11 Italian marines under 
Commander Olivieri were entrusted with the protection of Beitang, Favier's cathedral. 
After the 7th of June, when the attacks on the Christian missions became more 
frequent, progressively more and more military contingents came ashore including 60 
Italians. 40 were under the command of lieutenant commander Sirianni from the ship 
Calabria near Dagu and another 20 were led by Ermanno Carlotto in Tianjin.75 On 17 
June the joint naval forces, numbering 43 ships, attacked the Dagu forts, which had an 
important strategic value in view to future operations in the interior. The allied attack 
was successful; 24 Italian marines under the command of Giovanni Tanca 
participated.76 The landing operations and the unprovoked assault on Dagu convinced 
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Empress Cixi to officially declare war on the powers on 21 June. From then on, the 
allies had to confront the well-organized Chinese army in addition to the ill-equipped 
irregulars.77 
On 10 June 1900 the British admiral Edward Hobart Seymour (1840-1929) 
decided to advance against the capital as quickly as possible, after MacDonald's 
pleads for further reinforcements since the Boxers were relentlessly assaulting the 
foreign quarters. Therefore, he assembled more than 2,000 soldiers (among them 
Carlotto's marines), departed from Tianjin and marched towards Beijing. The 
international force advanced very slowly, due to the fierce Boxer opposition and the 
sabotages of the Tianjin-Beijing railway. On the 18th combined Chinese regular and 
irregular troops defeated the multinational army in Langfang. Seymour, with 200 
wounded, was forced to retreat and on the following day, pursued by a spirited and 
motivated enemy, he made camp in a Qing arsenal, where his forces were once again 
encircled and under heavy fire. In the meanwhile the situation of the citizens and of 
the military personnel in the legations was equally desperate. News of Seymour's 
defeat, famine and the ferocious Chinese assaults that had reduced the foreign 
legations into rubble, through mines, shelling and fire brought the besieged gradually 
on their knees. 78 The "Fu" wall that guarded a park which accommodated 
approximately 3,000 Chinese Christians, was within the joint Italian-Japanese 
defensive zone. It was not the first collaboration during the uprising between the two 
sides; it was though a unique occasion during which the two allies fought together in 
isolation for two days (13-15 July) under dramatic conditions against all odds. 
Besieged within the Fu wall, they were constantly driven back to the last defensive 
line.79 That was where the two colonialisms, the colonialisms of the weak, the timid, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
word's navies in the Boxer rebellion (China 1900), (London, 1905), p. 39. The Italian landing operation 
took place without the necessary military equipment. Luigi Barzini (1874-1947), correspondent of the 
newspaper Il Secolo caustically commended "One can no longer wonder about the disasters in Africa, 
when he sees how big is the ignorance and the negligence of our rulers. The War Minister's speech in 
response to the question posed to him by the parliament (...) is the most obvious proof of the complete 
ignorance in regard to the geographic and climatic conditions of the place in which his Excellency the 
Minister has sent us". On 10 July 1900, criticizing the apparent lack of supplies, maps, equipment and 
interpreters, the transportation difficulties and the diseases that spread in the cattle meant for the 
provision of the Italian troops, in contrast to the other nations' preparations, he added: "although we 
spent much, relatively to what Italy can spend, we don't have an army equipped for war". Despite his 
sharp tongue he was right. Tanca for the assault on Dagu asked the British and Germans for 
transportation means and for drinking water he resorted to the Russian benevolence. See De Courten, 
Sargeri, Le Regie truppe in Estremo Oriente, pp. 137, 250-260. The Osservatore Romano's editor 
suggested that the scarcity of means and general unpreparedness would make a bad impression in 
China, where Italy went to "maintain friendly relations" with the Powers and to "spread its 
civilization", see "Ai Parenti", L’Osservatore Romano, num 161, Saturday-Sunday 14-15 July 1900, p. 
1. Despite the economic and logistic difficulties Italy had to abide by its "commitments with 
consciousness of its duty", see "La Spedizione Italiana in viaggio", L’Osservatore Romano, n. 169, 
Tuesday-Wednesday 24-25 July 1900, p. 2.  
77 Harry Craufuird Thomson, China and the Powers. A narrative of the outbreak of 1900, (London-
New York, 1902),pp. 23-26. 
78  Ambassador Raggi managed to inform Rome, that despite the Italian legation's destruction the 
personnel was alive and still fighting, see "La situazione in Cina", L’Osservatore Romano, n. 183. 
Thursday-Friday, 9-10 August 1900, pp. 1-2. 
79Bassetti, Colonia Italiana, pp. 29-30. 
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the distressed, the aspirers' but also of the underachievers finally met. Japanese and 
Italian soldiers in a hostile land, champions of their respective states' prestige and 
successful modernization were risking their lives because that was exactly what the 
Great Powers had their soldiers do. Their governments instead of resolving internal 
problems, focused instead on keeping up appearances, as if securing economic 
privileges and political control at the expense of another poor, vulnerable, looked 
down on population would help them break free from their humiliating position of 
inequality and would offer them a prosperous future. Rome and Tōkyō, refusing to be 
further marginalized by the 19th century's champions, sought self-validation, respect 
and a role for their own distinct reasons while concealing their inherent weaknesses 
and insecurities. The self-affirmation and the initial "equality-complex" would be 
transformed, in the second quarter of the 20th century, into pompous, aggressive and 
reactionary totalitarian ideologies.  
While the siege in Beijing was underway a similar siege of Tianjin's legations 
was taking place.80 On 15 June the Boxers surrounded the foreign quarters and set the 
French sector on fire. Two days later Chinese imperial troops, numbering 15,000 men, 
joined them and started bombarding the city. The 2,400 marines and soldiers from 
Russia, Japan, Britain, Germany, the U.S., Austro-Hungary and Italy (Carlotto's 
forces remained eventually in the city whereas Sirianni joined the Seymour 
expedition), alongside 700 hundred foreign citizens and numerous Chinese in Tianjin 
drove back the daily assaults.81 On 20 June a mix of Russo-British forces, some 1,300 
men, was set to leave Dagu to relieve the pressure on Tianjin. Commander Tanca, 
who had remained until then in the forts, left 10 marines under the midshipman 
Minisini to guard the flag waving there as a symbol of Italy's power and joined the 
expedition.82 On 23-24 June the allied army fighting its way forward, entered the city 
and relieved the siege. On the 26th the victorious forces left Tianjin, found the 
destitute Seymour force, still besieged at the arsenal (Tanca participated after 
discovering that 40 Italians under lieutenant Sirianni were also trapped), rescued and 
accompanied it to Tianjin's safety.83 
After Tianjin was captured the allied forces spent July wiping out all enemy 
resistance pockets. On 4 August the multinational army commenced marching 
towards Beijing. Numbering nearly 20,000 men, it defeated the Chinese forces on 5 
and 6 August, covered 100 kilometres on foot and approached Beijing's ravaged 
legations a few days later. On 14 August the allied force was divided in two columns, 
the left consisting of the French, Italian, German and Russian troops and the right of 
the Japanese, American and British. The latter breached the city. The prestigious race 
for the first nation to relief the legations was won by the British. The 55 day siege was 
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over. The Italian force under Sirianni, entered the Chinese capital three days later.84 
On the 28th an official occupation ceremony took place attended by every allied 
contingent. In reality, there was little to celebrate: 2,000 foreign soldiers, another 
2,000 imperial troops along with innumerable Boxers, Chinese civilians and foreign 
missionaries and ordinary citizens were killed. Italy's losses are estimated at 36 
soldiers and officers.85 Despite the undeniable allied victory the peace treaty was 
signed after a year. In the meanwhile, the powers occupied Tianjin, Dagu, Beijing and 
other cities and initiated a series of punitive expeditions in the interior (in essence 
looting), with the pretext of restoring order and combating the still active Boxers.86 
Under the orders of the new (26 September) allied Commander in Chief Alfred 
Ludwig Heinrich Karl Graf von Waldersee (1832-1904) the allied forces (with Italian 
contingents), commencing from mid-September, attacked and devastated the villages 
that supposedly sheltered the barbarous insurgents. 87  Admiral Camillo Candiani 
(1841-1919) who participated in the transportation of the Italian troops in China, 
lamented the Italian inactivity and hesitation to partake in the marauding civilization 
mission. He was worried that Italy risked to be excluded from the partition that was to 
take place by not participating vigorously. Similarly, Colonel Vicenzo Garioni (1856-
1929), upon hearing the news of another punitive campaign asserted: "On 9 
November arrived the information that the Germans and the Austrians left for Kalgan 
for a new expedition. It was imperative for us to go with a somewhat strong 
contingent".88 
In February an armistice between the Allies and the Chinese was agreed and 
on 7 September 1901 the peace treaty was finally concluded. Each one of the 12 
clauses, already discussed and agreed by the allies among themselves (April 1901), 
were humiliating and imposed an outright limitation of the Chinese sovereignty. 
Article 5 prohibited the import of weapons or of raw materials essential for weapon 
manufacturing. Another article imposed the foreign control of 12 points along the 
Chinese railways in the coast and in the interior. Furthermore, the Chinese 
government was obliged to allow the stay of foreign armed forces for the protection of 
the Beijing legations, in which Chinese entry was forbidden. It was also bound to 
demolish the fortifications in Dagu. According to the sixth article, China had to 
provide, as war reparations, 450 million tael (67 million pounds); until the indemnity's 
payment, the powers took charge of China's internal and maritime customs and of the 
salt tariff as guarantee. The annual 4% interest and China's resort to foreign lending 
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86 For Lieutenant Masserotti the Russians were the more undisciplined while the Germans were the 
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resulted to an indemnity double the size of the original one and a huge public debt. 
The Italian government had anxiously instructed admiral Candiani to press the 
demoralized Chinese during the signing of the treaty, for the concession of San Mun. 
Other objectives were the exploitation of the coal deposits89 and the construction of a 
San Mun-Beijing railway. After the Beijing peace treaty, Salvago Raggi, the Italian 
ambassador was in unison: "I think it would be necessary to determine in an 
honourable way the question regarding the port we have already requested in 
Zhejiang".90 In the end, Italy was awarded with a consolation gift, 457,000 square 
metres for an indefinite period of time, in Tianjin, between the Austrian and the 
Russian concessions.91 Rome's gains were symbolic more than anything else. Firstly it 
obtained equal status with the other powers by acquiring the same extraterritorial 
privileges and the right to maintain a military force in the Legation Quarter in Beijing. 
Secondly, it now had official authorization to use the international quarters in 
Shanghai and Xiamen. Finally, Rome secured the right to protect mines, churches and 
railways by force if necessary.92 
The Chinese expedition's expenses for the fiscal year 1900-1901 had exceeded 
8 million lire; the following year's accounted for an extra 5 million, which had not 
been foreseen by the War and the Maritime Ministries. As war reparations, Rome 
received between 77 and 99 million lire (depending from the source), the 5.9% of the 
total indemnity, and the right to handle a part of the abandoned salt pits situated 
between Dagu and Beijing.93After the end of the operations, the main body of the 
troops were to repatriate between 29 and 30 July 1901; The only troops that remained 
in China had garrison duties: 400 in the Beijing legation, 400 in Tianjin and 300 to 
guard the railway passing through the Hwang-Tsun area. During a parliamentary 
discussion in February 1904 Deputy Dal Verme suggested the withdrawal of the 
majority of the armed forces from China for economic reasons but the retention of a 
limited naval force for international and stature purposes. The socialist Deputy De 
Andreis responded: "I will not even take part in the discussion of whether the marines 
are as capable as the land troops or if they are more or less expensive in these far 
away expeditions [...]; but in reality what did we obtain? Are we perhaps taller in 
international politics? Have we perhaps given independence to China? After falling 
under the control of a German general, we can really affirm that in China we only 
protect the regions where our forces are located and not a span further [...]. So every 
penny spent is futile in regard to civilization and peace; and we have to keep staying 
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there to maintain solidarity with the other powers that want to retain a foothold in 
China".94 
The concession was a part of the Beijing peace treaty and was concluded de 
jure on 7 June 1902 with the "Agreement with China for the Italian concession in 
Tianjin".95 Nevertheless, lieutenant commander Mario Valli had already occupied the 
location on 22 January 1901 to secure its future possession by a fait accompli. Raggi, 
witnessing the Russians and Belgians establishing themselves in the area of the Hai 
river, sent a telegram to Foreign Minister on 19 January 1901, asking for Rome's 
authorization to proceed to the provisional occupation of "the best of what remained". 
The Italian Minister in Beijing asserted: "[...] the provisional occupation of these 
terrains would serve to prevent the others from seizing them". Unsurprisingly, 
Venosta gave his consent and Valli captured the area and delimited it with markers, 
an action that irritated the Chinese and the neighbouring Russians alike.96 As early as 
27 April 1901, Raggi was authorized by the new Foreign Minister Prinetti to 
commence negotiations with the Chinese plenipotentiaries in order to obtain a 
concession in Tianjin in exchange for the definitive renunciation of the Italian 
aspirations in San Mun and Zheijang.97 On 12 March 1902 the two sides agreed on the 
following terms: The land and the property of the agreed territory, including the salt 
quays, were passing to the Italian government; 98  the latter had to resolve any 
territorial differences with the owners of the adjacent railway line. The Chinese 
residing in the villages were to remain landlords of their property, but the Italian 
government retained the right to expropriate it for public utility and sanitary reasons 
for a price 10% lower of what was regulated for the Japanese concession. The 
Chinese residents, in contrast to other "foreigners", were free to sell or acquire 
property within the Italian zone. Every other issue would be regulated "in the same 
way as established for the concessions obtained by the other foreign powers"; Italy 
was finally recognized as an equal in China. 99  On 7 June the Italian embassy's 
secretary and later on ambassador in China, Giovanni Gallina (1852-1936), Raggi's 
successor, and the inspector of Tianjin's maritime customs signed the agreement. 
Indeed "to encourage Italy's commercial growth in northern China, the Chinese 
government ceded indefinitely to Italy an area left of the river Hai, upon which the 
Italian government had the right to exercise total and full jurisdiction in the same 
manner that had been agreed for the concessions obtained by other nations". The 
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juridical status of the Tianjin concession, arranged by the 1902 Italian-Chinese 
agreement, was bewildering in every respect. Beijing preserved its sovereignty upon 
the territory but recognized to Rome the right to administer it and to confiscate and 
obtain, nominally vacated land. Non Italian nationals could acquire terrains 
exclusively through the Italian authorities'. Thus, in this regard, Italy acted as 
Beijing's proxy by possessing "full jurisdiction". It was a rare instance of one state 
ceding sovereignty and another acquiring it. Since the concession did not entail any 
variation to the level of Italy's political control or borders Tianjin is not considered an 
Italian colony by many scholars.100As already examined, a settlement was concluded 
with the leasing of a territory, which remained under China’s nominal ownership, to 
foreigners. The contract usually had a duration of 99 years. Concessions were a 
particular kind of settlement. They were terrains ceded in perpetuity to the foreign 
governments that placed them to their citizens’ disposal attributing a predefined land 
tax to the Chinese government. In their turn the foreign nationals, always under the 
extraterritoriality status, regulated the concession's fiscal, financial and municipal 
administration while imposing public order as well. The Italian establishment in 
Tianjin was a concession in every manner. Furthermore, the 'full jurisdiction" clause 
gave Rome the special right to purchase estates and not just lease them, as was the 
common practise in these cases.  
The concessions were typically administered by the respective nations' consuls 
or local committees that were elected by the foreign citizens of the quarters. In theory, 
the June 1902 protocol entrusted the administration to the Consul General as a 
representative of the Italian government.101 Before the treaty and even afterwards, as 
the consular executive authority was unprepared, Italian Tianjin, much like Eritrea 
and Somalia, was directed by servicemen; in this case by the lieutenant Domenico 
Guido Biancheri under the supervision of the Foreign Ministry.102 The Italian consuls 
and observers demonstrated an interest for the British "township" model of 
administration. The British concessions were managed by a council, whose president 
exercised powers similar to a town's Mayor. The French method was deemed as more 
"centralized". 103 In 1905 the Foreign Ministry approved the British municipal-
neighbourhood model. In the meanwhile (1903-1905) Tianjin was administered in a 
provisional manner, by an appointed delegate, a royal commissary. The subsequent 
"Building regulations" promoted western modernity in urban architecture, 
landscaping safety and hygiene. The consul had the power to demolish any building 
and drive away any Chinese inhabitant if this course of action would contribute to 
Tianjin's moral and technical advancement. Everything that was Chinese was 
downgraded and put aside whereas European superiority was vividly exalted. 104 
However, the lives and property of the Chinese inhabitants of the town living on the 
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Italian-Chinese territory were supposedly guaranteed by the 1902 protocol. The 
foreign administrations were bound to respect and exercise the imperial estate 
legislation. From a juridical point of view Chinese and foreigners alike were 
appertained to the township's and municipal police's jurisdiction; violations of the 
penal code in Tianjin the Chinese offender was to be extradited to Qing authorities 
and the Italian to the consul or mayor-chairman of the quarter.105 
Italy gained some international recognition but certainly not enough. Its 
concession, among the 9 foreign ones in Tianjin, was the second smallest after 
Belgium's and probably the more destitute one, from a sanitary and financial point of 
view. The Chinese city numbered just 200 shops and almost 900 houses; the 13,074, 
after the 1902 census, residents were mainly salt pit workers. The Italian vice counsel 
there, Cesare Poma (1862-1932), nominated in April 1901 but commencing his duties 
in August, lamented the poor choice of the location. On 19 November 1901 he 
reported to Camillo Romano Avezzana (1867-1949), the new ambassador, that Italy 
had made a "miserable acquisition"; he regarded the territory as a composition of a 
Chinese village, a cemetery and an unsanitary pond and he deemed the local 
population too impoverished to be able to contribute any taxes and the district's 
rearrangement and expropriation, in order to accommodate Italian citizens, 
burdensome. He addressed reports also to Raggi, highlighting discouragingly the 
difficulties. Foreign Minister Prinetti ordered Avezzana to dismiss the vexatious 
Poma on 18 November. In January 1901 lieutenant commander Valli claimed: "There 
the only Italian thing that exists is the barracks where our guard troops reside; the rest 
is an obstacle of swamps and Chinese graves [...]. It seems that the Italian concession 
of Tianjin is there just to satisfy modest nominal ambitions and makes (us) wonder 
with melancholy that it is maybe a good thing that the San Mun affair failed". Vice 
admiral Carlo Mirabello (1847-1910) visiting Tianjin in 1903 as the Royal Navy's 
inspector noted the activity in the nearby Russian, Austrian and Japanese settlements 
in comparison to the abandonment in the Italian sector. The only Italian firm 
operating within the concession was the "Italian Colonial Trading Company". The 
greatest advantage of the concession, as lieutenant Biancheri underlined in 1902 was 
its proximity to the Mukden-Beijing railway, an advantage that could boost 
production and commercial transactions with the interior. Minister Gallina after a 
survey telegraphed to Prinetti on 12 April 1902: "I have visited our settlement there 
and I am convinced that if its situation is handled with intelligence, it could present in 
the future real advantages either for our general position or for the interests of Italian 
individuals that will come here to trade". The scarce number of Italian citizens and the 
meagre financial interests urged some to propose the concession's abandonment or 
relocation to a more commercially active Chinese region. Rome selected to maintain 
it as part of its tedious, self-deceptive policy aiming to achieve equality.106 The debate 
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over Tianjin is highly reminiscent of the 1870-1880 intense deliberations over 
Assab.107 
No commercial association and private company appeared disposed to invest 
in Tianjin except one. In January 1901 a group of Italian capitalists presented to Raggi 
a somewhat vague developmental proposal for the transformation of the Tianjin area 
to a "centre of considerable importance". Raggi, elated by this example of Italian 
entrepreneurship, presented the plan to Venosta. In March the same businessmen 
addressed an official note to Raggi with the intention of developing "the whole area if 
the land had been granted to them free of charge". The investment group would 
undertake the infrastructural projects and requested to administrate the region 
autonomously, without the army's and the state's intervention, in line with the British 
and American examples. However, Raggi appeared reluctant to make any 
commitments when the establishment of a consular office and the official transfer of 
Tianjin were still underway. 108 The government, having to secure funds for 
infrastructure works such as roads, the swamps’ drainage, and the urgent relocation of 
the cemetery, resorted to low-price land auctions with the hope of attracting 
funds. 109 Light taxation was also imperative in order to cope with the road 
maintenance fees and the initial infrastructural costs. Full Italian jurisdiction, granted 
by the 1902 agreement, deprived the Qing government of the right of taxation which 
was passed to the Italian authorities. On 27 December 1901 Prinetti authorized 
Avezzana to award the demanding reorganization of the concession to a private Italian 
company. The company for the development of Tianjin would undertake the 
expropriation of the necessary areas, the removal of the cemetery, the construction of 
a 7 kilometre road network and the flattening of the ground. For its services, it would 
receive a portion of the land.110 The government would remain responsible for the 
implementation of the 1902 protocol until the signing of the sub concession between 
the future developers and the authorities. No firm demonstrated the smallest interest. 
The area was abandoned for almost 10 years, like Assab. Accordingly in 1908 the 
newspaper La Tribuna reported: "In Tianjin the Italian trade is zero, the only Italian 
firms are a barber shop and the company Marzoli, property of a brick factory".111 In 
June 1909 Tianjin's administration was almost bankrupt and Minister Tommaso 
Tittoni (1855-1931) suggested the state's intervention for "prestige" and "dignity" 
reasons in the Far East. Between 1902 and 1908 some improvements were 
accomplished: elementary hygiene organization, expropriation of land and houses and 
ground levelling thanks to the "scanty savings of the concession's balance". Further 
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construction projects such as a hospital, a dispensary, a school of arts and crafts were 
funded by a 400,000 lire loan. 112  Italy was substantially more experienced and 
cautious in China, after the African debacle, and acted in unison with the Great 
Powers' interests and more specifically with the British, a policy that eventually 
yielded some results. Tianjin bestowed Italy with prestige, recognition, and equality at 
least theoretically. Italy seemed to finally obtain an international role and an audible 
voice in the conferences and conventions that would shape future policies. 
Psychologically, the haunting Adwa shadow was cast away slightly in China, 
substantially in Libya in 1911 and completely in Ethiopia in 1936; its unsettling, self-
doubting uneasiness made a comeback in 1943. From a material point of view, the 
inability of the late 19th century Italian industrial production to cope with the 
international antagonism and the urgency to invest whatever surpluses were available 
amidst economic crises and the absence of a "capitalistic" consciousness, especially in 
southern Italy's stagnate interior, made investments and grandiose imperialistic 
adventures abroad strenuous. Tianjin's development, mirroring the entire early Italian 
colonial phenomenon, faced many financial problems in the first years when it came 
close to being abandoned. Since it was unable to render itself profitable, as Eritrea and 
Somalia in the past, the government was compelled to provide the funds for its 
sustenance; an impractical and, even worse, burdensome operation that was to act as a 
display of Italy's modernization and splendour in order to keep up appearances with 
the rest of the world. Interestingly enough, it would be the allied, fellow latecomers 
Japanese that would expel the Italians from Asia. Forged by identical distressing 
experiences and having risen together in the New Imperialism epoch as students of 
the European expansionism doctrines, they would occupy Tianjin in 1943.113 
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8. Japan's domestic and international situation after the 
Restoration 
 
This chapter will shed some light on modern Japan’s economic, political and 
social conditions. Japan in the 1850s was a relatively backward country. Political 
power was firmly in the hands of the Sei Tai Shogun, the "barbarian-subduing 
generalissimo". The seat of his power was in the capital Edo, from which he 
guaranteed protection from foreign dangers and preserved internal order. For a period 
of more than 200 years (1600-1868) this task belonged to the Tokugawa family, 
which established the shogunate (bakufu) system; a feudal military dictatorship 
comparable to the European lord/vassal relationship of the Middle Ages. 1  The 
Tokugawa controlled directly and indirectly 1/4 of the total land mass of the Japanese 
islands in the 18th century while the reception of foreign envoys, mostly from Korea, 
served to reinforce their legitimacy both within the country and internationally.2 They 
ruled in the name of the "Heavenly Sovereign", the Emperor, and were traditionally 
and ceremonially appointed by him and maintained their authority through strict 
military control and a sophisticated system of agents and inspectors, watchful for any 
signs of unrest.3 The Emperors were secluded in the ancient capital of Kyōto where 
they had no political say. They were stripped of any kind of influence in the domestic 
administration and served as religious symbols of the continuity with the past and as 
guardians of the nation's ancient values.4 Japan much like the other states of the Far 
East were in the orbit of Chinese superior political, economic and cultural influence 
and was expected, starting from 57 A.D., to annually dispatch tributes to China. These 
tokens of submission served as acknowledgment of the Celestial Empire's undisputed 
politico-cultural preponderance. During the Tokugawa period, the imperial household 
and court had conceded, willingly or not, their political power to the supreme military 
commander, and withdrew to the background of political developments. The 
Tokugawas expected loyalty from their vassal lords and loyalty was not conceived as 
devotion to the Emperor. The role of the Emperor was open to interpretations and 
depended on the views and interests of the two groups that would be opposed until the 
final showdown in 1868: the imperial loyalists and the shogunate's supporters.5 The 
regime's advocates were claiming that the Shogun, having brought order after chaos 
had every right to rule. Others like the shogunal regent Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759-
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1829) regarded the Shogun as subject to imperial authority, an "Imperial servant" in 
1788.6 At any rate, until 1868, the Shoguns legitimated their authoritarian rule by 
obtaining or extracting the imperial consent to administrate the land and ruled more or 
less in their name. 
The approximately 250 fiefs (han) were ruled by Daimyo (feudal lords) who 
owed their allegiance to the Edo government and governed their lands in a rather 
autonomous way. Despite their bond of vassalage to the Shogun, these lords 
maintained independent standing armies, imposed their rules and controlled their 
owned borders. Their administrative capital was each dominion’s castle town, 
protected by armies of feudal retainers (samurai). The samurai also manned the 
central bureaucracy in the castle town and they served as district magistrates in the 
outskirts, collecting taxes, administrating justice and maintaining public order as the 
lord's representatives. Cooperative self-government, subordination of personal goals 
to community's greater good, confidence in the central administration, and a strong 
sense of hierarchical lineage made this system successful.7 Above all else its success 
relied on the obedience of the peasants. Slow urbanization, the absence of state 
monopolies and the lack of pressures exerted by foreign markets guaranteed the 
functionality of the local administration until the abrupt disruption of traditional 
values that took place in the mid-19th century.  
Between 1633 and 1639 the shogunate promulgated a series of decrees that 
brought about the national seclusion of the country.8 Years of bad harvests in the 
1800s reduced tax revenues, and signified the government's inability to rely on tax 
contributions.9 A great number of samurai and feudal lords ended up in debt to the 
money lending merchants. The shogunate's inflexibility and centuries of failed, 
unproductive policies frustrated the merchants and the peasants who demanded lower 
prices and efficient governance. The discontent grew into anti-government riots in the 
1860s when 35 urban and 106 countryside incidents took place.10 
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The peasants, through their labour provided for the sustenance of the entire 
population and developed into the backbone of the feudal society. Japan was 
prominently an agrarian country; the peasants amounted to 80% of the total 
population and they had to contribute nearly 40% of their crops’ yield in taxes.11 The 
agricultural population remained stable from the 1850s to the 1940s, a fact that 
manifests the continuing importance of the agricultural sector into the modern era.12 
During the first decades of the 19th century, peasants cultivated less than a hectare of 
land each and many of them were struggling to survive. According to the law, 
peasants had no right to move and were tied to the land as labour force. If someone 
desired to cross his domain’s borders he had to obtain a special permission. 13 
Production techniques varied geographically, but they can be safely assessed as 
underdeveloped in western terms: agricultural methods were traditional and 
production below the potential levels even in terms of existing methods. Only a small 
percentage of the country's land was intensely cultivated.14 Chemical fertilizers were 
nonexistent, the equipment primitive, and capital accumulation an unknown notion. 
Scientific practices such as seed selection and double-cropping were not widespread 
until the end of the 19th century. Lack of interaction with the world, as a result of the 
seclusion policies, certainly contributed to a relative economic backwardness. On the 
other hand, it helped in forging a self-sufficient domestic market and more 
importantly averted the possibility of a foreign invasion.15 
In the 1850's this seclusion was seriously challenged from abroad. Through 
the annual reports of the Dutch, the Japanese were informed on the rising politico-
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economical pressure they Europeans were exerting in East Asia and China in 
particular. Apart from these reports, to this fact attested the increasing frequency with 
which Western vessels sought trade, diplomatic relations or a safe heaven to the 
Japanese shores. The first threat was the Russian settlements that appeared north of 
the Japanese island of Hokkaidō, in the Sakhalin and Kurile islands. Two Russian 
diplomatic missions in 1793 and 1804 were rebuffed but also verified the Russian 
interest in the North Pacific islands. Confrontation and sporadic skirmishes between 
Japanese and Russian settlers of the islands led to the apprehension of a Russian 
scouting party in 1811. Three years later a wandering party that had landed at the 
island of Kunashiri, was captured by Japanese officials but escaped after a short 
clash.16 The Bakufu strove to counter any foreign attempt in Hokkaidō (then known as 
Ezo) and consolidate its rights, detect future foreign activities and avert the danger 
exercised even firmer control. The first encounter with the British in the 19th century 
took place in 1808 when a frigate arrived at Nagasaki and demanded supplies in a 
remarkably coarse manner. In 1837 a joint American-British mission attempted to 
dock at Uraga, in Edo Bay, under the guise of returning home some Japanese 
castaways, although their overtures were rebuffed. Two diplomatic attempts by a 
British missionary in 1849 and by Hong Kong's colonial treasurer Robert 
Montgomery Martin (1801-1868) in 1853 failed all the same. Sporadically American 
and British whaling crews, seeking supplies and anchorage clashed with Japanese 
villagers like in 1824 in Mito. Fears of British territorial designs on Japan took a more 
tangible form when British vessels began to appear at the home waters due to the 
Opium War (1839-1842) with China. 17  The humiliation of the great continental 
empire, the acquisition of a permanent naval base in the Orient (Hong Kong) and the 
rumours that Paris or London were interested in seizing the Ryūkyū islands south of 
the Japanese island of Kyūshū in 1843 alarmed Edo. The scholar Aizawa 
Seishisai (1781-1863) grasping how western imperialism worked, warned in 1825 his 
fellow countrymen: "When those barbarians plan to subdue a country not their own, 
                                                          
16  James Main Dixon, "Russia and Japan", in Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern 
California, vol. 10, No 3 (1917), pp. 13-16. 
17 Some Japanese intellectuals of the time were convinced that the West was set to conquer both China 
and Japan and expressed their views in favour of an alliance against the common enemy. When 
mistrust of the West was rising many were proposing a Sino-Japanese co-operation. Later when 
westernization generated self-confidence the Japanese leaders forgot the notion that western powers 
were committing aggression and sought to collaborate with them instead. See Junji Banno, "Japan's 
foreign policy and attitudes to the outside world, 1868-1945: in Japan and Australia. Two societies and 
their interaction, ed. P. Drysdale, H. Kitaoji, (Hong Kong 1981), pp. 15-16. The Japanese public 
learned about the developments of the Opium war mainly from one source, the author Mineta 
Fūkō (1817-1883) who somehow distorted the actual flow of events. In short, he suggested that the 
Chinese fought valiantly and were winning the war against the ruthless drug dealers of the West. 
Chinese defeat was not attributed to the outdated eastern methods and obsolete equipment but to the 
lack of discipline, low morale and treachery. The story thus had a didactic and in a sense, self-
congratulatory meaning: Japan should avoid the Chinese errors that led to its weakness and decadence. 
Discipline, moral perfection and an unyielding vigorous policy against the foreigners would guarantee 
Japan's survival. See Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty. China's Lessons for 
Bakumatsu Japan", in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 1992) pp. 15-17. 
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they start by opening commerce and watch for a sign of weakness. If an opportunity is 
presented, they will preach their alien religion to captivate the people's hearts".18 
Aizawa urged military preparedness and a policy of "expelling the barbarian". He 
poignantly added: "The barbarian dogs and goats would trample us underfoot, and 
nothing could save us". Yoshida Shōin (1830-1859), an influential thinker among the 
loyalists, emphasized the danger coming from Britain whose pirates will not stop 
"until Ryūkyū is reached and Nagasaki is attacked".19 He was also aware and highly 
critical of the American peril. 20  Scholar Watanabe Kazan (1793-1841) was 
particularly worried about the Russian and British projects in the Far East and 
admitted in 1839 that "One European warship would suffice to annihilate a large 
Japanese army".21 At the same time Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860), Daimyo of the 
Mito domain believed that "Russia most probably will decide to invade Japan first and 
then go about conquering China". 22  The foreign military threat and the sense of 
intimidation that it brought contributed to the formation of a common national identity 
after centuries of political fragmentation. In 1844 King Willem II of the Netherlands 
(Willem Frederik George Lodewijk 1792-1849) sent a letter to the shogunate 
authorities suggesting the voluntary opening of the country before the decision was 
imposed to them, since prolongation of the seclusion policy under the new 
circumstances was impossible. In 1845 the British admiralty had already approved 
                                                          
18 William Gerald Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, (Stanford, 1972), pp. 77-78. For the Confucian 
scholars in Korea, China and Japan, the Celestial Empire and the countries that had accepted its 
superior civilization constituted the civilised world. In Japan in particular, the belief that the country 
and its inhabitants were of divine origin was epitomized and in line with the ancient native Shintō 
religion. Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
19 William Gerald Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan 1834-1858, (London, 1951),  
pp. 36-37. 
20 Shōin asserted that "English barbarians are not the only ones selling opium. Americans are too, and 
not to a small extent". And again "You Americans will not burn the opium yourselves while it is on 
your ships; you will let us burn it after unloading it in Japanese ports, thus creating an excuse for war. 
Moreover, you want free trade at ports throughout our land; but under such 'free' trade, smuggling 
would be impossible to stop. Stipulate as many prohibitions as you wish in the treaty. How will that 
prevent the spread of opium?" Talking about the US: "When you annexed New Mexico (1845), wasn't 
that by force of arms?". America had never acquired colonies in the Far East because it lacked the 
power to do so, not because it lacked the will; it would behave just like any other power given the 
chance. "You try to pass off your weakness as virtue. How detestable". He identified China's 
humiliation in the hands of the West with the lack of patriotic sentiment and ineffective administration. 
Spending money on armaments was of secondary importance. The Bakufu and Daimyo had to exercise 
strong and responsible leadership in order to confront the hated Russians and Americans. See 
Wakabayashi, "Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty", pp. 19-25. 
21 Watanabe also commented: “Today among the five great continents, America, Africa and Australia 
are already colonized by the Europeans... I cannot help but fear for Japan...our country is like meat 
thrown onto the road. How could they, like hungry tigers or thirsty wolves, not seize food thrown 
before them?”. See Richard Albert Bradshaw, Japan and European colonialism in Africa, 1800-1937, 
Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio University, 1992, p. 90. 
22 Wakabayashi, "Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty", p. 3. 
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suggestions for the forced opening of Japan to western trade to take place when a 
sufficient naval force could be mustered.23  
 
There was a variety of ideas on how Japan should best meet the Western 
threat. The threat of political and economic subjugation could be countered, according 
to some scholars, by vigorous reforms mainly in the administration and military 
sectors based on the adoption of western scientific patterns.24 In 1791 the military 
scholar Hayashi Shihei (1738-1793) recommended a series of military reforms based 
on western methods in view of protecting northern Japan from an eventual Russian 
offensive. The political economist Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) went a step further. 
He envisaged the improvement of Japan’s naval and merchant fleet as a way to deflect 
the foreigners. He suggested the capture of the Aleutian Islands and of North 
American territories as they could be used both for the installation of surveillance-
defensive posts and as source of raw materials. He also proposed the transfer of the 
capital to Kamchatka as the future centre of a Japanese Pacific Empire. Yoshida 
Tōyō (1816-1862), a samurai from the Tosa domain, in 1861 suggested the 
establishment of a western style navy and of overseas colonies. The student of 
western science and practices Satō Nabuhiro (1769-1850) in his 1832 book, called for 
the occupation of the entire Asiatic continent: "With proper spirit and discipline on 
our part, China would crumble and fail like a house of sand within 5 to 7 years". 
Subsequently, Burma, India, Central Asia would surrender. Additionally, the Ryūkyū 
Islands could offer a base for an offensive to the Philippines and from there the 
capture of the Dutch East Indies and of the Southeast Asia could be accomplished. 
The Empire would be ruled by a military totalitarian government based on various 
bureaus that would administer every aspect of the subjects' social and economic 
activities.25 To which extent Satō's ideas influenced future Japanese leaders remains 
dubious. It is astonishing, however, that this kind of reasoning was developed in the 
early 19th century when the ominous international state of affairs and its relative 
backwardness marginalised Japan in the backside of modern "civilised" word. In all 
probability, these views became popular, through pamphlets and books as a reassuring 
confirmation of Japan's survival, as a reactive psychological response to the foreign 
threat that jeopardized national security so bluntly. The author Shionaya Tōin in 1846 
predicted that Britain would soon turn its gaze from China to Japan. Through 
demands for provisions and raids along the coastline London would eventually 
                                                          
23 In April 1840 the British Minister John Copling wrote to Lord Palmerston (Henry John Temple, 
1784-1865) to propose the utilization of the British forces gathered in China to punish the Japanese 
authorities for their lack of cooperation. In February 1840 the former assistant secretary to the Royal 
Asiatic Society suggested to Palmerston the capture of Taiwan as a naval and commercial base. The 
Japanese fear of British engulfment appeared to be real. In reality London was not yet ready to open let 
alone attack the Japanese coasts. During the last years of the 1840s due to commitments to other fronts 
and the amount of force that would be presumably needed London could not undertake such an 
operation. See Ibid., pp. 42-72. 
24 Eiko Ikegami, "Citizenship and National Identity in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889: A Comparative 
Assessment" in International Review of Social History, Volume 40, issue S3 (1995), p. 196. 
25 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp.  79-80. 
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assemble a formidable military force to subjugate Japan. The destruction that had 
befallen on the Chinese was down to their own deficiencies and weaknesses. Chinese 
short-sightedness in recognizing the danger at the time and administrative 
mismanagement was to blame for the present perilous situation. Another author, 
Ōhashi Totsuan (1816-1862) in the 1850s, defended China by proposing the adoption 
of a mixture of western science and Chinese ethics, since the western ones were 
corrupting and dedicated to the search of profit. At the time, regardless of personal 
preferences and beliefs the majority of scholars, pamphleteers, politicians in Japan 
acknowledged the superiority of western science, institutions and equipment.26 
 
The US government, after expanding to the west coast (California) as a result 
of the Mexican-American war (1846-1848), turned their eyes to the Pacific, posing a 
potential threat for Japan. American missionaries began visiting remote Pacific 
islands, particularly Hawaii.27 In the following decades the search for markets for the 
nation's massive industrial and agricultural output led to an imperialist, market 
oriented foreign policy. The Americans planned a naval route from San Francisco to 
Shanghai and Japan had the misfortune to be situated along the road to the Chinese 
market. In the context of this policy an American vessel reached Nagasaki in April 
1849, its captain asked permission from the local authorities to establish a coaling 
station but was forced to leave empty handed.28 The foreign powers were not inclined 
to stomach these insults from a collection of meagre uncivilized islands for much 
longer. Edo could not keep on pretending that its 200-year isolationist policy was still 
feasible. In reality, in the capitalistic epoch of the globalization, its main actors, the 
imperialist powers did not intend to tolerate the existence of an autonomous, isolated 
island kingdom. The coincidence of western interests with those of Japan’s future 
ruling elites made the country’s insertion into this global network a matter of time. 
 
In 1852 Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry (1794-1858) was assigned by 
the American President, Millard Fillmore (1800-1874) the task of opening the 
Japanese ports to American trade with the use of gunboat diplomacy. He was to 
secure trading rights, protection for American sailors and in view of the 
intensification of the commercial relations with China and economic rivalry with the 
powers, a base for coal and provisions. He visited Hong Kong and the Ryūkyūs in 
May 1853, where he persuaded the local ruler to open the islands to US trade. With 
two sailing ships and two steam frigates he reached Uraga on 8 July; his ships' guns 
pointing at the city. He explicitly demanded to hand over his president's letter to the 
highest authority in Edo or he would go ashore "with a sufficient force" and deliver it 
in person. After handing over the American demands to the shogunal delegates, he 
threatened to return for an answer in the spring of 1854 "with a much larger force" 
                                                          
26 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
27 Jennifer Fish Kashay, "Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-
Century" in The New England Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 282-283. 
28  Eric T. L. Love, Race over Empire, Racism and U.S. Imperialism 1865-1900, (Chapper Hill, 
London, 2004), p. 2. 
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and departed. Two of the most influential lords, Hotta Masayoshi (1810-1864) and Ii 
Naosuke (1815-1860) acknowledged that Japan should open itself to trade, which it 
could prove less harmful than expected, since it was not in a position to confront the 
West militarily. 29  While the discussions were inconclusive Perry returned on 13 
February 1854, much earlier than he had promised, with 8 ships and 1,600 men. The 
talks took place in Kanagawa, and dragged on for a month. The shogunal authorities 
rejected a commercial agreement like those with China but accepted the opening of 
the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate to American vessels, guaranteed the safety of 
American castaways and established an American consulate in Shimoda on 31 March 
1854.30 Identical agreements were signed with Britain on 14 October 1854 and Russia 
on 7 February 1855.31 Many scholars, such as Sakuma Shōzan (1811-1864) attacked 
the Bakufu for its humiliating stance in signing the Kanagawa Treaty. What was the 
use of a system that could not guarantee the safety of its own subjects and instead of 
repelling the foreigners was yielding to their disrespectful demands? 
In reaction to the foreign danger many called for military reforms at home and 
adopting western methods and armaments. Besides that common point though, a total 
lack of unison dichotomized the Japanese society in the 1850s-1860s. The 
conservative Daimyo and their retainers sought reform but within the existent 
framework. They believed that the Shogun establishment could be renovated to rise to 
the western challenge. Some concessions had to be made and the Shogun had to 
cooperate more closely with the, until then politically inactive, imperial court in 
drafting national and foreign policy. The court came to be the rally point not only of 
the Emperor's supporters or of the advocates for radical reform. Everyone who felt 
underprivileged, discontent or oppressed and had every interest to bring down the 
current state of affairs rallied under the Emperor's banner. The Bakufu agreed to the 
foreign terms without consulting the Court. For the first faction signing was 
imperative in the face of overwhelming foreign power and military threats; for its 
critics the Bakufu did not rise to the circumstances and by signing the treaties 
selfishly gained time for its reorganization and relegated national interests to second 
place.32  
The scholars of the Mito school, by proclaiming the divine origin of the 
Emperor, criticised indirectly the Edo government, exerted great influence in the 
                                                          
29 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp. 88-92. 
30 The first article reaffirmed the peaceful relations of the two states. The second settled the details in 
regard to the opening of the two ports. The third and the fourth addressed the issue of the American 
castaways. The three following articles regularized monetary and product transactions in the two ports 
while the 9th granted to the American government the most favoured nation clause. See Centre for East 
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32 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp.  144. 
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population and intensified the anti-bakufu sentiment. They were predominantly anti-
foreign and isolationists. To Fujita Tōko (1806-1855), the people of the sacred land 
were all heroes and their martial excellence was a given unquestionable fact. 33 
Mootori Norinaga (1730-1801) had laid the foundations of the Emperor's cult: the 
Emperor as a descendant of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu and was himself a god… 
Loyalty and veneration to him was the "True Way". In early 19th century Hirata 
Atsutane (1776-1843) maintained that since the Japanese people were a broad family 
under the patriarchal figure of the Emperor they all had divine origin. The Japanese 
emperor was superior to every other ruler and so the Japanese people were superior to 
all other people.34 Naturally the true son of heaven was entitled to reign over the “four 
seas and the ten thousand countries”. Aizawa in 1825 asserted that the Emperor 
"should govern the land and control the people". 35  The shogun by signing 
disadvantageous agreements with the barbarians betrayed the Emperor's trust to rule 
in his name, failed in his duties to protect the people and honour the Emperor. 
Samurai Maki Yasuomi (1813-1864) proposed the continuation of feudalism but 
under the Emperor's figure. Hirano Kuniomi of Chikuzen proposed the seizure of 
Kyōto, in order to restore the Emperor, "extend his authority to all parts of the 
country", drive out the barbarians and annul the Shogun's power.36  
On 11 March and again in December 1863 Emperor Kōmei (1831-1867) 
requested the bakufu to expel the foreigners, and when that order was ignored, there 
resulted a crime wave against western merchants and consuls. Having agreed to open 
the country to trade and to protect the foreign nationals in the open ports this action 
was a direct challenge to Edo’s authority. The Chōshū domain in the southwest acted 
in what it understood as accordance to the Court's orders, and defied Bakufu's 
authorities.37 On 25 June Chōshū acting unilaterally closed the straits of Shimonoseki 
and fired upon American and, in the following days, French and Dutch merchant 
ships. In the following months Chōshū’s batteries exchanged fire with passing foreign 
vessels. The final battle took place when an international allied force of 2,000 men 
comprised of British, French and Dutch troops attacked and silenced the domain's 
guns on 6 September 1864. The ceasefire, the re-opening of the straits and an 
excessive 3,000,000-dollar indemnity to the allied powers was negotiated on 14 
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September by the US Minister in Japan Robert Hewson Pruyn (1815-1882). Edo on 
22 October 1864 assumed the responsibility of repaying this amount but its inability 
to do so led to intensified foreign pressure for the opening of further ports (Hyōgo-
Kōbe or Shimonoseki) and the diminution of customs tariffs to 5%. Hereafter the 
Bakufu government was cornered by Western pressure and by its internal enemies.  
On 5 July 1861 the British legation in Tōkyō was attacked by a group of anti-
foreign assailants. The first Secretary of the British Legation in Japan, Oliphant 
(Laurence Opiphant 1829-1888) was wounded. A year earlier the official interpreter 
of the British Consul General Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) was murdered in the 
same location. The Bakufu authorities agreed to pay an indemnity of 10,000 dollars 
and to punish the criminals in March 1862. In January 1861 the secretary to the 
American consul, Hendrick Conrad Joannes Heusken (1832-1861) was assassinated in 
Edo. As a result, Alcock and the other envoys sought refuge to Yokohama, where the 
combined naval forces could guarantee their safety. On 26 June 1862 a new attack on 
the legation resulted in the death of two British Royal Marines and Admiral Hope 
(James Hope, 1808-1881) proposed the bombardment of the forts situated at Edo as 
retaliation.38  In November 1864, two British officers, were murdered in Wakamiya 
Oji in Kamakura by anti-foreign samurai. The main culprit was beheaded but many 
Japanese saw him as a hero fulfilling his patriotic duty.39 
On 14 September 1862 the Namamugi or Richardson affair took place. 
Satsuma samurai killed Richardson (Charles Lennox Richardson 1834-1862) and 
wounded two of his companions. When John Russell, (John Russell 1792-1878), the 
British Foreign Secretary, found out about the incident he declared that Britain would 
demand indemnities from both Satsuma and Edo that had failed to prevent it. At the 
time 5 British warships were anchored at Yokohama, and British, French and Dutch 
parties landed there to protect the foreign nationals. The shogunate's government 
wanting to avoid war promised to investigate the incident. The British, through their 
Chargé d'affaires in Japan, Edward St. John Neale (1812-1866), demanded a 100,000 
pound indemnity and a formal apology by the Shogunate and the Satsuma domain. 
However, the burning to the ground of the new British legation on 1 February 1863 
made matters worse.40 On 24 January 1863 the Emperor's representative made known 
to the shogunate's officials that the Emperor has ordered the expulsion of every 
foreigner and the annulment of the treaties even if that meant war. Shogun reluctantly 
agreed but in the meantime tried to negotiate with the foreigners. The British were 
also unwilling to engage in war; after all, British exports in Japan in 1862 surpassed a 
million sterling pounds and in the last three years its trade had tripled. The Bakufu 
recognized the validity of the British demands and promised to pay the indemnity 
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with some delay in May 1863 but in the same time the foreign consuls in Hokodate 
and Nagasaki urged their nationals to be ready to evacuate the country.41  
The Satsuma daimyo ignored for months Edo's and British instructions. Seven 
ships left Yokohama on 6 August for Kagoshima, Satsuma's capital; Neale ordered 
Admiral Augustus Leopold Kuper (1809-1885) to commence offensive operations. 
After the battle the city of Kagoshima laid in ruins whereas the British suffered losses 
of 60 men and had many ships damaged from the city’s costal batteries. After Kuper's 
withdrawal both sides claimed victory. In November Satsuma promised to pay the 
demanded indemnity and friendly relations were restored. 42  The incidents of 
Shimonoseki and Kagoshima persuaded even the most xenophobic and conservative 
elements that Japan had a lot to learn from the West. A concrete project of 
modernisation was most urgently needed for the nation's survival. Terrorist tactics did 
not contribute to the expulsion of the westerners but to more humiliation. From the 
loyalists' point of view though, the weakening of the Shogunate, even in the hands of 
the hated foreigners, justified the human and material losses. Indeed, the new British 
Minister Harry Smith Parkes (1828-1885) sensing the Bakufu's weakening and 
inability to impose itself upon the court and the loyalist domains of Satsuma and 
Chōshū called for the ratification of the treaties by the Emperor himself. If the Bakufu 
was incapable of guaranteeing western rights perhaps its enemies were not. In autumn 
1864 Alcock proposed the use of gun-boat diplomacy to persuade the Court to accept 
what the shogunate had already ratified. Earlier, in June 1863, the US representative 
Robert Hewson Pruyn suggested naval action and simultaneously marching on land to 
Kyōto but the idea failed to convince the other envoys. Parkes succeeded in having 
the Emperor ratify the treaties on 26 November 1865.43 Like Edo was compelled to do 
earlier, the Court had to abandon the popular expulsion policy and acknowledge the 
treaties, finding impractical and impossible to dislodge the foreigners.44  
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On 7 March 1866, a Chōshū-Satsuma anti-bakufu alliance was concluded. Edo 
in September 1864 and May 1865 failed to subdue the two most powerful and military 
modernized clans and for a military regime this meant loss of prestige and 
degeneration. More importantly the Tokugawa shogunate appeared powerless and 
many turned their sights towards Kyōto for effective, centralized leadership.45 The 
shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu (1837-1913) also known as Keiki, nominated officially 
on 10 January 1867, was anxious to strengthen his government and promoted a series 
of administrative and military reforms under Paris' auspices. The French Consul 
General Léon Roches (1809-1900) appointed in October 1863 was known for his pro-
bakufu feelings and his rivalry with his British colleague Parkes who favoured the 
shogun's enemies. He also dispatched military missions to Edo in many occasions, 
notably in February 1867 to reorganize the government's armies. Through his 
diplomatic manoeuvres and provision of weapons, loans and support he tried to 
balance his country's lack of commercial interests in Japan and to limit the potential 
rise of another power's influence in Edo. By surpassing the British influence, he 
sought political benefits for France such as the acquisition of an ally or at the very 
least the lease of a naval base in the Orient.  A naval base would be useful in the 
occasion of an intervention in Korea due to the frequent attacks on French shipping 
and the maltreatment of French missionaries.46 
On 30 January 1867 emperor Kōmei died and the fifteenth year-old Matsuhito 
(1852-1912), ascended to the throne on 3 February 1867 as Emperor Meiji. The 
loyalist conspirators feared that the young emperor would fail to preserve the national 
unity against the Bakufu and to pacify the country. Satsuma and Chōshū moved their 
troops toward the capital, reaching Kyōto on 18 December and Ōsaka on the 31st. 
After this point there was no coming back.47 Iwakura Tomomi, perhaps the most 
prominent imperial statesman of the time, on 2 and 3 January summoned to his home 
in Kyōto the leaders of the loyalist domains to devise a political plan. The Emperor 
was to assume his ancient responsibilities in governing the land because of the need to 
"restore the country's prestige".48   
On 10 January the representatives of the powers, assembled at Keiki's castle 
and declared that they would stay neutral in regard to Japan's internal dispute. Parkes 
in particular was concerned that Russia might find the moment appropriate to occupy 
Japanese territory. Parkes despite the British proclamation of neutrality during the 
civil war urged Admiral Henry Keppel (1809-1904) to maintain a naval force of 7 
ships in Japanese ports in case the lives and properties of British citizens were in 
danger.49 On 27 January the shogun’s partially modernised force of approximately 
10,000 men was defeated while en route by 6,000 imperial troops armed with 
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howitzers, Gatling guns and modern rifles. Following Keiki's will to abdicate as early 
as 9 November 1867, the Meiji Restoration, Matsuhito's resumption of the country's 
direct rule was officially proclaimed on 3 January 1868. From that point on the 
Emperor was seen as a symbol of change and as the building block of a new nation. 
Nonetheless the Tokugawa forces were still resisting. The imperial forces under 
general Saigō Takamori (1828-1877), after some successful skirmishes entered on 3 
May 1868 the Edo castle and the Shogun officially surrendered. Ten days later Prince 
Arisugawa accepted the capitulation on behalf of the emperor but the civil conflict 
that would be known as the Boshin war, was not over yet. 3,000 Tokugawa followers 
revolted in Edo but Saigō suppressed the uprising. On 3 September 1868 the city was 
renamed to Tōkyō and after mid-1869 the Emperor made the former shogun's castle 
his residence.50  
Enomoto Takeaki (1836-1908), admiral of the Tokugawa navy, fled with the 
remnants of the shogunal navy in Hokkaidō to organize the Tokugawa counter attack 
with the northern Daimyo, Bakufu officials and the French advisors still employed by 
the shogunate. In May in northern Japan a coalition of 50,000 men from five domains 
(Aizu, Sendai, Yonizawa, Nagaoka and Shōnai) were ready to defend their feudal 
rights against the Satsuma-Chōshū "evil advisers" that manipulated the Emperor. 
Through a series of failed battles and castle sieges the alliance crumbled in 
September. By the end of the year Saigō had pacified the north but at a considerable 
human and material cost.51 Enomoto's facing defeat, requested that the Ezo be made a 
Tokugawa domain under imperial rule 52  Upon the rejection of his proposal he 
proclaimed the establishment of the independent Republic of Ezo on 27 January 1869. 
Enomoto was voted president by his followers. Thereafter he organized the island's 
fortifications and troops. An infantry invasion, after a brief engagement, took hold of 
Hakodate, forcing President Enomoto to declare the republic's dissolution on 26 June. 
Casualties amounted approximately to 10,000 men and the rancour, animosity and 
discontent would remain for years to come; however, by the autumn of 1869 Japan 
was finally unified and pacified. For the West final victory meant the Emperor's 
ascension as the supreme ruler, the substitution of the name of the shogun from the 
previous treaties with the emperor’s and the beginning of direct diplomatic relation 
between the West and the Court. The Emperor on 30 March 1868 issued the Imperial 
Decree Banning Anti-Foreign Violence. Many of the Daimyo and common people 
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who saw in the face of the Emperor a strong figure that would finally expel the 
barbarians felt betrayed.53 
In regard to the country's foreign relations, the new Meiji government, due to a 
second round of xenophobic attacks, found itself almost immediately in a difficult 
position. On 4 February 1868, 150 samurai from the domain of Bizen clashed with a 
foreign contingent near the city of Kōbe. Ten days later the government accepted in 
full the western demands for reparations and the punishment of the culprits, despite 
the fact that at the time it was not strong enough to enforce such a decision within the 
country. Amidst the civil war, still in progress, its decision could provoke discontent 
or even worse an internal rebellion. In its submissive way, the government at least 
guaranteed the powers’ neutrality. The man that was found responsible committed 
ritual suicide and the imperial government successfully resolved its first international 
challenge.54 
On 8 March 1868 the Sakai incident took place, the next crisis of Meiji-
Western relations, when 11 French sailors were brutally murdered at Sakai near 
Ōsaka by Tosa retainers.55 Roches on 12 March presented a list of formal demands to 
the Japanese government. Itō Hirobumi (1841-1909), at the time an official of the 
Foreign Ministry, blamed the French for the incident, who by their landing had 
violated Japanese sovereignty and harassed the local community. All this may have 
been true but once again the government was still too weak to oppose the foreigners 
and agreed to their humiliating demands. Foreign support for the Bakufu or a direct 
armed intervention would signify a premature end to the court's aspirations. Roches 
recognized the imperial leadership's sincerity and suitable handling of the matter. Last 
but not least, the attack on the British Minister Parkes in Kyōto occurred on 23 March 
(Nawate Incident). Parkes encouraged the government to condemn this kind of attacks 
and to punish the ones responsible as common criminals by beheading, and deprive 
them the possibility of an honourable suicide. On March the government notified the 
foreign representatives of its decree against attacks on foreigners issued some days 
earlier. It declared that persons attacking foreigners would be acting against the 
sovereign's wishes and would jeopardize Japan's national dignity.56 
The men that came to power in January 1868, had to wage and win a civil war, 
find resources to fund the war effort and administer the territories that they already 
held. Subsequently by overthrowing the Bakufu they inherited its responsibilities. In 
February 1868 the court formed seven departments inspired by the ancient imperial 
institutions (Daijōkan): Shintō (religion), Home, Foreign, Military Affairs, Finance, 
Organization and Justice. At the same time steps were taken so that the domains could 
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send delegates to a samurai assembly (lower chamber), giving voice to those that did 
not have an active role in the government. In 1869 a new civil service code was issued 
and the Ministry of Shintō Affairs was set up.57 The Bakufu and its allies' lands were 
confiscated by the government and placed under the administration of imperial 
officials as fu (cities) and ken (prefectures). In December 1868 a similar arrangement 
was enforced upon more daimyo lands. In March 1869 the lords of the loyalist 
domains were persuaded to offer to the court to promote centralization. The 
leadership had supported the abolition of the domains both because such an act would 
eradicate regionalist internal divisions and because national defence needed a unified 
national army not an amalgam of different military organizations. In August of 1871 
the government felt consolidated enough to attempt the domains' abolition, an 
important step towards centralization.58  
The Daijōkan the administrative structure of the 8th century, was revived 
(June 1868) and remained in effect until the modern executive Cabinet was 
formulated in December 1885. The Daijōkan structure divided power into three 
separate branches, legislative, administrative, and judicial. 59  The top position that 
supervised every other was that of the Minister of the Right, which was held by Sanjō 
Sanetomi. In 1875, when the Supreme Court and a Senate of Elders (Genrōin) were 
established. The latter was a bureaucratic, peerage drawn assembly that was able to 
review and propose legislation but not actually shape it.60 Many lamented the fact that 
the government acted as a despotic clique, ignoring the peoples' wishes. Indicatively 
the years from 1873 to 1878 are sometimes called as the period of "Ōkubo 
despotism". Indeed, the higher positions were held by a Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa and 
Hizen oligarchy of samurai that had previously brought about the Restoration.61 
While the government permitted the opening of prefectural assemblies it also 
issued laws restricting public gatherings (1880) and freedom of press (1875). The 
government eventually accepted the creation of a national assembly with the Emperor 
promising the opening of a parliament by 1890 on 12 October 1881.62 In 1885 the 
Daijōkan was abolished and a western style cabinet took its place; the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Army, Navy, Justice, Education, Agriculture 
and Commerce were established. The Ministry of the Imperial Household was 
established under Sanjō Sanetomi to act as the liaison between the court and the 
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government. At the same time the political independence of the court was safeguarded 
by the transfer of large state properties. Preparations for the promulgation of the 
constitution were underway but the state continued to suppress political movements: 
the Liberal party was disbanded in 1883 and the Rikken Teiseitō (Constitutional 
Imperial Rule Party) survived for only two years from 1882 to 1884. 63  On 25 
December 1887 the government announced the Peace Preservation Law that enabled 
it to expel from the capital any dissident64 In 1888 Itō became the president of the 
newly established Privy Council and engaged personally in the drafting of the 
constitution since the draft prepared by the Genrōin was too liberal for his liking.65 
Late developing nations such as Japan, anxious to safeguard their fragile new-born 
national unity and to catch up with the economically more advanced nations, often 
relegated people’s rights and democratization to second place. The priority of the 
nation building policy that the Meiji leaders had adopted was the creation of a sound 
economic basis that would support a strong state and an effective army to defend the 
nation against the machinations of western imperialism.66    
Let us return to the first years after the Restoration. In October-December 
1870 new taxation and administration regulations were issued. Discontent was high 
among those that did not approve the government's financial policies. Sources of 
unrest were also disbanded soldiers after the civil war. As a result, officials that were 
known as reformers were often assassinated in 1869-1871. The period between 1868 
and early 1869 due to inflation, civil war and crop failures saw a series of peasant 
revolts erupt. In the first ten years of Meiji administration (1868-1878) at least 508 
revolts took place. 208 of them occurred during the first three years.67 
The reformists, individuals that had been abroad and had studied foreign 
institutions and practises were convinced that, initially military and then economic 
and political modernisations, along the western lines, would realise the urgent goals of 
independence and diplomatic equality in the face of foreign imperialism. Japan at the 
time of the Restoration was fortunate that the besieging powers were busy carving up 
China, a struggle that left Japan out of their political control but in a semi-colonial 
status. China was apparently more attractive to foreign capitalism due to its vast 
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population and ineffective domestic rule.68 In Japan they contented themselves with 
economic penetration, port facilities and unequal treaties.69 With the occasion of the 
Iwakura mission in various western states, aiming to achieve the recognition of the 
new regime and to initiate the reforms that would annul the effects of the detrimental, 
demeaning unequal treaties, Prime Minister Sanjō Sanetomi wrote in October 1871 
that Japan "lost her equal rights and been made subject to the insults and wrongs of 
others" so that "the principle of equality between Japanese and foreigner, of 
reciprocity between East and West, is not maintained" and "We must restore our 
country's rights and remedy the faults in our laws and institutions; we must abandon 
the arbitrary habits of the past, returning to a rule of clemency and 
straightforwardness; and we must set ourselves to restore the rights of the 
people...seeking thereby to achieve equality with the powers". The Japanese had to 
prove that they were civilized and worthy of being treated as equal members of the 
international society.70 With these thoughts in mind a vast, ambitious, historically 
unique process of modernisation was implemented by the Meiji leadership.  
The Meiji restoration marked Japan's abrupt rupture with traditional social 
values, the beginning of its ascension to the Great Power status that took place in the 
20th century, its historically unique, for a non-western nation, process of 
modernisation-industrialization, while all the while being an anomaly of a semi-
colonized state that assimilated and put to practise the doctrines of imperialism as 
early as the 1870s. Albeit interesting this thesis' aim is not to trace every social 
change, reform, infrastructural improvement, law codification of the early Meiji 
period that led to these later developments. This chapter will rather examine the 
incentives of the anomaly's components: the initial cultural elements (religion, 
education, tradition), the foreign influences, the role of the army and of the economy 
that formed the ideological background for the territorial expansion debate and made 
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the ruling classes' imperialistic schemes appear feasible. Furthermore, the study of the 
newly born state’s foreign relations will enable us not only to approach more 
coherently its manoeuvres in the late 19th century political chessboard, but also to 
trace the origins and the reasoning on which these were based on. Lastly, the relations 
of the early Meiji state with the West were dictated by the provisions of the unequal 
treaties, a phenomenon that hugely shaped its reactionary, self-affirming, aggressive, 
imitative imperialistic disposition and as such one which requires a deeper look. 
After the Restoration the government was confronted by grave financial 
difficulties. The civil war had drained the court's treasury and revenue was hard to 
secure in a war torn country. The precarious position of the Meiji leaders meant that 
they could not rely on custom duties, subject to limitations by the unequal treaties, or 
levy new taxes. In 1868 state revenue amounted to 3,7 million yen while the 
expenditures rose to 25. The following year expenditure was at 20,8 million and 
income at 10,5. The chaotic situation was exacerbated by the circulation of several 
inconvertible notes and the coexistence of silver, gold and 1,500 varieties of clan 
coins. After the termination of the Boshin war, expenses were lowered and inflation 
disappeared as a result of the consolidation of a centralized modern state. 71  The 
abolition of the domains transferred both the cost of local administration and their 
feudal debts to Tōkyō. The government after the abolition of the domains assumed 
their liabilities that amounted to 78 million to be repaid to domestic and foreign 
creditors.72  In 1872 total expenses reached 58 million yen whereas revenue rose to 33 
and the government issued more than 73 million yen that year. By 1875 Tōkyō 
however, had managed to repay its former loans. A new 3,7-million-yen loan from 
London was secured in 1869 for the construction of a railway line and in 1872 a 10,7 
million loan was provided for the settlement of costs produced by the abolition of 
feudalism. Witnessing the miserable situation in China and understanding the 
connection between foreign credit and military-political intervention the Meiji 
leadership were disinclined to secure further loans from the West.73 National debt for 
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the fiscal year of 1877 exceeded the astonishing amount of 240 million yen. Itō 
proposed the adoption of the American banking model but the four national banks 
established in 1873-1874 failed in their task to issue money and upgrade state 
finances. From 55 million yen in June 1876 the expenditure reached 254 million in 
two years resulting in the reappearance of violent inflation and the doubling of the 
rice price between 1877 and 1881.74 The feeble financial establishment was ready to 
crumble under the weight of the imbalance of payments and government efforts to 
reorganize the army, establish western style schools and improve roads, facilities and 
all the necessary infrastructure that a modern state needed to survive amidst the late 
19th century economic-political antagonism. Only after 1881 the situation was 
stabilised under the measures taken by the Finance Minister Matsukata (Matsukata 
Masayoshi 1835-1924). The negative side of Matsukata's policies was the extra 
burden on the peasants that had to sell their properties and the collapse of many 
entrepreneurs who had to sell their companies to bigger firms. Between 1883 and 
1890 more than 367,000 peasants lost their land because they were unable to pay land 
taxes.75  
The growing expenditure on western style reforms and in particular the 
military costs made the need for cash inflow to the state treasury a vital matter, one 
which the entire process of nation building and modernisation hinged on.76 Iwakura, 
aware of the fact that the state could not afford paying the samurai, that were not state 
servants anymore, proposed the gradual cutback of the stipends in the summer of 
1870. A long debate followed. In 1873, samurai were given the option to convert their 
stipends into twenty-year bonds; in 1876 this conversion became mandatory. A total 
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of 173 million yen in bonds and 730,000 yen in cash were paid to 313,000 individuals 
to compensate the loss of their stipends.77 The loss of privileges and stipends and the 
creation of a national army based on conscription signified the end of the samurai 
class. These developments in conjunction with the dissatisfaction about the western 
patterned reforms and the enforcement of new taxes drove many impoverished and 
outraged peasants and former samurai to open revolts in 1868-1873. 66 of these 
outbreaks were about heavy taxation. In December 1871 the Finance Ministry anxious 
to secure more revenue increased the tax on owner-cultivator land. The land tax 
reform proclaimed on 28 July 1873 was the state's main income source for decades to 
come. The law drove many peasants to sell their crops for cash for which they were 
neither ready or savvy enough and that led to an increase in the price of tenancy rights 
and loss of land due to the financial hardships.78 Agriculture was by far the most 
important sector in terms of the economy’s total output and employment until the 
First World War. In 1880-1885 the agricultural sector generated 65-70% of the total 
state income. In the 1870s the government decided to promote industrial and 
agricultural production since an abrupt transformation of the peasants to skilled 
workers was not possible. Farm products were necessary to feed a growing 
population79 and as a counterweight for the vast imports of mechanized equipment, 
fundamental for the nascent Japanese industry. Agricultural exports amounted for 70 
to 80% of the early Meiji exports abroad. Tōkyō quickly perceived agricultural 
production as both an external and an internal source of income, through taxes, 
encouraged technical improvements and agricultural education. It also set out to 
eliminate the parasitic feudal privileges, rights, restrains and obligations80 set up by 
the Tokugawa.81  
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Sericulture and tea were the two products that helped preserve a commercial 
balance of trade (sericulture amounted to 5.6% of the value of the total gross 
production between 1875 and 1880) and rice was exported steadily from 1872 to 1887 
despite the urbanization trend and its high consumption at home. In 1879 40% of the 
total manufacturing production originated from the countryside: sake, millet, textiles 
and soy sauce. Traditional and early modern production techniques, still elementary 
though, co-existed and the "rurality" of the Japanese manufacture sector, mainly due 
to the textile exports, would persist until the First World War.82  The prestigious 
position of Japanese silk and its products in the international market in 1867-1870 
used both in weaving and in spinning made the need for modernisation a secondary 
one. Between 1875 and 1880 crude silk yarn, exported through the port of Yokohama, 
reached from 7% of the total exports to 30.4%.83 The cotton sector, amidst global 
competition, was in need of investments and state intervention. Only in 1885-1895 did 
the Japanese cotton became competitive abroad and confronted the foreign imported 
cotton yarns. The production of wool, unsustainable by the private sector alone, also 
received state subsidies. Nevertheless in 1872-1877 wool imports accounted for the 
19% per cent of the total. The opening of the ports to foreign merchants without 
protectionist measures increased trade between Japan and the West: between 1860-1 
and 1864-65 it tripled. In 1863 60% of the total imports were textile products and 
20% metals necessary for the development of domestic arms and shipbuilding 
industries. From 1860 until 1865 silk products and tea amounted approximately to 
65% of the total exports to Europe and the US. In any case imports exceeded by far 
exports increasing the trade deficit. Massive exportation was seen as the solution for 
strengthening commercial ties and modernising the state. Some kind of equilibrium 
was achieved only in late 1880s. In the early Meiji period paddy field farming was not 
substantially different from the methods and the equipment employed during the late 
Tokugawa period. The state’s lack of funds undermined any investment attempt. 
Moreover, tenant and semi-tenant farmers, who engaged in extremely measly farming 
practises under the pressure of rents, accounted for 60-70% of the agrarian 
workforce.84 
Today there is an ongoing controversy regarding the annual growth rate of 
agricultural production. Some put the growth rate after 1868 at 4% arguing that this 
development enabled the accumulation of capital, the financing of other sectors and, 
through commerce, it generated foreign exchange for the import of materials that 
were used in industrialization.  For others, innovation and a limited growth came 
gradually in the 1890s. Phosphatic fertilizer was introduced in 1888 whereas 
Ammonium Sulphate as late as 1900. Drainage, technical innovations, land 
reclamation and irrigation improvements achieved only limited success. Political 
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instability caused by events such as the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877 and the subsequent 
inflation benefited only those few landlords who had a surplus to sell. The status of 
tenants and small landowning peasants was further deteriorated by the deflationary 
policy of the Finance Minister Matsukata as already mentioned. In 1881 the price of 
rice was reduced from 8,86 yen per koku (Japanese unit of volume, 278 litres) to 5 
yen per koku. 85  A third group claims that Tokogawa period's agricultural and 
manufacturing production was not as backward as many may imply and served as the 
background for the following impressive or somewhat impressive boom. Western 
mechanized products, weapons and books were introduced in the early 19th century.86 
The existence of a unified national self-sustaining market during the shogunate period 
and the inherent Japanese propensity to save, as argued by some scholars, seems to 
give some credit to this theory.87  
Japanese foreign trade was dictated by western imperialism, that is by the 
limitations, rules and framework imposed by the unequal treaties. Under these 
constraints and the absence of the protective high tariffs it was only in the 20th 
century that Japanese capitalism was adapted, specialized and became competitive. In 
the 1860s-1890s though, foreign merchants, inexperience and obsolete methods of 
trading produced harsh conditions for the native merchants.88 In 1863 34% of the 
foreign trade's total value represented imports of western products. In 1867 this figure 
increased to 61% and in 1870 to 71%.89 Foreign products such as British textiles 
dominated the market, hampered domestic production, with the economy 
haemorrhaging reserves and cash abroad. 90 In 1870 Japanese exports accounted for 
14 million yen and foreign imports for 34.91 In May 1868 and in January 1869 the 
transit barriers between the domains and on the national highways were lifted 
respectively as the Meiji government attempted to unify and enhance the home 
market. Bridges and ferry systems were constructed and free travel in the country was 
allowed. Free trade in the form of unhindered commercial activity became possible 
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after the abolition of the domains in 1871. In the years after the Restoration the 
average Japanese, nurtured for centuries in a Confucian ideology hostile to profit 
making and lacking capital was not disposed to invest their meagre hard-earned 
savings in uncertain endeavours. Under the immature financial, social and legal 
environment an entrepreneur class inclined to invest in foreign or domestic ventures 
could not be formed.92 Inexperience, lack of funds and of credit institutions meant that 
the trade was in the hands of foreign commercial firms: in 1874 99.5% of the total 
exports and 99.9% of the total imports was directed by western merchants.93 Still in 
1894 foreign trade was managed by Western Trading companies in Yokohama and 
other ports. The aforementioned lack of capital, foreign preponderance and the small 
scale manufacturing production brought about the failure of the state initiative. 
Political confusion and insecurity amidst the depressing economic conditions after the 
abolition of the domains certainly weakened even further the commercial interactions 
in Ōsaka, Tōkyō, Kyōto.94  
After the loss of their privileged status and pensions, former samurai found 
themselves in a grave financial situation. Given their temperament their discontent 
could erupt in a full scale revolution, as it did in numerous occasions, and overthrow 
the new leadership. That is why finding occupation for them was a matter of life and 
death for the government. After the Restoration with every new measure proclaimed 
by the government95 the warrior class lost its benefits and military function.96 The 
samurai class did not entirely disappear; it was incorporated to the modern Japanese 
society shifting it from the inside towards reactionary and warlike attitudes. It should 
also be noted that many of the anti-foreign samurai of the previous era that committed 
or incited attacks against the foreigners in line with the "expel the barbarian" idea 
were now leading members of the military and the Meiji government.97  
Every economic sector in the 1870s was considered backward to Western 
standards and in need of huge investments and infrastructural upgrades.98 That was 
particularly true about the manufacturing sector which was traditional and slow-
growing so that one cannot speak about Japanese mass industrial production until the 
late 1890s and for some historians until the 1910s.99 In other words, in the 1890s a 
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light industrial production was underway but it heavily depended on machinery, pig 
iron, rolling stock and steel from abroad. 100  Furthermore, the unequal treaties 
prohibited the raising of protective tariffs. Domestic economic growth policies and 
military armaments led naturally to budgetary deficits in the first years after the 
Restoration. 101  Substantial state investments in industry and agriculture were 
effectuated when budgetary balance was restored in the mid-1880s and the needs of 
the military, the government's top priority, were met. The first "take off" of the 
Japanese economy occurred as a result of the preparations for the First Sino-Japanese 
War when shipbuilding, agricultural, arms and textiles' production faced foreign 
competition and finally abandoned the outmoded production methods. Despite the 
lack of convincing research and evidence, up to that moment someone could argue 
that the Restoration did not change radically the production process and the traditional 
economic ties centred on the village of the Tokugawa period. Economic subordination 
to foreign prerequisites meant that the Japanese economy was unstable and 
susceptible to economic fluctuations and western pressure. Despite the state's efforts 
many peasants were impoverished and most of the samurai (in the early Meiji period 
the samurai numbered 1,800,000 or 5% to 6% of the entire population according to 
Harry D. Harootunian's study)102 were unemployed. The lack of infrastructure and of 
reliable transportation network and the difficulty in introducing an integrated 
economic circuit hampered the states' efforts to recover economically after a two-year 
civil conflict.103 The situation was exacerbated by the lack of raw materials and the 
reliance on imports for their provision. Not only machinery and specialized equipment 
were to be imported but also western industrialization methods. 104  In 1875, 527 
foreign experts were employed by the Meiji government to help Japan set the 
foundations for its coveted economic development: 205 technical advisors, 144 
instructors, 69 administrative directors and 36 specialized foreign workers.105  The 
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absence of sizable iron ores and the inefficient ways of coal extraction were not a 
good omen for a promising industrial development.106 
The Japanese inherent lack of iron was a by-product of: inadequacy of 
investigation methods, insufficient charcoal, high price of pig iron, unskilled labour 
force, lack of the appropriate equipment.107 Until the founding of the Yawata Iron 
works in 1896, steel, a crucial material for the development of the nation's military 
and shipbuilding industry was manufactured at army arsenals and state run iron 
manufacturing plants without substantial results. The needs of the private sector were 
met by imports while the domestic production, limited as it was (1,200 tons in 1896), 
was dedicated to and absorbed by the military. In the 1890s Japan still imported pig 
iron mainly from Britain (12,000 tons in 1892, 44,000 tons in 1897). 
These developments highlight two interesting aspects in regard to this 
research. Firstly, Japan did indeed suffer from a lack of raw materials, equipment and 
vital machinery in the first decades after the Restoration. Some limited industrial 
expansion was achieved only at the closing stages of the 19th century after a long 
period of failures, inefficiencies and vast imports from abroad. Accordingly, there was 
no established full scale industrial production in 1870s-1880s at home whose 
necessities for new markets and raw materials would justify expansionist views. Japan 
was still agrarian, barely moving towards industrialization (and that was largely 
because of its military forces) in need of stability, internal reorganization and 
investments at home. At the time it certainly did not approach the so-called highest 
stage of capitalism, reached by Britain and Germany, the one which is synonym of 
imperialism according to Lenin. In other words, raw materials and markets abroad 
were not necessary, not before the 1910s and 1920s,108  when the take-off of the 
Japanese industry did actually occur. Secondly the state, after a reasonable delay, 
started to intervene as much as possible in order to secure the meagre sources of iron, 
coal and steel for military purposes, highlighting the close ties between the military 
and the government during the Meiji period. Indicatively by 1877 two thirds of the 
state’s investments were absorbed by the military while in the 1880s this figure was 
reduced to one half.109  
Aiming to maintain order, safeguard national defence and promote unity a 
programme to improve the country’s communications was launched. Educated 
citizenry, an industrial base, communications and transport networks were vital for 
the creation of a powerful modern army. The Ministers meeting on 14th November 
1869 highlighted the benefits of the creation of a railway system to national wealth 
                                                          
106 Hiroshi Saito, "The Natural Resources of Japan" in Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 122 The Far East (Nov., 1925), pp. 96-97, pp. 96-99. 
107 Tang, "Technological leadership", p. 100.  
108Gary R. Saxonhouse, "Productivity Change and Labor Absorption in Japanese Cotton Spinning 
1891-1935" in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 91, No. 2 (May, 1977), p. 207. 
109  Richard J. Samuels, "Reinventing Security: Japan since Meiji" in Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 4, 
Searching for Security in a Global Economy (Fall, 1991), pp. 15-16. 
251 
 
and development. Talks for a loan from London were delayed because some 
influential politicians and servicemen expressed reservations.110 The following years 
seven more lines were constructed for a total 505 miles and an invested amount of 
21,650,000 yen in every part of the country. By 1872 Japan had introduced postal 
services with postal offices being erected both in China and Korea.111 
There are some scholars that reject the notion of early Japan's successful 
industrialization as an economic myth. This view is mostly justified from the 
shipbuilding sector. In any case the Japanese manufacturers before attempting to 
create iron vessels had to replace the traditional wooden sailing ships with wooden 
steamships. Several domains attempted to introduce western shipbuilding methods. 
By 1868 14 domains had built modern yards but the lack of expertise and machinery 
made the acquisition of vessels from the West easier and simpler.112 During the entire 
1879-1896 period, Japanese yards produced only three ships displacing more than 700 
tons whereas foreign imports amounted to 174 ships of equivalent size. The Sino-
Japanese war gave an unprecedented boost to many industrial sectors. 113 During the 
1850s and until the 1870s the sea lanes, the coastal trade and the entire foreign trade 
were completely in the hands of foreign firms. The American "Pacific Mail Steamship 
Company" had, until 1876, the domestic shipping monopoly. Up until the 1880s small 
Japanese companies were continuing to use sailing ships. Funds and technological 
improvement were needed in order for the sailing ships to be finally replaced with 
western style steamships. In the early Meiji period attempts were undertaken to 
construct modern naval facilities and refurbish the obsolete ones in Yokohama and 
Kōbe. Under these conditions and the everlasting lack of funds the government 
recognized the prudence of subsiding just one larger private shipping company 
instead of several smaller ones. The government decided to challenge the western 
predominance by supporting the native Mitsubishi Company.114 
The Meiji reformers put forward the establishment of a spiritual bond between 
the people and the Emperor who ruled under the protection of the spirits of ancestral 
emperors. The new leaders striving to endorse a new national identity, and at the same 
time consolidate their position and the people's unity and loyalty to the regime 
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encouraged the rituals, native traditions and mythological elements known generally 
as Shintō that emphasized on the unity of the religious worship with the political 
administration. Thus in the period from 1868 to 1871 the Meiji leaders started 
promoting Shintō as a state religion (State Shintō). Iwakura claimed that the state 
could remake Shintō to "unify the population through common worship of national 
deities". In 1872 the government promulgated the "Three Great Teachings", an 
ideological creed to reinforce its own control over society: Respect the gods; love the 
country, observe the principles of Heaven and the Way of Man; and revere the 
Emperor and obey to the will of the Court.115 These teachings brought about the 
creation of loyal subjects that would die for the country, pay taxes, comply with state 
decrees and would even excel in western science studies.  
The promulgation of the Constitution (1889)116 and the Rescript on Education 
(1890), bolstered and popularized the concepts of national "policy" and reverence for 
the Emperor and became synonyms to the consolidation of the nation state. 117 
Indoctrination to nationalistic principles in schools was intensified during the term of 
Minister of Education Mori Arinori.118 Other key elements for forging the national 
identity and preserve the distinct Japanese essence were ethics training at school, 
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national holidays that celebrated historical anniversaries119 and the exaltation of the 
distinctiveness, the patriotism and the sense of one's duty to the imperial state.120 
Western knowledge was promoted and in the same time the exaltation of the "family 
state",121 the concept of a unique people with common origin headed by the throne, 
took place mixing rationalism and science with metaphysical didactic folklore.122  
Mori stated: "Our country must move from its third-class position to second-class, and 
from second-class to first; and ultimately to the leading position among all countries 
of the world. The best way to do this is [by laying] the foundations of elementary 
education".123 In 1900 the Ministry announced that Japanese history lectures should 
concentrate on the unbreakable lineage of the Imperial Dynasty. Around that time the 
previously implemented American model of education was substituted by the more 
nation centred conservative German (Herbartian pedagogy). 124  Glorification of 
patriotic duty and the worship of the ancestors was exalted through the establishment 
of the famous Yasukuni shrine in 1869, which commemorates up to this day the 
Japanese fallen in the service of the empire. 
Meiji leaders promoted the endorsement of foreign models as signs of 
civilization and modernisation. Modernisation meant Westernization and that could 
only be achieved by foreign assistance. 125  By adopting western law, technology, 
industry, education, finance and administrative systems Japan could eventually annul 
the hated unequal treaties and reach a level of apparent parity with the nations that 
from the visit of Perry on regarded it as savage and undeveloped. The popular Meiji 
slogan "rich country-strong army" reveals the reasoning of its leaders for Japan to 
maximise its chances of maintaining its independence; the Chinese example and the 
initial fear of foreign attack certainly contributed to this view. Therefore, the navy 
was modelled on the British; the army first on the French and then on the German; 
education on the French, American and German; communications on the British; 
police on the French; banking on the American and Belgian; legal system first on the 
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French model and then on the German. Emulation of the most efficient advanced 
patterns was common between the interconnected modern states in the 19th century. 
Other states such as Switzerland and Italy contributed to the Japanese cause not by 
sharing models for its institutions but by dispatching officials and employees.126 
The Meiji government maintained the ban on Christianity until February 1873. 
The Japanese-Dutch treaty of 1857 and the Japanese-American of 1858 recognized 
freedom of religion to the Dutch and Americans residing in Japan but made no 
mention to the Japanese followers of Christianity. The Iwakura mission received a lot 
of complaints during its visit in the US and Europe for its religious intolerance. 
Religious freedom had been proclaimed both in the February 1873 and later in the 
1889 Constitution.127  
Rising nationalism and religious fervour were key factors for the nation’s 
aggrandizement. Another institution and a main pillar of the later Japanese 
expansionist aspirations was the national military forces. Τhe absence of an imperial 
army was the actual reason of the court's marginalization by the warlords for 
centuries. Through the creation of a modern army, imperial authority would be 
respected, loyalty ensured and internal order preserved. The creation of an imperial 
army was a crucial step towards centralization. The difficult financial situation of the 
throne as a result of the anti-Tokugawa campaign signified its economic dependence 
by its supporters and the wealthy merchants; it also meant that military reformation 
had to be postponed for the moment. Ōmura Masujirō (1824-1869), the court's Vice 
Minister of military affairs suggested in June 1869 that the government's 
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independence and authority passed through the abolition of the domains, feudal 
armies and the warrior class. For a decade after 1868 there was no actual separation 
between military and civil services; Ōkubo Toshimichi, Minister of Home Affairs 
from 1873 to 1878, which was a civilian position, was in command of the military in 
the same time.128 The threat that devoured China129 could be eradicated by the advent 
of modernised, well equipped and trained national forces. With this in mind four 
major arsenals and three government shipyards were founded within the first 10 years 
after the Restoration. Two of the arsenals for the Army were situated in Tōkyō (1877) 
and Ōsaka (1870) and were operated initially by foreign experts. The Navy's, erected 
in Yokosuka (1866) and Tsukiji (1874), were facing substantial challenges due to the 
lack of iron, machinery, skilled labour and experience. 130  Later, in the 1880s, to 
reduce the dependence on imported materials such as steel the Army sought to 
directly manage mines and factories and pressed hard for the country's 
industrialization.131 
In August 1870 Saigō Tsugumichi and Yamagata Aritomo 132  (1838-1922) 
returned after a tour in Europe where they had observed the military institutions of the 
Western powers. They were both entrusted with important positions in the Bureau of 
Naval and Military Affairs but they could not agree on the model to be followed.  
Ōmura had proposed an army following the French paradigm and a navy modelled 
                                                          
128 Chitoshi Yanaga, "The Military and Government in Japan" in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Jun., 1941), p. 530. 
129 The Russian danger in the North, the British in the South and the pressures from Germany, France 
and the US resembled Poland's encirclement from the hostile powers that finally dismantled it in 1772, 
1793, 1795. A Japanese traveller in East Europe published the unfamiliar story in the Japan Weekly 
Mail in 1873 after his return in Japan. He was amazed about the cynicism with which the Western 
powers dissolved a fellow great kingdom and was terrified for his homeland future. See George Z. F. 
Bereday, "A Japanese View on the Partitions of Poland" in The Polish Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1974), 
pp. 89-90. 
130 The natal year of the modern Japanese Navy was 1855 when the Bakufu requested aid and training 
in tactics, shipbuilding and navigation from Dutch naval officers in Nagasaki. In 1867 the first British 
instructor arrived and in 1869 the first naval training school under the British admiral Archibald Lucius 
Douglas (1842-1913) was founded in Tsukiji. In 1873 the Navy consisted of 17 ships for a total of 
18,000 tons while in 1895, as a result for the preparations for the imminent Sino-Japanese war there 
were 28 ships of 57,600 tons and 24 torpedo boats, the majority of which were constructed abroad. See 
Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan since Perry, (New York, London, 1949), pp. 116-117. 
131  Kozo Yamamura, "Success Ill-gotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's Technological 
Progress", in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37. No. 1 The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 
1977), pp. 114-115, 118. 
132  Yamagata Aritomo served in many capacities; as Prime Minister (1889-1891, 1898-1900), as 
statesman behind the scenes, as field marshal, or as the president of the Privy Council, he shaped 
Japanese politics to an unprecedented degree. Working intensively against the parties and the 
parliament and in particular against Itō Hirobumi he favoured the military cast and by extension Japan's 
authoritarianism and military expansion. He was appointed Chief of the Army’s General Staff in 1878–
1882, 1884–85 and 1904-1905. 
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after the British, a plan accepted by Saigō and others. 133  Yamagata favoured the 
Prussian conscription system instead. However, the clans and many former retainers 
of the shogun were more familiar with the French model and language. On 2 October 
1870 the government announced the adoption of the French system and the hiring of 
French military consultants. According to the new organization, recruits would be 
trained in Ōsaka and then assigned to the Tōkyō, Tōhokou, Ōsaka and Chinsai 
garrison districts.134 This first national army suffered from both the lack of funds and 
the lack of officers trained to the modern methods, as did the navy. Another necessary 
step towards the consolidation of the national conscription system was the abolition of 
the domains. Worried about the political consequences and constant peasant uprisings, 
Ōkubo, at the head of the all-powerful Home Ministry, demanded more funding for 
the military whereas the Finance Minister Shibusawa Eiichi, (1840-1931) warned that 
excessive investment to military programmes would lead the country into debt. 
Income, he advised, should be invested to more crucial sectors.135 The Ministry was 
divided in the Army and the Navy Departments until 1872 when two separate 
Ministries were established. The conscription law was announced on 28 November 
1872 and came into effect the following year.136  
In February 1874 the Meiji leaders were confronted with perhaps the gravest 
threat to their rule when the former statesman Etō Shimpei (1834-1874) led the Saga 
rebellion. His death in April 1874 ended a potentially dangerous situation; the new 
national army acted as a "counterrevolutionary police force" according to the historian 
Kublin Hyman. Tōkyō's policies against the former warrior class and its 
westernization agenda largely provoked the so-called Satsuma rebellion in January 
1877 led by Saigō. Despite its victory, Tōkyō, acknowledged its flaws and realized 
                                                          
133 In 1872 16 French officers arrived in Japan although many lamented the high costs and the previous 
French-Bakufu connections. See Eleanor Westney, "The Military" in Japan in Transition. From 
Tokugawa to Meiji, ed. M. B. Jansen, G. Roznan, (Princeton, 1986), p. 178, pp. 169-194. 
134  Starting from 1874 Tōkyō started dispatching recruits to Hokkaidō in order to help with the 
development projects and of course defend the island against a possible Russian attack. They were 
called Tondenhei (military colonists) and they were later followed by civilians seeking to cultivate and 
protect the land under extreme climatic conditions. The politician Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900) 
initially proposed the project in order to appease the disappointed ex-samurai. The government 
supplied these men with transportation to the island, tools, housing for them and their families and 
firearms. They were organized in military settlements and provided approximately 3,500 active soldiers 
and 1,000 in reserve.  See Ibid., pp. 182-183.  
135 Hyman Kublin, "The Modern Army of Early Meiji Japan" in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 9, 
No. 1 (Nov., 1949), pp. 30-31.  
136 Many officials and commoners did not approve this western style innovation. The samurai were 
unwilling to share their profession with the common people and argued that the peasants, without trace 
of military tradition or of warrior ethics were not capable to defend the empire. The peasant families on 
the other side were complaining that the new measure was taking away their sons, rendering them 
unable to contribute to the families' agrarian activities for long periods of time. The Navy and Army 
continued to accept samurai volunteers. The French model of army training and organization was 
followed, while the German one was preferred for the conscription system. The highly regarded 
German mass conscription system had worked wonders in the Franco-Prussian war. These measures 
produced a standing army of 31,680 men. In case of war they would increase to 46,350. See Gotaro 
Ogawa, The Conscription system in Japan, (New York, 1921), pp. 17-18, 226. 
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the operational limitations of its modern army. After all it had to deploy its entire 
fighting force at the time, numbering 65,000 soldiers, sailors and policemen in order 
to come out victorious. The rebellion resulted in the destruction of a great part of the 
modern army, and the collapse of government services with finances stretched to the 
limit.137 Meiji leaders came to realise that greater (financial) efforts were required in 
order to construct a modern and effective fighting force. 
A French military mission did remain in Japan up until 1880 although its 
influence waned. 138  On 5 December 1878 an autonomous General Staff for the 
Army,139 reporting directly to the Emperor was inaugurated. It was followed by the 
Japanese Army War College in 1883 that was to train staff officers after the German 
successful paradigm. The establishment of the General Staff signified the separation 
of the military command from general state administration. In 1889 the Imperial 
ordinance n. 135 rendered the military independent from the government in military 
functions "of non-administrative nature".140  Katsura Tarō (1848-1913) the military 
attaché in Berlin and Yamagata's protégé used his influence to further align the 
Japanese military system to the German one. From the beginning of the 1880s the 
Emperor attended the Army's and Navy's graduation ceremonies and repeatedly made 
contributions for the state to acquire armaments and warships since the government 
had to deal with financial strains. In addition, many members of the imperial family 
were regularly enlisted for military service. The Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and 
Sailors, issued on 4 January 1882, was a draft on ethics based on the ancient warrior's 
code (Bushidō). It highlighted the military's importance to Japanese society and its 
bond with the Court. The Rescript stressed the notion of nationalism and loyalty not 
to the government but to the Emperor; elevated even further the privileged status of 
the military in the state; rendered it immune to restrictions by other state 
organisations; isolated members of the military from the political system by 
prohibiting individual political activities.  
                                                          
137 The Navy suffered accordingly. The first Japanese built warship after the Restoration was finished 
in 1876. Since the purchase of warships was remarkably expensive the government ordered only 6 until 
1886 despite the pleads of the still few Navy officers. Clan rivalries and lack of skilled officials made 
the Navy Ministry politically weak. Until the 1890s the Navy was bought from abroad not built. This is 
why it did not contribute significantly to the development of the shipbuilding industry in the 1870s and 
1880s. See Westney, "The Military", pp. 181-182, p. 192.  
138 The French did not take this insult lightly. When in 1885 and 1888 the Meiji government invited 
German instructors the French Legation logged two bitter official protests. French pretentiousness 
weighted upon diplomatic relations. Hara Takeshi (1856-1921) first secretary to the embassy of Japan 
in Paris confessed in January 1889 that "relations between Japan and France are in complete 
disharmony". See Takii, The Meiji Constitution, pp. 110-112. 
139 The Navy did not follow the Army's example and continued to be controlled by the Navy Ministry. 
In 1886, nonetheless, a Joint General Staff was created and two years later under its supervision two 
separate General Staffs were established. In 1893 the Navy General Staff became practically 
independent, like its Army equivalent. See Westney, "The Military", pp. 191-192. 
140 Military and naval operations, strategy, organization and training fell into the Supreme command's 
authority. Nevertheless, the government still regulated mobilization of the troops, proclamation of 
martial law, provisions, appointment or dismissal of military personnel. See Yanaga, "The Military and 
the Government", pp. 530- 531.  
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In 1881 the secret military police (Kempeitai) was founded. In the 1880s the 
influence of the military drastically increased in the government members of the 
military were appointed to ministerial positions. From 1868 to 1912 45% of civilian 
cabinet posts were held by military officers.141 In 1886 military training was made 
mandatory to schools. Furthermore, the military's appeal to the Japanese people 
should not be underestimated: the ancient ideals of Bushidō: loyalty, benevolence, 
justice and a martial and feudal tradition spanning almost seven centuries bound 
together emotionally the Army, the Navy and general public.142 Enjoying this kind of 
unconditional support, military leaders became progressively more audacious. In 
times of political instability, in February 1892 for example, the Army and Navy 
Ministers were ready to suspend the constitution. When the Cabinet opposed a 
military armaments expansion bill it was dissolved in 1891. 
The relations of the new backward state with the advanced civilized nations 
were largely dictated by the norms of the Western imperialism. Western disposition 
towards Japan was characterized by opportunistic, intrusive, dogmatic and menacing 
attitudes usually supplemented by a disdain for the oriental barbarians. This 
disposition, that arguably offended the Japanese public and ruling class, can be traced 
in the signing and the long and protracted revision process of the predatory unequal 
treaties. Let us briefly examine early Japan’s foreign relations.  
The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian (1870-1871) provided a welcome relief 
for Tōkyō. The two powers would exercise generally less pressure and would 
inevitably drop the issue of the Christians’ prosecution in particular. The war also 
demonstrated that the government was still unable to enforce its own independent 
foreign policy and force the Powers to respect its lawful sovereign rights. The German 
Minister von Brand asked for Japan's neutrality on 18 August 1870 and Outrey 
supported this idea in his report to Paris four days later: "...the extreme importance of 
showing to the Chinese, as to the Japanese, that, even in a state of war the European 
Powers will be always ready to unite in action to protect European interests in the two 
countries". On 22 August the Japanese government declared its neutrality with, 
according to Parkes, the very first state paper of the kind. No hostile engagement in 
Japanese home waters or within a distance of seven and a half miles was permitted 
and the warships that were to seek safe haven would be allowed to have a day's head 
start when they left port. Outrey was not satisfied and a second document was 
prepared. This one was accepted by both sides initially but later von Brandt demanded 
a similar clause for merchant ships. The Japanese government complied with this 
request and drafted the complementary articles only to revoke them on 16 October 
1870 due to Outrey's pressures. This incident demonstrates the diplomatic isolation 
and subordination of the still weak, unstable, intimidated Meiji government to foreign 
demands. Submissiveness to any Western whim, no matter how excessive it may have 
been, was frustrating but necessary at the time. Concessions in a stoical manner and 
                                                          
141 Westney, "The Military", pp. 189-191 
142 Yanaga, "The Military and the Government", pp. 531.  
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politico-economical sacrifices had to be made as long as the country was still lagging 
behind militarily to the West, and trying to consolidate its territorial integrity. That 
was the way chosen to achieve a future position of international parity.143  
Britain was the power to be feared due to its naval might and invasive 
capitalistic economy. At the same time, the example of an isolated island state lacking 
resources that imposed its will upon millions of people and controlled vast territories 
was appealing to those early 19th century Japanese scholars, who rejected xenophobia 
and seclusion. Britain appeared to be the greatest threat but simultaneously a nation to 
emulate and admire. Honda Toshiaki in 1798 proposed modernisation measures that 
would make comparable the "great island of Japan in the East" with "the island of 
England in the West... two most wealthy and powerful nations".144 On 21 January 
1862 a forty men delegation under Takenouchi Yasunori (1806-?), visited Europe. 
The scholar Watanabe Kazan in his widespread pamphlet "The Story of a Dream" 
expressed his admiration for the British Empire that controlled vast territories with its 
"25,000 ships and one million sailors" all over the world.145 Undeniably the most 
attractive British concepts were industrialization, empire building and naval 
superiority. The last two notions were underlined by the naval engineer Katsu 
Kaishū (1823-1899), who acknowledged the importance of creating a modern navy as 
means for Japan to establish its rightful place among the nations: By adopting the 
British paradigm of naval superiority, Japan would defend its sovereign rights from 
the Russian menace. 146  Moreover it would conquer Korea and East China thus 
creating a great continental empire. Katsu proposed the founding of naval training 
schools where students would be taught English and navigation by British tutors and 
instructors. The new government adopted many of these proposals.147  
                                                          
143 Ibid., pp. 111-113. 
144 W. G. Beasley , "The Edo Experience and Japanese Nationalism" in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 4, Special Issue: Edo Culture and Its Modern Legacy (1984), p. 562. 
145 Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, p. 34. 
146 Parkes both shared and partially incited Tōkyō's preoccupation of the Russian expansion in the Far 
East. In early 1868 Admiral Keppel returned from his surveying mission in the maritime Siberian 
provinces having gathered information on the Russian capture of Kunashiri in the Kurile Islands. 
Parkes, greatly preoccupied by the eventuality of a Russian expansion in the Sakhalin and Hokkaido, 
instructed the Meiji government to open a port in the northern part of Hokkaido. Western economic 
interests in Hokkaido would hamper any Russian aspirations for the island but the Japanese did not 
follow his advice. British fears were heightened by similar rumours stemming from the French 
authorities. Parkes as a counter measure asked from the Foreign Office consent for the occupation of 
the Hamilton island (Geomun-do) of the Korean coast and its use as a naval base. On 4 August 1875 
Admiral Charles Frederick Alexander Shadwell, (1814-1886) acknowledged the value of this 
acquisition but the Foreign Office rejected the request as it was unwilling to set an example of partition 
in the Far East. In any case there was no evidence of Russian activity in Korea, and in particular in Port 
Lazarev (Wŏnsan) for that matter. Despite the lack of concrete proof Parkes was monitoring the 
activities of Russian vessels in the Japanese ports with suspicion, warned the Governor of Hong Kong 
of the danger of a Russian attack and suggested the creation of a British naval base in Hokkaidō. See 
Daniels, Sir Harry Parkes, p. 89, 168-170. 
147 Fox, Britain and Japan, pp.  257-268. 
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Let’s return to the unequal treaties. In the turn of the century Tōkyō finally 
annulled the principle of extraterritoriality with the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of July 16 
1894. It was at last an equal treaty with trade rights and a mutual most favoured 
nation clause but Japan was still subject to customs rates on most of the products 
imported from Britain. Tariff autonomy would be restored as late as 1911.148 The 
second state to follow was the U.S and the third Italy on December 1 1894.149 
Hereafter similar agreements were signed with the other Powers making Japan the 
first politically equal country to the West.150 41 years of frustrating negotiations, long 
deliberations, demeaning refusals, racist attitudes, unfounded prejudices, unsettling 
marginalization, had passed in search of parity. Tōkyō to achieve this parity even 
resorted to the imperialistic scheming that it itself had been subjected to. Increasing its 
influence over Asia and imitating the powers’ actions it strived to prove that it was 
socially, military, economically mature enough to be admitted in their circle. 151 
Search for security, independence and an equal standing had been an endless, 
psychologically haunting experience for the Japanese. It naturally led to aggressive, 
anti-foreign impulses that were to be manifested later on, when Japan actually was in 
position to challenge the West. At the end of the 19th century the Japanese state was 
equal from the judicial point of view and was even admired for its modernization 
efforts and military victories at times. Nevertheless, racism and theories about the 
yellow peril did not cease in 1899; on the contrary they were at their apex. Persisting 
racist notions about the white race's supremacy, civilizing mission, paternalistic 
philanthropy to Asians and Africans placed Japan yet again in a position of inferiority, 
despite its phenomenal efforts. In the early 20th century in California and elsewhere 
anti-Japanese immigration legislation was enacted. In the 1919 Paris conference that 
brought an end to the First World War the Japanese demands for racial equality were 
frustratingly ignored by their fellow victors. Japan remained imprisoned in an inferior 
Orient amidst a West dominated world order. This fact gave rise to the creation of a 
siege mentality that led from fear and respect for the West to eventual resentment. As 
it will be seen Japan had to choose to collaborate with the oriental nations in the face 
of Western imperialism or "leave Asia", entering the Western camp and adopting its 
doctrine of expansion.  
 
                                                          
148 Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka, (London-Henley-
Boston, 1977), p. 50. On February 21 1911 the treaty of Commerce with the US restored Japan’s tariff 
autonomy but with a catch; Japanese immigration to the US had to be restricted. See Shumpei 
Okamoto, “Meiji Imperialism: Pacific Emigration or Continental Expansion” in Japan Examined: 
Perspectives on Modern Japanese History, ed. H. Wray, H. Conroy, (Honolulu, 1983), pp. 141-142.  
149 The treaty was signed in Rome between Foreign Minister Blank and the Japanese ambassador 
Kogorō. Rome always displayed sympathy for Japan’s plea for equality. See Luigi Vanutelli, “Le 
Capitolazioni al Giappone (1854-1899)” in La Rassegna Nazionale, Vol. 146 (1905), pp. 581-585. 
150  Hikomatsu Kamikawa, Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era, (Tokyo 
1958), pp. 150-155. 
151 Auslin, Negotiating with Imperialism, pp. 195-200. 
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9. The Japanese imperial tradition, colonial theories and the 
first exploration missions 
 
In this chapter the ideologies, overseas activities, and trends behind the first 
Japanese colonialism will be presented. The immigration issue, Japan’s historical 
legacy, invented traditions, colonial doctrines, influential theories and some 
exploration missions, seemed to justify for some Japan’s territorial expansion. All 
these factors however, were not essential but only complementary for the shaping of a 
colonial disposition. Since they were employed by some pro-colonial politicians, 
popular publicists and pressure groups to convince an even broader portion of Japan’s 
society that control of foreign territories would contribute to the nation’s development 
we have to examine them. Overpopulation, economic considerations, and constructed 
imaginaries were not the main stimuli behind Tōkyō’s early bid for colonies; 
international diplomacy and the quest for respect were infinitely more decisive.  
Fukuzawa promoted “Datsua Nyūō” theory, literally translated as “leave Asia 
and join the West” or commonly known as “Datsuaron” (“On Leaving Asia”) in his 
Jiji Shimpō editorial on 16 March 1885: “We do not have time to wait for the 
enlightenment of our neighbours so that we can work together toward the 
development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our 
lot with civilized nations of the West. As for the way of dealing with China and 
Korea, no special treatment is necessary just because they happen to be our 
neighbours. We simply follow the manner of the Westerners in knowing how to treat 
them. Any person who cherishes a bad friend cannot escape his bad notoriety. We 
simply erase from our minds our bad friends in Asia”.1 Fukuzawa’s influential theory, 
whichever way he meant it, encouraged Japanese nationalism and imperialism and 
served as a justification theory for the Japanese colonialism in Asia until 1945. 
Fukuzawa full of contempt for the “hopelessly backward” Asian nations compared to 
the westernizing Japan advocated the disruption of the cultural ties with Korea and 
China and the adoption of West’s attitude towards these states.2 Instead of solidarity 
                                                          
1 Hosok O, Cultural analysis of the early Japanese immigration to the United States during Meiji to 
Taisho era (1868--1926), Ph.D Dissertation, University of Oklahoma 2010, p. 82. 
2 Some scholars based on an 1895 article of Fukuzawa, in which he suggested leniency towards the 
defeated and thereafter non-threatening Chinese, recognized him as a moderate intellectual. For many 
historians, such as Yasukawa Junosuke, however, Fukuzawa’s theories guided Japan in all its wars 
against its neighbours. In particular, his “leaving Asia", "discarding Asia", "escaping from Asia" 
approach that associated Asia with backwardness, stagnation and subjugation to the West is perceived 
as the groundwork behind Japanese contempt, colonialism and the invasion of Asian countries. In 
contrast to Tōkichi Tarui (1850–1922), who in his Great Eastern Unification Argument in 1885 
proposed the unification of Korea and Japan against the Europeans, the author Hinohara Shōzō 
recommended the establishment of a Leave Asia Society (Datsu-A Kai). He published his idea in 1884 
in the newspaper JiJi Shinpō. See Pekka Korhonen, “Leaving Asia? The Meaning of Datsu-A and 
Japan’s Modern History” in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 50, No. 1 (Dec 2013), pp. 3-12. 
For more on Tarui’s political thoughts and activities see Kyu Hyun Kim, “Tarui Tōkichi’s Arguments 
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and cooperation with China, Japan, albeit belatedly, should have joined the Powers in 
carving spheres of influence and colonizing the East. By putting his high literary skills 
to work he greatly influenced and persuaded his contemporaries to seek an aggressive 
policy of expansion.  
He also viewed Japanese communities abroad as an extension of Japan proper 
and encouraged the immigrants to build Shintō and Buddhist temples and preserve 
their language and customs. These immigrants would lift Japanese prestige abroad as 
well as stimulate commercial activity and economic development at home. Tōkyō for 
its part had to protect them and establish frequent long distance sea lanes. Japanese 
immigrants wherever they settled, had to contribute to the motherland’s development, 
get accustomed with modern technologies and gain respect by attaining a 
distinguished status among the civilized nations of the world. Using the Anglo-Saxon 
type of colonization through migration as a model, Fukazawa, proposed overseas 
agricultural settlements as a means of achieving commercial competitiveness. Thus, 
excess Japanese population3 ought to settle to areas and acquire land still free of 
European domination.4 For Fukuzawa America, with its abundant natural resources 
and enterprising society, also offered great opportunities as a market for Japanese 
commodities. Along these lines the businessman Mutō Sanji (1867-1934) identified 
working abroad and sending remittances back home as a patriotic duty equal to 
paying taxes or fighting a war.5 The journalist Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957) asserted 
that if Japan was to have influence in the world then it had to "develop a policy to 
motivate our people to embark upon great adventure abroad…”. For Tokutomi 
colonization and immigration could provide a solution to Japan’s overpopulation 
problem and could cultivate Japanese ingenuity and enterprise. In 1890 convinced that 
“all great nation[s] of the world are expanding” he wrote about a “Greater Japan”. 
National expansion was to be achieved by peaceful means, trade and immigration 
“which ultimately would lead to colonization”.6  
For many influential intellectuals, immigration would stimulate commercial 
activity and maritime industry and additionally it would settle the internal 
                                                                                                                                                                      
on Behalf of the Union of the Great East, 1893” in  Pan Asianism: A Documentary History, Vol. 1, 
1850—1920, ed. S. Saaler, C. W. A. Szpilman, (Boulder, New York, 2011), pp. 73-83. 
3 In an 1896 article he calculated an annual population increase of almost 400,000 from 1874 to 1884 
and commented: “On the one hand, Japan’s territory is limited, and on the other hand, the population 
grows in such a rapid speed. Under this situation, sooner or later the population will reach the 
quantitative limit and stop reproducing”. Therefore, Japan had to follow Britain’s paradigm and capture 
regions of Asia, Africa and America to direct its immigrant flows. See Sindey Xu Lu, Diasporic 
Imperialism: Japan’s Asia-Pacific Migrations and the making of the Japanese Empire, 1868-1945, 
Ph.D Dissertation University of Pennsylvania (2013), pp. 33-35.  
4  Bill Mihalopoulos, “An Exercise in Good Government: Fukuzawa Yukichi on Emigration and 
Nation-Building” in The Journal of Northeast Asian History, Vol. 9 No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 20-22. 
5 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America, 
(Oxford, 2005), p. 20. 
6  Joanne Marie Lloyd, “Yankees of the Orient”: Yamato and Japanese immigration to America, 
Masters Dissertation, Florida Atlantic University, 1990, pp. 39-42. 
264 
 
socioeconomic problems. The widespread Malthusian theory of population added 
another incentive for the Japanese to immigrate. After the 17th century the population 
of Japan had increased by at least 2.6 times, if not 3.9 times over a 120-year period 
according to the historian Hayami Akira. The Meiji government encouraged 
immigration to maintain social order, lessening the social and political unrest within 
the country. Vulnerable and unstable in its first steps it used this "safety valve" to 
channel abroad the discontent of former samurai and peasants, avoiding potentially 
disastrous uprisings. The demoted, impoverished samurai class hit by the abolition of 
stipends, overpopulation, and unemployment, had in many cases resorted to banditry. 
The pro-tokugawa clans, namely the Aizu, that fought the imperial forces until the 
end during the civil war were considered by Tōkyō as traitors and were treated with 
utmost severity.7 Similarly the peasants, strained by the new land tax passed in 1873 
and Matsukata’s deflation measures (1881-1885), were suffering from the downfall of 
rice, silk and cotton prices and the rise of tenancy rates. Rural families were selling 
their daughters and some of them turned to prostitution at home and abroad.8 Poor and 
landless men in their most productive ages (14-35) abandoned mainly the southern 
Japanese prefectures, the more agrarian-underdeveloped of the country, to seek their 
fortune overseas. 9  Besides economic factors, the disappointment of those who 
nurtured hopes for a new liberal Japan after the Restoration and could not stand the 
conservative, authoritarian central regime, provided another motive to immigrate. 
Nationalistic ideas (Kokutai), religious reverence to the Emperor and unquestionable 
obedience, promoted by formal acts such as the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education 
and the 1887 Peace Preservation Regulations, seemed to strangle any opposing voice. 
Young men that had espoused liberal-democratic ideas, western science and even 
                                                          
7 O, Cultural analysis, pp. 124-131, 66-67.  The Aizu clan was stigmatized as traitorous by the rival 
clans that had prevailed in the 1868-1869 Boshin War. The four main victorious clans, especially the 
Satsuma and the Chōshū (Satchō Alliance) in their effort to retain and monopolize power, utilized the 
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Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great Crisis of 1873, (London-New York, 1992), p. 
244. For Calman the Restoration is just an usurpation or a transfer of power from the Shōgun to the 
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time, as already seen in the previous chapter, the Satchō oligarchy de facto controlled the most crucial 
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masses in general with the exception of the privileged few. Calman though goes a step further in 
asserting that Satchō systematically wiped out the opposition and promoted solely the political and 
commercial interests of its clan members and protégés in parts of Japan and Asia, disguised as acts of 
patriotism, prosperity and modernity from 1868 until 1945. According to Calman the economic 
interests and commercial aspirations of the Tosa, Satsuma, Chōshū and Hizen (Saga) clans in Northern 
Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia and China, explain the birth and evolution of the modern Japanese 
imperialism. In other words, this clique above the law envisioned and carried out ruthlessly a 
meticulously outlined plan of colonial domination, firstly by subjugating their fellow countrymen, after 
they had consolidated their status by silencing the domestic opposition, then by exploiting Japan’s 
periphery and lastly by advocating a plan of world conquest that led to the Second World War.   
8 Mihalopoulos, “An Exercise in Good Government”, pp. 7-8 
9 Nitaya Onozawa, “Immigration from Japan to the USA, Historical Trends and Background” in Tōkyō 
kaseigakuin tsukuba joshi daigaku kiyō, Vol. 7 (2003), pp. 115-117. 
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Christianity were asphyxiating and many of them decided to leave Japan. Some of 
them also desired to avoid the mandatory after 1873 military service at home.  
The 20th century imperialists traced the root of Japan’s “oversees 
development” to labour migrations in Hawaii and Guam in 1868.10 Even earlier, in the 
1880s their predecessors closely associated emigration with colonialism, viewing the 
mobilization of the ordinary people that emigrated abroad as the realization of the 
empire building process. In other words, the settlement of Japanese masses in far or 
more adjacent territories such as Korea11 or China were intertwined with the formal 
colonial ventures of the state. Naturally it was preferable to channel immigrants to 
backward countries with weak governments; Japanese settlers could easily dominate 
the locals and assert Japan’s influence less problematically there than in the US. 
Surplus population and social Darwinism theories, alongside with the ascent of 
nationalism and the imitation of western practices supplemented perfectly the 
“expansive nation” idea, the notion that the Japanese nation was predestined to 
expand. After 1868 for the more radicals, Japan, whose self-imposed seclusion 
suppressed its natural colonizing tendency, was ready to dedicate its energy and 
talents in conquest by leading the East, the “Asian race” against the rival “Aryan” 
one.12 The Seikyōsha (Society for Political Education) founded in 1888, popularized 
the “preservation of the national essence”, emigration-colonization scheme and the 
rejection of Western culture. Deriving originally from the Seikyōsha, the Tōhō kyōkai 
(East Asian society) was founded by Miyake Setsurei (1860-1945) and Fukumoto 
Nichinan or Makoto (1857-1921) in 1891 as a pressure group that encouraged 
Japanese commercial and political penetration to Manchuria, the South Seas and 
Korea. Similar organizations that raised funds and aroused public support for the 
Japanese settlements overseas were the Tōkyō keizaigaku kyōkai (Tōkyō Economic 
Society) founded in 1887 and the Kaigai ijū dōshikai (Friends of Overseas 
Emigration) formed in 1892.13 In the Western hemisphere where Tōkyō’s military and 
economic means were less effective, Japanese imperialists promoted the idea of 
                                                          
10 On 29 April 1868 42 Japanese emigrants moved to Guam under three year contracts. Unpaid and 
mistreated they were brought home by the Japanese government in 1871. It was the first Japanese 
overseas immigration but resulted in failure. See O, Cultural analysis, p. 83. 
11 In 1904 during a parliamentary session a Deputy referred to the installation of 5 million Japanese in 
Korea as a solution to the overpopulation problem, a view shared by the law professor, Katō Masao. 
See Thomas F. Millard, “Japanese Immigration into Korea” in Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 34, No. 2, Chinese and Japanese in America (Sep., 1909), p. 185, pp. 
183-189.  In 1880 835 Japanese residents were recorded in Korea and 166 in Manchuria. A decade later 
they numbered 7,245 and 864 respectively. In 1900 these numbers rose to 15,829 and 3,243. See Peter 
Duus, The Abacus and the Sword The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910, (London-Berkeley, 
1995), p. 290. 
12 Eiichiro Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development”: Japanese American History and the 
Making of Expansionist Orthodoxy in Imperial Japan” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 67, No. 4 
(Nov., 2008), pp. 1192. 
13 Mihalopoulos, “An Exercise in Good Government”, pp. 14-15. 
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“peaceful expansionism”14 as the historian Akira Iriye put it. Japanese immigrants in 
North and South America and Hawaii were urged to act as colonial settlers and to 
“create centers of economic and social activities closely linked with the mother 
country”. The superior qualities and industriousness of these patriotic pioneers of 
Japanese expansion ensured the feasibility of the plan against all odds: white 
oppression, racism and the occasional lack of governmental support.15 
On 5 August 1891 Enomoto Takeaki in his capacity as Foreign Minister 
established the Emigration Department as a subdivision of his Ministry. The goal was 
to promote long-term Japanese agricultural settlements as a solution to the socio-
economic problems at home and as a measure to improve the life and working 
conditions of the immigrants abroad. A more efficient state control over the migrant 
labour contracts was high in Enomoto’s agenda. 16  The misconduct of Japanese 
immigrants amidst the unequal treaties revision strife was injuring the nation’s 
prestige. It also entailed the political danger of associating Japanese nationals with 
Chinese degeneration in western eyes.17 In addition the government was preoccupied 
about its obvious inability to protect its overseas citizens in case of need. Settler 
emigration for the Minister meant acquisition of territories overseas in 
“underdeveloped regions with the objective of opening up the land and increasing its 
productivity” by employing “Japanese capital and labor”. However, the Emigration 
Department failed to attract popular support besides Fukuzawa’s newspaper Jiji 
Shimpō that shared Enamoto’s conviction for the moral and economic benefits of the 
Japanese settlements overseas.18 
The first Japanese political refuges came to America in the spring of 1869 
from the victimized Aizu region. It was the first organized mass immigration to the 
US.19 Financially aided by the Aizu daimyo, a group of 40 ex-samurai was able to buy 
                                                          
14 Iriye explains his concept: “The line between emigration and colonization was rather tenuous. Most 
authors, advocating massive overseas emigration, were visualizing the creation of Japanese 
communities overseas as centers of economic and social activities closely linked to the mother 
country....Though the outright use of force was not envisaged, such a situation would be much closer to 
colonization than to mere emigration - like the massive English colonization of the North American 
continent. Thus, “peaceful expansionism” did not simply mean the passive emigration of individual 
Japanese, but could imply a government-sponsored, active programme of overseas settlement and 
positive activities to tie distant lands closer to Japan”, see Azuma, Between Two Empires, p.  22. 
15 Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development”, pp. 1193-1194. 
16 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the “Law for the Protection of Japanese Women in Foreign 
Countries” to avert Japanese women from “conducting themselves shamelessly abroad” in March 1891. 
See Mihalopoulos, “An Exercise in Good Government”, p. 19.  
17 Prominent members of the Japanese community in San Francisco such as Ōsawa Eizo in 1899 and 
Akamine Seiichiro in 1886, pointed out to their state’s consular authorities the risk of the scorned 
Chinese being associated with Japanese nationals. See Ryo Yoshida, “Japanese Immigrants and Their 
Christian Communities in North America: A Case Study of the Fukuinkai, 1877-1896” in Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, Christians in Japan (2007), pp. 237-239. 
18 Mihalopoulos, “An Exercise in Good Government”, pp. 15-18. 
19 Hirohisa Kawaguchi, "Henry Schnell and Japanese Immigration to the United States" in Journal of 
International Relations, Asia University, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1991), pp. 344-345. 
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600 acres of land at Gold Hill in Coloma, El Dorado County, California in June 1869. 
This is how the first Japanese settlement in America came into being under the title 
Wakamatsu Tea and Silk Colony. A few years later the endeavour failed; the settlers, 
without protection or assistance from Tōkyō, struggled for 8 more years until 1879. 
After the colony's liquidation, the rest of them dispersed and very little is known 
about their fate.20 The first attempt to establish a new Japan failed but the endeavour 
paved the way for other Japanese agricultural colonies in the American West coast. 
The following years in other North American territories similar enterprises sprung out 
by men with little agricultural experience.21 They were liberals, many of them newly 
converted to Christianity and in search of a utopian society free of the conservatism 
and severity of the highly stratified Japanese society.22 The unexpected hardships and 
the discrimination policies they faced in the United States compelled them to 
relinquish these “Yamato”23 colonies and return home. Still the Wakamatsu colony 
and in particular one of its members, a 17-year-old girl presumably called Okei were 
glorified by the expansionists as precursors of the Japanese colonial enterprise in 
Asia. Okei, depicted as the forerunner of the Japanese growth overseas epitomized 
colonization in popular culture, which through novels and films, presented the 
Japanese immigrants to Manchuria as Okei’s worthy disciples. In the face of a brave, 
                                                          
20 O, Cultural analysis, pp. 69-71. 
21  In 1887 Inoue Kakugorō led a party of 30 Japanese settlers in California with the purpose of 
establishing an agricultural colony in Valley Springs, Calaveras County. There he acquired 20 acres of 
land under the auspices and financial support of Fukuzawa. Inoue had fully adopted his benefactor’s 
line of thought: “…no reason exists for Japan to remain a small, isolated island in the Orient. Japanese 
should go to foreign lands without hesitation and select suitable places to live. They must not forget 
Japan, however, in normal or other times. They should consume Japanese products for daily necessities 
and they should start businesses which will benefit the homeland. The more emigration flourishes, the 
further our national power expand…”. Shūyū Sanjin, editor of a guide for prospective Japanese 
immigrants in America, one of the many circulating in 1880s Japan, exclaimed even more 
enthusiastically in 1887:  “Come merchants! America is a veritable human paradise, the number one 
mine in the world. Gold, silver, and gems are scattered on her streets. If you can figure out a way of 
picking them up, you’ll become rich instantly to the tune of ten million and be able to enjoy ultimate 
human pleasures. Come artisans! Sculptors, lacquerers, carpenters, painters-anyone skilled in the least 
in the Japanese arts-can earn a lot of money by making fans, ceramics and lacquerware. Come 
students…”. See Yuji Ichioka, The Issei. The world of the first generation Japanese Immigrants 1885-
1924, (London-New York, 1988), pp. 10-11. 
22 An example of such a society was the Brotherhood of the New Life created by Thomas Lake Harris 
(1823-1906). Harris accompanied by some Satsuma men travelled first to Wassaic, next to Amenia 
New York and finally at Brocton where the New Life colony was established in August 1867. More 
Japanese joined the Brotherhood in the following months. Ultimately Kanaye Nagasawa (1852-1934) 
inherited the colony which under his leadership became more agricultural-commercial than “utopian”. 
Despite the mass departure of his compatriots Nagasawa and Harris planned to create a huge agrarian 
colony of Japanese immigrants on the west coast of Mexico in the late 1890s. The project did not 
materialize due to their failure to attract funding. See John E Van Sant, Pacific Pioneers, Japanese 
Journeys to America and Hawaii 1850-80, (Chicago, 2000), pp. 82-91. For more on Harris’ colony, see 
William S. Bailey, “The Harris Community: Brotherhood of The New Life” in New York History, Vol. 
16, No. 3 (July 1935), pp. 278-285. 
23 The Yamato term differentiates the mainland Japanese from the other ethnic groups residing in the 
islands. It derives from the Yamato province where in the 4th century the imperial court was initially 
seated.  
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pure (purportedly died a virgin) young girl that was the first recorded Japanese 
woman to die and be buried in the United States, the colonialists in Tōkyō constructed 
a romantic legend that exalted Japanese agrarianism, morality, tenacity and 
expansion.24  
After the 1892 American ban on Chinese immigration the number of the 
Japanese seeking employment and a better life in West America was in the rise. 
Mexicans, Southern Asians, Filipinos and Japanese were fervently sought to perform 
the most physically arduous tasks. 25 Consequently the numbers of Japanese 
immigrants exploded in a similar fashion. The US census of 1880 recorded 
approximately 150 Japanese in the mainland while the 1890 census recorded 2,292. In 
1900 this number reached 24,000. 26  However by 1891, based on congressional 
legislation, officers of the American Treasury Department commenced patrols for 
what the press was calling the "Dirty Japanese". Between 1891 and 1909 Tōkyō 
sought to promote the immigration only of those worthy to represent the nation 
abroad.27 On 4 May 1892 the newspaper Morning Call declared: "Japanese Pouring 
In: ‘Put up the Bars,’ Say Our Working People; Immigration on the Increase; What 
Collector Phelps Says of the Outlook; Bad for Our Boys and Girls; Street Filled with 
Japanese Sirens, Anarchists from the Mikado’s Realm".28 This discrimination and 
prejudicial treatment could only injure the pride of a nation that since 1868 had done 
literally everything to be treated as equal. These restrictions resulted in illegal 
practices by private immigration companies; after 1894 Tōkyō delegated the 
immigration enterprise to private firms (Meiji Emigration Company, Yokohama 
Emigration Company, Nihon Yoshisa Emigration Company and others). The Japanese 
in the US were mostly absorbed in agricultural, railroad, fishery, mills and smelters' 
enterprises, earning less than the Italians, Greeks and East European immigrants but 
more than the Mexicans and the Chinese.29 Tōkyō, preoccupied that the wrong kind of 
people were going to the US, temporarily prohibited travel to North America on 2 
August 1900.30  
The most popular destination for the Japanese immigration flow however, was 
undoubtedly Hawaii. The Hawaiian government was in urgent need for foreign 
working hands for its sugar plantations. The first mass Japanese emigration to Hawaii 
was initiated in 1868. Extreme poverty pushed many Japanese to immigrate to 
Hawaii. Working literally as slaves many died due to exhaustion and lack of medical 
                                                          
24 Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development”, pp. 1200-1205. 
25 Raymond Leslie Buell, "The Development of the Anti-Japanese Agitation in the United States" in 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1922), p. 606. 
26 Yamato Ichihashi, Japanese Immigration, its status in California, (San Francisco, 1915), pp. 3-5. 
27Mitziko Sawada, "Culprits and Gentlemen: Meiji Japan's Restrictions of Emigrants to the United 
States, 1891- 1909" in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), pp. 341-342. 
28 O, Cultural analysis, pp. 306, 375. 
29 H. A. Millis, "Some of the Economic Aspects of Japanese Immigration" in The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1915), pp. 791-792.  
30 Sawada, "Culprits and Gentlemen", p. 348. 
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care. After the end of the civil war the government took prompt measures. In 
September 1869, it sent Ueno Kagenori (1845–1888), as special envoy to negotiate 
with Hawaiian authorities the matter of the inhumane treatment. The pressure exerted 
by Ueno resulted to improved wages and living conditions for the Japanese labourers. 
On 19 August 1871 Japan and Hawaii signed the Treaty of Amity which allowed 
Japanese labour immigration to Hawaii.31  
On 4 March 1881, the Hawaiian ruler, King David Kalakaua (1838–1891) 
arrived at Tōkyō as part of an international diplomatic tour and asked Emperor Meiji 
to send immigrants to Hawaii as a means of resolving the shortage of labourers on the 
sugar plantations. King Kalakaua offered his niece’s hand to Prince Higashifushimi 
Yoshihito (1867–1922) for the formation of a royal alliance between the Hawaiian 
Kingdom and Japan.32 Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru believed that immigration to 
Hawaii would stimulate commercial activity, banking, shipbuilding and the influx of 
foreign currency so vital for the state's modernization efforts.33 The politician Ōishi 
Masami (1855–1935) analysed the "relation between shipping, emigration, and the 
expansion of Japanese trade" and gave his consent for the "peaceful emigration of 
Japanese overseas". Thus, expansion (a commercial and not a territorial one) was to 
be achieved by gaining trading footholds in foreign lands which Japan could utilize as 
market for its exports and upon which it would exert economic dominance. The 
professor of Japanese history, Kobayashi Masaaki regarded shipping lines and in 
particular Mitsubishi as "the large private enterprise in Japan which adroitly utilized 
the ‘nationalism of the government’". The governments of Japan and Hawaii finally 
reached an agreement on 30 June 1884. No restrictions would be imposed as long as 
the rights and safety of Japanese labourers were guaranteed.34   
                                                          
31 Ibid., pp. 86-90. 
32 According to the US State Department, from 1785 to 1895 there were 103 American interventions in 
the affairs of foreign nations such as Hawaii and the Caribbean and South American states. The king of 
Hawaii proposed to Emperor Meiji a "Union and Federation of Asiatic Nations and Sovereigns" as 
means of evading the US grip and preserving his state's contested independence. Kalakaua was even 
disposed to offer Hawaiian territory to lure Tokyo into an alliance. Kalakaua was prepared to go further 
than that. He approached London asking modern firearms and formal protection against external (US) 
intervention. He sought to consolidate his state's integrity by expanding its territory. In 1883 he 
dispatched missions to the New Hebrides and Gilbert Islands and devised plans to annex Samoa and 
the Tonga Islands. As anticipated, the leading powers interested in the region namely the US and 
Germany did not allow a new player to interfere with their imperialistic plans in the Pacific. See Gerald 
Horne, The White Pacific: US Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War, 
(Honolulu, 2007), pp. 103-115. 
33 Inoue hailed from Yamaguchi and was aware of the serious socioeconomic problems his hometown, 
Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Hiroshima and the southern regions in general faced; he suggested these 
prefectures, due to their agricultural tradition, as the main areas for recruiting labourers for Hawaii. 
96% of all Japanese immigrants during the period 1885-1895 period originated from these four 
prefectures. See Alan Takeo Moriyama, Imingaisha: Japanese Emigration Companies and Hawaii, 
1894-1908, (Honolulu, 1985), p. 13. 
34The grim economic situation and oppressive policies gave rise to the liberal "Freedom and People's 
Rights Movement" in the 1880s. Apprehensive of this threat to the authority of central government, the 
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However, due to the June 1887 coup d'etat in Honolulu, when the white 
oligarchs forced the king to grant them a favourable constitution, the rights of suffrage 
and naturalization were rescinded; suffrage was granted only to Caucasian men of 
twenty years or over who were able to read and write Hawaiian, English, or other 
European languages. Whereas it was obvious that the provisional government was 
uneasy about the massive Japanese presence on the islands, Inoue was elaborating the 
eventuality of bringing Hawaii under Japanese influence. The next Foreign Minister 
and simultaneously Prime Minister Itō entered into discussions with Honolulu in 
order to obtain voting rights for the Japanese labourers in Hawaii. These efforts did 
not come to fruition. As a result of the establishment of the pro-American Republic of 
Hawaii on 4 July 1894, the 29,069 Japanese citizens that had immigrated to Hawaii 
between 1885 and 1894 were left unprotected, without legal rights and mistreated in a 
country preparing for its annexation by the United States. In the 1890s American 
expansionists viewed Hawaii as a naval base to defend the West Coast and as a 
commercial centre on the way to the Asian markets.35 
The white sugar plant owners overthrew the monarchy and on the 1st of 
February 1893 proclaimed Hawaii a US protectorate and dispatched envoys to 
Washington for the coveted annexation. The US government had been already leasing 
Pearl Harbor as a naval base since 1866. However, the new President Stephen Grover 
Cleveland (1837-1908) did not proceed to an outright annexation probably because 
his party, the Democrats, desired an Americanized Hawaii and were opposing the 
incorporation of numerous Chinese and Japanese inhabitants to the United States. 
Racism seemed to halt the annexation process that had been envisioned by American 
politicians since the 1850s. The American Minister in the islands John Leavitt 
Stevens (1820-1895) claimed in 1894 that if "the present state of things is allowed to 
go on… the Asiatics will soon be largely preponderate".36 On 9 February 1893 the 
American newspaper The Nation wrote disapprovingly about the eventuality of 
awarding US citizenship to a population of "natives recently emerged from slavery" 
and The Chicago Herald claimed Hawaii would be "a pigmy State of the Union". In 
February 1893, the New York Herald asserted: "It would be a curious thing indeed to 
someday have a close election for President of the United States settled by the votes 
of semi-barbaric Sandwich Islanders, whose grandfathers were cannibals, aided by 
Chinese and Japanese and Papuan laborers".37 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Meiji leaders seriously began considering overseas emigration as an alternative option to suppress the 
movement. During the Matsukata deflation policy (1881-1885) there were over 28,000 applications for 
immigration labour, a number that highlighted the terrible domestic situation. See O, Cultural analysis, 
pp. 111, 134-135. 
35 Ibid., pp. 136-155. 
36 Eric T. L. Love, Race over Empire, Racism and US Imperialism 1865-1900, (Chapper Hill, London, 
2004), pp. 73-79. 
37 In January 1893 even the geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan urged his government to act before any 
other power in order for Hawaii to "be an outpost of European civilization" and not "of the comparative 
barbarism of China”. He asked for the expansion of the American naval armaments programme and a 
robust policy against Tōkyō. See Love, Race over Empire, pp. 102-108. 
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While President Cleveland seemed sceptical about the islands' future the white 
oligarchs proclaimed the Republic of Hawaii on 4 July 1894. In March the new 
establishment assembly for the drafting of a constitution, did not include any Asian 
representative even though according to the Hawaiian census of 1895, native 
Hawaiians numbered 31,000, the Japanese 24,400, the Chinese 21,600, the Portuguese 
15,100, the Americans 3,000, the British 2,200, the Germans 1,400 and 8,400 were of 
mixed race. Despite the abuse and the hardships another 40,000 Japanese made the 
journey and settled in Hawaii during the 1894-1900 period.38 Tōkyō witnessing the 
upheaval and the danger for its citizens sent the battleship Naniwa to Hawaii. Arriving 
on 23 February 1893, captain Togo Heihachiro (1848-1934) the future Russo-
Japanese war hero, in command of the Naniwa declared: "Now that we have laid 
anchor in Honolulu, you will have to consider this ship an extension of our country. 
Be careful in your actions as your every move will reflect on the honor of our nation. 
Should occasion arise, we must be prepared to act decisively and with courage as 
befitting our nation’s warriors". The reason behind Togo’s actions was the Republic 
of Hawaii’s refusal of entry to 713 out of 902 immigrants on 27 February and 20 
March since they did not possess the required by the 1894 Act 50-dollar guarantee 
fee. 39  In Japan outraged citizens protested about the maltreatment of their 
countrymen. In late 1896, 42 immigrants were forced to return to Japan. The 
frequency of these episodes and the denial of suffrage for the Japanese immigrants 
damaged bilateral relations and immigration to Hawaii was suspended.40 
The Japanese consul at Honolulu Shimamura Hisashi announced after the 
1896 episode that an imperial warship would arrive and anchor at the capital's port 
permanently. He justified this action by asserting that in Hawaii there was the largest 
concentration of Japanese outside the home country. On 18 March 1897, he requested 
the arrival of a warship: “to exhibit our power and protect 26,000 Japanese almost 
one-fourth of the total population of Hawaii". Once again under Togo, Naniwa left 
Yokohama for Hawaii in May 1897. This fact relieved the Japanese immigrants but 
alarmed the white Hawaiians.41 The American Secretary of the Navy, John Davis 
Long (1838-1915) ordered its staff to revise the current naval war plan and account 
for the possibility of a Japanese-American war. Within three months Rear 
Admiral Montgomery Sicard (1836-1900) devised the first American war plan against 
Japan. The fear of a massive Japanese riot against the pro-American Hawaiian regime 
intensified Washington's naval presence in those waters: four warships would guard 
Honolulu and patrol the surrounding area in search of Japanese activity. During the 
same time 50,000 dollars were earmarked for investment to Pearl Harbor's naval 
base.42 
                                                          
38 Ibid., p. 116. 
39 O, Cultural analysis, pp. 110-112. 
40 Ibid., pp. 106-112. 
41 William Michael Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins of the Hawaiian Annexation Treaty of 1897" 
in Diplomatic History, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Sept. 1982), pp. 27-28.  
42 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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President William McKinley (1843-1901) succeeded Cleveland on 4 March 
1897 and as early as June took measures for the long-awaited annexation. The white 
dominant class calculating the rate of Japanese workers pouring into Hawaii to a 
thousand per month urged Washington to act swiftly. They suggested the annulment 
of the contract labour system as a means of securing Christianity’s and American 
civilization’s victory over the "Asian hordes" and the "Mongolian supremacy". On 16 
March 1898 during the annexation talks the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
apparently referring to the Asian menace known as yellow peril, proposed swift action 
"to prevent the establishment of an alien and possibly hostile stronghold in a position 
commanding the Pacific coast and the commerce of the North Pacific". On 19 April 
1897 Theodore Roosevelt Jr. (1858-1919) was appointed Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy. Being an ardent expansionist himself, he added his voice to those advocating 
the swift annexation of the islands. The 9 April 1897 Chicago Tribune read: “the 
invasion of the Asiatics can be stopped only by immediate annexation". 
The politician Hoshi Tōru (1850-1901) in his effort to stall the annexation 
informed the Secretary of State, John Sherman (1823-1900) that Tōkyō was against 
this eventuality because of the possible infringement of the Japanese interests 
guaranteed by the previous agreements with Hawaii. Sherman replied in April 1897 
that legitimate Japanese rights would be respected. On 12 April, the Hawaiian consul 
in Yokohama reported that the Japanese masses were "most belligerent". On the same 
day, the American Minister in Tōkyō warned that the denial of entry to the 
immigrants spurred warlike feelings in the Japanese press. He concluded that Tōkyō 
had to dispatch imperial warships in order to satiate the people's thirst for retaliation. 
Sherman knew that even a single battleship could bring a state like Hawaii without 
navy or army to its knees. For this reason, he dispatched a flotilla of the Navy 
Department to Honolulu. On May 18 the special emissary Akiyama Masanosuke 
(1866-1937) was dispatched to investigate the entry denials. A potential Japanese 
demand for compensation concealed a greater danger for Washington: if Hawaii 
denied to pay, Japan could, potentially, resort to force. If Honolulu were to concede 
voting rights as a result of Tōkyō's pressures the dominant pro-annexationist clique 
would be marginalized by the numerically preponderant Japanese community. 43 
Akiyama did demand an indemnity; after 14 months of negotiations he obtained 
$75,000 as compensation. Furthermore, he pressed for the right to reside, travel and 
trade, legal protection, suffrage rights and a formal assurance that Japanese 
immigrants would never again be subjected to arbitrary treatment. Despite the 
legitimacy of these demands, Roosevelt in June 1897 was pressing for war in order to 
impede Japan from utilizing the immigration dispute as a pretext for occupying the 
                                                          
43 Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins", pp. 35-37. Japan’s firm attitude against a Great Power would 
have been unthinkable 10 years before. In 1897 though Tōkyō was revitalized by the splendid victory 
over China in 1894-1895 and the partial annulment of the unequal treaties. Thus, it enjoyed a position 
of a greater respect and equality internationally. This fact surely made its politicians, diplomats and 
common people more optimistic, robust and far less submissive in their dealings with Western or Asian 
representatives.   
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islands. On May 22 Shimamura now as Minister in Honolulu visited the Foreign 
Ministry to receive the Hawaiian government's final answer. When it was conveyed to 
him that an official response was still underway Shimamura replied that no more time 
would be granted. As a result the Japanese Minister in Hawaii informed the local 
press that "Japan wants nothing unreasonable; she wants fairness and justice in the 
matter-nothing else. If she cannot get it-well, I do not know what will follow... the 
honor of Japan is at stake... If I cannot get a reasonable answer to my request I may go 
home, and perhaps someone else will have better success. If I withdraw, you know 
what follows. I hope it will not reach that point". Shimamura's firm stance was 
interpreted as a Japanese formal ultimatum by Washington.44 
Roosevelt advised McKinley that an annexation treaty would discourage 
Tōkyō and would prove how strongly Washington felt about the matter. According to 
Senator Georg Frisbie Hoar (1826-1904), McKinley confessed while talking about the 
islands: "Japan has her eye on them. Her people are crowding in there. I am satisfied 
that they do not go there voluntarily, as ordinary immigrants, but that Japan is 
pressing them in there in order to get possession before anybody can interfere. If 
something is not done, there will be before long another revolution and Japan will get 
control. That rival and predatory nation, is doubtless waiting her opportunity." Geared 
up by such theories and notions of Anglo-Saxonism as opposed to Pan-Asianism or 
Pan-Slavism, the House of Representatives passed the annexation act (209 to 91) on 
15 June 1898. The American Senate did likewise on 6 July (42 to 21).45 The State 
Department informed Hoshi on 16 June that the Japanese-Hawaiian treaties were 
annulled and superseded on the basis of the previous Japanese-American treaties. Due 
to the subsequent Japanese protests the US maintained armed forces in Hawaii. 
McKinley's administration ignored the Japanese demands and Tōkyō gradually 
withdrew them.46 In the meantime, many Japanese had left the islands to settle in the 
continental US, where wages were higher.47 The Americans decided to absorb the 
island kingdom for reasons of strategic security. Japan on the other hand tried not to 
annex Hawaii but to exert some influence in order to defend the interests of its 
nationals there but without success. Occupying a territory so far away from home was 
not a feasible option for Tōkyō at the moment. The fact that it found the courage to 
clash with a Great Power over the protection of its immigrants is explained by Japan’s 
resolution to be respected and recognized as a first class state abroad.  
Besides the overpopulation problem and the need to protect the immigrant 
nuclei Japanese colonialists draw their inspiration from the nation’s long historical 
tradition. For this reason, we must take several steps back in history to explore the 
very origins of Japan’s modern drive for colonies. Naturally enough the first colonial 
                                                          
44 Ibid., pp.  39-40. 
45 Love, Race over Empire, pp. 145-156. 
46 Morgan, "The Anti-Japanese Origins", pp. 42-44. 
47 Yuzo Murayama, "Information and Emigrants: Interprefectual Differences of Japanese Emigration to 
the Pacific Northwest, 1880-1915", in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), 
pp. 125-129.  
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pretensions were aimed and directed beyond the familiar Tsushima strait, towards 
ancient Korea. The Nihon Shoki or Nihongi, known as the Chronicles of Japan was 
completed in 720 AD and is Japan’s oldest historical record along with the Kojiki 
(712 AD). Both literary works cannot be considered accurate historical sources. In 
regard to Korea, the Nihongi asserts that in 29 BC the kingdom of Minama was 
founded. Many Japanese considered Minama to be an ancient outpost of Japanese 
influence in the peninsula. 48  Apart from geostrategic considerations, traditional 
folkloric elements blended with debatable historical facts were employed to legitimize 
Japanese claims over their ill-fated neighbour in the 16th and in the 19th centuries.49 
Such is the case of the legendary empress Jingū Kōgō, considered and revered as the 
conqueror of Korea, who, according to the Kojiki and Nihongi chronicles, reigned 
from 201 AD to 269 AD. Her role and very existence is controversial. Since at the 
time we cannot speak about “Japan” and “Korea” as state entities the tradition of war 
and conquest is more probable a later manufactured narrative. For a few modern-day 
scholars there is a core of historical facts behind the legend.50 Scientifically unproven 
the “first invasion of Korea” holds little relative value. However, Jingū Kōgō’s 
depictions inscribed on the Ema, the wooden wishing plaques offered at Shintō 
Shrines, suggests the impact and legend’s attraction to the lower masses’ psyche in 
the 19th century. Especially in Southern Japan, home of the most conservative and 
militant societies in the archipelago and closer geographically to Korea the popularity 
of the supposed conquest cannot be seen as merely a popular folklore story. The 
shrines where the Ema were dedicated were meeting and discussion points for the 
local community. Many distressed by the foreign danger identified the annexation of 
Korea as a viable solution to the nation’s problems. A most likely fictitious figure 
provided inspiration for an actual compelling issue such as the relations of the state 
with its neighbours. This is how susceptible to mystical and allegorical imageries 
Japanese temperament was in the 19th century.51 
                                                          
48 The fact that the Japanese never forgot their overseas legacy is confirmed by two testimonies. The 
politician Hirano Kuniomi (1828-64) asserted in the early 1860s that Japan ”must reconquer Korea and 
restore the prefecture of Minama” as a step towards global hegemony. Much later in the 1910 issue of 
the History and Geography journal, the editor celebrating the annexation of Korea to the Japanese 
empire that year commented on the glorious event by mentioning that the Japanese in 663 AD had lost 
their influence in Korea but the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars finally “completed” the work 
that had started in the ancient times. See Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent. 
A Study in the History of Japan with Special Reference to Her International Relations with China, 
Korea, and Russia, Vol. 1, (Berkeley, 1937), pp. 194-195, 241-242 
49 Richard W. Anderson, ”Jingū Kōgō "Ema" in Southwestern Japan: Reflections and Anticipations of 
the "Seikanron" Debate in the Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji Period” in Asian Folklore Studies, Vol. 
61, No. 2 (2002), p. 253.  
50 According to Kojiki, Jingū Kōgō, in charge of her army and guided by the gods, ultimately 
subjugated Korea. In the same records the story of Sun Goddess Amataretsu’s brother Susanoo-no-
Mikoto (mythical), god of sea and storms is found. According to some (Japanese) interpretations 
Susanoo settled in Korea and was the ancestor of the first legendary king of Korea Dangun Wanggeom. 
See Okakura, Kakuzō, The awakening of Japan, (London, 1905), pp. 203-204. 
51 Anderson,”Jingū Kōgō”, pp. 257-264. 
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The annihilation of the Mongolian armies during the invasions of 1274 and 
1281 convinced some Japanese that they were invincible and under divine protection. 
China’s eventual defeat in the hands of barbarian hordes contrasted with Japanese 
martial supremacy and dispersed the traditional feeling of respect and fear towards the 
great continental empire in later centuries.52 China came to be seen as vulnerable, 
feeble, savage and was scorned by many Japanese. In the 14th century some of them 
turned to piracy; they ravaged not only ships but also villages and cities, killing, 
plundering and taking prisoners along the Korean and Chinese coasts. They were 
called Wakō, “dwarf pirates”, a term deriving from the Chinese that used this insult to 
mock the Japanese.53 The first large scale wave of violence struck Korea in the 1220s 
but it was between 1376 and 1385 that 174 pirate raids (228 or even 346 according to 
other scholars) took place.54 From 1440 to 1550 Chinese records mention only 25 
Wakō raids but in the decade between 1551 to 1560 no less than 467 are documented. 
Japanese scholars to this day minimize the participation of their countrymen in these 
onslaughts shifting the blame to the Chinese. They stress that the few Japanese that 
ventured in the continent were misunderstood, in search of mutually beneficial 
commerce and carried weapons merely for self-defence. Other Asian historians seem 
less sceptical about their role.55 
For the Koreans, the biggest Wakō raid was the Japanese invasion of 1592. 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi the warlord that brought an end to the warring states period 
(Sengoku Jidai 1467-1603), a time of constant conflict and utter disorder, envisioned 
a great condimental empire under his reign. For the samurai and even the monks that 
shared his vision, the primordial conquest of Korea by Empress Jingū justified the 
venture.56 The great unifier in 1591 set the date of his continental invasion. The 
historian Tanaka Yoshinari wrote in 1905 that the invasion was the realization of the 
Japanese manifested destiny. 57 Korea was entirely overrun despite China’s 
intervention.58 The other Asian countries would soon follow according to Hideyoshi’s 
world domination plan. However, despite the overwhelming victories against the 
                                                          
52 In a 1118 communication, the Chinese Emperor addressed the Japanese Emperor as the “Chief of the 
tribe of Eastern Barbarians” and demanded tributary offerings. See Kuno, Japanese Expansion, Vol. 1, 
p. 68.  
53  For more information on the Wakō activity, see M.S. Seoh, “A Brief Documentary Survey of 
Japanese Pirate Activities in Korea in the 13th-15th Centuries” in Journal of Korean Studies (1969-
1971), Vol. 1, No. 1 (July-December 1969), pp. 23-39 and Peter D. Shapinsky, “Predators, Protectors, 
and Purveyors: Pirates and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan” in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 64, No. 
2 (Autumn, 2009), pp. 273-313. 
54 Diachronic acts of Japanese aggression are well remembered and documented in Korean ancient 
historical records. In short, between 14 BC and 493 AD more than 20 invasions, sieges and acts of 
looting are diligently recorded. Ibid., pp. 214-217. 
55  Jurgis Elisonas, "The Inseparable Trinity: Japan's Relations with China and Korea", in The 
Cambridge History of Japan, volume 4, Early Modern Japan, ed. J. W. Hall, M. B. Jansen, (New York, 
Cambridge, 1991, pp. 249-253. 
56 Ibid., p. 265.  
57 Ibid., pp. 269-270. 
58 Kuno, Japanese Expansion, Vol. 1, pp. 151-152.  
276 
 
Chinese-Korean forces the Japanese evacuated Korea without any gains after 
Hideyoshi’s death on 18 August 1598. For Koreans the seven-year war evokes enmity 
and deep rancour against the Japanese to this day. Literature works and monuments 
were built to remind to the upcoming generations the devastation, cruelty and 
atrocities of the first Japanese occupation. 59  The Japanese were the only ones to 
emerge from the conflict with some profit, albeit cultural. No territorial gains were 
gained much less an Asiatic empire. Around 50,000 Koreans were sent forcibly to 
Japan and they brought with them books, Buddhist scriptures, Confucianism and 
superior techniques in printing, weaving and porcelain ware manufacture. More 
importantly the war provided inspiration to the 19th Japanese and convinced them that 
fighting the feeble mainlanders, meant certain victory.60  
Japanese imperial ambitions were not confined just in the mainland though. 
During the campaign and ecstatic by the first brilliant victories Hideyoshi planned to 
annex Formosa (Taiwan), Borneo, Philippines, Burma, India and Persia. He sent a 
series of letters demanding subordination to his divine rule to the king of Korea, the 
Portuguese viceroy of Goa in India and the Spanish governor of the Philippines 
among others.61 In November 1593 he composed a letter to the ruler of Formosa 
demanding his submission by dispatching a tribute bearing emissary as a sign of 
subordination: “The Philippines and Liu Chiu (Ryūkyū) have sent tributary-bearing 
envoys to our country, thus showing due reverence. […] Your country, however, has 
not yet sent any envoy to our military headquarters. This lack of loyalty will certainly 
bring the curse of Heaven upon you[…] if you should fail to pay due reverence, we 
shall immediately instruct our military leaders to invade your country and to inflict 
severe punishment”. The Japanese messenger unable to locate any form of central 
authority in Taiwan returned home bringing the letter with him”.62  
Hideyoshi’s successor was the last of the three unifiers. Tokugawa Ieyasu was 
the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate that was to last from 1603 to 1867. Unlike his 
predecessor, he was not obsessed with overseas territorial expansion. Instead he 
strived to make Japan Asia’s most important economic and commercial power. In 
1609 peace with Korea was restored and a trade treaty went into effect. In the spring 
                                                          
59 In February 1593, the Japanese forces in Seoul destroyed the city “killing to a man all the Chinamen 
(Tōjin) that there were in the capital and burning all the houses outside the [Japanese] fortifications”. 
Many Koreans were put to death or mutilated indiscriminately during the occupation. Collecting noses 
and ears was a token of martial valour for the invaders. They preserved them in salt, dispatched them to 
the Inspectors General in barrels and shipped them to Japan. Between September and October 1597 just 
one unit submitted 18,350 noses. Even today the “Mount of ears” can be seen in Kyōtō. See Ibid., pp. 
280, 290-291.  
60 For some an unbroken hereditary link existed between the first invasion by Jingū Kōgō, Hideyoshi’s 
expedition and the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895). It was employed to reaffirm every time the 
Japanese claims in Korea. See Carlo Haushofer, Il Giappone costruisce il suo Impero, Trans. A. 
Pedineli, (Florence, 1942) p. 206. 
61 Ubaldo Iaccorino, “Il Giappone e le Filipine Spagnole, (1592-1594): La Minaccia di Hideyoshi” in Il 
Giappone, Vol. 46 (2008), pp. 5-16. 
62 Haushofer, Il Giappone,  pp. 313-323. 
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of the same year Ieyasu instructed the lord of Satsuma to invade the Ryūkyū kingdom. 
Ryūkyū was a vassal state of the Ming empire, which by becoming also a Japanese 
dependency, could act as an intermediary between China and Japan and facilitate 
commercial relations. His trade policy failed in China but not in the rest of South East 
Asia; a revived ocean going commercial navy of 198 vessels established regular trade 
connection with the main commercial nodes between Japan and India: Malay, Siam,63 
Annam, Java, Formosa, Cambodia, Batavia, Borneo, Timor, Celebes and Macao64 in 
which Japanese communities started taking shape.65  
In February 1609 Ieyasu claimed: “Siam, Cambodia, and many other far-off 
nations have rendered due reverence to us by sending their trade ships annually, but 
Formosa, which is situated so close to our country, has not established any relations 
with us. This is an international outrage which we cannot overlook. Therefore, you, 
Lord of Arima, are hereby instructed to send a military expedition to that island and 
take necessary steps”. Arima’s (Arima Harunobu 1567–1612) orders were to engage 
in hostilities in case the Formosans “stubbornly oppose” him, study the local 
products66 and navigate the island’s coastline drawing a sketch map. Arima also had 
to arrange the terms of the Chinese-Japanese commercial dealings in Taiwan and 
bring back with him forcibly or not Taiwanese envoys. It was a scouting expedition to 
a potential trading post with the continent that was backed by considerable force. The 
Japanese clashed with the natives and captured some tribesmen that were presented to 
the Shogun upon their arrival. In 1616 a similar expedition was arranged. On 4 May 
4,000 men (some historian doubt this estimate) on board 13 war vessels encountered a 
hurricane en route to Formosa. The disastrous result was that only one ship reached 
Taiwan, a meagre force to invade the unruly island. The Japanese failures of 1593, 
1609 and 1616 can be attributed to the very nature of Taiwan. What frustrated the 
Japanese was the total lack of central authority, the absence of a general leader that 
would be forced or lured into tributary relations. In contrast the politically fragmented 
tribes were conquered rather easily by the Dutch, who employed the language of trade 
and gunpowder rather than the language of the tributary system. The Dutch bluntly 
took advantage of the vacuum of power in Taiwan under the nose of a relatively 
potent Asian state from a military point of view. 67  
                                                          
63  Yoko Nagazumi, “Expansion and Diaspora: Ayutthaya and Japan: embassies and trade in the 
seventeenth century” in The Pacific World, Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific 1500-1900, ed. 
M. Caprio, K. Matsuda, (Hampshire, 2007), p. 248.  
64 Ken'ichi Kuroda, Nihon shokumin shisōshi [History of Japanese colonial thought], (Tokyo, 1942), 
pp. 3-4.  
65 In 1639 108 Japanese were recorded in Batavia, modern day Jakarta. In Cambodia, their total number 
was around 1,500 in the 1620s. See Madalena Ribeiro, “The Japanese diaspora in the seventeenth 
century according to Jesuit sources” in The Pacific World, Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific 
1500-1900, ed. M Caprio, K. Matsuda, (Hampshire, 2007), pp. 277-284.  
66 Stephen Turnbull, “Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 
1616” in Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 4.    
67 Ibid., pp. 17-18. The Japanese resented and opposed the Dutch colonial rule in Taiwan that lasted 
from 1624 until 1662. The traders residing there refused to pay taxes and created complications to the 
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Besides immigration and the warlike legacy, other secondary features shaped 
the direction of Japan’s expansionism. The Tokugawa period’s isolation, highly 
hierarchical society and autocratic rule were features that shaped Japan’s later 
colonial policy. As we have seen, we can trace an extraordinary mixture of an 
overseas quasi-mythical legacy and a latent expansionistic tendency: a distinct 
national identity, a conviction in invincibility and divinity, a contempt for the 
“inferior” adjacent nations,68 a profound military tradition, a precedent of an inspiring 
offensive, venerable territorial and commercial aspirations and a sense of mission to 
overthrow the humiliating Sinocentric tributary system.69 Undoubtedly most of these 
traits were duly reshaped, exploited and diffused by 19th century Japan’s pro-colonial 
elements. They were vividly resurrected as a result of the promising Meiji 
Restoration, another step towards the fulfilment of the nation’s worldwide imperial 
destiny. Even before the direct involvement of the common people with politics 
through the suffrage in 1890, the Emperor promulgated the Charter Oath in April 
1868. Among other provisions, it called the people to seek knowledge from 
throughout the world, and take an active role in participating in the state’s goals.70 
Common people, taking advantage of the new freedoms, plunged in heated 
discussions on foreign policy and the revision of the unequal treaties nationwide. 
Among them were some who called for overseas expansion. As it has been already 
established however, in the 1870s-1880s the domestic and international condition of 
Japan did not permit the realization of their aspirations for the time being.  
As we have already seen, a vulnerable and feeble Japan in the advent of 
European colonialism in the Far East and the Pacific was more in danger of becoming 
a colony rather than creating a vast empire itself.71 There were Western ambitions on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
newly instated administration. The Dutch in order to cope with the troublesome Japanese merchants 
excluded them from their colony. One of them, Suetsugu Heizo Masanao (1546-1630), worried about 
the encroachment of Japanese trading rights by the Dutch East India Company escalated the conflict. In 
1627 he recruited 16 aborigines and dispatched them to Edo as an allegedly Taiwanese delegation 
asking for Japanese protection against the oppressive Europeans. The fake ambassadors failed to attract 
the Tokugawa shogunate’s intervention, already oriented towards the national seclusion policy. See 
Adam Clulow, “A Fake Embassy, the Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan” in Japanese Studies, Vol. 
30, No. 1, pp. 35-38.  
68  18th and 19th century Japanese adopted from the West the racist notions about savages and 
civilization mission and viewed with contempt the coloured people of Africa and the Pacific. See 
Richard Albert Bradshaw, Japan and European colonialism in Africa, 1800-1937, Doctoral 
Dissertation, Ohio University, 1992, pp. 102-103. 
69 The politician Tōgō Minoru (1881–1959) found undisputed proof on the nation’s ancient skills to 
colonize overseas territories while examining the Japanese history. The 6 preconditions set up by the 
geographer Sir Charles Prestwood Lucas (1853-1931), for a successful colonial race were: 
entrepreneurial spirit, commercial insight, the ability to adapt to new environments, courage, 
administrative skill and the power of assimilation; according to Tōgō all were present in Japan’s 
history. See Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895-1945” in The Japanese 
Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. R. H. Myers, M. R. Peattie, (New Jersey, 1984), p.  87.  
70 Ryōsuke Ishii, History of Political Institutions in Japan, (Tokyo, 1980), p. 100. 
71 Sven Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Meiji and Taishô Japan − A Preliminary Framework, (Tokyo, 2002), 
p. 13. 
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territories where Japan’s sovereignty was unclear,72 such as Hokkaidō (Ezo) and the 
islands to its north, the humiliating unequal treaties were in effect and the Western 
Powers maintained troops in Japanese soil and arrogantly had the ability to attack or 
blockade port cities at will (like the Kagoshima Bombardment in August 1863). 
Temporary servility and mimetic modernization policies seemed to deflect the 
Western encroachment elsewhere. The Meiji leaders struggled to transform Japan 
from a weak agrarian second-rate state to a modern power able to resist foreign 
conquest. Projection of military might, colonial possessions73 and modern economical 
and administration models were the high-status symbols in late 19th century. To the 
Japanese leadership at the time the world seemed to be divided into colonies and 
colonizers, oppressors and oppressed. In practice, the Japanese leadership had a rather 
straightforward dilemma: between the appealing model of the British Empire and the 
detrimental position of Egypt or China the choice was obvious. The constant threat of 
foreign intervention, Western arrogance, the Restoration process, the Boshin civil war 
and the renewed Shintō and Kokutai teachings galvanized the entire spectrum of 
Japanese society after centuries of restraint, isolation and socio-political 
fragmentation. 74  Moreover the samurai class and the fiefdoms may have been 
liquidated but the feudal, militaristic mentality could not be wiped out in a few short 
years of modern progressive legislation. As the former warriors were frequently 
employed in administrative positions and in the army their militaristic, belligerent 
influence never really waned.75 After the Restoration, political, economic and military 
limitations, as we have seen, meant that Japan was not capable of asserting its 
interests to distant territories and had to endure its inferior diplomatic position until 
the time was right.  The traumatic experience of Western contact came as a shock and 
convinced the Meiji leaders that patience at first and aggression, when appropriate, 
were the solutions amidst a hostile world. The answer to the western menace to 
national security was prestige, militarism 76  and the acquisition of territory at the 
                                                          
72 In this case, the unjustified anxiety of hostile intrusion functioned as a verified act of aggression. 
73 Robert Brose, The Context of Japanese Imperialism, Masters Dissertation, American University of 
Washington D.C., 2003, p. 34. 
74W. G. Beasley, “The Edo Experience and Japanese Nationalism” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 18, 
No. 4, Special Issue: Edo Culture and Its Modern Legacy (1984), pp. 556-564. The distinguished 
historian Hilary Conroy suggests that the Japanese notion of uniqueness had instilled a consolidated 
national identity long before the Restoration. Adherence to the imperial system and to traditional 
nativist beliefs had forged a widespread sense of shared belongingness and nationalism. See Hilary 
Conroy, “Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 
(Jul., 1955), pp. 821-823.   
75  Herbert Norman, La nascita del Giappone moderno: Il ruolo dello stato nella transizione dal 
feudalesimo al capitalismo, (Turin, 1975), pp. 100, 223-225. 
76 In a society nurtured for centuries under the ideal of martial valour (Bushidō), militarism was widely 
endorsed almost to the point of religious tradition. The author and politician Nitobe Inazō (1862-1933) 
explained in these terms the outcome of the Sino-Japanese war: “What won the battles on the Yalu, in 
Korea and Manchuria were the ghosts of our fathers, guiding our hands and beating in our 
hearts…Bushidō as an independent code of ethics may vanish, but its power will not perish from the 
earth”. Under state Shintō many imperial shrines were dedicated to the god of War Hachiman and 
shrines were even dedicated to glorify the spirit of Hideyoshi. In the late 19th century Meiji leaders 
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expense of fellow Asian nations.77 Many influential scholars, publicists and military 
officers urged Tōkyō to expand on the Asiatic continent and the Pacific as a pre-
emptive strategic move to secure national wealth. In the 1860s and even after the 
inspiring accomplishment of the Restoration these manifestations could not be 
transformed into official policy.  However, these views hold historical significance as 
they constitute the first concrete Japanese aspirations overseas. In 1875 Hayashi 
Shihei completed a geographical survey of Korea, the Ryūkyūs and Hokkaidō. The 
last one in particular had to be developed as a bulwark to the Russian threat but all 
three regions had to be acquired for strategic reasons. They would function as bases to 
“be ready for the time when Japan’s brave samurai raise troops and enter these three 
countries”.78  
As already presented, Satō Nabuhiro had already envisaged a plan of world 
domination. For him Japan was the first country created and as foundation of every 
other country its place in the world had to be restored. Japan’s destiny was to 
incorporate every other country (the Ryūkyūs, Philipines, Indonesia, Russian East 
Asia, China, India…). The Chinese were cowardly and disorganized so Manchuria 
should be attacked by a Japanese force wintering in Karafuto. After Manchuria, 
Nanjing was to be captured. Then the whole of China would surely fall under Japan’s 
grip. The locals had to be treated and ruled fairly to facilitate their incorporation into 
the empire; in case of insubordination they had to be massacred according to the Will 
of Heaven.79 Chinese resources and manpower coupled with Japan’s military ability 
would render world conquest feasible. In 1861 Daimyo Itakura Katsukiyo (1823-
1889) proposed to the shogunate government a similar plan. He suggested that the 
government moved swiftly to take advantage of the Chinese defeat in the Second 
Opium War (1856-1860) in the hands of the British and French expeditionary forces. 
Armies had to be dispatched in Taiwan, Korea, Shandong and the welfare of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regarded militarism as synonymous to legitimacy, survival and power. It became clear to them that all 
great nations were militaristic. See E. E. N. Causton, Militarism and Foreign Policy in Japan, (London, 
1936), pp. 20-33. 
77 Enrica Colloti Pischel, “Considerazioni sull’ascesa del Giappone nel gioco delle grandi potenze” in 
L'ascesa del Giappone, ed. E. C. Pischel, S. Pigrucci, (Milan, 1994), pp. 218-223.  
78 Donald Calman, The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Re-interpretation of the 1873 
Crisis, (London-New York, 1992), 57-58. 
79 Elaborating on this concept Daimyo Hotta Masayoshi commented in March 1858: “When our power 
and national standing have come to be recognized, we should take the lead in punishing the nation 
which may act contrary to the principle of international interests; and in so doing, we should join hands 
with the nations whose principles may be found identical with those of our country.... Such a policy 
could be nothing else but enforcement of the power and authority deputed (to us) by the Spirit of 
Heaven. Our national prestige and position thus ensured, the nations of the world will come to look up 
to our Emperor as the Great Ruler of all nations, and they will come to follow our policy and submit 
themselves to our judgment”. Additionally, Iwakura Tomomi in a 1869 memorandum expressed his 
conviction that “all countries beyond the seas are our enemies”. See Robert T. Pollard, “Dynamics of 
Japanese Imperialism” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Mar., 1939), p. 20.  
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locals secured. Tsusima’s Confucian scholar Yamada Hōkoku 80  and Ōshima 
Tomonojō, anxious to resolve their domain’s economic problems, were also 
envisioning a Korean-Manchuria-Taiwan invasion in 1863, following Itakura’s 
ideas.81 
Naturally, Korea due to its proximity and Hideyoshi’s legacy was the target of 
the majority of the early Japanese territorial aspirations. Maki Yasuomi or Maki Izumi 
(1813-1864), a samurai, advocated the expulsion of every foreigner from the sacred 
Japanese soil and the conversion of Korea, Manchuria and the Philippines to vassal 
states. In October 1869 the Daijōkan instructed the foreign Ministry official Sada 
Hakuho (Motoichiro) to lead an investigating mission in Korea. He visited the trading 
post in Pusan. In his report he recommended pre-empting the Westerners and 
occupying Korea,82 but only as a base for further penetration in central Asia. This task 
would be easy since the Korean government was corrupt and highly unpopular. As he 
claimed in spring 1870 this country was Japan’s traditional vassal83 and thus “…we 
can massacre Korea with a single stroke, polish our military system, and demonstrate 
to the world the imperial glory”.84 More than that, Korean was seen as a “goldmine”; 
its wheat, grains and rice were invaluable to Tōkyō.85 Furthermore, the Koreans were 
to be pressed into forced labour in the underdeveloped Hokkaidō for the greater good 
of the Japanese nation. It was the revival of Hideyoshi’s programme86 Sada’s Deputy 
Shigeru Moriyama devised precise military plans for the invasion. The permanent 
                                                          
80 At the time, Yamada seemed to influence the military instructor Mori Shigenobu on his expansionist 
views. The latter declared in the early 1860s that Japan had to attack China as a: “strategy of averting 
internal crisis by an overseas campaign”. Ōshima Tomonojō devised plans for the attack and on 13 
June 1863 met with the advocate of naval expansion Katsu Kaishū to convince him. On 16 July Katsu 
submitted his invasion proposal to the Bakufu councillors. The outbreak of the Chōshū-bakufu war in 
late August cancelled these plans. See Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: 
Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (London, 1980), pp.  83-97. 
81 Calman, The Nature and Origins, pp. 68-69. 
82 In October 1869, a French advisor to the Foreign Ministry warned that the Russians would try to 
establish their presence in Sakhalin and Korea. Miyamoto Okazu’s, the Ministry’s official, comment on 
the matter was that if Korea was lost, an “everlasting harm” would befall on Japan. See Duus, The 
Abacus and the Sword, pp. 33-34.  
83 Miyamoto Okazu towards the end of 1869 also considered Korea a tributary nation of ancient Japan. 
Korea if abandoned would be seized by the Russians who constituted a serious threat to Japan and so 
Tōkyō had to exercise its ancient claims there. See Kim, The Last Phase, p. 133. 
84 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 34-36. 
85 This argument was prevalent throughout the years. In 1885 during the Sino-Japanese negotiations in 
regard to Korea, Itō Hirobumi stressed the importance of this country for Tōkyō. Korea was able to 
make up for the lacking domestic rice production and offer employment to the future sons of Japan. 
See Norman, La nascita del Giappone, pp. 230-231. 
86 Calman points to the anachronism of Japanese imperialism and stresses that this was not a reaction to 
contemporary conditions and cannot be explained by the fact that the state was formed amidst the 
apogee of economic and military antagonism. He reached the conclusion that Hideyoshi and the 19th 
century Meiji leaders similarly utilized war to safeguard their standing and saw expansion as a solution 
to domestic issues after the two unifications: in both occasions, there were impulsive unemployed 
masses of samurai, agrarian riots and economic depression. See Calman, The Nature and Origins, pp. 
194-195. 
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occupation of Korea appeared to be the solution to the nation’s fiscal and social 
problems. Moriyama urged the unemployed, destitute, and turbulent, for the 
government, samurai to migrate and find employment, chiefly as a police force, 
across the Tsushima Strait.87 The government was naturally reluctant or unprepared to 
adopt these recommendations. In April 1881 former Foreign Minister Maruyama 
Sakura (1840-1899) became co-founder of the Chūaisha, a political organization that 
established a preparatory school for the army in order to promote militarism. Talking 
about the annexation of Korea and the northern islands he appealed for a holy war to 
conquer the world: “Our Emperor is not just the Emperor of these islands but the 
Great Emperor of the six continents…if you don’t have the spirit to swallow the six 
continents, how can one really revere that one person?”. The army’s Chief of Staff 
Viscount Kawakami Sōroku (1848-1899), the director of Chūaisha, laid war plans and 
planted a spy network in Korea and China. When war actually broke out in 1894 with 
China a thrilled Muruyama rushed to Korea to lecture the troops on Japan’s legacy 
there, to encourage them and to hold ceremonies for the dead. The soldiers ought to 
die for the Emperor’s glory and by doing so they would become gods. Similarly, 
when war came Fukuzawa Yukichi exclaimed: “My happiness is so intense there is 
nothing I can do but shed tears”. In 1882 Sasa Tomofusa established another 
association (Shimei Gakukai) dedicated to the teaching of ethics and martial 
preparation. The society was granted 500 yen by the emperor in May 1883 and was 
visited frequently by prominent guests from the army and government. After 1882 
many of Sasa’s students were dispatched as “part spies, part merchants” to gather 
information on Japan’s future targets. Additionally, when the General Staff was 
separated from the Army Ministry in December 1878 two distinct offices were formed 
in the Kanto and Kansai regions responsible for “national defence and strategy”. 
Besides their domestic functions the Kansai branch was responsible for intelligence 
gathering and pre-war planning for China and Korea whereas the Kanto office kept an 
eye on Hokkaidō, Karafuto, Manchuria and Siberia.88  
Another Japanese hero, Saigō Takamori envisioned imperial expansion on the 
continental mainland. His contemporary Sakai Gendan disclosed in a letter dated 9 
January 1874 that Saigō viewed the defence of Hokkaidō, the settling of the Korean 
problem and the attack in Siberia as a response to the Russian challenge.89  Both 
Sakamoto Ryōma (1836-1867) and Yoshida Shōin urged for the occupation of the 
small island of Takeshima between Japan and Korea in the Sea of Japan as a base 
from which Tōkyō was to penetrate Korea and Manchuria. The statesman Kido 
Takayoshi proposed a similar plan in the 1860s.90 As early as 1854 Shōin had devised 
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a great project of colonial expansion. Russia was to be deprived of its Asian 
possessions, Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan and the Philippines were to be attacked and 
finally Australia91 was to be invaded by Japanese colonists.92 In the middle of the 19th 
century, far ahead of his time he envisioned greater Japan as a world power and came 
up with a plan for its realization. 93  Shōin’s contemporary, the samurai Sanai 
Hashimoto (1834-1859) advocated for a war against Britain, the most dangerous 
nation in his view. Then Japan would acquire India, Manchuria, Korea and parts of 
North America. To him even a defeat would be invigorating since “a nation can only 
attain glory and prosperity after having risked her existence and having successfully 
passed through great national crises”.94   
The statesman Etō Shimpei also perpetuated the idea of an attack to Korea and 
China, making Beijing the Japanese capital. China could be carved up jointly by 
Tōkyō and Saint Petersburg. His 1871 “Foreign policy plan” to Iwakura suggested 
that a European war was at hand and Japan should patiently wait to profit from its 
spoils. Etō’s follower Yamanaka Ichiro, after his European tour presented the 
government with a report in 1873. He tried to divert colonial aspiration towards 
Southern Pacific and Oceania. For instance, whereas Japan had a population of 40 
million Australia had just 4 million. Therefore, all that Tōkyō had to do was to train 
100,000 men and send them to colonize the island. The plan of colonizing the south 
was further elaborated by the liberal politician, Count Gotō Shōjirō, one of the first to 
envision Japanese presence in the Celebes, Borneo and Sumatra in 1863. He even 
tried to acquire land for this purpose in Borneo but failed.95 It appears that many, if 
not the majority, of the Meiji leaders endorsed the widespread imperialistic axiom of 
the late 19th century. As early as 1879 Prince Katsura Tarō (1848-1913), who was to 
become Prime Minister in 1901, was sent on an intelligence mission to China by 
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Prince Yamagata Aritomo, Field Marshal of the Imperial Japanese Army. Former 
Foreign Minister, Soejima Taneomi in order to justify the 1894 Japanese aggression 
referred to Empress Jingū’s invasion and claimed: “All historians know that the 
claims of Japan [to Korea] were earlier [than China’s] in origin and had been 
exercised for a longer space of time”.96 The historian Naitō Torajirō (1866-1934) in 
1888 stressed the necessity of expansion to thwart the overpopulation problem back 
home. More territory and markets were needed. Korea was not sufficient. He urged 
his government to increase its influence in China, by acquiring navigation and mining 
rights particularly in the Fukien region. To the ultra-nationalist Naitō, the Chinese 
were “filthy”, “crime-ridden”, an “inferior race” and a “fallen nation”. Furthermore, 
he argued the occupation of Manchuria, as source of foodstuff, over the saturated 
Philippines or South China.97 
Another ideological vehicle for expansion was also the Pan-Asianism theory. 
Comparable to the West’s civilization mission, it was the axiom of bringing to the 
corroded and backward Asian populations progress through reform as Japan had 
previously achieved for itself. The Pan-Asianism doctrine emphasized the need for 
Asian unity against foreign influences, highlighting the common cultural traditions in 
a way similar to the Pan-Slavism theory. The movement stressed the Asian peoples’ 
shared historical experience, language, scriptures, culture, geography and religion.98 It 
was also implemented to legitimize Japanese hegemony and colonial rule. 
Ideologically it is considered the precursor of the 1930s creeds, New Order in Asia 
and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Asianism is a “claim that demands a 
union of Asian peoples (sho-minzoku) under the leadership of Japan to resist to the 
aggression (shinryaku) of European and American powers” and it could manifest 
itself either as right wing or left wing extremism.99 The Japanese as superiors and 
more virtuous had the moral responsibility to conquer and enlighten the less fortunate 
nations. Thus, the holy mission to “liberate Asia”100 was in fact the extension of 
Japanese nationalism overseas, to peoples that had the same physical traits. Japan 
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volunteered to lead the Asian nations, respecting not destroying local traditions as the 
West has been doing outside Europe.101 For the Pan-Asianists, Japanese expansion 
was different from Western aggressiveness since it derived from “pure patriotism”.102 
In view of the dangers that western imperialism represented some scholars 
advocated for the alliance of the Asian states. Others, as Fukuzawa, proposed the 
disengagement from the continent and the collaboration with the imperialistic powers. 
Katsu Kaishū a Bakufu official had proposed a Sino-Japanese alliance as early as the 
1860s, a view embraced by the politician Sugita Teiichi (1851-1929) in the 1870s.103 
Political organizations, that preached Asian solidarity and fraternity against the White 
Peril,104 criticized the government for its foreign policy decisions; Tōkyō imprisoned 
advocates of Pan-Asian rhetoric and tried to suppress the movement that seemed to 
fuel the West’s Yellow Peril suspicions. However, the organization Kōa-Kai (Society 
for Raising Asia) founded in 1880, and its successor in 1883 Ajia Kyōkai (Asia 
Association) enjoyed the protection of prominent government members.105 Kōa-Kai 
was based in Tōkyō but soon established branches all over Japan, Korea and China. It 
was primarily the work of Sone Toshitora (1847-1910) who in 1877 had established 
the Shin’a-Kai (Association for the Advance of Asia). Kōa-Kai was created to 
promote collaboration between Tōkyō and Beijing, resist the West and advance Asian 
interests. The organization published its own journal,106 revolving around the region’s 
political and economic matters, and set up a Chinese Language school in its 
headquarters. The Association’s membership was comprised of royals, such as Prince 
Komatsu Akihito (1846-1903), diplomats of the Foreign Ministry, navy and army 
officers and editors, a total of 400 members in 1881. By 1882 26 Chinese were also 
admitted. When it came to Korea the Japanese members retained an ambiguous 
position. Many of them forgot all about Asian fraternity, considered Korea too weak 
for independence and supported the Japanese claims, citing the Jingū-kōgō and 
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Hideyoshi’s legacies.107 For the philosopher Miyake Setsurei Japan should advance 
the “cause of goodness” by using its military strength to defend its weaker Asian 
neighbours from western encroachment.108 However, the statesman Shimada Saburo 
(1852-1923) demanded a showdown with the Chinese over Korea in order to 
demonstrate which state was the leader in the region. Komura Jutarō (1855-1911), the 
Japanese Minister in Beijing in 1893 was pessimistic about Chinese prospects of 
modernization. A weak China that attracted western incursions was a danger to 
Japan’s sovereignty. To counter this situation he believed Tōkyō had to build up its 
military forces and join the struggle for territorial expansion in China.109  
Japan’s adjacent territories in Korea and China were provokingly tempting to 
anyone who had any sort of military capability and nurtured colonial aspirations. 
Since control of Korea by a Western power would be detrimental not only for Japan’s 
interests but, as many publicists and activists saw it, to Japanese independence as 
well, Tōkyō saw the need to pre-empt other colonial suitors. China and Korea could 
always reform their outdated ways and embrace western administration and military 
models to resist any foreign encroachment but this process required resources and 
precious time. Many Japanese expressed the idea that greater Japanese influence in 
Korea and Manchuria would help protect the native peoples from western domination, 
while also protecting Tōkyō’s interest.110 The fear of western imperialism form the 
mid-19th century was so deeply ingrained in Japanese consciousness that the search 
for national security never really came to a halt. 111  Every victory brought more 
military preparations; every enlargement meant more buffer areas: Japan necessitated 
a Japanese Korea for its security, Japanese Korea a Japanese Manchuria, Japanese 
Manchuria a Japanese Mongolia and so on and so forth until 1945. To head Western 
encroachment off, Japan needed to take the initiative, and take control over an ever 
widening sphere of influence. The “concentric circles” of expansion was a theory 
elaborated by Tokutomi, Kita Terujirō (Kita Ikki 1883-1937) and Nitobe.112 Tokutomi 
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believed that a nation that did not expand was destined to perish. Commenting on 
imperialism, he stressed: “It is a policy born out of necessity if we are to exist as a 
nation and survive as a race”.113 The writer Ukita Kazutami, (1859-1946) stated in 
1902 that imperialism should be seen as a superior way to build national strength. The 
controversial historian Karl Ernst Haushofer (1869-1946) concurred: “Weighting… 
the forces behind Japan’s expansion drive, we must admit that they did not develop 
out of the need of the moment but out of concern for the distant future”.114 
Religion too played a certain role in creating a pro-colonial disposition. For 
the historian William Lockwood Japan’s emergence as a colonial power seemed to 
stem from the contemporary society’s indoctrination with a mystical faith in the 
imperial destiny. The Tokugawa period of seclusion meant that Japan had cut off its 
intellectual and cultural ties with the mainland for more than two centuries. The 
Tokugawa period saw a wide variety of religious and philosophical movements, 
including the encouragement of kokugaku, the research of native studies, which 
exalted spiritual superiority and thus Japanese nationalism in contrast to the corrupted 
foreign ways. To the followers of scholars, such as Motoori Norinaga and Hirata 
Atsutane, Japan, contrary to the ancient sinocentric system, was the centre of the 
universe; the emperor was the emperor of the entire world, and all the Japanese, as 
descendants of the gods, were superior beings. China’s military defeats and economic 
subjugation to the West appeared as a confirmation of Japan’s ascension to Asia’s 
supreme cultural position. The scholar Ōkuni Takamasa (1792-1871) wished to 
restore the world to the imperial way, even by conquest. To Hirata foreigners were 
“insects”, a distasteful euphemism for the term barbarian.115 Finally a Shintō sect 
called Ōmoto is also considered a promoter of territorial expansion. Founded in 1892 
as a response to the official Shintō, which was deemed as corrupted and decadent, this 
new religion taught moral values, pacifism and virtue. Still, the sect’s leader Deguchi 
Onisaburō (1871-1948) aspired to make it a world religion centered around divine 
Japan. Universalism was combined with ethnocentrism. The world had to be unified 
under Japan that was predestined to diffuse Ōmoto, the universal truth, to the four 
corners of the globe. In this respect Tōkyō’s territorial acquisitions were not 
incompatible to universal pacifism. They were to be used as advanced bases for 
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missionary work.116 Naturally Shintō did not have a monopoly on ultranationalistic 
rhetoric, there were also ultranationlistic aspects in Nichiren Buddhism.117 
The new education institutions established under the Meiji instilled as supreme 
values extreme loyalty, self-sacrifice and undisputable religious reverence towards the 
throne.118 Despite the nation’s prehistoric ancestral “purity”, when it came to foreign 
populations under Japanese domination the “family” could extend to include these 
new subjects transforming them into “imperial peoples”; they were adopted not as 
brothers but as obedient children. Centuries of isolation and cultural submission to the 
Chinese had created an inferiority complex, 119  which was now gradually being 
reversed by the reactionary notion of racial uniqueness reinforced by the imported 
concept of Social Darwinism. 120  If the West excelled by embracing the Social 
Darwinism and colonial doctrines, then Japan had to follow its lead in order to enter 
the restricted club of imperial powers and secure its independence.121 The language of 
the new imperialism was keenly adopted: colonies,122 balance of power, protectorates, 
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enclaves, military and naval bases, search for markets, centres of trade, investment 
possibilities, raw materials. In Japan’s case, the civilizing mission was paraphrased as 
the Yellow Man’s burden. The “national necessity” scheme, with its requirement for 
new territories, was also adopted from European promoters of imperialism.123 Tōkyō 
had to resolve pressing issues such as the consolidation of the new state, the 
construction of modern infrastructure and the partial transformation of an outdated 
agricultural economy to a capitalistic and industrial one. Social issues such as the 
abolition of domains, political representation and the samurai stipends needed 
immediate resolution after the civil war as they constituted a potential threat to the 
new government.124  Despite these pressing issues, the Japanese government acted 
positively towards opportunities for overseas expansion throughout the Meiji period.  
While economic considerations certainly weighted on the minds of the Meiji 
policy planners, economics cannot be considered as the main stimuli for expansion at 
the time. In the late 1890s Japan took indeed noteworthy steps towards 
industrialization but it largely remained an agrarian country. In any case the Japanese 
products could not compete internationally with those of the Western manufacturers. 
At that time, Tōkyō was able to penetrate economically only Korea and China, the El 
Dorado of Japanese trading and shipping interests: shipping costs were obviously 
lower for Japanese manufacturers compared to their Western counterparts.125 In brief, 
the Japanese state in the 1870s-1890s being agrarian and relatively underdeveloped 
was far from approaching the capitalistic maturity levels required to be considered by 
Lenin’s disciples imperialistic. Japan was lacking domestic capital and was nowhere 
near forming a “monopolistic capitalism in its final stage”. 126  Without dynamic 
industry there was no actual need for raw materials or overseas markets. However, 
Tōkyō resting on a rather weak and backward economic base took part in the 
expansionistic struggle as much as other, more prosperous, rivals. Hence, any rhetoric 
pertaining to national economy cannot illustrate the motives of early Japanese 
colonialism. This “anomaly” partially explains the lack of western studies on the early 
Japanese colonial phenomenon that paved the way for the later expansion. As a matter 
of fact, the colonial expert David Fieldhouse among others, totally neglected Japan’s 
overseas possessions in his momentous work.  
The Miyazaki brothers (Yazō, Tamizō, Tōten) in the closing years of the 19th 
century belonged to a small minority that criticized the government’s imperialistic 
attitudes and the concept of expansion in general. Tōten or Torazō, especially, 
demonstrated sincere solidarity towards China which he saw as being a fellow victim 
of colonial machinations. According to Tōten Tōkyō should have assisted Beijing in 
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its modernization efforts and in order to fend off the ravenous West in unison with 
Japan.127 In 1874 Ueki Emori (1857–1892), one of the few sincere pacifists, called for 
the creation of an Asian League championing the independence and equality of every 
Asian region. 128  The socialist Kōtoku Shūsui (1871-1911) rejected Japanese 
expansion and militarism on humanitarian grounds. Kōtoku suggested that the 
government’s pompous but pointless imperialistic enterprise was distracting his 
countrymen from the actual social issues at home.129 However, when war with Qing 
China came he united his voice with the Christian, and allegedly, pacifist Uchimura 
Kanzō (1861-1930) in proclaiming it a war of “justice”, “civilization” and 
“humanity.”130 Nakae Chōmin (1847−1901) another prominent liberal, dreamed of 
defeating Russia and expanding at its expense.131 Finally the activist Ōi Kentarō is a 
pragmatic example of the Japanese liberalism’s weakness in Meiji Japan. An idealist 
and a proponent of liberal reforms at home, he contributed to the expansionistic 
rationale of the “tyrannical” and “selfish” Tōkyō government.132 In 1884 he raised 
money and weapons and in October 1885 his private army of trouble makers was 
ready to embark for Korea. On 2 November 1885, the police arrested 130 adventurers 
interfering with Ōi’s plan (Ōsaka Incident). These “heroes" were to enlighten Korea 
and in case of failure their death was to bring national condemnation for Tōkyō’s anti-
liberal and passive stance. In any case their activities would destabilize Korea and 
give a pretext for intervention to Japan. Using this elaborate scheme Tōkyō would 
extend its influence over the peninsula.133 
In Meiji Japan, the tendency for expansion developed virtually unhindered by 
liberals, anarchists and idealists. Cases of dissidents are rather rare since the broad 
base of the population, be them the ruling classes or the lower ones, were convinced 
of the benefits imperialism and militarism had to offer. Even Home Minister Ōkubo 
Toshimichi certainly not a liberal but a politician known for his cool-temper promoted 
war with Russia in September 1869 to “rouse the hearts of the people of the realm”, to 
assert “imperial prestige” and to “spread the glory of the Imperial House to the 
outside world”. 134   Besides this was the age of expansion. 135  Before the state’s 
                                                          
127 Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism”, pp. 74-75. 
128 Szpilman and Saaler, “Pan-Asianism as an Ideal”, p. 9. 
129 Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism”, p. 65. As Hobson did before him Kōtoku believed that imperialism 
and in particular the Japanese participation during the Boxer Rebellion, benefited only some 
businessmen and the military. Imperialism for him was the product of militarism and jingoistic 
patriotism. See Fred G. Notehelfer, Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical, (Oxford, 1971), pp. 
82, 84.  
130 Fred G. Notehelfer, “Kotoku Shusui and Nationalism” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. 
1 (Nov., 1971), p. 35.  
131 Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Meiji, pp. 17-18. 
132 Marius B. Jansen, “Oi Kentaro: Radicalism and Chauvinism” in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 
11, No. 3 (May, 1952), p. 307.  
133 Ibid., pp. 309-310. 
134 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 29-30.  
135  The newspaper Nichi Nichi on the eve of the country’s colonial awakening wished that “the 
Japanese will be able to enter on a heroic career as a strong and enlightened Power in the East” while 
291 
 
formation and throughout the span of the century the Japanese as passive spectators 
witnessed with fear and wonder the Great Powers establishing their presence in the 
Far East after having completely absorbed Africa into their empires. The Portuguese 
were in control of Macao from 1557, the British of Hong Kong from 1841, and after 
1884 the French held Tonkin whereas the Russians were gradually approaching the 
Japanese islands in the north.136 Many came to believe that possessing colonies would 
confer pride and bring about parity with the fellow imperialist powers as Japan would 
be participating in the illustrious civilizing mission. The writer Takekoshi Yosaburō 
(1865-1950) in 1907 commented on the matter: “Western nations have long believed 
that on their shoulders alone rested the responsibility of colonizing the yet-unopened 
portions of the globe and extending to the inhabitants the benefits of civilization; but 
now we Japanese, rising from the ocean in the extreme Orient, wish as a nation to take 
part in this great and glorious work”.137 
Japan’s first overseas acquisition came as a result of the Sino-Japanese war, 
the first modern war of the nation in 1895. Beyond territorial aggrandizement the war 
promoted the Meiji leadership’s nation-building programme. The invention of a 
common enemy, in this occasion Qing China, fostered national identity, instilled 
patriotism, rallied the people and distracted them from the more pressing domestic 
issues. It proved to be a very popular war, one that excited and moved the 
intelligentsia and the lower echelons of the 1890s society alike. On 24 August 1894 
Fukuzawa described it as a war “between civilization and barbarism”. Tōkyō 
newspapers Nichi Nichi Shimbun and Asahi Shinbun when the war erupted in August 
claimed that the Japanese soldiers fought for honour and justice whereas the cowardly 
Chinese were motivated by the prospect of money.138 The periodicals of the time 
portrayed the ordinary Japanese soldier as a selfless hero, a propaganda that seemed to 
move the animated readers. Poems published in 1894 mentioned Empress Jingū, the 
ancient vassal states and Hideyoshi’s campaigns. 139  Kabuki plays, the traditional 
Japanese theatre, were composed to exalt “Japan’s Great Victory”. Former samurai 
volunteered and donations were accumulated to be sent to the front. Every victory was 
celebrated frantically in local festivals as they sketched a common destiny and a 
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glorious future. Military parades, battle recreations, religious commemoration for the 
fallen and construction of war memorials throughout the country followed China’s 
capitulation in April 1895.140 
All of the aforementioned constitutes the 19th century ideological and 
emotional load instilled in the prospective colonialists’ minds. Let us now examine 
the first truly colonial venture of the Meiji state that paved the way for further 
aspirations and imperialist schemes. According to the Japanese tradition the Bonin 
Islands, approximately 1,000 kilometres south of Tōkyō, were discovered by the 
feudal lord Ogasawara Sadayori in 1593 from whom they took the name Ogasawara 
Guntō. Allegedly, he was instructed by Hideyoshi to lead an exploration mission to 
the south islands.141 The scholar of the Tokugawa period, Hayashi Shihei embraced 
the myth and demanded for the Bakufu to annex and fortify the islands. The 
Tokugawa authorities were disinterested since the Bonin Islands laid “beyond the 
jurisdiction of the empire”. According to modern historiography the islands were 
discovered by the Japanese in 1670. In any case it was only after Westerners 
demonstrated interest about the islands that the government became alarmed. The 
British captain Frederick William Beechey (1796-1856) declared unilaterally the 
acquisition of the islands in the name of the British Crown in 1827.142 Ignoring this 
claim Commodore Perry proposed the annexation of the island to the US during his 
1853-1854 expedition to Japan. A Russian explorer followed.143 
After many deliberations the Bakufu was convinced to organize an expedition 
for the colonization of the Bonin in 1861. In October Mizuno Chikugo was selected as 
the leader of the ambitious endeavour. He fervently started amassing supplies and 
men interested to migrate. On 17 December 1861 state official Andō Nobumasa 
(1819-1871) aware of the foreign ambitions on Bonin and of the presence of foreign 
subjects there informed the American and British Ministers, Harris and Alcock of his 
government’s intentions.144 The mission departed from Shinagawa on 3 January 1862 
and reached Port Lloyd on the 17th. Mizuno’s priority was to plant the Japanese flag 
on the highest peak of the main island. Subsequently he engaged in talks with the 
Westerners stationed there. To their claim that Bonin had been a British possession 
from 1827 onwards, Mizuno responded that the islands were discovered by the 
Japanese 300 years prior to their arrival. He was referring to Ogasawara’s alleged 
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exploration in 1593. After overcoming their objections he enacted legislation as the 
governor of the newly established Japanese possession. It included naval provisions, 
prohibition of hunting, Japanese names for locations and landholding restrictions for 
the settlers. After a brief exploration of the archipelago, Mizuno departed for Japan on 
7 April 1862 leaving at his post Obana Sakuranosuke. Upon his arrival in Edo he 
found out that Alcock had presented on 7 March 1862 a complaint note to the Bakufu 
authorities asserting the British rights on the Bonins. Mizuno urged his government 
not to give in. He justified his view by presenting the strategic and economic value of 
the island chain. Fertile soil, mineral wealth, and lucrative whaling provided 
opportunities for prosperity almost effortlessly. He even compared Port Lloyd’s 
harbour facilities with the ones situated at Uraga near Edo. The shogunate, 
encouraged by these reports, rejected Alcock’s pretentions on 7 July 1862. On the 
same day, the American Minister was notified that the settlers did not object to the 
new administration. In reality the foreign settlers, under threat of expulsion, had 
already signed declarations accepting Edo’s rule. In the same time the Bakufu 
recruited potential Japanese colonists by promising land, money and supplies. 
Consequently 38 settlers, mostly peasants, reached Port Lloyd on 19 September. 
Governor Obana accommodated the newcomers away from the Westerned-led 
“locals” in order to avoid conflicts and international incidents.145 After almost a year 
of peaceful coexistence and arduous agricultural labour the Japanese, on 24 June 
1863, were urgently ordered to abandon the settlement.146 The reasons of this sudden 
departure are obscure and we can only speculate. In the early 1870s only non-
Japanese inhabited the islands and the Ministers of Germany and Britain raised 
questions regarding Bonin’s administration. That was the inglorious end of the first 
colonial venture in modern Japanese history. The enigmatic evacuation did not signify 
the relinquishment Japan’s sovereignty rights though. The Bonin Islands were 
officially annexed in 1875 and passed under the direction of the Home Ministry in the 
following year. In November, the first magistrates after 12 years of inaction assumed 
the islands’ administration; Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori had officially 
notified the powers a month earlier. The islands came under the jurisdiction of 
Tōkyō’s prefectural government in 1880 and six years later the foreign residents 
obtained the Japanese citizenship. 147  In this way Japan asserted its claims in a 
adjustment territory for strategic reasons and not as a result of economic 
considerations; the value of the barren and almost unpopulated islands was low but 
their geographical position crucial for Japan’s future expansion. 
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The Japanese naturally turned their gaze to the Pacific region. The Bonin 
Islands stirred the imagination as Japan’s gateway to the South Seas (Nan'yō).148 The 
South Seas were identified as an outstanding source of wealth and an outlet for the 
nation’s surplus population by journalists, diet politicians, former samurai and patriots 
in general. It was also “res nullius”, a region still untouched by Western imperialists 
and as such available for Tōkyō’s early colonization attempts. The Navy exploited the 
commotion and joined the chorus to advance its own interests and attract further 
funding for its armaments programme.149 In the 1880s and 1890s the Navy’s training 
operations in the Pacific brought its cadets in contact with the region. Colonial 
minded scholars, businessmen and authors were also on board. The first Japanese 
vessel to enter Micronesia was the Ryūjō that docked in the Carolines in autumn 1883. 
Other warships were subsequently dispatched as far as Australia and South America 
to show the Japanese flag. The author Shiga Shigetaka (1863-1927) on board the 
Tsukuba in a reconnaissance voyage, visited Samoa, the Fijis, Australia and Hawaii in 
1886. Upon his return in 1887 he called for the imminent occupation of an island 
before the Japanese people’s ignorance and Western imperialism rendered this 
prospect unfeasible. After a similar journey Hattori Tōru (?-1908), a journalist, 
claimed that the nation’s destiny laid in the islands of the South Seas. There the 
Japanese could realize their mission of civilization and commerce. Citing once more 
Takekoshi Yosaburō: “Our future lies not in the North, but in the South, not on the 
continent but on the ocean” and “it is our great task as a people to turn the Pacific into 
a Japanese lake”. Having succumbed to the South Seas fever he concluded rather 
excessively: “Who controls the tropics controls the world”.150  
The popular “political novels” of the time had little scientific value but, 
excited the imagination, raised interest and awareness for the Nanʼyō all the same.151 
In these literary works published in the 1890s the natives, following the European 
practice, were depicted as savages and in need of Japan’s intervention to liberate and 
bring them a higher level of civilization. Furthermore, the authors stressed the affinity 
of the islanders to the yellow race and their hostility towards the white people. In a 
romantic way they incited expansionism and legitimated future action.152 In any case, 
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Meiji Japan despite the grandiose plans concerning America, Hawaii, South East Asia 
and the Pacific was unable to impose its claims. The world was already carved up. In 
the Pacific Tōkyō, did not find unclaimed islands and did not obtain one until 1914; 
by the 1890s France held Tahiti, Britain the Fijis, Spain the Marianas and Carolines 
and Germany the Marshal islands. This state of affairs though did not discourage the 
colonial visionaries from dreaming the creation of a “Maritime Empire”.153 
Enomoto Takeaki had proposed to his government the purchase of some of 
Spain’s Pacific islands as early as 1876. As Foreign Minister, he approached Madrid 
to inquire about the possibility of buying the Mariana Islands and Palau. Furthermore, 
he urged his colleagues to secure Borneo and New Guinea. In 1885 Enomoto 
established the South Seas Assembly (Nanʼyō Kyōkai). Its objectives were to collect 
information, sponsor exploration missions and act as a pressure group towards the 
government. In 1887 as Minister of Communications he sponsored an amateur 
exploration mission in the South Seas which discovered the Volcano Islands 
southwest of the Bonins. Iwo Jima was annexed two years later.154 The philosopher 
Miyake Setsurei commenting on the 1880s’ anxiety revealed that: “At the time the 
desire for colonies, especially in the South Pacific, was strong…We felt Japan had to 
acquire territory”. In agreement, Shiga wrote on 3 April 1890: “Every year on the 
anniversary of Emperor Jimmu’s accession, February 11, and on the anniversary of 
his passing, April 3… we should ceremonially increase the territory of the Japanese 
Empire even if only it is by a small measure. On each of these days our navy vessels 
should sail to a still unclaimed island, occupy it, and hoist the Japanese flag… Not 
only would such a programme have direct value as practical experience for our navy 
but it would excite an expeditionary spirit in the demoralized Japanese race”.155  
Early in 1884 a group of Japanese pearl divers were murdered on the atoll of 
Lae in the Marshalls. A passing British vessel discovered their remains and reported 
their untimely demise back to Tōkyō. Gotō Taketarō and Suzuki Tsunenori were 
dispatched to investigate the case. On 23 September 1884, they reached the Marshalls. 
They studied the population’s customs, its density and the anchorages of the adjacent 
islands. Their ultimate goal was “to place the islands under our Emperor’s flag, to the 
glory of our country”. The local tribe chief Kabua (?-1910) promised them assistance 
and according to Suzuki, he accepted to place the Japanese flag over his house in 
Ailinglapalap. Suzuki’s submitted his official report to Foreign Minister Inoue but 
was instructed by him, to return to Ailinglapalap and remove the flag. Inoue did not 
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dare to displease the powers. In any case in October 1885 the Marshall Islands 
became a German protectorate and the opportunity was lost. In the spring of 1887 
Suzuki travelled once more to the Central Pacific this time exploring small islands 
north of Hawaii. His memoirs, published in 1893, reveal that he urged his government 
to hasten and obtain an island before the West absorbed everything.156 
Those Japanese attracted by the prospect of adventure and profit ventured 
daringly south of the Bonins.157 The merchant Mizutani Shinroku approached Penope 
in the Carolines but was fined and driven away by the Spanish authorities for illegal 
trade in 1887. The incident did not prevent him for trading in other islands.158 Many 
followed his example. The entrepreneur Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905) was the most 
famous of them. An advocate of mercantile expansion and colonization in the South 
Seas he contacted Enomoto to secure the government’s backing. This is how Taguchi 
became president of the newly established Nantō Shōkai (South Sea Islands 
Company) and, thanks to its funding, bought himself a trading vessel, whereas other 
merchants were forced to cancel their plans due to lack of capital. The scandal 
generated criticism but Enomoto was fixed with the idea of exploration, maritime 
expansion and colonization: on 15 May 1890 Taguchi left Japan for Guam.159 After 
negotiations with the Spanish he built a trading post in Kolonia Island. The modest 
turnover however brought about the liquidation of the company and its assets.160  
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Advocates of Nanshin-ron or the Southern Expansion Doctrine in contrast to 
those who perceived as Japan’s lebensraum, Manchuria and Siberia (Hokushin-ron) 
did not limit their ambitions on the Central Pacific island chains.161 One of them 
Taketsuna Sasaki, commented on New Guinea in 1881: “Life [in New Guinea] is not 
so difficult, as the climate is of the best kind and there is a sufficient supply of food. 
The only problem is sometimes that we have attacks from natives. The islands [of 
New Guinea] are located at a distance of only a 10 day-voyage from Japan. It is to our 
advantage to gain these islands both from a strategic and a commercial point of view. 
Today is the opportunity to acquire these islands”. The economist and politician 
Tsuneya Seifuku (1855-1909), who had never visited the island, was propagating the 
western stereotype of inferiority and “ferocious nature” of the man-eating natives in 
New Guinea ten years later. In 1891 and 1892 the explorer Komakichi Tomiyama 
visited New Caledonia and New Britain and investigated the population of these 
island chains and their administration. Upon his return in 1893 he entertained the 
possibility of an ancient Japanese colonization in New Guinea: “According to a 
scholar, who wrote a book about the South Seas, he dug out Japanese swords, bows 
and arrows in some place in New Guinea and he suggested the Japanese might have 
migrated there in ancient days. He also found native behaviour similar to that of the 
Japanese”. Hattori Tōru, taking into account Katsuki Nakayama’s exploration of Port 
Moresby and its adjacent areas in 1881, emphasized the possibility of Japanese 
immigration through Port Moresby to Papua-New Guinea in 1884. Finally, in 1895 
Ken’nosuke Tsuji an agent of an immigration company, exalted the economic 
opportunities in the waters of British New Guinea, particularly in the field of 
fishery.162 
Japanese immigrants in Australia and the Thursday Island, where they 
successfully engaged in pearl fishing, starting experiencing from the 1890s the 
Australian authorities’ racism and hostile legislation.163 As a result some of them 
sought an alternative settlement in New Guinea. Among them was the pearl diver 
Isokichi Komine (1866-1934), who, in search for a new suitable location, had 
explored those waters both alone and with Tsuji in November 1894. They established 
the Nichi-go Bōeki Kaisha (the Japan-Australia Trade Company) to facilitate 
Japanese immigration in British New Guinea. However, Tsuji was unable to convince 
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the colony’s governor Sir William MacGregor (1846-1919) to grant land to 
prospective Japanese settlers. Gonzaemon Ogirima, the manager of the Kōsei 
Emigration Company persisted. On 11 May 1900, he requested his Foreign Ministry’s 
approval to extend Japanese immigration to New Guinea. For a series of reasons his 
plan did not come into fruition. Australia’s and Thursday Island’s distressed Japanese 
then opted for the German New Guinea solution; Komine opened negotiations in 
1901.164 Planting of Japanese communities in distant and unknown Pacific islands 
would raise Tōkyō’s wealth, influence and prestige only slightly. Japanese nationals 
continued to be mistreated abroad but the Meiji government had other priorities: it 
needed a greater prize, a colonial possession to administrate effectively demonstrating 
its value to the world. 
The Philippines could certainly not evade the attention of the aspirant 
colonialists. The ardent expansionist and member of the Nanʼyō Kyōkai, Yōkō 
Tōsaku starting from 1886 proposed a Japanese mission to the Spanish colony with 
the intention of surveying the archipelago and negotiate the purchase of land for his 
poverty ridden countrymen. Motivated by the Malthusian concept of surplus 
population he advocated the purchase of Palawan, Sulu, Mindanao, the Carolines and 
Marshal Islands. Sugiura Shigetake or Jūgō (1855–1924) through his political novels 
introduced the idea of Tōkyō’s civilizing and liberating mission in the Spanish held 
Philippines in 1886.165 On 5 June 1885 he asserted “If you created a colony outside 
the 60-odd prefectures, opened a New Japan, and came to hoist the rising-sun flag 
there, you would not only recover your honor but also help project Japan’s national 
prestige overseas”. 166  The journalist Kuga Katsunan (Nakata Minoru 1857-1907) 
stressed not only the fertility and resources of the Philippines but also the two nations’ 
alleged common “Malay lineage” in November 1888.167 The nationalist Suganuma 
Teifū or Suganuma Sadakaze (1865-1889) in his work New Japan’s Dream of 
aspirations to the South Seas, published around 1888, suggested the capture of the 
neighbouring European colonies and the collaboration with fellow Asians to ward off 
the western menace. In regard to the Philippines he claimed that one hundred 
battleships costing 100,000,000 yen were sufficient to drive the despotic Spanish 
away from the archipelago as “Hideyoshi once gave it a try”. While in Manila he 
investigated Luzon’s prospects for immigration and trade and discovered that 
Madrid’s hold was weak. He found that the country was rich in natural resources. To 
legitimize an expedition that might have proven eventful, he referred to Japan’s 
mission to assist fellow Asians and to the racial similarities of the two nations. “The 
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gods have wanted to give this new territory to Japan. Therefore, the gods left them in 
another’s hands for a while because they had feared that the Philippine islands would 
be occupied by others. Then the gods are waiting for our occupation…” he concluded 
before his death in Manila in 1889.168 In April 1891 Suzuki Noriaki, an official of the 
Japanese embassy in Manila, undertook surveys in the province of Pampanga in view 
of establishing there future Japanese immigrants.169 
Fukumoto Nichinan, founder of the Tōhō kyōkai (East Asian society) as 
previously mentioned, championed Japanese trade, immigration and finally expansion 
on the Philippines as a means of insuring his homeland’s security. Anxious that a 
“mighty country” could occupy the islands before Tōkyō had the chance to do so, he 
particularly feared a German interest and possible establishment south of the 
Ryūkyūs. Fukumoto visited the Philippines twice, in 1889 and 1891, to gather 
information. He concluded that the local colonial authorities were inadequate to 
sufficiently administer or defend the islands.  On 30 April 1890, nervous about 
Japan’s southern border, he wrote “Here is one way, if Spain could continue holding 
the [Philippine] Islands we should help her; if she cannot keep the Islands, we should 
take them from her and govern them”. Such a development would have undoubtedly 
raised the nation’s prestige, security and prosperity.170  
After the 1895 Sino-Japanese war many oppressed Asian nations came to 
regard victorious Japan as a modernization model and an inspiration for their own 
political emancipation. This trend was further intensified after the Japanese triumph 
against Russia in 1905 in a way similar to how the 1896 battle of Adwa had spread 
hope to the African peoples.  In August 1896, a revolt against the Spanish rule took 
place in the Philippines. The Katipunan (Patriots League), a revolutionary society 
founded in 1892, sent several envoys to Japan seeking material help from a fellow 
Asian nation. The Japanese warship Kongo docked in Manila in May 1896. Its captain 
met with Andres Bonifacio (1863-1897) and other leaders of the national liberation 
movement but we can only speculate about the results.171 The military sent Sakamoto 
Shiroo (1872-1931) in Manila in March to report on the situation. As a supporter of 
the liberation movement he proposed the dispatch of a battalion of Japanese marines 
to collaborate with the rebels against the American forces that had in the meantime 
                                                          
168 Josefa M. Saniel, “Four Japanese: Their Plans for the Expansion of Japan to the Philippines” in The 
Pacific World, Lands, Peoples and History of the Pacific 1500-1900, ed. M. Caprio, K. Matsuda, 
(Hampshire, 2007), pp. 324-326.  
169 Shinzō Hayase, “Diplomats of Meiji Japan in the Philippines” in Philippine Quarterly of Culture 
and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 291.  
170 Saniel, “Four Japanese”, pp. 331-332. 
171 Revolutionary leader Emilio Jacinto y Dizon (1875-1899) presented the Japanese captain with a 
letter for the Emperor in which he requested material help. Some claim that the captain responded 
rather formally and departed without tangible results. Others though believe that on that particularly 
day a secret alliance, the “Kongo agreement”, was concluded. See Grant K. Goodman, “Filipino Secret 
Agents, 1896-1910” in Philippine Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Third Quarter 1998), p. 378.  
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succeeded the Spanish. 172  Tōkyō at that time though was pursuing harmonious 
relations with the West in order to negotiate the annulment of the unequal treaties. On 
17 June 1898 envoys of the Philippine Provisional Revolutionary Government exiled 
in Hong Kong, travelled to Yokohama to buy armaments but discovered that Tōkyō 
was unwilling to sever its relations with Washington so bluntly.173 Emilio Aguinaldo 
                                                          
172  It is appropriate to examine briefly the 19th century American position vis-à-vis the Pacific. 
Officially, the natal date of the American Imperialism is considered to be April 1898. This is when the 
US declared war on Spain taking advantage of this declining power’s domestic upheaval and its 
military inability to combat the constant Cuban and Philippino revolts for emancipation. Long before 
that occurrence though the American politicians, industrialists, publicists and the military harboured 
territorial ambitions on the Caribbean, South America and the Pacific. The remarkable technological 
progress and industrial growth (from 8% in 1860 to 54% in 1900) of the United States came as a 
confirmation of the country’s splendid “Manifested Destiny”. The extermination of the Native 
Americans, the abuses against coloured people, the victorious conflict with Mexico (1846-48) and the 
irrepressible expansion towards the Pacific coast created a self-centred racial, militaristic and 
imperialistic precedent. In his 1886 book the clergyman Josiah Strong (1847-1916) envisioned the 
American race’s settlement in Central and South America, Africa and beyond. Ulysses S. Grant (1822-
1885) administration’s failed attempt to occupy the Dominican Republic in 1869 and 1871 was 
followed by the lease of Samoa’s port Pago Pago first unofficially in 1872 and then officially in 1878. 
In the Pacific, Hawaii, Wake, Alaska and Guam were either purchased or conquered as naval and 
coaling stations on the route to China, which American financial circles, believing the Chinese market 
myth, desired to penetrate commercially. The 1870-1880 depression drove America’s ruling political 
and business classes to discover markets where their production surplus could be sold off. It was 
crucial that the Asian markets had to offer equal trading opportunities and remain open. Washington  
witnessing the European scramble for spheres of influence, railway and mining rights was worried 
about the Russian progress in Manchuria where one-half of America's textile exports went. On 31 
January 1898, the American Minister in Beijing, Charles Denby (1861-1938) declared that "partition 
would… destroy our markets" and asked for "an energetic protest...against the dismemberment of 
China". Despite the fact that the Spanish-American war was fought on the pretext of Cuban liberation, 
McKinley’s government planned the seizure of the Philippines as the "American Hong Kong”; a 
military and trading base from which American merchants could directly penetrate the coveted Chinese 
markets. In contrast with Cuba and Puerto Rico, in the Philippines there were no American commercial 
interests or even missionary activity at the time. It was a strategic long sighted move. Several months 
before the outbreak of the war the Assistant Secretary of the Navy Department, Theodor Roosevelt had 
devised a war plan that included the dispatch of 20,000 men and the seizure of Manila. After the 
capture of the city on 13 August 1898 the Filipino War for Independence (1899-1902) begun, this time 
directed against Washington. On 3 June 1899, President McKinley ordered the US Navy to capture 
some islands in the central Pacific to serve as a station between Manila and the mainland US. The 
military’s and businessmen’s support to expansion was more than granted. On 16 September 1898 
McKinley talking this time about the prospect of Hawaii’s annexation exclaimed: "If to this we now 
added the Philippines, it would be possible for American energy to... ultimately convert the Pacific 
Ocean into an American Lake". For more see Alberto Aquarone, Le Origini dell’Imperialismo 
Americano da McKinley a Taft (1897-1913), (Bologna, 1973), pp. 11-119 and Thomas McCormick, 
“Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the Spanish-American War” in Pacific 
Historical Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (May, 1963), pp. 155-169 and Jennifer Fish Kashay, “Agents of 
Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii” in  The New England 
Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 280-298. 
173 Alfred Eliab Buck (1832-1902), the American Minister in Japan at the time reported the support he 
received by Foreign Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu “to hold and govern these islands”. In January 1899, 
the new Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō disclosed to Buck that “Japan could not and would not permit 
any step hostile to the interests of the United States in the Philippines”. In the same month the Filipino 
envoys’ request for arms was rejected. On 10 February Itō Hirobumi offered to Buck to act as mediator 
and to use his influence as an Asian in order to convince the rebels to yield. Itō believed that the 
Filipinos were incapable to govern themselves and so "their only safety was in quietly submitting to the 
authority and control of the United States”. Tōkyō remained unwavering even when Lieutenant 
General Mariano Trías y Closas (1868-1914) met Hojo Taiyo, chancellor of the Japanese consulate and 
spoke with great respect about the Japanese monarchy and the Filipino-Japanese kinship on 11 October 
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(1869-1964) the country’s later president visited Japan and met activists and 
sympathizers to his cause.174 As a result a shipment of weapons and ammunitions was 
sent, as discreetly as possible, but it was lost when the ship carrying it sunk off 
Shanghai in 1898. 175  This incident demonstrates the Japanese interest for the 
Philippine Revolution and the later anti-American movements but also the reluctance 
of the government to act openly against the Western block. In any case Tōkyō 
restlessly witnessed the scramble for the Pacific region being unable at the time to 
exert its claims and influence from Hawaii to the Philippines. The powers enjoyed the 
privilege of first picking dominions even in an area so closely interwoven to Japan’s 
strategic interests and aspirations. Japan’s attention, energy and frustration had to be 
directed towards the Asian continent.   
Talking about activists it is appropriate to present the most influential pressure 
groups of the era. Among the various western concepts and practices introduced in 
Meiji Japan, naval and geographical lobbies were also present. However, the extent 
and influence that the secret political associations championing militarism and 
expansion enjoyed was almost unheard of in European politics. After the Satsuma 
Rebellion of 1877 disheartened right wing former samurai created pressure groups in 
the form of political organizations to express their opposition and hopefully influence 
the central government’s foreign policy. They called themselves Shishi (patriots) and 
were political activists inspired by Saigō Takamori’s patriotism and Yoshida Shōin’s 
expansionistic rationale.176 Such groups were the Kōyōsha (Facing the Sun Society), 
the Kaikonsha (Reclamation Society), the Kyōninsha (Perseverance Society) and the 
Kyōshisha (Society to Train the Will).177  
The first evolved into the famous Gen’yōsha (Dark Ocean Society) by 
Tōyama Mitsuru (1855-1944) in Fukuoka in February 1881. Hiraoka Kōtarō (1851-
1906) was the group’s first president. Gen’yōsha’s size increased when the fourth 
president Hakoda Rokusuka (1850-1888) merged it with a similar society. The “dark 
ocean” that separated Japan and Korea signified the members’ resolution to expand 
across these waters on the Asian mainland. Moreover, they were convinced that the 
Restoration should lead to Tōkyō’s rule there.178 As defenders of Asia their mission 
was to eradicate the “yoke of Western imperialism”. Initially there were 50 members 
and even though the organisation grew, its membership would never be more than 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1900. In exchange for weapons he promised "coaling stations in the island they preferred, freedom of 
trade and freedom to build railroads” however without avail. See Goodman, “Filipino Secret Agents”, 
pp. 379-384. 
174 Frank Jacob, Japanism, Pan-Asianism and Terrorism: A Short History of the Amur Society (The 
Black Dragons) 1901-1945, (Cambridge, 2014), p. 36. 
175 Hayase, “Japan and the Philippines”, pp. 38-39. 
176 Despite being a rebel Saigō was venerated as the archetype of patriotism and champion of Japan’s 
expansion by the leaders of the extreme nationalist societies. See E. Herbert Norman, “The Genyosha: 
A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism” in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1944), p. 265. 
177 Jacob, Japanism, pp. 25-28. 
178 Bradshaw, Japan and European colonialism, pp. 98-99.   
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600. They came from South-Western Japan, mostly Fukuoka,179 despite the society’s 
growth in Tōkyō and Ōsaka, and many of them identified themselves as liberals. In 
the 1880s liberals, bourgeoisie capitalists, disappointed by the lack of democratic 
reform at home opposed Tōkyō’s cautious foreign policy in order to embarrass and 
apply pressure on the government. Later the Gen’yōsha turned to plots, blackmailing, 
espionage and political assassinations. In 1882 Tōyama, the society’s mastermind 
assembled a group of spies to collect information about Korea and China, useful in 
case of war.180 Tōyama himself, travelled in 1897-1898 from Irkutsk in Siberia to 
Saint Petersburg, gathering information and making maps for reference in a future 
war against Russia. Many of his followers followed his example. His good rapport 
with industrialists, high ranking officials and the military provided funding for 
Gen’yōsha. In 1884 the Tōyō Gakkan (Oriental Academy) was inaugurated in 
Shanghai as a cover for the society’s espionage programme. Similarly, in Shanghai 
the Rakuzendō (Hall of Pleasurable Delights) initially a shelter for undercover 
activities, became in 1886 an operational base for the Japanese military.181 Gen’yōsha 
members also prepared an invasion of Korea without success in 1885 (Ōsaka 
Incident). They were also responsible for the bombing attack aimed at Foreign 
Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu in October 1889. China was not neglected. Kim Ok-gyun 
(1851-1894), a Korean revolutionary, Philippine rebels and other prominent Asian 
activists met with Tōyama and enjoyed his assistance. Modern China’s first president 
Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), after a failed revolt in October 1895 took refuge in 
Yokohama. The Shishi supported him expecting the destabilization of the Qing 
government and territorial compensation for Japan in case a Chinese revolution broke 
out. 182  Domestically, Yamagata, Prime Minister in 1891, sought the society’s 
                                                          
179 Kyūshū Island and Fukuoka in particular are considered “the spiritual home of the most rabid brand 
of Japanese nationalism and imperialism. Because of its history and geographical location Fukuoka had 
been the starting point for all Japanese efforts to secure a foothold on the continent, beginning with the 
semi-legendary invasion of Korea by the Empress Jingū. Fukuoka was the chief target of the Mongol 
invasions of 1274 and 1281, and it was the main base for Hideyoshi's armadas for his invasions of 
Korea in 1592 and the following years; finally, it was the chief base of naval operations during the 
Russo-Japanese war. In comparatively modern times it has produced more men who have concerned 
themselves with an aggressive foreign policy than perhaps any other centre”. See Norman, “The 
Genyosha”, p. 266. 
180 Jacob, Japanism, pp. 29-30. 
181 It was mainly founded by the military and operated by Arao Kiyoshi or Sei an officer of the General 
Staff and an expert in Chinese politics, a fact reveals the close ties of the society with the military. Arao 
was an ardent Pan-Asianist. In 1886 he declared “I will go to China and take it over. Having taken it 
over, I will give it a decent administration and through that, try to revive Asia”. Of course, in his plan 
Japan had a prominent position. On 20 September 1891 Arao despite financial hardships set up the 
Nisshin Bōeiki Kenkyūjo (Institute for Sino-Japanese Commercial Research). It was comprised of 150 
carefully selected pupils who were sent to Shanghai to study Chinese, commerce and geography. The 
graduates were then sent to India, Burma, Manchuria, the Philippines or Mongolia to survey local 
defences, communication networks and commercial prospects. See Norman, “The Genyosha”, pp. 278-
280. 
182 The “originator of fascism in Japan” as the historian Eizawa Kōji described him, Uchida Ryōhei 
(1873-1937) accompanied Sun Yat-sen to Shanghai in 1900 in order to organize an uprising. When the 
Chinese revolutionary suspected that Uchida, to accelerate a revolution, planned to assassinate eminent 
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assistance. In 1891 the parliament was dissolved because the liberals declined to 
approve the military budget for the build-up of the nation’s armed forces. During the 
February 1892 elections Yamagata tried to weaken the opposition by employing 
nationalistic groups and the police to intimidate his political rivals. In Fukuoka 200 
Gen’yōsha members attacked those perceived as disloyal, who would not vote for the 
military expansion. Militarism went hand in hand with expansion schemes.183 
One of the organization’s activists, Uchida Ryōhei found the Gen’yōsha 
insufficient and too modest for his dream of Japanese hegemony over Asia. On 13 
January 1901, the mother organization and the Ten’yūkyō merged into the 
Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) in Tōkyō. Its 59 members on 3 February became 
more than 300 in few months. Its title can also be read in Japanese as “Amur River 
Society” highlighting the new society’s ambitions on Manchuria.184 Maps of Siberia, 
guidebooks and Russian language classes proved that the next enemy after the 
conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war would be Russia.185 The Kokuryūkai aspired not 
only to halt Saint Petersburg’s influence in Korea and Manchuria but to incite war as 
well. Tōyama, the apostle of Japanese expansionism and creator of the model for 
ultra-nationalistic organizations, was involved in Kokuryūkai’s activities 186  and 
frequently consulted by his disciple Uchida.187  
A less belligerent organization was the Tōkyō Geographical Society (Tōkyō 
Chigaku Kyōkai). It was founded in 1879 by Watanabe Hiromoto (1848-1901). Its 
declared objective was to spread geopolitical knowledge about Japan, Asia and the 
rest of the world. By 1880 it had 143 members.188 The former Foreign Minister, 
Enomoto Takeaki acted for some time as its chairman. During his term a closer 
                                                                                                                                                                      
government officials they terminated their collaboration. Uchida and 13 other saboteurs, translators and 
propagandists formed the Ten’yūkyō (Society of Heavenly Salvation for the Oppressed) aiming to take 
advantage of Korea’s precarious internal situation (Donghak Peasant Revolution) and trigger a war. 
With the military’s approval, they travelled to Korea in June 1894 where Uchida attacked Korean 
soldiers, supply routes and governmental buildings. The eventual Chinese armed intervention would 
surely ignite a war. Tōkyō alarmed, planned an investigation but the military disbanded it by labelling 
the group “volunteer corps”. Two months after Uchida’s arrival in Korea the Sino-Japanese War 
erupted. See Jacob, Japanism, pp. 34-35, 46-47. 
183 Ibid., pp. 37-39. 
184 Bradshaw, Japan and European colonialism, pp. 98-99.  
185 Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan Asianism, 
and Militarism in Japan, 1901-1925″ in International Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2014), 
p. 136. 
186 By 10 February 1901 the society had set up its very own publishing house. Precisely a month later 
its first journal was published. The government had to ban Kokuryūkai publications numerous times 
since their editors were often advocating the outright occupation of Hawaii, India or the Philippines. 
Also, small areas of strategic importance were purchased in Korea to be used for ammunition 
stockpiling and intelligence gathering in preparation for the upcoming war. Furthermore, the society 
established a language school in which Russian and Chinese were taught to members of the military. 
See Jacob, Japanism, pp. 59-60. 
187 Uchida, like his mentor, travelled in Siberia and founded a jūdō school in Vladivostok in 1895 as a 
cover for his followers’ espionage activities. See Sven Saaler, “The Kokuryukai”, pp. 131-132. 
188 Morifumi, “The Asianism of the Kōa-Kai”, p. 42.  
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collaboration with Navy officials was established thanks to his contacts with high 
ranking officers. This association propagandized through lectures and publications 
colonization, immigration and shipping enterprises especially in the Pacific. 189 
Enomoto also established the Colonial Association (Shokumin Kyōkai) in February 
1893. The founding members were journalists, politicians and representatives of 
Tōkyō’s economic cycles. This association strived to transform Japan’s contract 
labour migration to Hawaii and North America to a colonial one. Permanent “Settler 
colonization,” could solve the nation’s overpopulation problem, boost the shipping 
industry, promote exports, and stimulate the industry and commerce. Among the 
association’s activities was the organization of lectures and surveys to collect 
information on the most suitable places for Japanese settlement. The Colonial 
Association’s board inspected every possible location and came to the conclusion that 
Latin America was the ideal destination for Japanese settlers. Enomoto regarded 
Mexico in particular as an inviting prospect free of western domination and 
exploitation. He even started purchasing Mexican land to provide for future Japanese 
peasant settlement but the endeavour encountered financial difficulties.190 
In 1888 the scholar Sugiura Shigetake launched the aforementioned Seikyōsha 
(Society for Political Education). For its members, national self-strengthening would 
be achieved by exporting people, capital and products. Japan had to evolve into an 
“oceanic” maritime nation. Sugiura in August 1887 lamented Japan’s territorial 
extent: “How miserably small Japan looks on the map of the world”. He asked for the 
creation of a “Colonial Ministry” to regulate immigration, administer Hokkaidō and 
the Bonin islands and “investigate methods for developing other colonies”. On the 
occasion of war with China in August 1894 he stressed that Japan as a maritime 
nation must “expand not only in navy” “but also its sea-lanes and shipping in 
peacetime” in order to advance its foreign trade.191 He wanted Japan to become “a 
great island empire”, “an empire of free trade” motivated by the British example. The 
journalist and co-member, Fukumoto Nichinan stressed the urgency for Japan to solve 
its overpopulation problem and to develop its shipping industry. 192  Furthermore, 
Sugiura believed that expansion was invaluable for “cultural renewal” and for 
infusing patriotism to the still timid Japanese. For the more adamant Seikyōsha 
supporters, Japan through trade, emigration and if necessary war, had to acquire 
territories in order to be taken seriously in the international power politics. Tōkyō for 
them had to lead Asia against the West as well. These ardent imperialists conceived 
Japanese mass settlement overseas as the instrument for the “conquest of frontiers” 
and the establishment of “New Japans” throughout the world as Shiga 
                                                          
189 Schencking, “The Imperial Japanese Navy” pp. 775-776. 
190 Xu Lu, Diasporic Imperialism, pp. 67-68. 
191 Uchida, “From Island nation”, pp. 60-62.  
192 Seikyōsha members were not the only ones to promote these notions. An April 1885 bulletin of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry urged Japanese merchants to venture aboard as in the 
early 17th century when “Our merchants, full of enterprising spirit, frequently travelled to Taiwan, 
Cochin [China], Siam, and Cambodia” creating “colonies”; in Siam alone, “Japanese residents, male 
and female, totalled as many as eight thousand”. See Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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Shigetaka envisioned in 1887.193 Sugiura and Fukumoto Nichinan both called for the 
construction of more warships that would not only contribute to national security; in 
time of peace they were to be employed as transports to carry merchants to South 
American and Pacific markets.194  In 1886 the former suggested energetic expansion 
by “choosing a prospective colony among the islands of the East Indies” and the 
creation of a Japanese East Indies Company to top at least the “level of Holland and 
Spain”.195 
In September 1900, the Kokumin Dōmeikai (People Alliance Society) was 
founded by the pan-Asian ideologue Prince Konoe Atsumaro who also advocated 
expansion to the Asian mainland. He envisioned an Asia for the Asians. He confided 
in the socialist Shūsui Kōtoku: “If we defeat Russia, we expand to the continent and 
bring peace to Asia”. 196  Two years earlier Konoe had established the Dōbunkai 
(Society for Common Culture) which evolved into the Tōa-Dōbunkai (Society for 
Common East Asian Culture) on 2 November 1898. Its aims were to assist China’s 
development and preserve its integrity. This association was a semi-governmental 
organization since it was sponsored by secret funds of the Foreign Ministry, the Army 
and from business cycles; Foreign Minister Aoki Shūzō promised financial support in 
April 1899. From then until 1913 the Tōa-Dōbunkai, the Foreign Ministry’s eye in 
China, received 40 thousand yen as subsidy on an annual basis. The Tōa-Dōbun Shoin 
(Academy for East Asian Culture) opened in 1900 and operated in Shanghai making 
use of these funds.197 Realizing Konoe’s dream it evolved into the largest cultural 
facility outside of Japan and its colonies. It was Tōa-Dōbunkai’s greatest undertaking 
and it lasted until the very end, 1945.198 
 
                                                          
193In the same occasion he explained: “If our countrymen migrated and settled everywhere across the 
sea . . . they would order daily necessities and goods from the home country, thereby establishing [new] 
connections”. See Ibid., pp. 63-68. 
194 They were not alone in harbouring visions of prosperity through commerce. The Mitsui Trading 
Company’s inaugural statement (1876) stated the firm's objective to “export overseas surplus products 
of the Imperial land, to import products needed at home, and thereby to engage in trade with ten 
thousand countries of the universe”. See Bradshaw, Japan and European colonialism, pp. 112-113. 
195 Uchida, “From Island nation”, pp. 81-82. 
196 Harry Jerome Lamley, The Taiwan literati and early Japanese rule, 1895-1915: a study of their 
reaction to the Japanese occupation and subsequent responses to colonial rule and modernization, 
Doctoral Thesis, University of Washington, 1964, pp. 318-319. 
197 Saaler, Pan-Asianism in Meiji, pp. 22. As it is evident by the numerous Japanese institutions in 
Shanghai, this city attracted the interest of Meiji politicians and merchants alike. Initially though and 
despite Kishida Ginkō’s (1833-1905) pleads for the establishment of a more energetic commercial 
presence no Japanese businesses existed in Shanghai in 1871. In contrast Britain had 221, the US 42, 
Germany 40 and France 17. Arao also pointed out the western example and mentioned the advantages 
that commerce and industry in China provided to national prestige and strength. By 1887 however, 41 
Japanese businesses were operating in this vivid commercial node. See Douglas R. Reynolds, 
“Training Young China Hands: Tōa-Dōbun Shoin and Its Precursors, 1886-1945,” in The Japanese 
Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. P. Duus, R. H. Myers, and M. R. Peattie, (Princeton, 1989), 
pp. 212-215.  
198 Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
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 10. Japan’s politico-strategic position in the Far East 
 
Before expanding overseas, the Japanese sought to secure for themselves the 
adjacent territories ahead of the Great Powers. The fear of foreign penetration through 
bases close to mainland Japan pushed the Meiji leaders to ascertain their claims and 
finally incorporate lands both in the north and south of the country. In this chapter the 
diplomatic maneuvers, the relations of Meiji Japan with its neighbors and the powers, 
the management of its bordering territories, and the very first Japanese attempts to 
expand in East Asia will be examined.  
On 7 February 1855, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan 
and Russia was concluded as already examined. Signed by Vice Admiral Yevfimy 
Vasilyevich Putyatin and a Japanese delegation under the samurai Moriyama 
Einosuke (1820-1872) it opened Nagasaki, Shimoda and Hakodate to Russian trade. 
Article two was the most important as it demarcated the common border of the two 
neighbouring empires. According to its provisions, the island of Sakhalin (Karafuto) 
was placed in rather vague terms; the Russian settlements in the north and the 
Japanese in the south would remain intact under a “joint possession” status. In the 
Kurile islands, Edo kept Etorofu and the southern islands whereas Saint Petersburg 
gained Urup as well as the rest of the northern islands for the time being.1  
Japan and Russia had both shown interest in the islands north of Honshu 
during the early 19th century. The first scientific exploration of the island was 
entrusted by the Bakufu to Mamiya Rinzō (1775-1844) in June 1809 in an attempt to 
designate and define the Japanese-Russian-Chinese borders.2 The treaty of Aigun in 
May 1858 between Qing China and the Russian empire ceded to the latter territory on 
the northern bank of the Amur in Manchuria. In 1860, Saint Petersburg enhanced its 
strategic position in the Far East by establishing the Pacific Maritime province and the 
Vladivostok bastion. The island of Sakhalin bordering the Russian possessions was 
considered of high strategic and economic importance. Russian explorers discovered 
rich deposits of coal there in 1852-1853 and the explorer Gennady Ivanovich 
                                                          
1 George Alexander Lensen, The Russian push toward Japan: Russo-Japanese relations, 1697–1875, 
(New York, 1959), p. 425.  
2 Besides this strategic necessity, western practices dictated the use of geographical and mapping 
expeditions as predecessors to expansion and primary sovereignty claims. Hence the explorers Mogami 
Tokunai (1754-1836), Matsuda Denjirō, Matsūra Takeshirō (1818-1888), Murakami Shimonojō, 
Aoshima Shunjō and Inō Tadataka were dispatched to Hokkaidō and Sakhalin to survey the northern 
territories and consolidate Japan’s rights. Russian, French and British explorers and cartographers had 
already outlined Sakhalin’s coastlines in the eve of the 19th century thus posing a potential threat to the 
shogunate. In April 1807, the explorer Nikolaj Petrovič Rezanov (1764-1807) and his men attacked 
Japanese garrisons and fisheries in Sakhalin and the Kuriles. These attacks were meant to exert 
pressure and open Japan to foreigners before Perry. For this reason, Mamiya’s orders were to 
thoroughly explore Sakhalin. He presented the island as almost vacant, ready for Japanese occupation 
with the exception of some locals who maintained tributary relations with the mainland Qing 
authorities. See Brett L. Walker, “Mamiya Rinzo and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island: 
Cartography and Empire” in Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 33 (2007), pp. 283-305. 
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Nevelskoy (1813-1876) proclaimed Sakhalin’s annexation to Russia. Putyatin negated 
this claim out of fear of an Anglo-French attack since the Crimean War (1853-1856) 
was already underway.3 However, the Russian government instructed in April 1853 
the contracted Russo-American Company to administer, exploit and defend the island 
from foreign intruders. After the Russo-Japanese treaty and the end of the Crimean 
war both sides tried to strengthen their claims by erecting posts and installing 
garrisons. Albeit belatedly the Bakufu came to understand Karafuto’s importance for 
the protection of Hokkaidō.4 Under the new governor of Oriental Siberia, Nikolay 
Nikolayevich Muravyov-Amursky (1809-1881), nominated in 1856 the Russians built 
fortifications and excavated mines gradually pushing the Japanese settlements farther 
south. In August 1859, he visited Edo to negotiate the cession of the entire island in 
return for fishing rights but the shogunate officials called for the maintenance of the 
division based on the 50th parallel north. Mutual distrust was heightened after the 
murder of three Russian sailors in Shinagawa on 25 August. The tension rose even 
further when Edo dispatched more troops and supplies in the Japanese base near the 
Aniwa river called Kushunkotan (Korsakov) in October 1860, when the Russians 
were sending immigrants and prisoners to create a penal colony.5  
The prospect of war between Russia and Japan appeared imminent on 13 
March 1861 due to the Possadonick incident. The Russian warship Possadonick 
docked at Tsushima Island for repairs and replenishment without authorization. 
Almost immediately the ship’s crew started building shore facilities and Birileff, their 
captain, demanded the permanent leasing of the location. Edo, alarmed by Tsushima’s 
authorities dispatched the statesman Oguri Kozukenosuke (Oguri Tadamasa, 1827-
1868) to dismiss the outrageous pretentions on 14 June. The negotiations dragged on 
without the Russians demonstrating any inclination to abandon the island. On 14 
August, Alcock, the British Minister, and Admiral Hope intervened in favour of the 
Japanese. In late August, two British warships made their appearance in Tsushima 
forcing the Russians to finally leave in early September. Edo had to rely on foreign 
support to protect its sovereignty from intruders. The fact that any power could seize 
any part of the national territory at will added to the people’s anxiety.6 
According to an English observer, in 1869 the Japanese settlements in 
Sakhalin, numbering 200-300 mainly seasonal hunters and fishermen, were located 
                                                          
3  In August 1854, the Allies indeed seized the city of Petropavlovsk at Russian Kamchatka. See 
Lensen, The Russian push, p. 426. 
4 Daniela De Palma, “Le Relazioni Russo-Giapponesi negli anni 1854-1875”, in Il Giappone, Vol. 36 
(1996), pp. 72-73.  
5 The Russians also destroyed the Japanese fishing stations and lodgings in Kushunkotan. Colonel 
Mikhail Ivanovich Veniukov (1832–1901) admitted in the early 1870s that a sort of guerilla warfare 
was taking place on the island; strongholds were erected and demolished, supplies and infrastructure 
were sabotaged and troops were frequently deployed to give the impression that a particular locality 
was under Japanese or Russian control. The frontier was not respected and each side ventured across 
the border and created posts at will. See Lensen, The Russian push, pp. 426-427. 
6 Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese 
Empire, 1860-1882, (London, 1980), pp. 89-90 
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exclusively in the south coasts. In 1859-1860 a Russian explorer estimated the 
number of permanent settlers to around 150 located in the southern tip. The 
implication was that the rest of the Sakhalin, that is ¾ of the island belonged to 
Russia. Encouraged by these evaluations De Preradovich, the commander of the 
Russian forces in Sakhalin, revealed to the aforementioned Englishman that dual 
possession was unpractical and since the Japanese were not able to develop 
economically the island they had to renounce their part. In the summer of 1862 a 
three-member Japanese delegation visited Saint Petersburg to revolve the protracted 
and unsettling issue. Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev (1832-1908), director of the 
Foreign Affairs’ Asian department, and the Edo’s delegates did not reach to an 
agreement. In March 1866, the diplomats Koide Hidesane and Ishikawa Kanzaburo 
were sent to resume negotiations with Ignatyev’s successor, Petr Stremoukhov.7 The 
Japanese proposed a common investigation of the boundary and a line of demarcation 
on the 48th parallel. Stremoukhov responded that the island had to be placed under 
Russian protection to prevent other powers from moving in. To smooth over the 
Japanese objections he offered fishing rights and the islands of Uruppu, Broton and 
Chiproi in the Kurils. On 30 March 1867, the “Temporary Regulations relative to the 
island of Sakhalin” was concluded establishing: free passage for Russian and 
Japanese subjects in the entire island, protection of the native Ainu race and 
settlement of differences by the local authorities. With the Boshin War (January 1868-
June 1869) in progress and the Restoration uncompleted, Japan found itself in a 
precarious position both internally and diplomatically. Taking advantage of the 
situation in 1868, the Russians penetrated the Japanese part of the island, constructed 
a fort and burned down the station of Ōtomari. Furthermore, they transported there 
800 prisoners and guards. However, Sakhalin’s proximity to the Japanese home 
islands meant that colonists, supplies and troops were more efficiently available in 
contrast to the rival side.8 
After the conclusion of the Boshin war and the consolidation of the Emperor’s 
rule a different approach was attempted. The Karafuto Kaitakushi (Sakhalin 
Colonization Company) was established under Kuroda Kiyotaka in March 1870 for 
the administration of the southern part of the island and the mediation of the 
American government was requested. 9  In the summer of 1872, Foreign Minister 
Soejima acknowledging that the protracted friction with Russia was detrimental to the 
newborn state’s diplomatic standing met with Evgenii Biutsov, the newly appointed 
Russian Minister in Japan. Soejima offered two million yen for the acquisition of the 
northern part of the island but Biutsov declined. He proposed the exchange of 
                                                          
7 Lensen, The Russian push, pp. 434-435.  
8 De Palma, “Le Relazioni Russo-Giapponesi”, pp. 76-77.  
9 The Japanese government approached William Henry Seward (1801-1872) in October 1869. He was 
the politician that had negotiated the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. The involvement of the 
American Minister in Japan, Charles Egbert De Long, in March 1870 and of the American Secretary of 
State, in December did not yield any fruits either. Saint Petersburg rejected the American good offices’ 
overtures. See Lensen, The Russian push, 438-439. 
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Tōkyō’s share with several northern Kuril Islands instead. The negotiations broke 
down once more without resolving the frontier issue. Kuroda on a memorandum to 
the throne in May 1873 maintained that Sakhalin’s feeble economic value did not 
justify the drain of resources amidst the government’s modernization program. 10 
Finally, Enomoto Takeaki this time as Japan’s plenipotentiary met the Russian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883) in January 1875 in 
the Tsar’s capital. The prolonged discussions were concluded on 7 May and resulted 
in the Karafuto-Chishima or Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Exchange treaty.11 Sakhalin and 
the Kurils were recognized as Russian and Japanese respectively, mutual 
compensations for the construction of infrastructure was accorded, repatriation for 
those who wished to leave and protection for those who preferred to stay was agreed 
and free use of the Kushunkotan port was granted to the Japanese where a Japanese 
consul was to be installed. Finally, the Japanese were granted fishing, navigation and 
trade rights at the ports of the Sea of Okhotsk and Kamchatka.12 
The treaty and its supplement concluded on 22 August in Tōkyō was deemed 
offensive by the Japanese public. Sakhalin’s strategic importance and resources were 
undoubtedly superior to the northern uninhabited islets of the Kurils. Τhe treaty was 
even more unjust for the native Ainu (japanefied or russified) and Aleuts residents 
that had to choose nationality within 3 years and migrate accordingly, abandoning 
their ancestral lands.13 The southern part of Sakhalin was recovered by Japan as a 
result of the Russo-Japanese war. As for the central and northern Kurils acquired in 
1875, Tōkyō incorporated them into the homeland. 14  Since 1798 many Bakufu 
scholars such as Habuto Masayasu and Tokugawa Noriaki (1800-1860) envisaged the 
colonization of the Kurils. Naturally the Exchange treaty of 1875 sparked the interest 
of activists. Cabinet Secretary Kaneko Kentarō (1853-1942) after an exploration 
mission in 1885 suggested the installation of farmer-soldiers (tondenhei) to these 
strategic outposts. The relocation of the Ainu during the previous year had left the 
                                                          
10 Extraction of coal required capital investments which Tōkyō did not possess, the harsh climate 
prohibited any serious immigration or any agricultural endeavours and finally the common border 
contributed to the ongoing Russian hostility. In 1874 many Japanese colonists were moved to 
Hokkaidō in an effort to avoid expenses and dangerous disputes in Sakhalin. See De Palma, “Le 
Relazioni Russo-Giapponesi”, pp. 78-79. 
11 George Alexander Lensen, “Japan and Tsarist Russia-the Changing Relationships, 1875-1917” in 
Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Oct. 1962), pp. 337-338.  
12 Lensen, The Russian push, p. 443. 
13 The proximity of the russified Ainu to Kamchatka and their affinity towards the Russians seemed as 
a palpable threat to Tōkyō’s officials. Efforts to persuade them to relocate failed in 1876, 1878 and 
1882 and so in June and July 1884 their removal was made mandatory. In the southern islands the Ainu 
unaccustomed to farming, relied on government subsidies for their survival; they were paid 1,800 yen 
annually until the Aborigine Protection Law in 1889. In 1896, Tōkyō dispatched Budhist priests and 
teachers to culturally assimilate the Ainu children. However, the russified Christian Orthodox Ainu 
were not the best candidates for loyal imperial subjects. See John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-
Japanese Frontier in the Pacific, (London, 1974), pp. 109-113. 
14 The Kurils were administered as part of Hokkaidō. The southern part formed the Chishima district in 
1869. From 1871 these islands, and after 1875 the rest of the archipelago, were administered by the 
Hokkaidō colonial government. From 1882 to 1886 the islands were part of the Nemuro province and 
subsequently of the Nemuro Branch Office. See Ibid., pp. 93-97.  
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islands uninhabited and vulnerable to Russian intrusion. According to Kaneko, regular 
shipping service and the presence of the Imperial Navy would ward off any potential 
encroachment. His views were endorsed by Kataoka Toshimazu in his report to the 
Emperor in 1892. The geographer Okamoto Kansuke15 (1839-1904) established the 
Kuril Society (Chishima Gikai) to raise volunteers and capital for the colonization of 
the Urup and Iturup islands. Lack of funding signaled the dissolvement of the society. 
His successor, Lieutenant Gunji Shigetaga founded the Kuril Service Society 
(Chishima Hōkō Gikai) in 1892. Under the concentrated crowd’s ovation Gunji and 
60 daring colonists departed from Tōkyō for the empire’s northern edge on 20 March 
1893. Very few survived the hazardous voyage and the extreme conditions to settle in 
the remote islands.16  
Hokkaidō, known as Ezo or Yezo Island, was not entirely integrated to the 
Shogunate’s territory until 1855, when the island was typically annexed in response to 
a perceived threat from Russia. Besides the southern tip that was inhabited by 
Japanese nationals the rest of the vast island was populated by the Ainu aborigines. 
Ezo was seen by many Japanese as terra incognita, foreign but at the same time within 
the Japanese cultural and commercial orbit. In the 15th century the Tokugawa 
administration entrusted the jurisdiction and internal order of the island to the 
Matsumae clan. The Matsumae sought profits through trading with the natives and not 
by taxing the rice production, as it was the case traditionally, due to the area’s frigid 
conditions. From the first half of the 15th century fortified trading posts in the interior 
and the Shakushain War17 against the Ainu resulted to political penetration and the 
gradual economic exploitation of Hokkaidō by the mainland.18 However, the northern 
part of the island remained unknown and unexplored, a dumping ground for deported 
criminals. The Meiji leadership demonstrated interest for the development of 
Hokkaidō and alarmed by the Russian escalating presence in the north strove to 
protect its sovereign rights and establish its national boundaries. After the dissolution 
of Enomoto’s Republic of Ezo in June 1869, the Matsumae were briefly reinstated to 
perform its policing duties but it was clear that a firm modern administration was 
                                                          
15 Back in 1868 Okamoto began leading colonists to Aniwa bay, in Sakhalin’s southern tip. The 
settlement programme cost Tōkyō 400,000 yen between 1870 and 1873. See Peter Duus, The Abacus 
and the Sword The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910, (London-Berkeley, 1995), pp. 197-198. 
16 Gunji did not lose hope. He returned yet again to the Kurils in 1896 accompanied by his followers 
and family. During the Russo-Japanese war he organized a mission and invaded the Russian 
Kamchatka. His self-appointed task force of 100 adventurers occupied the town of Ozernoe on 6 June 
1904 until the arrival of a Russian detachment. See Stephan, The Kuril Islands, pp. 115-117. 
17 For more on Shakushain's War (1669-1672) see Brett L. Walker. The Conquest of Ainu Lands: 
Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800, (Berkeley-London, 2001), pp. 48-72.  
18 Donald Calman, The Nature and Origins of Japanese Imperialism: A Reinterpretation of the Great 
Crisis of 1873, (London-New York, 1992), pp. 28-30. 
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necessary in order to colonize19 the island; installing Japanese settlers in the imperial 
extremities was the indicated answer to the newborn state’s geopolitical anxieties.   
As early as 9 March 1868 and in the midst of the fierce civil war, the Emperor 
gathered its advisors to outline the national policy in regard to Hokkaidō.20 In April 
1868 the Hakodate District Court was established. It was expanded into the Hakodate 
Administrative Office in May. In July 1869 the Daijōkan created the Hokkaidō 
Development Agency (Kaitakushi) to administer and develop the island. The 
appointment of Nabeshima Naomasa (Nabeshima Kansō 1815-1871) as the first 
colonial secretary in 12 July 1869 was accompanied by the following imperial order: 
“The flourishing condition of the Imperial Power is dependent upon the colonization 
and exploitation of Hokkaidō. At present there is urgent need of action. We realize the 
great difficulties of governing this area which lies several hundred li in the Arctic 
North. On your official tour of duty do your best to exploit the area and to open the 
lock on the Northern Gate so that the people may prosper and there may be a firm 
base for the expansion of the Imperial Power”.21 The affirmation of metropolitan rule 
in Hokkaidō was reinforced by the imperial visits of 1876 and 1881.22  The new 
colony was funded and defended by the central government. In 1872 a ten-year 
financial project secured one million yen for the Kaitakushi annually, deriving from 
local taxes, the Mitsui Company and subsidies from the national treasury. Until 1882, 
infrastructure works, roads, prisons,23 food mills, fisheries, railways and mines had 
cost 20 million yen, 12 of which were provided by Tōkyō. Livestock, farming and 
geological surveys were conducted by foreign experts, mainly American,24 employed 
                                                          
19 The high administrators of Tōkyō prefecture inquired the government about the prospect of obtaining 
Nemuro in eastern Hokkaidō as a relocation ground for the city’s poor and troublemakers in the mid-
1870. See Ibid., pp. 226-227. 
20 A year later Iwakura submitted a report stressing the importance of Hokkaidō, encouraging the 
spreading of civilization and transforming the underdeveloped island into a “little Japan”. See Michele 
M. Mason, Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery 
and the Modern Nation-State, (New York, 2012), pp. 23-24. 
21 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
22 For the same reason the construction of a supplementary imperial palace at Hokkaidō was approved 
according to the 21 January 1890 Nichi Nichi newspaper. See Ibid., p. 29. 
23 Three prisons were built on the island to detain criminals, Tokugawa supporters and radicals: in 
Kabato (1881), in Sorachi (1882) and in Kushiro (1885). For the historian Takashio Hiroshi the convict 
labour force was to develop Hokkaidō’s rich natural resources, coal in particular. Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
24 The choice of American advisers was not coincidental. Meiji officials knew that the United States 
had settled the American West through ranching and the forced removal of the natives. The most 
famous American adviser to visit Hokkaidō was the military officer Horace Capron (1804-1885). After 
Kuroda’s visit to Washington in the fall of 1870, Capron was convinced to assist the island’s 
development and modernization, introducing American agronomic patterns, machinery and crops. He 
arrived in Japan in August 1871 and was employed as Kaitakushi’s special adviser. Directing a team of 
American scientists, he surveyed the frontier’s climate, soil, and mineral deposits. In regard to 
colonization the team proposed voluntary settlement on loose terms, an advice that was adopted from 
1872 to 1886. A policy of free land exempt of taxes was instituted in 1874 but without success. From 
1869 to 1881 just 1% of the island’s arable land was cultivated. For this reason Capron proposed the 
influx of western capital and farmers. Although the latter were far more accustomed with modern 
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by the agency after 1871. Ports were opened to foreign trade and banks were 
inaugurated in 1896 and 1899. Kuroda, Vice Governor General of colonization and in 
charge of the Sakhalin area, submitted a document in favour of colonization and 
national defense in the face of Russian encroachment. He claimed that warships and 
troops had to be based in Sapporo. In January 1875 as the Inspector-General of 
Military Police Affairs of the Hokkaidō Militia, Kuroda founded the first company of 
the Colonial Militia.25  
Initially the Kaitakushi suffered from lacking facilities, funds and personnel 
and from a power struggle within the ranks of the administrators. Until 1871 the 
agency controlled just 20% of the island since huge plots of land were granted to the 
imperial households, the Army and various religious orders. Central funding and the 
increase of the officials from 35 in 1871 to 306 a year later did not avert the bitter 
quarrels between the directors Kuroda and Iwamura or between Shima and 
Higashikuse. An initial effort in 1869 to settle immigrants to Sakhalin and Hokkaidō 
ended tragically with the death of 25% of the 300 settlers because of the hardships 
and the insufficient preparations before the undertaking. Similarly, in 1882 a similar 
percentage of the 436 destitute poor that had reached the eastern part of the island 
perished.26 Furthermore, Hokkaidō’s apparent economic potential led to corruption, 
antagonism and even nationwide political scandals.27 Benjamin Smith Lyman (1835-
1920), an American geologist in the agency’s employment accused Kuroda for 
mismanaging public money and corruption in a letter written on 6 April 1874. In 1875 
Enomoto and another government official Ōtori Keisuke (1833-1911), obtained from 
the government great parcels of fertile land. The American experts in charge of the 
development of the island opposed the transfer arguing that no settlers would arrive if 
the best lands were not available to them. 
The biggest scandal took place in 1881. Tōkyō’s investments in Hokkaidō 
were valued at 30 million yen in 1880. In July 1881 Kuroda planned in secrecy to sell 
                                                                                                                                                                      
practices, Tōkyō refused on the grounds of national security. Outraged by the Kaitakushi’s oversized 
bureaucratic inertia, ignorance and overspending Capron notified the Japanese government of his 
intention to leave on 28 March 1875. See John A. Harrison, “The Capron Mission and the Colonization 
of Hokkaido, 1868-1875” in Agricultural History, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jul., 1951), pp. 136-140 and Donald 
Roden, “In Search of the Real Horace Capron: An Historiographical Perspective on Japanese-American 
Relations”, in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Nov., 1986), pp. 552-555. For more details on 
Capron’s activity and his scientific reports to Tōkyō see Merritt Starr, “General Horace Capron, 1804-
1885” in Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (1908-1984), Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jul., 1925), pp. 
259-349. 
25 Jintarō Fujii, Japanese Culture in the Meiji Era. Volume VII. Outline of Japanese History, (Tokyo, 
1958), pp. 74-75. 
26 Calman, The Nature and Origins, 233-238. 
27 One more of Enomoto’s societies, the trading company called Hōninsha, in operation from 1872 
until 1875, received a 100,000 yen funding and a vessel from Kaitakushi to promote the Japanese-
Hokkaidō-China trade. By 1881, Iwasaki Yatarō (1835-1885), founder of the Mitsubishi company, 
through his high political connections had secured control of Hokkaidō’s shipping and credit sectors. 
Finally, the Mitsui firm was engaged in fishing and commercial activities in the island. Ibid., pp. 229-
232. 
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the mines and enterprises to the merchants Godai Tomoatsu (1836-1886) and Nakano 
Goichi, who also happened to be high level government officials, for the ridiculous 
amount of 300,000 yen payable in 30 years. When the misdeed was discovered the 
public criticized bitterly the government, giving momentum to the liberal People's 
Rights Movement in the 1880s that led to the imperial note announcing the opening of 
a National Diet.28 In October 1882 the assets sale was cancelled and the Kaitakushi 
was brought to an inglorious end. Thereafter the Hokkaidō prefectural office took 
over. It appears that not everything was as splendid as the agency’s journal self-
congratulatory advertised. The Hokkaidō Development Journal, first published in 
January 1880, highlighted the island’s abundance of resources and the 
administration’s modernization mission. It also contained practical information on 
immigration and economic opportunities.29 
The Tondenhei colonization programme, which was briefly mentioned in the 
first chapter, was the Kaitakushi’s main objective.30 The former samurai’s discontent 
aggravated by the widespread economic distress was equally dangerous for the 
metropolis’ internal stability and was thus channeled to the vast, open territory in the 
north. Free transportation, seeds and dwellings, tax exemptions, rice and salt subsidies 
for three years and farming tools, were promised by Tōkyō to convince the settlers to 
move to an inhospitable environment. Each farm household received 16 acres of 
arable land and was eligible to purchase up to 80 acres at low prices. The regulations 
were explained in the Tondenhei handbooks. The programme, inextricably linked to 
the nation’s vulnerability syndrome, was the brainchild of Kaitakushi officials. In 
1871 they proposed to the central government the relocation of 20 families from 
Tōkyō to Hokkaidō to “convert Tōkyō’s excess, useless population into indispensable 
soldiers”. Foreign Minister Maruyama advocated banishing to Hokkaidō the anti-
imperial troops during the Boshin war, to “secure Japanese borders and establish 
Japanese presence in Ezo-Sakhalin”. The recruited colonists engaged in mandatory 
military drills annually. For the first three years, they were kept on active duty 
following which they spent a further ten years on the reserves. They also participated 
in the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion and later in the Sino-Japanese war. The first 
                                                          
28 Fujii, Japanese Culture in the Meiji Era, pp. 119-120. 
29  Mason, Dominant Narratives, pp. 26-29. Two of its most famous journalists were Okamoto 
Nagayuki and Tsuda Sen (1837-1908). The former justified the colonization of the north by citing 
verses of the ancient texts Kojiki and Nihongi that validated the inherent agrarianism of the Japanese. 
The latter exclaimed: “Aah! The security of the northern gate is of the outmost importance to our 
country and high spirited production is presently urgent. In the north in Hokkaido, good farmers are 
increasing the power of our nation many times over and spreading the prestige of our country far and 
wide”. Ibid., pp. 47-48.  
30 Before the enactment of the Tondehnei sponsored programme in 1874 those who wanted to settle in 
Hokkaidō were voluntary settlers, bearing themselves the transportation and subsidence costs. They 
were not organized militarily and they leased land according to the following rules: those with an 
income above ten koku were given 1.5 acres of land; those with one to ten koku were given about one 
acre; those with less than one koku were given about 0.5 acres. See David L. Howell, “Early Shizoku 
Colonization of Hokkaidō.” in Journal of Asian History, No. 17 (1983), pp. 55-61.  
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Tondenhei village was Kotoni, founded in May 1875 and populated by 198 men and 
their 965 family members. Τhe Nichi Nichi newspaper referred to the village’s 
establishment in terms of securing and protecting the northern territory.  Another 16 
similar settler groups arrived in the 1870s and five more in the 1880s. During the 30 
years of the Tondenhei program 7,337 men were chosen to colonize Hokkaidō, 
Japan’s first settlement colony. During the first 15 years only former samurai were 
recruited; starting from 1890 commoners’ petitions were also accepted. The 60,000 
Japanese in 1869 rose to one million at the end of the century. 31  Approximately 
600,000 men settled there between 1880 and 1890. Governmental encouragement, 
extreme poverty and the prospect of employment in agriculture, fishing or forestry 
enterprises provided the main stimuli. In 1883, the year after the dissolution of the 
agency the government announced that 150,000 yen would be loaned annually to 
former samurai to support the colonization effort in Hokkaidō. The Regulation for the 
Settlement of Former Samurai two years later provided for interest free loans and 8 
acres of land to each incoming family.32 
During the Tokugawa era (1603-1868) Japan’s political boundaries did not 
coincide with its geographical ones. The Ainu, the Ryūkyūans and even outcast 
minorities constituted autonomous communities or foreign entities subordinated to 
Edo. In regard to Hokkaidō’s and Sakhalin’s aborigines, relations were based on 
economic transactions rather than political subordination. However, the diverseness 
between the backwardness of the northern barbarians (“internal others”) and the 
cultural superiority of the metropolis facilitated the development of a common 
Japanese identity. 33  The bipolar antithesis between the civilized centre and the 
barbaric periphery constituted one of the ideological pillars of the late 19th century 
Japanese expansionism. Japanese laws were too sophisticated for the savage Ainu. 
Japanese language and customs would acculturate them but not to a decree to be 
equally accepted as Japanese. For the pioneers of Japanese ethnography however, the 
Ainu and Yamato “mainland” Japanese were not so different. The ethnographers 
Koganei Yoshikiyo (1859–1944) and Tsuboi Shōgorō (1863–1913) for instance 
asserted that the Ainu were racially immature but their ancestors were related to the 
prehistoric Japanese. The depiction of the Chinese, Ryūkyūans, Taiwanese and 
Koreans as primitive but kindred races was also a vehicle for attaining an empire.34 
                                                          
31 Richard Siddle, “Ainu Moshiri Revisited: Indigenous Nationalism in Japan” in East Asian Studies, 
No. 2 (Dec. 1994), p. 52.  
32 See Komori Yōichi, “Rule in the Name of “Protection”: The Vocabulary of Colonialism” in Reading 
Colonial Japan: Text, Context, and Critique, ed. H. Lee and M. Mason, (Stanford, 2012), pp. 67-68.  
33 David L. Howell, “Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of the Early Modern Japanese State” in Past & 
Present, No. 142 (Feb., 1994), pp. 74-79.  
34 Morris Low, “Physical Anthropology in Japan: The Ainu and the Search for the Origins of the 
Japanese” in Current Anthropology, Vol. 53, No. S5, (April 2012), pp. 58-62. 
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In Hokkaidō the Meiji government focused primarily on colonization and 
resource development. The presence of a segregated “savage” population35 suddenly 
became a sort of nuisance for Tōkyō’s modernizing mission. 36  The island was 
declared as terra nullius37 by Meiji politicians, journalists and novelists to legitimize 
the appropriation of the land and the protection of the local population. In other 
words, the supposed laziness and barbarity of the natives attested to their failure to 
exploit the land’s great natural resources; a fact that was used to justify the 
metropolis’ “beneficial” intervention. Progress came at a cost though. Hokkaidō had 
to be seized, enlarging Japan’s borders, and administrated according to western 
capitalistic norms, whereas the aborigines had to become loyal imperial subjects, 
abandoning their obsolete way of life. In 1893 the politician Nitobe described the 
Ainu as “barbarian folk” and the natural resources of the island as “untouched by 
human hand”. Starting from 1871 the Kaitakushi announced a series of reforms38 that 
made the relocation of native settlements mandatory, so that fertile lands were made 
available for the colonists, banned various religious practices and prohibited the 
native’s traditional means of subsistence. 39  The 1899 Hokkaidō Former Natives 
Protection Act40 was the cornerstone of an assimilation policy, of an indoctrination 
through schooling and mandatory agriculturisation. 41  The same kind of treatment 
                                                          
35 Anne-Gaëlle Renaud, “Comparative study of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Hokkaido” in 
SOAS Conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies (April 18-20 2008 Prague), p. 5. 
36 The phrases “spreading civilization” and “civilizing mission” were used in September 1869 by the 
Daijōkan Minister Sanjō Sanetomi in his letter to the Kaitakushi. Western imperialistic oratory was 
amply endorsed and put into practice initially in Hokkaidō and later in the Ryūkyūs, Taiwan and 
Korea. Hokkaidō was a lab experiment and Japan’s first successful settlement colony. See Yōichi, 
“Rule in the Name”, pp. 64-65. 
37 Colonial wording such as “no-man’s land” or “new frontier” was borrowed from the American 
policies for the Indian territory (1862). It can be found in Capron’s report that was developed into the 
1872 Hokkaidō Land Regulation. See Katsuya Hirano, “Thanatopolitics in the Making of Japan’s 
Hokkaido: Settler Colonialism and Primitive Accumulation” in Critical Historical Studies, Vol. 2, No. 
2 (Fall 2015), pp. 207-209. 
38 The 1871 Family Registry Law made mandatory the use of the Japanese language among other 
assimilation policies. With the 1872 Land Holding Regulation, the territory where the Ainu used to fish 
and hunt was expropriated by the government and made available for the incoming settlers: the already 
“opened land” became privately owned and, with the exception of privately leased land and land for 
government use, the rest of the island was available for sale to private groups. See Yōichi, “Rule in the 
Name”, pp. 66-67.  
39 Michele M. Mason, “Writing Ainu Out/Writing Japanese In: The ‘Nature’ of Japanese Colonialism 
in Hokkaido” in Reading Colonial Japan: Text, Context, and Critique, ed. H. Lee and M. Mason, 
(Stanford, 2012), pp. 35-44.  
40  This law, which was modelled after the American Dawes Act of 1887 for Indian minorities, 
guaranteed the claim of every Ainu household to a minimum of five hectares of cultivable land. It 
further established free Japanese language schools for Ainu children. See John B. Cornell, “Ainu 
Assimilation and Cultural Extinction: Acculturation Policy in Hokkaido” in Ethnology, Vol. 3, No. 3 
(Jul., 1964), pp. 297-299.  
41 On the other hand, the aforementioned legislation awarded to the natives the same rights on property 
ownership and citizenship that any commoner enjoyed. In any case though, Ainu numbers in Hokkaidō 
shrank due to illnesses and the inability to adapt to the “modern” way of life: from 66,000 in 1871 to 
18,000 in 1901. Tōkyō sought to incorporate the island into the national economy as an organic part of 
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towards the natives would be employed in Japan’s colonies overseas. Hokkaidō, 
attained for reasons of strategic security, was the training ground for the early Meiji 
colonialists.  
Let us now turn our attention to the South. As already mentioned, the shogun 
Ieyasu sought to restore peace with Korea after Hideyoshi’s war of aggression, which 
was to perpetuate the mistrust and animosity of the continental nations for centuries to 
come. Ieyasu complied with the demeaning Korean demands as he aimed at 
normalizing diplomatic relations and commerce with Korea and through it, with Ming 
China.42  These efforts culminated to the signing of the Kiyu treaty in 1609 that 
regulated bilateral relations until the Meiji Restoration. Japanese presence was strictly 
restricete to the Waekwan district (“Japanese House” equivalent to Nagasaki’s 
Deshima Island) in the port city of Pusan, also known as Fusan or Busan, whereas 
trade and diplomatic relations were entrusted to Tsushima’s Sō clan. Through the 
clan’s good offices, 12 Korean congratulatory embassies were dispatched to Japan 
until 1763 on the occasion of each Shogun’s ascension to power. 43  Seoul’s 
commitment to a policy of isolationism continued after the enthronement of King 
Gojong or Kojong of the Joseon Dynasty (1852-1919) in 1864 and his father’s 
(Heungseon Daewongun or Taewŏn'gun 1820-1898) regency between 1864 and 1873. 
It was only in 1876 when Korea was forcibly “opened” by an unequal treaty, just as 
China and Japan were in 1842 and 1854 respectively. Resistance to the West’s trade 
and diplomatic missions in the 1860s resulted in small scale conflicts.44  
                                                                                                                                                                      
mainland Japan. Its aim was Japanization and through it territorial aggrandizement, national security 
and increased revenue. Some scholars professed that the systematic extinction of the entire Ainu 
population was not among its goals. Ibid., pp. 290-292. 
42 Japan starting from the 1592-1598 war did not hold official relations with China until 1871. Since 
Japan was unwilling to demote itself to the tributary status, the only way to achieve a bilateral 
relationship with China in the Sino-centric world order was through Korea, the unique avenue for 
continental contact. See Woong Joe Kang, The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the 
Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866–1882, (Lanham-Boulder 2005), p. 42.  
43 The hereditary lords of Tsushima played the role of the intermediary between the two nations; by 
paying tribute and adhering to Korean rules, protocol, and terminology, the Sō clan assumed the right 
to trade but also an inferior status in regard to Korea. Seoul therefore, perceived and dealt with the 
Tsushima clan as its vassal a fact that infuriated Meiji leadership. Ibid., pp. 41-43. 
44 The Russians sharing a common border with northern Korea approached the authorities of Ŭndŏk 
county seeking trade in 1864 and 1865 but were rebuffed. Another point of conflict was the 
Daewongun’s persecution of Korean Christians and the execution of 9 catholic missionaries that 
provoked a French expedition in the autumn of 1866. Seven ships and 600 men, occupied the strategic 
Ganghwa Island, clashed with local troops and retreated in November without tangible results. In July 
1866, the American merchant ship General Sherman was fired upon and destroyed off the Taedong 
River. Washington sensing the opportunity for a trade treaty, after three failed attempts, asked Tōkyō’s 
mediation and dispatched two fact finding missions to the crime scene in 1867 and 1868. In June 1871, 
an American expeditionary force landed in Ganghwa Island, captured some forts only to depart in early 
July without further results. Repulsing foreign forces made Seoul even more arrogant and unyielding 
towards Japanese demands. In spring 1880, American officials again asked Inoue Kaoru’s and Ueno’s, 
the Vice Foreign Minister, good offices to approach Seoul. With Beijing’s approval, the Korean-
American treaty was signed on 22 May 1882. The first article described Korea as an autonomous state 
but subordinated (vassal) to China. The rest of the powers followed suit in 1883-1884. See Shin’ichi 
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After 1868, the Meiji leaders wished to reinvent the nation’s international 
standing, assert its independence, project the image of a sovereign modern state and 
redefine its political status and diplomatic relations. The quest for security, prestige 
and parity passed through the revision of the humiliating unequal treaties with the 
West. As for its Asiatic neighbours, establishing formal diplomatic relations and 
agreements according to international law and western practices was the way to gain 
recognition for the new regime and display its progress towards civilization and 
modernization. With the goal of informing the Korean court of the emperor’s 
reestablishment as the head of the state and the abolition of the Bakufu a Tsushima 
ambassador was sent on 13 November 1868 to pass a diplomatic note. The Korean 
authorities in Pusan viewed this development as a breach of protocol and found the 
terms “imperial house” and “emperor” as insolent and unacceptable. The character kō 
(皇) that the Japanese side had used for the Meiji emperor in the document was 
traditionally used to denominate the Chinese emperors and implied political 
superiority over the corresponding character ō (王) used for Korean rulers.45 All in all 
the new ceremonial method suggested parity between Japan and China and Korean 
inferiority or even vassalage.46 A second attempt was rebuffed when the Restoration 
government’s “formal envoy” was not recognized as such by Korean officials on 31 
January 1869. In January 1870 Seoul authorities refused to accept Japanese envoys 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Kitaoka, “Inception of a Modern Relationship” in Japan-China Joint History Research Report, Modern 
and Contemporary History, Vol. 1 (Mar. 2011), p. 26 and Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States, 
1853-1921: revised and continued to 1928, (New York 1970), pp. 135-137. 
45 The diplomatic quarrel for nominal superiority was not so superficial as it may appear and goes back 
many centuries. For example, the method in which the ceremonial titles or the date were depicted in a 
dispatched letter was a constant cause of disputes. After the inconclusive result of the 1592-1598 war 
both sides claimed victory and treated the other with contempt. The Sino-centric tributary international 
order, the traditional Korean perception of Japan as an “inferior barbarian” nation and the teachings of 
Kojiki and Nihongi that implied suzerainty over Korea clashed. A vague perception of victory and 
therefore of superiority were means to achieve international prestige, internal stability and to 
consolidate legitimacy for the regimes in Beijing, Seoul and Edo. The Japanese leaders that had never 
lost a land battle in the war utilized the sporadic Korean embassies to perpetuate a fantasy of 
subordination to the Tokugawa shogunate for the sake of displaying authority towards their own 
subjects. The allies behaved in the exact same manner as they had managed to expel the Japanese army 
and had not sued for peace first. It is true though that during the Muromachi period (1336-1573) 
Japanese leaders with the goal of gaining the right to trade with the continent received investiture from 
Beijing but the Tokugawa shoguns, proud unifiers of the country, discontinued the demeaning practice. 
The Tokugawas contested Chinese supremacy after the fall of the empire to the barbarian northern 
ethnic group of the Manchu or Qing in 1644. For some scholars, emulation or rivalry denote a sense of 
inferiority complex for the “smaller and poorer” nation. In other words, the much-admired Chinese 
culture had to be challenged for the sake of the nation’s survival and the formulation of a distinct 
Japanese identity. The introduction of a Japan centred universe and the 19th century embracement of 
the western “higher” civilization constitute evidence of this concept. Iwakura surely considered the 
principle of equality among civilized nations a facade and Kido insightfully declared in 1868 that 
“international law was a tool for subjugating the weak”. See Norihito Mizuno, Japan and its East Asian 
neighbors: Japan’s perception of China and Korea and the making of foreign policy from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth century, Ph.D Dissertation, Ohio University 2004, pp. 66-358. 
46 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 30-31.  
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and notifications and demanded a rewritten note according to the established etiquette 
and the stipulations of the 1609 treaty.47  In October 1870 the diplomats Shigeru 
Moriyama and Yoshioka Kōki48 were ordered to deliver another letter by Foreign 
Minister Sawa Nobuyoshi. As neither was a Tsushima envoy the request for a meeting 
was granted months later on 17 May 1871 and then only informally. Eventually the 
Koreans refused yet again to accept the Japanese communication.49 
At the same time, preliminary talks for a Sino-Japanese treaty on an equal 
titular basis between the two governments were underway. 50  In 1862 it was the 
Shogunate’s turn to dispatch a diplomatic mission to Shanghai seeking bilateral trade 
without success. In August 1870 Tōkyō authorized Foreign Vice Minister Yanagihara 
Sakimitsu (1850-1894) and Finance Minister Date Munenari (1818-1892) to negotiate 
a treaty of amity with the prominent Qing diplomat and Viceroy of Zhili province, Li 
Hongzhang (1823-1901). Date quite strikingly suggested an unequal treaty in favour 
of Japan asking for a most-favoured-nation clause and the right to trade and travel in 
China’s interior. The draft, modelled on the 1861 Prussian treaty with China, was the 
brainchild of international law scholar Tsuda Masamichi (1829-1903), who apparently 
believed that superiority over China meant equality with the West and the annulment 
of Japan’s own humiliating arrangements. 51  Japan, convinced of its sufficient 
advancement, believed that it deserved the same privileges that the Western powers 
enjoyed in the comparatively backward China. Li bluntly rejected the Japanese draft 
and countered it with one of his own. Many others felt also insulted. The Director of 
Civil Affairs of the Anhui province noted that Japan was a Qing vassal and a 
barbarian state and in any case, in no position to demand to be treated as a Great 
Power. Li, reflecting on China’s internal turmoil due to rebellions and the Russian 
occupation of the Ili region responded that an equal treaty with Tōkyō had some 
benefits. On the 11th or the 13th of September 1871 Li and Date signed in Tianjin the 
Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty. Mutual recognition of limited consular 
jurisdiction, fixed trade tariffs and the exchange of consuls were accorded. However, 
the most remarkable point of the treaty was article 2 that left open the possibility of a 
military alliance against the West: each party was obligated to come to the other’s aid 
or to at least mediate in the event of the latter being treated with injustice or 
contempt.52 This provision raised suspicion among the Foreign Ministers in Tōkyō 
                                                          
47 Woong, The Korean Struggle, p. 47. 
48 Foreign Minister Sawa instructed Yoshioka in May 1871 to approach the Korean authorities in 
Pusan. With the American attack pending, Sawa offered Tōkyō’s mediation in exchange to a Korean-
Japanese diplomatic settlement. See Kim, The Last Phase, p. 158.  
49 Kitaoka, “Inception of a Modern Relationship”, p. 27. 
50 A nominally equal treaty placing the Japanese emperor in the same titular status to the Chinese 
sovereign meant in practice that Tōkyō would be able to treat Korea as an inferior. Seoul’s insistence 
on equal diplomatic relations was unacceptable for those in Japan nurtured with the victories of 
Empress Jingū and Hideyoshi. See Mizuno, Japan and its East Asian neighbors, pp. 214-216. 
51 Urs Matthias Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese 
Discourse on National Identity, 1895-1904, (London-New York 2009), p. 14. 
52 Kitaoka, “Inception of a Modern Relationship”, pp. 19-20. 
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who protested to Date against the potentially menacing clause. The American State 
Secretary also raised the issue during his meeting with Iwakura in Washington in 
1872. A note from the foreign ministry claiming that “mutual assistance does not 
mean military assistance” appeased western fears. However, it was clear that even a 
remote association with China was sufficient to harm Japan’s relations with the West. 
The only way forward was the collective imperialistic exploitation of the Chinese and 
not cooperating with them.53 
In Tōkyō the Korean responses were perceived as national insult by those who 
demanded a more active foreign policy.54 In early January 1869, the politicians Kido 
and Ōshima demanded in indignation, the renewal of Korea’s tributary status to Japan 
as in the ancient times, as a direct result of the imperial rule’s restoration.55 On 16 
January 1872 the new Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi appointed the State official 
Sagara Masaki to undertake a mission in Korea. Being aware of the possibility that 
negotiations could break down, Soejima also warned the Japanese subjects in Pusan, 
through Yoshioka, to be ready to withdraw from their district.56 Tōkyō, determined to 
bring its antiquated diplomatic norms in line with western “civilized” practices, 
authorized Hanabusa Yoshimoto (1842-1917), of the Foreign Ministry, to transfer 
Waekwan’s jurisdiction from the Sō family to the ministry in September 1872. 
Hanabusa reached Pusan aboard the warship Kasuga on 16 October accompanied by 
two infantry platoons. The government also dispatched to Pusan the official Hirotsu 
Hiroshima in April 1873 to assume the role of the Japanese commissioner. In protest, 
the local authorities posted a provoking proclamation, referring to Japan as a “lawless 
country”, in May 1873. In addition, Hirotsu reported back to Tōkyō that Korean 
officials had placed the Japanese residents under siege, obstructing their activities and 
cutting off the outpost’s supplies. 57  Henceforth diplomatic relations ceased. The 
“Korean problem” led to a heated government debate (Seikanron) on the possibility of 
chastising or subduing Japan’s arrogant neighbour.  
In November 1871, 54 fishermen from the Miyako and Yaeyama islands of 
modern day Okinawa (out of a total of 69) shipwrecked on Taiwan (Formosa) and 
were murdered by an indigenous tribe. After the abolition of the domains in August 
                                                          
53 Zachmann, China and Japan, p. 14. 
54 Bushido’s warring spirit, Shintoist teachings, patriotism and the “psychological disorientation” of the 
entire samurai class after the abolition of their privileged status made a Korean expedition not just 
probable but also morally justifiable to the Meiji ruling elites and commoners. See Kun Lee, “Political 
Culture in the "Advocacy of an Expedition to Korea" in the 1870s: An Aspect of Japanese 
Imperialism” in Korean Journal of Population and Development, Vol. 23, No. 1 (July 1994), pp. 108-
110.  
55 Kim, The Last Phase, pp. 115 
56  Sagara’s arrival at Pusan on 22 February aboard a steamship irritated the Koreans and incited 
suspicions of a Western-Japanese collaboration against Seoul. Talks were once more inconclusive and 
Yoshioka on 9 May requested his government’s approval to evacuate the Japanese House. Despite a 
dramatic march out of the walls of the compound to reach the Korean officials the mission failed and 
Yoshioka, Sagara and others left Pusan on 20 July. See Ibid., pp. 163-165. 
57 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 37-38. 
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1871 the Ryūkyū Islands, as part of the government’s effort to eradicate their 
precarious “double affiliation”,58 were administratively assigned to the Kagoshima 
prefecture, that had succeeded the Satsuma domain. Tōkyō, in order to avoid foreign 
domination of the islands59 and to eradicate their vassal status to both Qing China and 
Meiji Japan, sought to confirm its exclusive sovereignty according to modern 
international law. 60  Beijing naturally contested these unilateral actions. The new 
Japanese authorities, installed in February 1872 to administer and implement the 
mainland’s reforms on the islands, upon hearing the news of the massacre61 requested 
the dispatch of a punitive expedition to Taiwan in June 1872.62 Taiwan or at least 
parts of it were nominally Chinese territory after 1662 when the Dutch were finally 
expelled from the island. At the time of the massacre it was still unclear if authority 
rested with Beijing or the local tribes and to what extent. In March 1873, Foreign 
Minister Soejima was sent in China as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary 
                                                          
58 The ambiguous “double tributary status” had to be overturn by Tōkyō to satisfy the European 
standards of effective governance and disperse potential Chinese or Western claims. See Shogo Suzuki, 
Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society, (New 
York, 2009), p. 154. 
59 On 14 December 1852, Commodore Perry proposed to the Secretary of the Navy the occupation of 
Ryūkyūan ports despite his recognition of Satsuma’s historical claims and the status of double 
subordination. He justified his suggestion by stating that such a development would help with the 
“accommodation of our ships of war” and it would apply pressure to Japan to finally open its gates. See 
Norihito Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies Towards the Ryukyus and the Taiwanese Aboriginal 
Territories” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May, 2009), p. 692. 
60 In July 1872, the Ryūkyūan government was ordered by Tōkyō to dispatch a congratulatory mission 
to the Emperor on the success of the Restoration. King Shō Tai’s (1843-1901) envoys met Emperor 
Meiji on 14 September. The Emperor in his speech stressed the ancient cultural and racial ties between 
Japan and the Ryūkyūs and referred to the islands’ long established subordination to Satsuma. 
Furthermore, he demoted King Shō from ruler of a country to lord of a domain and “a member of the 
peerage”, abolishing the kingdom and incorporating it to Japan proper. This was a proposition made by 
Inoue Kaoru, the Vice Minister of Finance, on 5 July for safeguarding national security and elevating 
Tōkyō’s international prestige. In September 1872 Yamagata called for the annexation of the Ryūkyū 
Islands to solve once and for all the status of their sovereignty and to secure the nation’s southern 
border. As expected Soejima gave his consent a month later. The distressing status quo was no more 
acceptable. To the envoys’ objections and negotiations, the government acted swiftly: a 28 September 
1872 Daijōkan proclamation annulled every treaty between the kingdom and the foreign powers, 
namely the Netherlands (1859), France (1855) and the US (1854). The kingdom was demoted to a 
Japanese domain on 14 November. In the same time, Satsuma’s office in the Ryūkyūs was superseded 
by a Foreign Ministry bureau in Naha and in September 1872 foreign representatives in Japan were 
notified of Tōkyō’s formal assumption of jurisdiction over the islands. However, during the following 
years (1872 and 1874) the islands still paid tribute to Beijing since Tōkyō, wishing to avoid 
confrontation on this matter, did not promptly inform the Chinese of these events. See Hideaki 
Uemura, “The colonial annexation of Okinawa and the logic of international law: the formation of an 
‘indigenous people’ in East Asia” in Japanese Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 112-116.  
61 The news were firstly communicated to Tōkyō by the diplomat in Beijing Yanagiwara (Zenkō) 
Sakimitsu (1850-1894) on 27 June 1892 and a month later (17 July) by the Kagoshima authorities. Α 
second report suggested a presumably voluntary Ryūkyūan petition to the central government for 
action against the aborigines. See Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies” p. 689.  
62 In September, the head of the second garrison in Kyūshū Kabayama Sukenori (1837-1922), Japanese 
Taiwan’s first governor-general, made a similar plea. See Uemura, “The colonial annexation”, p. 109. 
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(nominated on 28 February) to carry out his “national rights diplomacy”; or for some, 
Tōkyō’s designs to dominate Asia. The mission’s official objective was the 
ratification of the Sino-Japanese treaty and a personal audience with the Chinese 
Emperor Tongzhi (1856-1875). However, days before his departure Soejima was 
charged by Emperor Meiji and the Daijōkan with asserting Japanese jurisdiction over 
the Ryūkyūs, clarifying and investigating China’s jurisdiction limits in Taiwan, 
conferring with the Chinese Foreign Ministry (Zongli or Tsungli Yamen) on the 
Korean problem and finally demanding reparations for the murders.63 It is noteworthy 
that this mission and the contemporary diplomatic-political processes behind and in 
front of the scenes took place during the Iwakura mission (December 1871-September 
1873). This means that key members of the government (Ministers Iwakura Tomomi, 
Ōkubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, Itō Hirobumi) were absent and a provisional 
“caretaker” government (Saigō Takamori, Itagaki Taisuke, Soejima Taneomi, Etō 
Shimpei, Gotō Shōjirō) had been appointed in their stead. In December 1871 this 
stand-in cabinet signed a pledge to refrain from any reforms; despite this, military 
conscription, a supplementary land tax and education laws were enacted during that 
period.64  
Soejima, before reaching China, stopped at Kagoshima on 19 March to meet 
with the Councilor of State and Supreme Commander of the Japanese Armies Saigō 
Takamori. He was a keen proponent of a punitive expedition to Korea and/or Taiwan 
and an idol for the ultra-nationalist-expansionist societies. The Soejima mission 
arrived at Shanghai on two military vessels, on 1 April 1873. On 30 April, the 
Japanese delegation signed the ratification of the 1871 treaty with Li Hongzhang in 
Tianjin. Li expressed his distaste for the Japanese adoption of western practices: 
western style lodging, attire and the presence of a foreign adviser. On 7 May, Soejima 
arrived in Beijing. His assistants were, the interpreter Tei Ei-nei, the secretary of the 
embassy Yanagihara and the American diplomat and general Charles William 
LeGendre (1830-1899). 65  LeGendre’s profound knowledge of Taiwan 66  and his 
                                                          
63 Marlene Mayo, “The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Ealy Meiji Foreign Policy” in The Journal of Asian 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Aug. 1972), p. 805.  
64 Ibid., p. 794. 
65 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, p. 713. 
66 In March 1867, the American ship Rover shipwrecked in South Taiwan and its crew was slaughtered 
by the local tribes. LeGendre, at the time the American Consul to Amoy (Xiamen) in South China, 
conferred with Qing authorities, travelled extensively in Taiwan, gathered information on the 
population, natural resources, the geography and the ineffectiveness of Chinese rule and approached 
the leaders of some aboriginal villages. In June, an American punitive expedition landed and clashed 
with the aborigines without much success. LeGendre in September 1867 organized another expedition 
and visited Taiwan for a second time where the flowing month he negotiated a treaty for the safety of 
foreign shipwrecked sailors with a prominent local chief, namely Tokitok leader of the Botans. In 
September 1872, he visited the American Minister in Tōkyō, DeLong. The Minister anxious to expand 
his influence presented LeGendre to Soejima as a Taiwan expert and the former consul was 
subsequently employed as an adviser to the Foreign Ministry. From his new post, he submitted a series 
of memoranda on Taiwan, the Ryūkyūs and Hokkaidō stressing constantly the threatening British and 
Russian encroachments and the importance of trade and industrialization for Japan. According to the 
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intimate knowledge on international law and diplomatic protocol were invaluable to 
Soejima’s efforts in dealing with Qing and Western representatives in Beijing.67  
On May 20 Soejima met with the British Minister in Beijing Thomas Francis 
Wade (1818-1895). Wade after discussing the matters of Korea, Taiwan and the 
Ryūkyūs with the Japanese ambassador reported to London: “Japan contemplated the 
annexation of Formosa” and had some “design on Korea as well”. Soejima, in two 
later meetings on 3 and 9 June, explained that if Korea insisted to disregard Tōkyō, 
force may be employed. As for Formosa, the principle that sovereignty over a 
territory equaled to exercise of actual governance was to be applied, in accordance 
with international law. To demonstrate that China did not enjoy real authority over the 
aboriginal part of the island he pointed out Beijing’s failure to interfere with the 
American expedition in 1867. Soejima also discussed his case with the American 
Minister, Frederick Ferdinand Low (1828-1894) and gained his trust. On 18 June 
Soejima asked Low for Beijing’s memorandum regarding the nature of its tributary 
relations with Korea; drafted by the Chinese statesman Prince Kung or Gong (1833-
1898), it had been presented to the American authorities in the aftermath of the 
General Sherman incident, to absolve the Chinese authorities from any responsibility 
for the massacre. Low along with other Westerners that wished to open up Korea was 
glad to provide a copy of the note that in practice established Korea’s internal 
sovereignty and independence in regard to its foreign relations and trade. Although 
the Korean monarch received investiture from the Emperor of China, the Sino-Korean 
affiliation was purely ceremonial.68 The questions of peace and war remained in the 
hands of the Korean government. Soejima was glad for obtaining a note that 
established Korea’s independence and hence, it could be dealt with without Beijing’s 
interference.69  
                                                                                                                                                                      
future Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu “LeGendre’s opinion was that Japan should annex Korea, 
Formosa, and Manchuria, thus to make a semicircle around China, threaten Russia in Siberia and take 
the leadership in Asia”. See Sandra T. Caruthers, “Anodyne for Expansion: Meiji Japan, the Mormons, 
and Charles LeGendre” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 129-139 and 
Ernst L. Presseisen, “Roots of Japanese Imperialism: A Memorandum of General LeGendre” in The 
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Jun., 1957), pp. 108-111. 
67  A Chinese denial to accept the imperial plenipotentiary or a prolonged delay would suggest 
disrespect to the Meiji monarch and lead to a diplomatic breakdown. Well aware of this fact Soejima 
pressed the Tsungli Yamen for a personal audience with Emperor Tongzhi exempt from the 
humiliating ceremonial etiquette called kowtow (three bows and nine kneelings before the emperor). 
To the typical postponements and excuses of the Yamen he replied that China had to modernize its 
ways; it was stubbornly obsessed with trivial courtesy protocols while Asia was being swallowed up by 
the West. After many inconclusive meetings, he threatened to leave Beijing; on 20 June, Yanagihara 
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29 June 1873. He was the first foreign non-tributary representative to meet the Chinese sovereign in 80 
years. See Wayne C. McWilliams, “East Meets East. The Soejima Mission to China, 1873” in 
Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 255-261. 
68 Kung’s message read: “Although Korea is regarded as a subject state of China, she is completely 
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inquired, i.e. interfered”. See Woong, The Korean Struggle, pp. 13-14. 
69 McWilliams, “East Meets East”, pp. 262-263. 
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On 21 June Yanagihara and Tei conferred with the Yamen Ministers, Mao 
Ch’an-hsi and Chung Hsun. The lack of written records and the availability of 
exclusively Japanese sources caused controversy, contradiction and misapprehension: 
for Soejima the Chinese, as a result of this meeting, gave their consent for a Japanese 
punitive expedition in Taiwan whereas the Yamen denied even the knowledge of such 
an intention. Yanagihara was initially interested in the conditions of Macao's 
concession to Portugal. The Ministers replied that it remained Chinese territory leased 
to the Portugese. Next Yanagihara asked if the Chinese declaration to the Americans 
about the status of Korea was still in effect and the Ministers responded affirmatively. 
Then Yanagihara moved to the subject of Taiwan stating that after the overthrow of 
the Dutch, China administered only a half of the island and that the ungoverned 
aborigines in the south had murdered in 1871 “Japanese subjects”, implying the 
Ryūkyūans. He continued: “Therefore the Japanese Government intends, in the near 
future, to send a punitive expedition against them. But since the aboriginal area is 
adjacent to territory ruled by the Chinese government, our ambassador thought it best 
to inform you before our government takes action, less it might cause the slightest 
disturbance to your territory or cause suspicion on your part and thereby jeopardize 
the peaceful relation between our two empires”. The Chinese responded that since the 
Ryūkyūs were Chinese this was an internal issue. Yanagihara responded that the 
islands always belonged to Japan and their inhabitants were entitled to Tōkyō’s 
protection. He subsequently asked why Beijing did nothing to punish and govern the 
aborigines who had attacked foreigners on many occasions. These acts of aggression 
could attract the occupation of the island by a foreign power, a dangerous scenario for 
both China and Japan. The Yamen Ministers responded that two kinds of aborigines 
existed in Taiwan, “raw barbarians” and “ripe” ones, those who abode by the Chinese 
rule.70 They added that they had not punished the natives “because they were beyond 
the reach of our government and customs”.71  
On 29 June, an enthusiastic Soejima reported to Prime Minister Sanjō 
Sanetomi that he had fully succeeded in his mission: he claimed to have obtained a 
Yamen declaration “that Chinese political rule did not extent to the aboriginal area of 
Formosa and that the aborigines were beyond the pale of Chinese civilization”. China 
renounced any jurisdiction there and had consented to a Japanese military expedition. 
He further stressed that Beijing was not responsible for Korean policies and hence it 
acknowledged Japan’s right to intervene in Korea. According to the ambassador, 
Beijing did not question Tōkyō’s claims regarding the Ryūkyūs either.72 A careful 
study of the aforementioned attests that these declarations were unjustified and one-
                                                          
70 On contemporary maps, Taiwan was depicted as a Qing possession but the extent of the actual 
Chinese rule was questionable. With this in mind Soejima and in this case Yanagihara was instructed to 
discuss the prospect of punishing the natives and of compensation for the victims’ families. In any case 
if Beijing was unwilling to undertake or even join the expedition it was called upon to give its 
permission. See Mayo, “The Korean Crisis”, p. 806. 
71 McWilliams, “East Meets East”, p. 265-266. 
72 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 
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sided. Soejima’s failure to obtain a written formal agreement is at the very least 
suspicious. Before his triumphant return at Yokohama on 25 July 1873 he met with Li 
on 8 July in Tianjin in an amicable spirit. The Qing statesman’s polite reception was 
not a byproduct of his unfamiliarity with the proceedings that had taken place in 
Beijing as one might think. On the contrary, he was aware of the Japanese maneuvers 
but he was convinced that if the Americans failed in 1867 to subdue Taiwan’s 
aborigines, the weaker Asian neighbours had no chance.73 
During Soejima’s absence, the elaboration of the policy to be followed in 
regard to the Korean problem was well underway. The Korean issue had become the 
focal point of a broader debate about foreign policy. Saigō suggested that a Taiwan 
expedition was necessary as a means “to give vent to [the anger over the reduction of 
samurai pensions] outside the country”. On the other hand, Ōkuma reported that the 
contemptuous attitude and insults of the Koreans were more infuriating than some 
uncivilized tribe’s aggression. Ueno Kagenori, the stand-in Foreign Minister, 
proposed sending the army to protect Japanese residents in Korea and escort another 
envoy. This suggestion, espoused by Itagaki Taisuke among others, was discussed in 
the Council of State on 12 June 1873. Saigō, contemplating on the possibility of a 
foreign (Russian)74 intervention to “protect” Korea, suggested he serve as the imperial 
emissary in Seoul; in case of hostilities or his death, Japan would obtain an excuse to 
attack. Itagaki, Etō 75  and Gotō agreed with this plan and Saigō was named 
ambassador on 17 August 1873. The deed was approved by the Emperor the 
following day. All that Prime Minister Sanjō could do was to delay Saigō’s departure 
until Iwakura’s return.  Soejima had recently returned after his success in China and 
wished to undertake this task personally.76 Iwakura, Ōkubo77 and Kido returned from 
their mission abroad in September 1872, May and June 1873 respectively, convinced 
of Japan’s unpreparedness to engage in war and of its relative backwardness in 
relation to the western nations. Japan at the moment was in need of internal stability 
and of a gradual far reaching “enlightenment” program as Iwakura disclosed to British 
Minister Parkes on 8 October 1873. That meant domestic reconstruction and revision 
of the unequal treaties. Kido too, warned against military ventures in either Taiwan or 
                                                          
73 Ibid., p. 273.  
74  During the distressing dispute over Sakhalin, Soejima requested Russia’s neutrality from the 
ambassador Eugene Butzov in the event of war with Korea on 6 March 1873. He also maintained 
cordial relations with the Russian Minister during his stay in Beijing. Saint Petersburg having claimed 
the whole of the Sakhalin Island was keen for Japan’s attention to shift on Korea or Taiwan. See Mayo, 
“The Korean Crisis”, pp. 801-809. 
75 During the October debate, Councilor Etō, expansionist and preoccupied about the future of the 
samurai, advocated a Korean expedition to restore the nation’s prestige. See Ibid., p. 812. 
76 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 38-40. 
77  In early October Ōkubo presented his seven points memorandum to the rest of the Council, 
advocating restraint. The main anti-war arguments were budgetary restrictions, the incomplete 
modernization programme, Russian and British aggression since Japan and Korea would be weakened 
by the war and the vassal-like status that Tōkyō still held in its relations with the foreign powers. See 
Nobutaka Ike, “Triumph of the Peace Party in Japan in 1873” in The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 2, 
No. 3 (May, 1943), p. 293-294.  
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Korea in August. Saigō however, nourished by warrior and ethnocentric ideals, 
enjoyed the support of the impoverished former samurai in search of glory and 
employment mainly in the southern parts of the country, and of many government 
members. He had already dispatched two of his most trusted followers to China and 
Korea in August 1872 to gather intelligence on the enemy’s military strength.78 As Itō 
Hirobumi, Minister of Industry at the time, pointed out in the fall of 1873 to Kido: 
“army officers from Satsuma have insisted on the attack on Korea from the start and 
they have agitated for this policy all over the country”. He added that “two thirds of 
the men in the Imperial Guard lean towards the view that Korea should be 
subjugated”.79 Two rival factions, ambassadors against caretakers, cautious politicians 
against less cautious expansionists within the Daijōkan were formed. During the 
ministerial debates Saigō’s wing seemed to take the advantage. The rival faction 
submitted its resignation but was reinstated according to the wishes of Emperor Meiji, 
who shared a special personal bond with Iwakura.80   
By the time Iwakura returned, war plans had already been devised. Saigō and 
Soejima were considering the dispatch of 50,000 men in Korea and 10,000 in Taiwan. 
Korea being rich in resources was able to sustain an occupation army of this size. 
Secret agents and students were also sent to gather intelligence at three fronts: 
Sakhalin, Korea and Taiwan. Military preparation and war seemed imminent despite 
Soejima’s misleading reassurances in April 1872 to the British charge d'affaires that 
“war with Korea would be a calamity to Japan”. However even among the “seikan” 
side there was not a consensus on exactly what to do with Korea; occupation, punitive 
expedition or just a show of force were all on the table. One thing was certain; Meiji 
leaders were willing to use force to push their agenda in Korea. In any case Iwakura 
stressed the financial burden of a war for a poor country and the priority of juridical, 
educational and economic reforms. He appeared unmoved when some samurai groups 
proposed to raise funds, ammunition and volunteers for the assault because a 
“private” expedition of this kind would be beyond the government’s control. 
Yamagata Aritomo in August 1873 responded to Saigō that the army was not ready. 
He made the same remark in July 1874: “The army is not ready to extend Japan’s 
authority to areas outside of the country. Or to fight with China…” and again: “Our 
army is in the midst of reorganization at the present time; but in a year or two, the 
foundation of the military system will be established, and there probably will not be 
any obstacles to prevent the sending of an army to the continent”. Navy Minister 
Katsu (Awa) Kaishū told Sanjō that more ships had to be bought from abroad before 
the undertaking of an expedition.81 Kido expressed his opinion on the matter: “Let us 
postpone matters for now. We can decide later what to do about Korea and Taiwan. It 
                                                          
78 Hilary Conroy, The Japanese seizure of Korea: 1868–1910. A study of realism and idealism in 
international relations, (Philadelphia 1974), p. 36. 
79 Duus, The Abacus, p. 40. 
80 Calman, The Nature and Origins, pp. 134-135. 
81 Duus, The Abacus, p. 42. 
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will not be too late to act when we are properly prepared”.82 This kind of reasoning 
spurred many scholars to believe that both wings envisaged a plan of imperial 
domination in Asia; they just could not agree on the timing. Japan seemingly had the 
mission to conquer its neighbours but at the time and until it was materially and 
diplomatically prepared, had to show restraint. Discontent and nationalistic sentiments 
of revenge and expansion had to be put on hold. Despite this climate, restrain 
eventually prevailed, since a sizeable part of the government turned down the 
notorious bellicose project at the moment. On 23 October Iwakura persuaded the 
emperor to withdraw Saigō as ambassador, a fact that pushed Saigō, Etō, Itagaki and 
Gotō into tendering their resignation two days later.83 Infuriated and humiliated Saigō 
led the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 and Etō the Saga rebellion in 1874 against 
government forces. 84  Etō and Itagaki established Japan’s first political party in 
January 1874 before the former’s execution. The tensions and the strong emotions 
that the heated debate generated tore the country apart. A complicated decision 
regarding war or peace or in other words Japan’s imperialistic prospects was 
sufficient to plunge the entire population of 30 million and the government in chaos, 
resentment, assassinations, riots, division and even suicides85 only 5 years after the 
formation of the modern Japanese state. The 1873 political crisis did not lead to an 
attack and the boiling discontent kept menacingly building up until another release 
valve was found, the Japanese expedition to Taiwan in May 1874.  
The first tangible outcome of Soejima’s efforts was the incorporation of the 
Ryūkyū Islands to the Empire. On 12 July 1874, the islands’ jurisdiction was passed 
from the Foreign Ministry to the Internal Affairs (Interior) Ministry. The former 
kingdom was granted a subsidy and its debts were annulled. Beijing by supposedly 
giving its approval to Tōkyō’s expedition in Taiwan seemed to recognize the Ryūkyūs 
as a Japanese possession. Indeed, the treaty that followed this expedition, signed on 
21 October 1874, recognized Ryūkyūans as Japanese subjects. However, in 
November 1874, the island’s government, despite being under the control of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, dispatched a diplomatic mission to China as if it 
represented an independent nation. Internal Affairs Minister Ōkubo planned legal and 
                                                          
82 Mayo, “The Korean Crisis”, pp. 798-799, 814-815. 
83 Iwakura reported to the Emperor: “Upon serious consideration, I venture to say that it is not more 
than 4 or 5 years since the Restoration, the foundation of the nation is not very solid, political 
institutions have not yet been well organized, and, though internal security seems to be maintained, 
there is no telling what trouble may occur. Under such circumstances dealings with foreign countries 
should not be viewed lightly”. See Duus, The Abacus, p. 42. 
84Calman, The Nature and Origins, p. 136. 
85 In July 1871, a Kagoshima samurai committed suicide in front of the Imperial Council building to 
express his disapproval for Korea’s proposed conquest. In the note found on him he wrote that Japan 
was poor and had many problems and “no time to condemn the impoliteness of Korea”. In March 1872, 
a Foreign Ministry official was arrested for plotting to organize a private expedition against Seoul. On 
14 January 1874, Iwakura was assaulted and wounded by advocates in favour of Korea’s conquest and 
the following month anti-government disturbances took place in Nagasaki and Fukuoka. See Conroy, 
The Japanese seizure, pp. 51-52. 
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educational reforms as well as the construction of army posts to bend the “Ryūkyū 
domain’s stubborn and strict adherence” to “ancient outdated laws”.86  Diplomatic 
relations with China were suspended and the government’s uncertainty on how to 
handle the question as a matter of international law was evident. The Ministry turned 
to the French legal adviser Gustave Émile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1825-1910) who 
submitted his suggestions on 17 March. Boissonade perceived the Ryūkyūs as a 
colony and not as an integral part of the mainland and thus proposed an indirect 
system of administration through the local dynasty similar to the British model. The 
Ministry rejected his rationale arguing that Meiji Japan had inherited territorial rights 
over the territories that were previously its “subject states” and exerted direct 
sovereignty over them. Instead of a colonial policy a straightforward annexationist 
one, in line with Ōkubo’s directives was to be implemented by the Ministry’s 
secretary, Matsuda Michiyuki (1832-1882). Invested by the emperor as “Disposition 
Officer” on 10 June 1875, he arrived at the island’s capital Naha exactly a month later 
accompanied by a number of reformers. On 14 July Matsuda presented to Prince 
Nakijin Chōfu (1847-1915), who represented the ailing domain lord Shō Tai, a series 
of demands. Prohibition on sending and receiving tributary envoys from and to China, 
legal and administrative reforms, dispatch of 10 students to study at Tōkyō, abolition 
of the Diplomatic House of Ryūkyū in Fujian China, installation of a Japanese 
garrison and finally Shō’s visit to Tōkyō to express his gratitude.87 Despite Matsuda’s 
threats the Prince rejected these terms and Shō Tai did not travel to Tōkyō, facts that 
offended the emperor’s honour and drove the infuriated Japanese envoy to request the 
central government’s “abolishment of [the] Ryūkyū domain” on 25 September.88 The 
ever present Enomoto agreed that a fait accompli would be the best solution at the 
moment.89 
Ryūkyū officials rejected Matsuda’s demands and submitted a letter of 
complaint on 15 October 1875 to Tōkyō. The unyielding Minister of Internal Affairs 
carried forward with the process of gradually infringing the islands’ internal authority; 
despite local protests on 1 August 1876, legal jurisdiction and policing rights were 
formally passed to the Ministry. On 3 September, a military garrison consisting of 25 
men was installed. The Ryūkyū government sent secretly envoys to China asking for 
help. In March 1877, they met with Qing officials who, despite previous assurances to 
Tōkyō, asserted that they considered the islands a Chinese “outer domain”. The 
Chinese government pressed for a conference that would come up with an 
international solution and sent the first Chinese Minister in Japan, He Ruzhang to deal 
with the matter.90 
                                                          
86 Uemura, “The colonial annexation”, p. 117. 
87 Rosa Caroli, “L'edificazione del moderno stato giapponese e la definizione dei suoi limiti territoriali 
- L'intervento del Giappone Meiji nelle Ryūkyū” in Il Giappone, vol. XXXI, pp. 91-92. 
88 Uemura, “The colonial annexation”, p. 119. 
89 Caroli, “L'edificazione del moderno stato”, p. 95. 
90 Minister He met with Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori in September 1878 and on 7 October he 
accused Japan for “untrustworthy, unjust, unfeeling and unreasonable” policies. He added: “The 
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In spring 1878 Ryūkyūan officials in Tōkyō approached western 
representatives asking for mediation and protested against Japanese oppression. On 26 
January 1879, Matsuda complained to Prince Nakijin for breaching the ban regarding 
foreign diplomatic relations. On 11 March 1879, accompanied by 160 police officers 
and 400 soldiers he presented an ultimatum; the Ryūkyūan king had to evacuate his 
premises in the castle of Shuri in Naha by the 31st the date by which the Japanese 
forces would occupy the palace.91 Military force and not gradual incorporation or 
international law led to the abolishment of the Ryūkyū domain (han) and the 
establishment of the Okinawa ken (prefecture) on 4 April 1879. Tōkyō appeared as a 
crusader against the anachronistic Asian world order securing international legitimacy 
and demonstrating its prestigious “civilized” status to the West. 
Qing China was beginning to see Japan as a constant threat due to Tōkyō’s 
worrisome interventions in Taiwan and in its tributary states of Korea and the 
Ryūkyūs. Minister He’s protests, before the official annexation, were bluntly rejected 
by Terashima who professed that Chinese investiture was primarily ceremonial and 
did not constitute effective rule. Li Hongzhang feared the formulation of a precedent 
that could gradually deconstruct the tributary system and threaten the very existence 
of the Qing Empire.92 The loss of the Ryūkyūs and of North Vietnam (Tonkin) to 
France in 1885 were certainly not auspicious omens.93 Li expressed his disapproval of 
the Meiji policy in the Ryūkyū to the Japanese Minister in Beijing, Mori Arinori in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Japanese have neither mercy nor reason. They are like crazy dogs bullying others as they please…”. 
See Uemura, “The colonial annexation”, p. 120. 
91Ibid., p. 122. 
92 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, pp. 159-161. 
93 Before the outbreak of the Sino-French war in August 1884, the French chargé d'affaires in Japan 
Ulric de Viel-Castel implied to his government an alliance with Tōkyō against Beijing. On 13 June 
1883, he informed Paris that sufficient supplies and “considerable enough” troops were available in 
Japan. On 6 June statesman Paul-Armand Challemel-Lacour (1827-1896) discussed with the Japanese 
ambassador in Paris, Hachisuka the revision of the unequal treaties and the "common interests of Japan 
and France towards China". Enomoto acting as ambassador to Beijing notified Foreign Minister Kaoru 
on 26 April 1883 that his French colleague appeared inclined to offer an anti-Chinese alliance. Inoue 
having prioritized the maintenance of peace rejected both French suggestions. The following year 
Lieutenant General Miura Gorō (1847-1926) seemed more cooperative. In Paris, he and General 
Baptiste Marie Edouard Campenon (1819-1891) negotiated Japan’s entry in the war, a French loan and 
the revision of the treaties. The coup d'état that took place in Seoul in December of that year, which 
will be examined further on, could act as a casus belli against China and Korea. At the same time, 
public opinion appeared favourable to the prospect of an armed intervention. Inoue though was 
adamant. The destruction of the Chinese forces by the French and the weakening of Qing influence 
were sufficient. On 15 December 1884, French Prime Minister Ferry authorized his Minister in Japan 
Sienkiewicz to negotiate an alliance but the latter, contemptuous of Tōkyō’s military capabilities, never 
really pursued this goal. Miura continued to advertise the benefits of an alliance with a Great Power 
during the month of February 1885 and during the following month Kuroda Kiyotaka went to Saigon to 
have talks with the French officials stationed there. Sienkiewicz in August wrote to the Governor of 
French Indochina that Kuroda was visiting "under the pretext of studying the organization of our 
colonial troops in Cochin-China and Tonking" but "the mission would try to penetrate into Siam". In 
June the war ended and the opportunity of joint action against Beijing vanished. See Richard Sims, 
French Policy Towards The Bakufu and Meiji Japan 1854-95, (Richmond 1998), pp. 121-181. 
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September 1877. Minister He, convinced of Japan’s political instability, economic 
feebleness and military vulnerability, proposed to his superiors to adopt a more 
adamant stance in regard to Tōkyō’s provocations. If negotiations failed dispatching 
troops and warships to aid Beijing’s hard-pressed vassals had to be organized in 
accordance with his May 1878 report.94  
In the meantime Tōkyō implemented an assimilation policy to cultivate loyalty 
and incorporate the future generations of the islanders, now named Okinawans, as 
law-abiding Japanese subjects. Some Meiji leaders like Ōkuma and Kidō did not 
considered the Ryūkyūans as Japanese. However, Tōkyō finally assumed the costs of 
the islands’ administration for security reasons.95 In 1879 the US president, Ulysses S. 
Grant embarked on a world tour. At the request of Prince Kung and Li he stopped 
over at Beijing and Tōkyō in June and July to offer his advice on the Ryūkyū dispute. 
The negotiations between Japan and China, mediated by Grant, continued despite the 
former annexing the islands.96 In an effort to find a peaceful and viable resolution the 
Japanese government suggested in April 1880, a draft according to which two islands 
of the Ryūkyū chain would be ceded to China in exchange for some trading rights and 
the "most favoured nation" status to Japan.97 The everlasting search for parity with the 
West seemed to be drawing to an end when Beijing approved the settlement presented 
by Shishido Tamaki, Japanese ambassador to China, on 21 October. Li, however, 
opposed the ratification of the treaty and declared that China was prepared to go to 
war to defend its legitimate rights. The inaction that followed signified that China 
were no longer interested in forcefully disputing Japan’s claims and on January 5 
1881 Shishido formally informed Beijing that Tōkyō considered the matter of the 
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that may had objections with a fait accompli. See George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island 
People, (Boston-Tokyo, 2000), pp. 382-383. 
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Ryūkyū islands settled.98 Japan this way secured its southern border from foreign 
encroachment; employment of sheer force and infringement of the native population’s 
rights were to be used later in other territories as well.  
Having examined Japan’s northern islands and the southern tip of the empire 
we must now turn our gaze towards the continent. For it was in Korea where Japanese 
colonialism reached its apogee and clashed fiercely with the Chinese and Western 
imperialistic interests. As a result of the continental war of 1894-1895 Tōkyō obtained 
Taiwan, its first ever “outer land” (gaichi), as the Ryūkyū Islands and Hokkaidō 
consisted parts of the mainland (naichi) or Japan’s internal colonies. For some 
scholars the Ryūkyū Islands and Hokkaidō were also gaichi despite the fact that both 
territories were under the indirect control of Japanese from the time of the Edo period, 
and had long-standing cultural ties with the mainland. In any case it can be argued 
that the colonization of Taiwan and Korea represented the extension of Japanese 
power beyond its Edo period sphere of influence. 
Shigeru Moriyama was sent in the spring of 1874 to Seoul to open 
negotiations once more in Saigō’s place. Despite his efforts, his aforementioned war 
plans and his threat to send battleships in April 1874 the negotiations continued only 
to reach yet again stalemate and he left Pusan on 21 September.99 Almost a year later 
to the date, on 20 September 1875, the Japanese vessel Un'yō surveying Korea’s 
western coasts was fired upon by the batteries of the fort at Kanghwa island. The 
Japanese landed a party, exchanged fire and destroyed the forts. The news was 
communicated to Tōkyō by Inoue on 28 September and on the following day it was 
decided to send battleships in Pusan to protect the Japanese residents there. The 
government after years of frustration and unrest found an opportunity to employ and 
impose western diplomatic practices on Korea. After the signing of the Sakhalin-Kuril 
Islands Exchange treaty in May 1875, Enomoto was confident that Russia would not 
intervene in Korea and derail the good momentum of Saint Petersburg-Tōkyō 
relations. Li Hongzhang advised Seoul, because of its unpreparedness to comply with 
the Japanese demands, the American Minister in Japan John Armor Bingham (1815-
1900) approved the idea of opening Korea following the Perry model in November 
and Foreign Minister Terashima obtained the moral support of the US and British 
legations in Tōkyō.100 The foreign powers after their numerous failed efforts appeared 
favourable to integrating Korea in the global capitalistic network. Mori Arinori met, 
as Japan’s Minister in China, with Prince Kung on 9 December 1875 and extracted 
from the Prince another declaration that Korea, though subordinate to China, was free 
to choose its own policies. The Chinese would come to regret their naivety.101 Tōkyō 
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was ready to capitalize the Un'yō incident having secured its rear.102  Throughout 
1875 Ōkubo and Matsukata in the Finance Ministry stressed the financial burden of a 
conflict and the priority of regaining Japan’s tariff autonomy. Kido, on the contrary, 
was anxious to take action and volunteered to act as Japan’s envoy in Korea in 
October “for the glory of the empire and the security of our people”. In December, the 
government appointed Kuroda as Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, with 
Inoue as his Deputy, to demand compensation for the incident and sign an unequal 
treaty. In case of another stalemate military plans were laid by Yamagata and General 
Torio Koyata (1847-1905) providing for the deployment of a division and of 4 or 5 
warships against Korea. Kuroda and Inoue arrived at Kanghwa on 11 February 1876 
accompanied by 400 troops. After the arrival of more troops Kuroda told the Korean 
authorities that he had brought with him 4,000 men and they had to choose between a 
treaty and war.103 Kuroda demanded an apology presenting Un'yō as the aggravated 
party despite the ship’s unauthorized entrance in Korean territorial waters and the 
killing of 35 Koreans soldiers. Kuroda responded to Korean objections by returning to 
his ship. Western imperialists and gunboat “diplomats” could not be prouder. The 
Koreans, who had never forgotten Hideyoshi’s atrocities,104  were threatened once 
more by a nation that had always benefited from the cultural ties with Korea and had 
repaid them with pirate raids and destruction.105 
On 26 February 1876 Korea was finally opened to foreigners with the Korea-
Japan Treaty of Amity modelled on Japan’s Ansei treaties. A vulnerable and isolated 
Seoul, after Beijing’s tacit consent, could no longer resist the implementation of 
international law, at least as Japan and the consonant Western powers intended it. The 
same kind of provisions that were imposed on Japan by the foreigners and were 
regarded as a “national disgrace”, were now enforced on an Asian “backward” nation. 
Korea was declared an independent nation and Japan its equal according to the “law 
of nations”.106 The trade of opium was banned. Moreover, Wŏnsan and Inchon in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
was a Chinese dependency and that Tōkyō’s actions constituted an external interference in its domestic 
affairs. Mori in disagreement obtained at least Beijing’s consent to negotiate with Korean authorities 
since China was unwilling to take full responsibility for its “vassal’s” actions. See Brahm Swaroop 
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addition to Pusan were to be opened to trade and Japanese consuls were installed 
there. In November 1880, the first Japanese legation was inaugurated in Seoul.107 The 
exchange of diplomatic representatives was agreed as well as the rights of conducting 
surveying missions and of docking for supplies in Korean harbours. The right of 
extraterritoriality was also established. Obsolete diplomatic practices were abolished. 
The supplementary trade treaty of 24 August 1876 was even more unequal: Japanese 
imports and exports were exempt of any tariff duties; the circulation of Japanese 
currency was allowed and Japanese merchants were permitted to lease land in the 
ports and undertake their businesses virtually unhindered within a radius of 4 
kilometres from the ports.108  
This is how Japanese political and economic influence became predominant in 
Korea. China naturally sought to reassert its authority in a typical imperialist manner. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
were more preoccupied with title denominations than the far more substantial extraterritoriality clause, 
demonstrating an antiquated mentality. See Mizuno, Japan and its East Asian neighbors, pp. 246-247. 
107 Besides the consular authorities in Seoul, 11 Japanese officers undertook the protection of the 
embassy; after 1882 their number increased to 28. In April 1880, the Wŏnsan’s consulate was guarded 
by 32 police officers. Approximately 11 officers were stationed in Pusan and Inchon respectively to 
maintain social order. They were funded out of the consular budget and the community’s subsidies. 
After 1899 consular offices were inaugurated in 10 Korean cities. In China, a further 4 Japanese 
consulates in different cities were added to the ones operating at Shanghai, Tianjin and Xiamen 
(Amoy) after 1896, following Western paradigm. In the Japanese enclaves (settlements) consular 
officers, besides their typical police work, oversaw the management of internal administration, 
sanitation and public health expanding Japan’s authority and prestige overseas. See Erik Esselstrom, 
Crossing Empire’s Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia, 
(Honolulu 2009), pp. 13-41.  
108 Woong, The Korean Struggle, pp. 58-71. These favourable conditions attracted so many Japanese 
labourers, Buddhist priests, artisans and poor farmers that in the late 19th century Korea became the 
most popular overseas destination after Hawaii and the continental US. As for the entrepreneurs that 
crossed the Tsushima Strait, they were mostly petty merchants since Japanese capitalism was in its 
infancy and capital scarce in this initial phase. In the 1870s and 1880s they mainly sold Western 
manufactured goods first imported in Japan and then channeled to the Korean market. Around the end 
of the century, Korea started importing Japanese goods domestically produced such as cotton products. 
In any case in the early 1890s Tōkyō imported 90% of Korea’s exports and exported back 50% of its 
foreign trade whereas 70% of the merchant ships docking in Korean ports were Japanese. Korean 
agricultural products and the revenue from the export trade came to be considered important to Japan’s 
industrialization with the passing of years and seemed to legitimize Tōkyō’s economic control. This 
fact does not mean that Japan had become an industrialized, prosperous nation. Government officials in 
1896 and 1898 still lamented the lack of private investments and of Japanese owned businesses abroad. 
In 1896 74% of the value of the country’s non-official exports and 70% of the value of the non-official 
imports were still handled by foreign merchants. The arrogance of the Japanese merchants, their 
“frugality”, contrary to Confucian moral ethics, and their animated protests every time Seoul banned 
the export of grain due to domestic shortages made them a parasitic nuisance; the Koreans saw them as 
“beggars” and “dwarf barbarians”. The Japanese immigrants on the other hand looked down on the 
uncivilized, wasteful and lazy natives. Even Inoue found the Japanese behavior arrogant, rude and a 
cause for future Korean hatred. The Japanese community, through its local consuls, frequently asked 
Tōkyō’s intervention when felt oppressed by Seoul’s or Beijing’s economic policies. The immigrants 
also published their own newspapers, Chōsen Jihō and Kanjō shinpō in the 1890s that reported every 
suspicious Russian move in the country. The settlers actively supported the Japanese forces during the 
Sino-Japanese war by gathering supplies, building barracks and serving as interpreters. See Jun Uchida, 
Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945, (London 2011), pp. 37-50 and 
Clarence V. Gilliland, Japan and Korea since 1910 in Annual Publication of the Historical Society of 
Southern California, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1920), pp. 48-52.  
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A Tzongli Yamen memorandum on 21 August 1879 mentioned Tōkyō’s “cunning” 
project to “master the Orient” and “turn her expansionist design to Korea in some 
future day”. Viceroy Li alarmed by the loss of the Ryūkyūs persuaded Korean 
officials to counterweight Japanese influence by signing commercial treaties with the 
West that would breach the Japanese trade monopoly.109 For the Meiji leadership 
Seoul’s independence constituted a strategic concern of the highest priority due to 
Korea’s geographic proximity and inability to defend itself.  
Korea’s backwardness and feebleness made it an easy prey for the Powers. For 
Major Meckel, the famous German military instructor, the peninsula was “a dagger 
pointed at the heart of Japan”, a dramatic phrase used to denote the danger of Korea 
falling into the hands of a Great Power. In October 1892, the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs disclosed to the Council of State: “Great Powers, including Russia, 
are now coveting Korea like meat on the table. No one but the imperial state can 
undertake the responsibility of saving Korea by maintaining international law. If 
Korea were seized by a Great Power such as Russia as a result of our neglecting this 
matter, it would represent a permanent harm and an imminent danger to the imperial 
country”. An unknown official of the Ministry added: “Although association with 
Korea is of no utility, it would be invaded by Russia if it were left alone. This could 
cause great harm to Japan. We help Korea not because we love Korea but because we 
love Japan”.110 Korea had to be protected, reformed, civilized and “independent” for 
Japan’s sake. The only question was what exactly that independence meant. A 
December 1884 note by a political group to Itō Hirobumi read: “The war against 
China is our greatest wish” and “If by some stroke of ill fortune, Korea becomes a 
base for foreign vessels, our country will not be able to maintain the peace of the 
Japan Sea… Hence, to help Korea achieve complete independence, and to deepen the 
friendship between our nations, is ultimately to protect our own independence”.111 
This deep anxiety explains the struggle for power with other nations and the constant 
interventions in Korea during the following decades. 
In February 1881, the Korean government appeared to finally embrace the 
notions of “enlightenment”. An administrative reform was followed by the dispatch of 
reform-minded and pro-western officials in Japan to study the country’s modern 
institutions in early 1881. The military attaché of the Japanese legation was 
commissioned to train part of the Korean army according to western standards in May 
1881. On 23 July 1882, the Imo mutiny broke out when frustrated troops, unpaid for 
13 months, attacked the royal palace and the Japanese legation killing the Japanese 
                                                          
109 According to the aforementioned Yamen memorandum, treaty relations were useful because “if 
Japan and Korea began fighting in the future [the other treaty states] could all stand up and admonish 
the wrongdoer”, meaning Japan. See Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, pp. 166-167. 
110 Mizuno, Japan and its East Asian neighbors, pp. 208-209.  
111 A December 1880 edition of the newspaper Chōya Shinbun declared in unison: “Korea is our 
northern gate. If we do not guard the gate our own independence is not at all secure… If Korea comes 
under the occupation of another people, we must not abandon it even for a day”. See Duus, The 
Abacus, pp. 49-51. 
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instructors.112 Τhe Japanese Minister in Seoul since 1877, Hanabusa Yoshimoto and 
his staff fled to Inchon and returned to Japan after being rescued by a British vessel on 
the 26th. Korean regent Daewongun found the opportunity to regain control over his 
rivals, the family of Queen Min that favoured a conservative pro-Qing approach. On 4 
and 13 August Beijing sent warships and land forces respectively to impose its direct 
control upon Seoul. The Daewongun was arrested and a pro-Chinese faction took 
control of the government.113  In September-October 1882 Seoul agreed to a new 
commercial treaty that granted to Chinese merchants trade privileges over the 
Westerners and the Japanese. Beijing proceeded to the colonization of Korea asserting 
its tributary rights: it installed a Minister Resident in Seoul to advise the government, 
granted loans, undertook the reorganization of the Korean army and placed 
Mollendorf, a German national, to handle Korea’s customs administration; according 
to Li the “Japanese fear Germany the most and dislike Mollendorf, so we will send 
him to Korea in order to prevent their licentiousness”. Tōkyō’s ire can be summarized 
by the plea made by Fukuzawa, who was always concerned about the peninsula’s 
future, in the summer of 1882, to impose a Japanese protectorate there. Despite the 
belligerent voices and the mobilization of the reserves in August, ultimately restraint 
prevailed. Japan was at the moment too weak to confront the Qing forces and a 
collaborative, conciliatory approach was deemed best. Besides according to the 
Finance Ministry, Matsukata’s deflation measures restricted the Navy to procuring 
just three warships a year. In the end of 1881 the Japanese Naval Minister Kabayama 
lamented the state of the Navy and asked for 24 vessels in three years starting from 
1883.114  
Hanabusa returned escorted by Japanese troops to protect the legation and 
demanded an indemnity so as not to initiate hostilities. Beijing however, interpreted 
this gesture as another one of Inoue’s “poisonous tricks”, who it was believed to have 
collaborated with the Regent in the latter’s attempt to oust King Gojong and regain 
control. With treaty of Chemulp’o (Incheon) on 30 August 1882, Seoul agreed to pay 
an indemnity of 550,000 yen as reparations for the loss of life and damages that the 
Japanese had suffered, to punish the assailants, to permit the stationing of Japanese 
troops in the capital and to send a mission of apology to Tōkyō for the Imo incident. 
                                                          
112 The riot was directed mainly against the Japanese revealing the strong anti-Japanese sentiment of 
the Korean masses. See Junji Banno, “Japanese diplomatic attitudes towards Korea, 1880-1885” in 
Papers on Far Eastern History, vol. 21 (1980), pp. 63-65. 
113 Kitaoka, “Inception of a Modern Relationship”, p. 30. 
114 Kabayama commented on 15 November 1882: “When we see the recent attitude of the Chinese 
government, we notice that it is concentrating its energy on armament increases, especially on the 
increase of naval forces. China has now more than sixty warships, and many warships, gun-boats, and 
torpedo boats are now under construction both in China and overseas”. In June 1883, Yamagata asked 
again for the expansion of the country’s arsenal due to the rumour that Qing forces would be deployed 
in the East after the end of Sino-French war. The Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai, Tadamichi 
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intimidate Tōkyō and dispel any thoughts of a Japanese-French alliance. Accordingly in late July, the 
Japanese Ministers in Seoul and Beijing reassured the Qing authorities that Japan would never ally 
itself to Paris. See Banno, “Japanese diplomatic attitudes”, pp. 66-69. 
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When this mission arrived in October, the Meiji government returned 400,000 yen of 
the indemnity “to be used for reform in Korea”.115  
In October 1882, another mission by a Korean pro-reformist faction met with 
Foreign Minister Inoue to ask for Tōkyō’s assistance. Inoue called for the 
government’s more direct support to Korean reformists and a small loan of 170,000 
yen was subsequently arranged.116 After the mutiny Japan and Qing China, the latter 
with the sturdy collaboration of the Min family, coexisted and clashed in the 
peninsula. Both protagonists were unwilling to go to war over Korea as they struggled 
to expand their influence and outmaneuver the rival their opponent. This war of 
friction was to last until 1894-1895. Seoul’s “awakening” through support from 
Beijing or the West was a “political crime” for Fukuzawa “since Japan was the first 
state to recognize Korean independence, it had the responsibility to support it and “its 
enlightenment and civilization”.117 It was Tōkyō’s task to modernize the country; after 
all, the degree of China’s civilization by western standards was debatable. Many 
young Korean reformists grew impatient with their reactionary government’s slow-
paced modernization programme. They approached the French legation in Tōkyō 
during the Sino-French war and the Japanese Minister in Seoul, Takezoe Shin’ichirō 
(1841 or 1842-1917) for assistance. Ignoring Inoue’s calls for caution Takezoe 
supported the 4 December 1884 coup d'état that briefly succeeded;118 a pro-Japanese 
government under the reigning king was installed to free Korea from Chinese 
tyranny.119 The coup, which came to be known as the Gapsin coup, was crushed under 
the weight of 3,000 Qing and Korean soldiers in the capital two days later. The 
plotters and the approximately 300 Japanese troops, originally assigned to protect the 
legation, were defeated and their leaders were arrested or fled to Japan. The legation 
was burnt, Seoul’s Japanese residents were lynched by the mob and Takezoe, like 
Hanabusa, was forced to abandon Korea. This incident that caused the clash of 
Beijing’s and Tōkyō’s forces in Korea was settled through negotiations undertaken by 
Inoue with Korean and Qing officials. Beijing, especially, was unwilling to risk a war 
while fighting the French in Tonkin. On 9 January 1885, the treaty of Seoul was 
signed despite diplomatic complications.120 Korea humiliatingly agreed to apologize, 
                                                          
115 Akira Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status” in The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5, 
Early Modern Japan, ed. Marius B. Jansen, (New York, Cambridge 1995), pp. 299-300. Before the 
mission’s return its members met with Emperor Meiji explaining to him the conditions in Korea and 
their resolution to modernize their country following the example of the Restoration’s. They received 
500 rifles and promises for financial aid to free Korea from Beijing’s grip. See Donald Keene, Emperor 
of Japan: Meiji and his world, 1852-1912, (New York 2002), p. 377. 
116 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 52-55.  
117 Suzuki, Civilization and Empire, p. 169. 
118 Takezoe asked his government if he should provide military support to the plotters against the 
Chinese but the negative response arrived too late to discourage his plans. See Duus, The Abacus, p. 
57. 
119 Iriye, “Japan’s Drive”, p. 302. 
120 The presence of Qing officials meant that Beijing obviously insisted in regarding Korea as its 
vassal. The Japanese side demanded the punishment of the Chinese that had attacked Japanese citizens 
and the withdrawal of Qing forces from Korea. The same demand was presented by the Chinese as 
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punish the culprits and pay 110,000 yen as compensation to Japanese victims and 
another 20,000 for the reconstruction of the legation.121 Tōkyō’s responsibility for the 
incident was overlooked but it was clear that a permanent solution with China had to 
be found in order to avoid a full-scale war. The outcome of a premature war at that 
point was unsure. Furthermore, an eventual conflict would complicate the serious 
efforts for the revision of the treaties undertaken by Minister Inoue. Since Japan had 
just began an armaments build up programme, the Meiji leaders chose the road of 
negotiation.122 
Through the mediation of the British diplomat Harry Parkes, the two great 
statesmen of China and Japan, Li and Itō, the latter one Japan's leading politician after 
Iwakura's death, met in China in March 1885. On 18 April, they signed the Tianjin 
Convention or the Li-Itō Convention, as it is better known, containing three points. 
Each country’s military forces had to withdraw, a new Korean army, trained by 
foreigners (not Chinese or Japanese), would take their place, and lastly it was agreed 
that if either Japan or China wished to dispatch troops in Korea it had to give prior 
notice to the other party. The hard-liners and the resolute patriots saw the agreement 
as Japan’s surrender in Korea. Beijing’s primacy was not contested and Qing 
influence reached its apex at the expense of Tōkyō’s prestige. A different 
interpretation suggests that the convention recognized Japan’s interests for the first 
time, albeit to a limited extent.123  
In May 1885 Enomoto, Japan’s Minister to China wrote to Inoue proposing 
the transformation of Korea to an Asian Switzerland under the protection of both 
powers. In November 1885, the new Chinese Minister Resident Yuan Shih-kai (1859-
1916) declared that he was in charge of Korea’s diplomatic and trade relations. 
London seemed to endorse Beijing’s tributary claims and actions in Korea. The 
politician George Nathaniel Curzon (1859-1925) both in 1885 and 1893 suggested a 
Sino-British alliance with the possible entry of Japan to counter the growing Russian 
influence.124 King Gojong approached the Russians to counter the Beijing’s growing 
pressure. The latter, in the summer of 1886, commanded Yuan to depose the king and 
install the Daewongun in power. This coup failed but Yuan succeeded in banishing 
the pro-Russian Ministers of the Korean government. Furthermore, the Chinese 
managed to take control of the shipping lines between the two states and gained a 
monopoly in the installation of telegraphic lines in Korea. Beijing’s fixation was 
                                                                                                                                                                      
well. Kabayama and General Takashima Tomonosuke (1844-1916), despite the Navy’s lack of 
readiness, advocated in favour of an immediate war against China. See Banno, “Japanese diplomatic 
attitudes”, pp. 72-73. 
121 Kitaoka, “Inception of a Modern Relationship”, pp. 31-32. 
122 Military spending was amounting to less than 20% of Japan’s fiscal budget until 1882. It started 
exceeding this threshold from 1883 onwards. Ibid., p. 33. 
123 Michael A. Barnhart, Japan and the World since 1868, (London 1995), pp. 14-15. 
124William L. Langer, La Diplomazia dell'Imperialismo (1890-1902), vol. 1, (New York, 1935), pp. 
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linked to its perception of Korea as China’s “protective fence”, a buffer state to 
supplement the Qing’s national security.125 
Admittedly, Takezoe obtained the most-favoured-nation clause for Japan with 
the “Treaty Regulations” agreement signed in July 1883. Nevertheless, Beijing still 
enjoyed greater trade privileges annulling the benefits of the Kanghwa treaty.126 Meiji 
leaders lamented the lack of modern reforms and the ineffectiveness of the “self-
strengthening” movement in Korea, and in a time that tension and reciprocal 
suspicion were building up in Seoul, they failed to grant military or financial support. 
Budgetary limitations, naval and army insufficiency and an appeasing foreign policy 
of avoiding conflict passed the initiative to the opposing side.127 
Beijing and Tōkyō were not the only suitors for Korea. In 1884 Saint-
Petersburg proposed to Seoul the dispatch of military experts to train the insignificant 
armed forces. Following the report of the North China Daily News on the 5th of 
August 1885, a rumour about a Korea-Russian alliance circulated. Amidst the 
relentless imperialist struggle between London and Saint-Petersburg in Asia, the 
former occupied Geomun-do (Hamilton island) from 1885 to 1887 whereas the latter 
was supposedly planning to obtain Port Lazareff (Wŏnsan) from Korea. In the 
meantime, as result of the Sino-French conflict, Paris concluded the occupation of the 
Taiwanese Pescadores islands in July 1885. In the summer of 1886 another rumour 
regarding the transfer of Korea from China to Russia spread panic to the Meiji ruling 
classes.128  “It was obvious”, Yamagata wrote in January 1888, “that the existing 
competition in Asia between Britain and Russia would within a few years cause much 
trouble in East Asia”. He warned the Emperor in 1892 that Japan had to take pre-
emptive measures and build up its power before the completion of the Trans-Siberian 
railroad. For Yamagata, it was Tōkyō’s duty to keep Korea free from foreign 
encroachments. In March 1890 while requesting a larger military budget he claimed: 
“If we wish to maintain the nation's independence and to rank among the Great 
Powers, it is necessary to step forward and defend our line of interest, to be always in 
a favorable position, and not satisfied to defend only the line of sovereignty” And he 
added, "our line of interest is really in Korea”. 129  Hence traditional Japanese 
militarism evolved into a modern style imperialistic ambition through the medium of 
the national security oratory. Yamagata’s preoccupation about security in combination 
with his view of a predatory world transformed Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, China 
and the rest of the Asian states into objectives necessary for Japan’s national interests; 
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“neither China or Korea is our enemy; it is Britain, France, Russia” he claimed in 
October 1893.  Fukuzawa agreed on the need of military buildup: “When other use 
violence, we must be violent too”. Japan should not stand idle while the West carved 
up the Far East but had to “join the chase for the prize”.130 Fukuzawa accused Seoul 
and Beijing on being xenophobic and backward; on 29 July 1894 he described the 
Sino-Japanese War as a holy war between civilization and barbarity. The scholar 
Okakura Kakuzō (1862-1913) asserted that Korea, was Japan's "ancient Domain" and 
it lies within the "lines of legitimate national defense”.131  
In a memorandum to the council of state in September 1882, Iwakura claimed 
that Japan had to increase its naval strength since the Chinese were expanding their 
fleet. Yamagata too was not content with a conscript army numbering just 40,000 men 
and his protégé Katsura Tarō in 1886 demanded increased military expenditures so 
that Tōkyō could “rank with the leading powers”. Besides, only second rate nations 
were content to merely defend their borders; Japan for Katsura had to arm itself and 
expand. In 1886 military expenditures rose to 25% of total government expenditures 
and by 1890 accounted for 31%. The Navy developed its own plans for expanding to 
42 vessels that were to be acquired mainly from abroad. With a conflict with China 
more likely than ever the Army’s General Staff devised plans for an attack on the 
continent132 and organized large scale army and navy maneuvers in the spring of 1890 
and fall of 1892. The previous decade’s conciliatory policy towards the feared Qing 
Empire gave its place to a conviction of victory in the 1890s.133 
In April and May of 1894 a group of anti-foreign peasants calling themselves 
Tonghak revolted in southwestern Korea against the central government which was 
unable to put the rebellion down.  In Seoul, the Japanese chargé d’affaires, Sugimura 
Fukashi although convinced that the rebellion was not a real threat requested from 
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Foreign Minister Mutsu the dispatch of troops on 22 May. The new Minister in Seoul, 
Ōtori Keisuke (1833-1911) expressed his agreement on the 31th. Fearing Western 
intervention the rebellion was used as a pretext to apply political pressure and impose 
the reforms that Tōkyō was promoting for years in Korea. 134  On 4 June, the 
information that the Chinese, after Seoul’s request the previous day,135 were to send 
1,500 men was joyfully welcomed by the Japanese legation. Many, Mutsu among 
them, welcomed the prospect of a war that would act as a safety valve for the bitter 
political discords. Furthermore, it would rally the nation behind the government.136 
The Japanese military attaché in Beijing and the consul in Tianjin confirmed the 
Chinese military preparations.137 The following day the 5th division was mobilized 
and on the 10th, Ōtori marched to Seoul with 300 marines from the Japanese warships 
stationed at Inchon. He declared to the protesting Koreans that Japan had the right to 
protect its own citizens according to the 1882 Chemulp’o treaty. Prime Minister Itō 
obtained imperial sanction for the dispatch of troops at Korea and for the dissolution 
of the Lower House that criticized the Cabinet’s policies.138 In mid-June when the 
Tonghaks agreed to an armistice, the Chinese Minister Resident Yuan and Ōtori 
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negotiated the reduction of their forces in line with Seoul’s request.139 However, by 
the end of June Tōkyō had already poured in Korea 7 to 8,000 men between Seoul 
and Inchon; 140  a withdrawal without something to show for, such as Korea’s 
modernization, was out of the question due to the widespread warlike sentiment141 
and the ruling classes’ ambitions.142  The Japanese merchants trading primarily in 
cotton textiles in Korea were another pressure group that desired the country’s 
modernization along Japan’s paradigm.143 The Army had to stay for the time being as 
a counterweight to Qing pressure. The Meiji and Qing detachments glared its other 
menacingly in the absence of an actual foe.  
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Emperor a memorandum that criticized the government for its passivity before Beijing’s provocations. 
See Kyu Hyun Kim, “The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895): Japanese National Integration and 
Construction of the Korean ‘Other’” in International Journal of Korean History, Vol.17 No.1, (Feb. 
2012), p. 8. 
See Kamikawa, Japan-American Diplomatic Relations, pp. 156-157. 
142 Matsukata Masayoshi, who was usually critical of Japanese interventions in Korea, in this case 
proposed to Kuroda in mid-June 1894 the utilization of the already deployed forces to extract “real 
rights and interests” meaning railway and mining rights from Seoul. See Duus, The Abacus, p. 70. In 
January 1895, President of the House of Peers Konoe pointed out that victory at war must be followed 
by Japan’s domination of the shipping lines in the Pacific and the Chinese Sea so that Tōkyō became 
“the maritime king of the East”. Meiji leaders had to take advantage of the trade nodes that would 
develop around Japan after the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and the Panama Canal. See 
Zachmann, China and Japan, p. 42. 
143  It was the prospect of profit and not actual revenue that convinced the merchants of Korea’s 
economic value. For example in 1893, besides the increased volume of trade transactions, Japanese 
exports in Korea were valued at just 1,7 million yen. Akira Iriye suggested that Japan’s immature 
finance capitalism of the mid-1890s should be treated as one ingredient and not as the most 
predominant factor behind Tōkyō’s imperialistic policies. For Conroy “economic matters had no 
important effect in determining the Japanese course toward the annexation of Korea” and “the causes 
of the Sino-Japanese war were not economic…”. See Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, p. 45. 
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On 14 June Itō presented to the Cabinet a list of reforms to be imposed upon 
Seoul. The next day Mutsu declared that if Beijing appeared unwilling to join forces, 
Japan would implement the reforms unilaterally. On the 16th the Qing government, 
through the Minister to Japan, Wang Fengzao refused to jointly suppress the rebels or 
reform Korea. Ten days later Ōtori submitted his reform proposal to King Gojong. 
The latter ignored it, demanding instead the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from 
his country. Following the advice of many Japanese officials, back home and in 
Seoul, Ōtori decided to occupy Seoul and impose a protectorate. 144  Unlike the 
previous coups this time the Japanese forces were strategically positioned and ready 
to control the capital upon Tōkyō’s command;145 the latter had to allay the powers’ 
suspicions. On 25 June Mikhail Khitrovo (1837-1896), the Russian Minister in Tōkyō 
met with Mutsu and called for the withdrawal of Japan’s forces and the maintenance 
of peace. The Japanese Foreign Minister responded that his government wished only 
to reform Korea with or without China. Khitrovo stiffened his position on the 30th: 
Japan had to recall its troops or “bear serious responsibility for the consequences”.146 
In the same time the British Minister in China, Nicholas Roderick O'Conor (1843-
1908) mediated between the Tzongli Yamen and Komura, Japan’s Minister in Beijing 
in the hope of reaching a peace settlement. London was concerned about the 
disruption of trade in the Far East and seemed to foresee a Chinese victory. The 
Deputy Minister to Tōkyō, Ralph Spencer Paget (1864-1940) met Mutsu on 23 July 
and gained his commitment that if war finally broke out, both belligerents would 
avoid operations around Shanghai,147 the focal point of the British sphere of influence 
in China.148 A day earlier, Japan’s Minister in Berlin, Aoki Shūzō (1844-1914) had 
reported that London was proposing the division of Korea between Beijing and Tōkyō 
to avoid the conflict. On 9 July, the American Minister called Mutsu to respect 
Korea’s independence, whereas the French François Jules Harmand (1845-1921) 
asserted that peace in the future was feasible through a French-Japanese alliance. Li 
                                                          
144 The imposition of a protectorate “for many future years or even forever” was the general line 
adopted among other options by the cabinet on 17 August. The two other options presented also by 
Mutsu were Korea’s independence, a very precarious scenario due to the country’s vulnerability, and 
the extraction of a declaration from the interested powers guaranteeing Korea’s integrity. See Duus, 
The Abacus, p. 80. 
145 Kamikawa, Japan-American Diplomatic Relations, pp. 157-158. 
146 Mutsu’s answer to this threat on 2 July was that he appreciated the friendly Russian advice but the 
Tonghak rebellion was not completely suppressed yet. See Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 40-43. 
147 China however, used the area for military purposes. In August, Japanese authorities made clear to 
O'Conor that if the current situation persisted Tōkyō could not guarantee Shanghai’s safety. Thus the 
British Minister extracted a demilitarization declaration from Beijing as well. See Aleš Skřivan, Sr. and 
Aleš Skřivan, Jr., “Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895” in Prague Papers on the 
History of International Relations, Vol. 2 (2015), p. 23.  
148 Paget on 21 July warned Mutsu that if Tōkyō did not accept mediation as Beijing had requested or 
an international conference to solve the problem then “only Japan will be responsible”. Mutsu in 
protest claimed that it was China that had refused the Japanese proposal to collaborate and that Tōkyō’s 
sole preoccupation was to secure the privileges that Beijing already enjoyed. After the declaration of 
war, London and Washington offered their good offices to end the conflict in October and November 
1894 respectively. See Kamikawa, Japan-American Diplomatic Relations, pp. 161-164. 
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Hongzang in the same time approached the Western Powers, especially Britain and 
Russia that had extensive interests in the Far East, for mediation. The diplomatic 
battle for international sympathy continued. To make Japan appear as the defender of 
civilization and not the aggressor in the upcoming war,149 Mutsu authorized Aoki in 
late July-early August to bribe the Reuters news agency to circulate pro-Japanese 
articles.150   
On 16 July 1894, Britain’s extraterritoriality, rights in Japan were finally 
annulled by a new more “equal” trade treaty (although tariff privileges were retained). 
On 22 November, a similar treaty was signed in Washington although it was not 
ratified until February 1895 due to American concerns over the rumours of Japanese 
atrocities in China.151 The show of force during the war and not modern institutions 
and legislature symbolized Tōkyō’s growing status and proved to be the key to 
achieving nominal parity with the West. In Japan, publicists, politicians and citizens 
desired more than shaking Chinese influence off Seoul: extending Japanese influence 
in Asia and acquiring a beachhead for future domination if not the outright 
establishment of an empire in the continent that would serve as an outlet for the 
nation’s rapidly increasing population. The government was politically and militarily 
up to the task and backed up by public opinion pursued an expansionist policy, 
signifying international recognition and the status and prestige of a Great Power.152 
Japan was now a global power and not a semi-colonized nation, as the Buddhist 
missionary153 Nakanishi Ushirō (1859-1930) had envisioned in his 1 January 1895 
                                                          
149  Japan was winning the media war. Through pictorials on bilingual newspapers, paintings and 
woodblock prints even before the war had started, Tōkyō managed to project itself as a civilized, 
westernized nation to the world. It also reassured its domestic audience of Japan’s righteous aims, 
exalted patriotism and drew widespread support for the war. Japan’s victorious armies were often 
depicted with western features whereas the coward Qings as monkeys or pigs. Prints of Korea’s 
conquerors Hideyoshi and Jingū were also popular. See Marco Del Bene, “Propaganda e 
Rappresentazione dell’Altro nel Giappone Prebellico: Cina e occidente tra manga e nishikie” in Le 
Guerre Mondiali in Asia Oriental e in Europa: Violenza, Collaborazionismi, Propaganda, ed. B. 
Bianchi, L. De Giorgi, G. Samarini, (Milan 2009), pp. 89-103 and Judith Fröhlich, “Pictures of the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895” in War in History, Vol. 21, No 2 (2014), pp. 214-250. 
150 Keene, Emperor of Japan, p. 493 
151 Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 56-76. 
152 However, Tōkyō’s siding with the West against China did not mean an outright admission of the 
Asian island country to the elite club of the civilized and powerful states. Concerns about the Yellow 
Peril were still not dispersed; they were intensified after Japan’s emergence as a potentially powerful 
foe. Chinese resources under Japanese guidance appeared as an ominous scenario for some Western 
politicians. The expert historian Masao Murayama recognizes a clear case of “transfer psychology” in 
the West’s psychological pressure (subjugation threat, disdain) towards Meiji Japan. This pressure in 
combination with oppressive policies domestically made the common people more racist and 
proponents of a tougher foreign policy towards weaker counties. See Richard Storry, The Making of the 
Twentieth Century Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943, (London 1979), pp. 19-20. 
153 Japanese Buddhists of various sects undertook their own paternalistic “civilizing mission” to reform 
the less sophisticated and corrupt Korean Buddhism. The first sect to establish its base in Pusan was the 
Higashi Hongan-ji in 1877, followed by the Nichiren in 1881, and the Nishi Hogan-ji in 1895. During 
the Sino-Japanese war they served Tōkyō’s imperialistic agenda by performing rituals, distributing 
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editorial, one that had the task to defeat the strong and the violent and help the weak 
and the feeble of the world. As Tokutomi Sohō commented two days before the 
opening of hostilities “I do not advocate war just for the sake of it. I am not 
advocating plundering of other lands. But I insist on war with China in order to 
transform Japan, hitherto a contracting nation, into an expansive nation”.154 
Ōtori, instructed by Mutsu on 11 July, to provoke China with his demands, did 
everything in his power to incite a war. His plan in collaboration with Ōshima was to 
capture the palace and oust the reactionary Min faction. The coup was to be presented 
as it was staged by Regent Daewongun and the Japanese intervention as a response to 
his call for help against the pro-Min troops. The pretext was Seoul’s unsatisfactory 
response on 19 July to Ōtori‘s demand to expel the Qing forces. On the morning of 23 
July, the palace was seized and the reluctant Daewongun was forced to act as the head 
of a new pro-Japanese government. The previous Sino-Korean agreements were 
annulled. On the 27th a new Deliberative Council was established to implement the 
reforms that Tōkyō dictated.155 In the meanwhile and without a formal declaration of 
war two battles took place on land and at sea. On 25 July patrolling units of the 
Japanese navy exchanged fire with units of the Qing Beiyang Fleet that was 
transporting troops to Korea’s west coast. The naval battle of Pungdo or Feng-tao 
ended in a definite Japanese victory. However, the sinking of the transport ship 
Kowshing caused a diplomatic incident between London and Tōkyō.156 Leased by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
talismans and pamphlets and gathering donations. The most important “western style” missionary that 
crossed the Tsushima Strait to enlighten Korea, the land “still shallow in knowledge”, between 1894 
and 1901 was Katō Bunkyō. For him Japan was the “center of world Buddhism” and Japan religiously, 
as much as politically, had the mission to “civilize”, reform and protect the faithful. Among other 
activities, Katō expanded Japanese secular and “moral” influence in the peninsula by building 
educational facilities and temples with Tōkyō’s aid. Similarly the Buddhist priest Okamura Enshin 
(1843-1913) settled in the remote village of Kwangju to create a “Japanese village” or a “paradise 
village”. Okamura enjoying the financial support of Konoe Atsumaro, an Asianist, erected a school and 
taught modern agricultural techniques and the Japanese language to local farmers. See Micah L. 
Auerback, Japanese Buddhism in an age of empire: Mission and reform in colonial Korea, 1877-1931, 
Ph.D Dissertation (Princeton 2007), pp. 121-156 and Nam-Lin Hur, “The Sōtō Sect and Japanese 
Military Imperialism in Korea” in Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1/2 (Spring, 
1999), pp. 107-134. 
154 Iriye, “Japan’s Drive”, pp. 321-313. 
155 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 76-77. 
156 After Kowshing went down, Japanese cruisers rescued only the British members of the crew. An 
official apology was delivered immediately to London. There was also the matter of the legitimacy of 
the Japanese actions. On 3 August, the Foreign Office held Tōkyō responsible for the loss of British 
property and the ship’s owners demanded compensation. After an investigation by experts and jurists 
the action was adjudicated to be in conformity with International Law and London eventually dropped 
the charges. The outcome was certainly affected by Aoki’s efforts to influence the western public 
opinion and the Japanese-British rapprochement after the signing of the new trade treaty. Besides it 
was Japan and not China that could act as an ally against Russian expansion as the 1902 Japanese-
British alliance reveals. Nevertheless, London hypocritically did receive compensation for the 
Kowshing incident from Beijing in April 1896 and March 1903. Apparently, China’s “belligerent 
behaviour” was ruled responsible for the loss of approximately 1,000 Chinese lives. See Douglas 
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Beijing to land troops in Asan (Seonghwan), the vessel flew the Union Jack in time of 
peace. Subsequently the Qing forces in Asan did not receive reinforcements and in the 
following battle of 28-29 July they were routed by Ōshima’s 4,000 men. The 
survivors fled north to Pyongyang leaving the capital and southern Korea in Japanese    
hands and the northern half to the Chinese. War was formally declared on 1 August 
1894.157 
In Seoul, by late August Ōtori had implemented numerous modern laws and 
extracted more economic benefits paving the way for an actual protectorate. In 
exchange Tōkyō guaranteed Korea’s “independence” against the Tonghaks and the 
Chinese; on the 26th a mutual defensive and offensive military alliance valid for the 
duration of the war was signed. Two days later, King Gojong declared Korea’s 
independence and promulgated several reforms such as religious freedom, abolition of 
slavery and the establishment of a diplomatic service. An action that he would repeat 
on 12 December. On 25 October 1894, Inoue Kaoru arrived in Seoul as adviser to the 
king in place of the ousted conservatives, the Mins, and make sure that the much-
needed reforms were proceeding. In Japan there was frustration with the slowness of 
reforms in Korea. Fukuzawa lamented the need to work with the Daewongun, and 
decried Tōkyō’s wasting of money and blood for a backward and stubborn “barbarian 
country”.158  
While the outcome of the conflict was still undetermined, the Daewongun and 
the King dispatched letters asking Beijing for help in August despite the signing of the 
military alliance with Japan. This was perceived as a treasonous act by the Japanese. 
As a result, Inoue backed up by Tōkyō’s expeditionary forces removed the regent and 
installed a reformist pro-Japanese government. Furthermore, Inoue pressed for a loan 
to the puppet regime in return for a naval base, the monopoly on telegraphic lines and 
the construction of a Seoul-Pusan-Inchon railway 159  among other demands, in a 
typical example of economic sub-imperialism. As he boldly told Itō on 24 December 
1894, he was implementing the Egyptian policy of the British in Seoul. The best tool 
to maintain a long-lasting influence, even after the war’s termination, was economic 
subjugation. During December and January, he pressed his government for a 5 million 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Howland, “The Sinking of the S. S. Kowshing: International Law, Diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese 
War” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Jul., 2008), pp. 673-703. 
157 The Chinese declaration of war accused the “wojen” (pigmies) for breaking the laws and interfering 
in Korea, whereas according to Emperor Matsuhito the state had been “our tributary for the last two 
hundred odd years”. See Turnbull White, The war in the East; Japan, China and Corea: A complete 
history of the War, its causes and results, its campaigns on sea and land, its terrific fights, grand 
victories and overwhelming defeats, (Philadelphia 1895), pp. 449-450. 
158 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 81-83. 
159 Yamagata was a great supporter of a railway from Pusan to Manchuria reaching as far as India. It 
would enable Japan to dominate the East militarily and economically. The railway and other economic 
monopolies enjoyed by Japan provoked the Ministers of Russia, Britain, the US and Germany at Seoul 
to lodge jointly an official protest. See Peter Duus. “Economic Dimensions of Meiji Imperialism: The 
case of Korea, 1895-1910” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. R. H. Myers, M. R. 
Peattie, (New Jersey, 1984) p. 139.  
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yen loan secured against revenue stemming from Korea’s southern provinces, which 
were under Japanese supervision. Itō and the financiers in Tōkyō appeared reluctant. 
Inoue turned to the Korean branches of the Japanese Dai-Ichi Bank (Inchon, Pusan160 
and Seoul) to secure the loan.161 By spring 1895, 40 Japanese advisers, instructors, 
Ministers and secretaries were employed by the new submissive government.162 
The Qing army numbered more than a million soldiers but just 10% were 
equipped with modern arms and trained along modern western standards. The navy 
was composed of semi-modern vessels. Τhe absence of unified command and the 
fragmentation of forces in ethnic groups guaranteed the Chinese military’s 
inadequacy. On the other hand, Tōkyō mobilized 100,000 men in the initial phases of 
the war (5 divisions and 2 in reserve), possessed more modern warships and it had 
instituted a General Staff for both the army and the navy. The First Army’s task under 
Yamagata was to secure Korea and attack Manchuria. The Second Army under the 
command of the War Minister, General Ōyama Iwao (1842-1916) was also to attack 
Manchuria, capture Port Arthur, rendezvous with the First Army and threaten Beijing. 
On the battlefront the demoralized Chinese troops retreated to Pyongyang where they 
fortified themselves. In mid-September 1894, the Imperial Japanese Army surrounded 
the city from several directions. The Chinese forces had 2,000 dead and 4,000 
wounded and retreated in haste beyond the Yalu River, the physical border between 
Korea and Manchuria abandoning large part of their equipment. The victorious 
Japanese suffered 102 dead and 433 wounded. On 17 September, the greatest naval 
battle of the war up to that point took place at the mouth of the Yalu River. The 
Japanese Combined Fleet intercepted the Beiyang Squadron while attempting to bring 
reinforcements to the Qing fighting troops. After hours of mutual shelling 4 Chinese 
cruisers were destroyed with a loss of 600 sailors in contrast to Japan’s 239 dead. 5 
Chinese transport ships were also captured a fact that ensured Japan’s naval 
superiority for the rest of the war and Beijing’s inability to supply efficiently and 
speedily its hard-pressed troops in Manchuria.163  
In southern Korea, 20,000 participated in a riot against the Japanese 
occupation forces in early October, the season’s bad harvest aggravating their 
grievances. At the same time, other revolts took place in Kiung-sang, Jeho and in the 
country’s mountainous regions initiating a guerilla resistance movement. Surprisingly 
for Tōkyō, the occupation army and the “enlightenment” that it brought with it was 
not welcomed by the entire local population. The Japanese army responded with harsh 
reprisals involving arrests and executions.164  
                                                          
160 The first store was erected in Pusan in 1878 thanks to a governmental subsidy of 100,000 yen. See 
Ibid., p. 154. 
161 The loan of ultimately 3 million was concluded on March 30 1895 by the Bank of Japan. See 
Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. 51-52. 
162 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 92-93. 
163 Skřivan and Skřivan, “Great Powers”, pp. 18-22. 
164 Stewart Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan, (New York 2000), p. 34. 
346 
 
The continuous Chinese defeats on the battlefront had compelled Beijing to 
ask for the mediation of the powers for a ceasefire as early as November 1894.165 On 
6 October, British Prime Minister Rosebery (Archibald Philip Primrose 1847-1929) 
fearing China’s collapse attempted to summon an international peace conference on 
the premise of Korean independence and war reparations for Japan. Berlin found the 
move premature, Paris discreetly supported it, whereas the Russian foreign policy was 
for the time inactive due to the Czar’s impending death. 166  The Italian Foreign 
Minister Alberto Blanc was the only one to openly express agreement.167 In order to 
disperse the prospect of an anti-Japanese front, Mutsu met with Khitrovo and assured 
him that Japan would respect western interests in Korea. Russian Foreign Minister 
Nicholas de Giers (1820-1895) expressed his sympathy to London’s initiative but 
ultimately on 24 October Russia refused to intervene. The eventuality of a British-
Russian approach and of a subsequent expansion in the Far East propelled the 
ambitious German Kaiser to propose to Chancellor Hohenlohe on 11 November 1894 
the seizure of Formosa or of another naval base. Hohenlohe after conferring with his 
advisors responded that Formosa had unfavourable natural conditions, a hostile 
population and its development would require huge administrative costs.168  
The outcome of the war was already determined, much to the surprise of 
foreign observers,169 but Tōkyō pressed on to gain more benefits at the negotiations 
table. The diet, relocated to the war capital Hiroshima, voted unanimously for an 
enlarged war budget of 150,000 million yen during the 18 and 22 October session 
twice over the state’s annual revenues.170 The Japanese General Staff set as its next 
objectives the strategically important ports of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei. On 24 
October, the Japanese crossed the Yalu River and entered Manchuria. The following 
day they captured the deserted city Jiulianzheng after another Chinese retreat to the 
North. The advancing First Army divided its forces: The Fifth division under General 
Nozu Michitsura (1840-1908) moved towards Mukden whereas the Third under 
Katsura, pursued the fleeing Chinese and headed for the Liaodong peninsula. To 
administer the occupied territories in Manchuria the army established a civilian affairs 
office on 1 November 1894 in Andong under Komura Jutarō. In a letter to the local 
authorities Yamagata justified this action by claiming that such a measure was 
necessary in order to ensure the population’s safety and property. A second office 
opened later in Liaodong under another diplomat. However, military officers would 
                                                          
165 On 26 November Li dispatched the German Gustav Detring (1842-1913) to Hiroshima to negotiate 
the terms upon which Japan would agree to cease hostilities. Itō refused to meet with him since Detring 
did not carry any official authorization. See Skřivan and Skřivan, “Great Powers”, p. 29. 
166 Fung, “Ch'ing Policy “, p. 140. 
167 The Japanese Minister to Rome, Takahira Kogorō (1854-1926) reported to Mutsu on 10 October 
and 11 November that the Italian views were identical to the British and that Rome “wishes to act in 
concert with Britain”. See Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 133-134. 
168 Langer, La Diplomazia, pp. 282-292. 
169 Fung, “Ch'ing Policy”, p. 137. 
170 Walter Wallace McLaren, Political History during the Meiji Era, 1867- 1912, (New York 1912), p. 
227. 
347 
 
take charge of these offices on a later date. Komura was replaced by Colonel 
Fukushima Yasumasa (1852-1919) on 9 December. The army had found Komura’s 
plea to respect the Chinese non-combatants offensive, since it was not his place as a 
civilian to make such a request. The traditional conviction of military superiority and 
the continuous victories exacerbated the already deep-rooted disdain that the Army 
nurtured for the decadent Chinese and even its own civilians. A measure that 
increased Japanese popularity was Yamagata’s decision to renounce that year’s taxes. 
Collaboration with local Qing officials made coexistence more bearable and secured 
the invading army’s supply lines.171 This brief administration of the occupied areas 
provided the Meiji with their first experience in controlling overseas colonial 
territories. Weihaiwei was the target of the Second Army which on the 6th and 7th 
November occupied Jinzhou and Dallian with minimum losses. In the same time a 
third army was being assembled in Nagasaki ready to embark and land in Dagu in 
close proximity to Beijing.172 On 20 November the siege of Port Arthur commenced, 
China’s most modern, well equipped and heavily garrisoned fort. The Beiyang fleet 
was nowhere to be seen and the Qing commanders fled the besieged port abandoning 
their men to their gruesome fate. The taking of the “impregnable” fort took less than a 
day for Ōyama’s men. 
During this period, the press reported an alternative reality. Foreign reporters 
had been exalting the Japanese soldiers’ courage, efficiency and discipline.173 News 
reports of the patriotic Tōkyō Nichi Nichi and Jiyū shinbun newspapers frequently 
highlighted the efficiency of Red Cross military hospitals and the supposedly heroic 
and chivalry behaviour towards the vanquished Chinese.174 The truth however, was 
quite different. Many foreign reporters were bribed and thus unreliable, whereas 
Japanese press was censored during the war.175 In reality the Imperial Army suffered 
from lack of guides, supplies, winter uniforms and most of all discipline: incidents of 
gambling, disobedience and desertion had been recorded. The biggest incident of 
insubordination, the Port Arthur massacre, unfolded from 21 to 25 November 1894.176  
The reporter Cowan of the London Times, an eye witness, described the events after 
the fall of the fort as an “horrifying scene” and an “awful epidemic of “incredible 
                                                          
171 Lone, Army, Empire, pp. 34-35. 
172 Itō was opposing the plans of his political rival Yamagata for the capture of the Chinese capital and 
discharged him supposedly due to his poor health. The fall of Beijing meant the fall of the Qing 
dynasty, the intervention of the powers and chaos. The Prime Minister wanted a quick, decisive victory 
before any of the Powers could interfere. The port of Weihaiwei, the target set by the navy, presented a 
more appropriate objective for Itō. On 4 December, he obtained an imperial approval for a joint army-
navy expedition against Weihaiwei; Beijing was not to be seized. See Skřivan and Skřivan, “Great 
Powers”, p. 30.  
173 Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 106-197. 
174 Kim, “The Sino-Japanese War”, p. 11. 
175  “Reports should record insofar as possible true facts concerning acts of loyalty, courage, 
righteousness, and nobility and should encourage feelings of hostility toward the enemy”. Those who 
violated these regulations would be suitably punished. See Keene, Emperor of Japan, p. 493. 
176 Lone, Army, Empire, pp. 30-31. 
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brutality”. Japanese cavalry was “slaughtering all within range” and “I saw the 
Japanese march in, firing up the streets and into the houses chasing and killing every 
live thing that crossed their path…I saw scores of Chinese hunted out of cover, shot 
down, and hacked to pieces, and never a man made any attempt to fight”.177 At a time 
when Tōkyō was seeking to be “admitted as an equal into the family of civilized 
nations”, Cowan concluded that Japan was only pretending to be humane, and now 
stood “disgraced upon the world” and driven by “a new lust for dominion” that “have 
set her mad”. General Ōyama’s staff investigated the incident and arrested a few 
culprits. The reporter’s damning account could not be more damaging to Japan’s 40-
year effort to be recognized as a modern, civilized nation: “…that Japan has been 
arraying herself in the outward garb of civilization, without having gone through the 
process of moral and intellectual development necessary to grasp the ideas upon 
which modern civilization is founded; that Japan at heart is a barbarous nation, not yet 
to be trusted with sovereign power over the lives and property of civilized men”.178 
While estimates of the total number of victims still vary from 3,000 to 20,000 the 
massacre is undeniably one of the darkest pages in Japan’s modern history. As the 
reporter of the New York World, James Creelman put it: “It was the first stain upon 
Japanese civilization. The Japanese in this instance relapsed into barbarism. All 
pretenses that circumstances justified the atrocities are false”.179  
Despite Chinese attempts to halt the Japanese advance in Manchuria, 
Haicheng was occupied on 13 December 1894 and the First and Second Armies 
jointly defeated the enemy remains at Ganwangzhai 6 days later. On 10 January 1895 
the strategically important city of Gaiping also fell. In December 1894 Beijing 
authorized the diplomat Zhang Yinhuan (1837-1900) and Shao Youlian, former 
chargé d’affaires in Saint Petersburg and Governor of Formosa, to open negotiations 
in Hiroshima. According to some, Prime Minister Itō, in an effort to humiliate China, 
refused to accept their credentials on 1 February and they left Japan three days later. 
Entrusting this important task to less important men like Zhang and Shao implied that 
China had not “acknowledged her defeat” and did not sincerely desired to “terminate 
hostilities”.180 On 23 January 1895 General Ōyama landed his forces in Shandong and 
on 12 February Weihaiwei was seized. The road to Beijing was open. The supposedly 
                                                          
177 The following days “were spent by the soldiery in murder and pillage from down to dark, in 
mutilation, in every conceivable kind of nameless atrocity… I saw corpses of women and children…”. 
Cowan continued: “bodies of men stewed the streets in hundreds, perhaps thousands…. disemboweled 
and dismembered, with occasionally a dagger or bayonet thrust in private parts”. Cowan discredited the 
Japanese excuses that the city’s populace was armed and attacked the marching army barricaded in 
buildings. He admitted that Japanese soldiers on their way to Port Arthur had discovered mutilated 
bodies of their comrades. Enraged they “swore revenge, and they carried out their vow thoroughly in 
barbarous eastern style. All that can be said is that the Chinese committed nameless atrocities which the 
Japanese repaid a hundred fold”. The torpedo boats off the port sunk ships filled with civilians trying to 
escape the earthly inferno. Even the presence of foreign reporters and diplomats in the city was unable 
to “check the carnival of murder”. He added: “I saw hundreds killed after being captured and tied”. See 
White, The war in the East, pp. 599-600. 
178 Ibid., pp. 601-605. 
179 Keene, Emperor of Japan, p. 493. 
180 Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 152-153 
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liberal politician Ozaki proposed the seizure of China’s coastal provinces in case the 
Qing collapsed.181 Russian and British diplomats in Saint-Petersburg decided to act. 
On 3 February, they asked Tōkyō to dictate its peace terms to China. The new 
Russian Foreign Minister Lobanov (Alexey Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovsky 1824-
1896) initially did not appear hostile to territorial gains or even a Japanese 
protectorate in China. The Kaiser on 6 March however, advised Japan to show 
restraint and moderation during the peace negotiations. Li, desperate to save the 
empire, approached O'Conor on 24 February offering an alliance. He asked for 
London’s intervention and offered as a counterweight control of the country’s 
administration, railways, army, and mines. London however, was content with the 
expansion of foreign economic privileges in China, which the Japanese peace treaty 
would guarantee for every power.182 On 8 January 1895 the British Minister in Japan 
(1895-1900), Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929) espoused Itō convictions that Korean 
independence was “quite impractical” and it should “be either annexed, or be placed 
under the protection of some other Power”. Satow added that the solution of an 
independent Korea had great disadvantages “as Russia would then be able to deal 
with Korea directly”. 183  The London-Tōkyō understanding against the common 
enemy was taking form rapidly. 
On 19 March 1895, Li Hongzhang arrived at Shimonoseki to meet Itō once 
again 10 years after their previous meeting in Tianjin. He suggested an Asian alliance 
against the Western aggression and an immediate ceasefire, an unrealistic demand 
since on 23 March 1895 Japanese forces landed at Pescadores and two days later at 
Taiwan. At the same time Japanese troops were advancing towards Beijing. Thus, on 
21 March Itō, to suspend hostilities, demanded control of the forts and the surrender 
of all arms and military supplies in the regions of Dagu, Tianjin and Shanhaiguan 
along with monetary compensation and railway concessions. Viceroy Li rejected the 
plan as its establishment in these strategic locations would essentially enable Japan to 
threaten Beijing at will. The war continued until the 27 March ceasefire declared by 
Emperor Meiji due to an assassination attempt against Li by a fanatic two days earlier.  
Japan’s demands according to the terms set on 1 April 1895 were: recognition of 
Korea’s full independence, annexation of Formosa184  and territories in Manchuria 
including Port Arthur, reparations of 300 million taels, control of Weihaiwei until the 
                                                          
181 Lone, Army, Empire, p. 39. 
182 Fung, “Ch'ing Policy”, pp. 147-148. 
183 George Alexander Lensen, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The 
observations of Sir Ernest Satow British Plenipotentiary to Japan (1895-1900) and China (1900-1906), 
(Tokyo 1966), pp. 24-25. 
184 Formosa was inserted in the peace treaty draft following Mutsu’s suggestion on 8 October 1894. Its 
occupation was supplementary to the demand for a Chinese indemnity or as a counterproposal should 
Beijing refuse to give up Liaodong. According to memorandum sent on 1 December by the Japanese 
Minister to Russia, Nishi Tokujirō’s (1847-1912) every territorial gain would provoke Western 
reaction. In this respect Formosa, backward and less desirable by the powers, was perhaps the lesser 
evil. In addition, seizure of Taiwan was to appease the expansionists and the navy officers that desired 
to strengthen Japan’s position in the South Seas. See Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, p. 56-58. 
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final payment of the indemnity, the most favoured nation status, a new trade treaty, 
the opening of a further seven ports and other economic privileges to be shared by all 
treaty signatories. The last provision was a tactical move to gain the sympathy and 
recognition of the powers in anticipation of their eventual hostility to Japanese 
continental aggrandizement.185 For the same purpose on 25 May 1895 the cabinet, to 
reassure western concerns, published in English its resolution to respect the powers’ 
treaty rights. Recovered from his injuries, Li had 4 days to respond. On 5 April, he 
raised objections to every single Japanese claim 186  and commented that the 
commercial provisions were “unreasonable… and derogatory to the sovereignty of an 
independent nation”. After the expiration of the ceasefire on 8 April hostilities 
commenced yet again. Upon hearing the harsh terms Lobanov, now opposed to the 
idea of a Japanese held Port Arthur that would jeopardize Chinese sovereignty, 
proposed an intervention to London;187 on 8 April the British government decided that 
its interests were not threatened by such an arrangement. Two days later, Itō presented 
to Li the revised and more lenient terms for peace which included the concession of 
Pescadores, Taiwan and Liaodong, the opening of 4 ports and reparations of 200 
million yen.188 Liaodong was returned to China in May under foreign pressure as we 
                                                          
185 For the Japanese history expert Asada Kyōji, the war was a way for Tōkyō to prove its modernity 
and gain parity and respect by impressing the West. This is how he explains the fact that Japan settled 
for such small rewards after fighting a major conflict that cost 18,000 deaths (officially 13,300, 1,418 
deaths in action and 11,894 by disease) and 5,000 wounded. See Lone, Army, Empire, p. 40. 
186 On 9 April, he submitted his counterproposal: joint recognition of Korea’s independence, Japanese 
annexation of the Pescadores, a smaller territory in Manchuria, an indemnity of 100 million taels and a 
reciprocal most favoured nation clause. Li argued that extensive land concessions would provoke the 
Chinese people’s “hostility” preventing any future cooperation between the two nations. During the 
talks, Itō in order to mollify Li’s protests on Taiwan stated that “we may have to spend on the lands 
more than we can reap from them”. The following dialogue is enlightening; Li: "You will find Taiwan 
difficult to take. France tried but failed. The coast is stormy and the people are defiant." Itō: "Our naval 
and land forces can bear any hardship." Li: "Taiwan is infested with malaria. You had lost many lives 
there before. Most of the Taiwanese smoke opium in order to counteract the effects of malaria." Itō: 
"When we take Taiwan, we shall forbid opium smoking". As for Li’s plea for reciprocal trade rights 
Tōkyō’s refusal signified Japan’s new standing after its prestigious victory. There was no reciprocity 
between China and the West and thus there could be no reciprocity between Beijing and Tōkyō either. 
Japan could not afford to be placed in a more disadvantageous position than the European powers’ in 
China, as the statesman Saionji Kimmochi (1849-1940) declared on 14 December 1895. See Beasley, 
Japanese Imperialism, pp. 60-67. 
187 The envoy to Berlin, Aoki disclosed to a British diplomat on 9 April that Tōkyō should not fear 
Saint Petersburg. A sizeable Russian army in Manchuria would suffer from starvation and the Japanese 
navy’s blockade. See Skřivan and Skřivan, “Great Powers”, p. 39. 
188  The vast indemnity covered Japan’s war expenditures and gave a boost to domestic 
industrialization. On the other hand, it impoverished the Qing regime’s already staggering economy 
and threw it into the hands of western creditors. Loans or leases of territory to Russia and Britain 
appeared as a debatable but in any case, desperate solution. See McLaren, Political History, p. 240. 
Japanese war expenditures amounted to 236,001,606 yen divided among the Army office (194,777,467 
yen), Navy office (38,745,785) and administrative costs (2,478,354). This sum was defrayed by the 
Treasury’s surplus and reserve funds. See Giichi Ono, Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War, (New 
York 1922), pp. 35-47. 
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will see later. The peace treaty of Shimonoseki was concluded on 1 April 1895 
granting Japan its first ever gaichi colonies.  
In the face of the challenge posed by the West, early Japan despite being still 
weak and poor, responded by acting exactly like it. Tōkyō’s adjacent territories in the 
North, South and West were invaded, and placed under its protection in different 
degrees. In 1895 Japan was ready to put in practice the same patterns in Taiwan. 
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11. Taiwan, the first Japanese colony 
 
11.1 The first Japanese expedition in Taiwan 
 
Let us return to the Formosa debate at the time of the Soejima mission. 
Foreign Office official Yanagiwara Sakimitsu’s was sent to Beijing to ascertain the 
question of Chinese jurisdiction over the “barbarian” part of Taiwan. If Chinese did in 
fact exercise jurisdiction, they had to assume responsibility, punish the savages and 
compensate the families of the deceased sailors. If that was not the case however, 
Yanagiwara was instructed to enquire whether the Chinese government would had 
any objections to Japan dispatching a punitive expedition to the southern part of the 
island. On June 21 1873 Yanagiwara reached the conclusion, during the negotiations 
with the Yamen Ministers that China had no jurisdiction over the southern part of the 
island and thus Tōkyō had the right to dispatch an expedition and punish the 
aboriginals that had murdered its subjects, the Ryūkyūans. Asked about the status of 
Taiwan’s populace the Ministers responded: “There are two kinds of aborigines on 
this island. The aborigines who have been subjugated are called jukuban (barbarians 
inside the Qing jurisdiction); we have set up prefectures and administered them. The 
other aborigines who have not yet been subjugated by us are called seiban (barbarians 
outside the Qing jurisdiction). They are beyond the influence of Chinese civilization 
(huawai) and also beyond our jurisdiction”. The Japanese understood that Beijing 
recognized its absence of sovereignty over the aboriginal territories and that it was 
now up to Japan to act. The Chinese carelessly renounced their responsibility gifting 
in practice Tōkyō carte blanche to invade Taiwan. What happened next, is a matter of 
contention.1  Yanagiwara supposedly informed the Chinese of Tōkyō’s intention to 
act independently to chastise the “raw barbarians” that had committed the atrocities 
back in December 1871 and were living beyond the Chinese borders: “The Japanese 
government, therefore, intends to conquer the aborigines immediately. However, our 
                                                          
1 There are no recorded accounts of the meeting a fact that contributes to the confusion and controversy 
that surrounds the issue. Edward Howard House (1836-1901) a pro Japanese journalist gave the 
following explanation as to why Soejima or Yanagiwara neglect to obtain a written agreement from the 
Qing authorities: “The fact of their [China's] neither exercising nor claiming control over the savage 
region [of Formosa] was so commonly recognized that nothing beyond a verbal allusion to it was 
regarded necessary.... To demand a written acknowledgement of what was an established truth 
appeared both unnecessary and injudicious”. See Wayne C. McWilliams, “East Meets East. The 
Soejima Mission to China, 1873” in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), p. 267. On 
the other hand Li Hung-chang attacked the Japanese on the matter: “The Japanese deliberately avoided 
written notification of her [Japan’s] action. Because once China replied with commitment to the 
investigation of the matter, the Japanese would not be able to send their troops at will. It is unthinkable 
that countries will handle such an important event without formal documents in the process of the 
diplomatic exchanges." See Lung-chih Chang, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and 
Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874-1906, Ph.D Dissertation, 
Harvard University 2003, p. 59. 
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Minister (Soejima) restrained the popular call for a punitive expedition in order to 
promote amity between the two countries”. 2  However, there must have been a 
miscommunication because in the following year when the Yamen was actually 
notified of the Japanese expedition was shocked; it affirmed that the Japanese “had 
spoken not of a military action…but of the dispatch of officials to the aboriginal 
territories of Taiwan”.3  In typical fashion in May 1874 the Yamen sent a vague 
memorandum to Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori stating that Taiwan’s 
“territories were remote regions of China belonging to China” but the “aborigines 
were beyond Chinese legal and administrative control”.4 The two sides also used 
different meanings of sovereignty, one deriving from Chinese practice and the other 
from European. For Beijing the absence of effective governability did not mean the 
loss of sovereignty over a territory. In contrast and in accordance with modern 
international law Tōkyō perceived Beijing’s declared lack of factual authority as 
evidence of these territories’ vacancy: aboriginal lands were res nullius and thus a 
punitive expedition legitimate.5 
Soejima was eagerly convinced on these points by conferring with the US 
Minister DeLong and the Foreign Ministry adviser LeGendre. During a meeting with 
the former on 24 October 1872 the Japanese Foreign Minister was told that Taiwan 
was “floating, and would become the possession of the first to take it”;6 since Qing 
rule in Taiwan was nominal despite the Chinese claims, the island could be annexed 
by anyone willing to undertake the arduous task of civilizing it. DeLong exalted the 
strategic position and natural resources of the island. He further reassured the 
Japanese Foreign Minister that the US government would not oppose the prospective 
change in ownership: “U.S. did not occupy foreign lands, it was quite happy to see 
states friendly to [the U.S.] occupy others’ lands and develop them”. Soejima’s fervor 
for expansion ignited. By these actions the US Minister was planning to bring Japan 
closer to the US and the Western powers. He genuinely feared a joint Sino-Japanese 
action against the West.7 In the following days Soejima, through DeLong’s mediation 
met with “Formosa expert” LeGendre and became even more confident over the 
dispatch of an armed mission overseas. On October 25 the former Amoy consul 
confirmed that the Chinese had already admitted that parts of Taiwan lay beyond their 
                                                          
2  Norihito Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies towards the Ryukyus and the Taiwanese Aboriginal 
Territories” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May, 2009), pp. 714-715.  
3  Norihito Mizuno, “Qing China’s Reaction to the 1874 Japanese Expedition to the Taiwanese 
Aboriginal Territories” in Sino-Japanese Studies, Vol. 16 (2009), p. 103.  
4 Although the Qing government asserted that Taiwan was administrated normally as a district of the 
Fukien province it failed to incorporate the mountainous eastern and south-western areas into the 
administrative units of the prefecture. See Grace Fox, Britain and Japan, 1858-1883, (London, 1969), 
p. 281. 
5 Mizuno, “Qing China’s Reaction”, p. 104. 
6  Hideaki Uemura, “The colonial annexation of Okinawa and the logic of international law: the 
formation of an ‘indigenous people’ in East Asia” in Japanese Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 110.  
7 Sandra Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, American Diplomacy, and Expansionism in Meiji Japan, 1868-
1893, Ph.D Dissertation, University of Colorado 1966, pp. 59-61. 
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control.8 Two days later he encouraged Soejima to send 2,000 men claiming that this 
force would be sufficient to subdue the aborigines. Once there the garrison could not 
be easily removed. The later boastfully responded that he could gather 10,000 with no 
effort; regardless of the domestic problems there were 400,000 “brave” but discontent 
ex-samurai willing to prove their martial valor. LeGendre in addition supplied maps, 
recommended the hiring of American advisors and provided detailed diplomatic and 
military strategy suggestions. 9  Peshine Smith an American legal adviser to the 
Foreign Ministry also suggested that Japan was compelled to acquire the islands if 
China was unable or unwilling to effectively rule the southern Taiwan tribes. 
LeGendre in his memoranda to Soejima illustrated that bringing civilization to the 
barbarians was a sufficient reason to justify the colonization of a territory according to 
western standards. In his memoranda spanning from November 1872 to mid-March 
1874 he persistently suggested the occupation not only of the aboriginal territory but 
of the island’s entirety and even Korea to secure Japan’s strategic position against the 
powers’ imperialistic schemes. Since the indigenous Taiwan was backward it was 
likely that Westerners would employ the terra nullius principle as an excuse to occupy 
the island. Tōkyō had to obtain Taiwan either by enticing Beijing or by forcibly 
occupying it "in order to uphold its prestige in the East”.10 Furthermore, the Chinese 
claims were superficial and unfounded from the international law’s point of view.11 
LeGendre’s final memo, on 13 March 1874 to Councilor of State Ōkuma, argued that 
Japan had to punish and “civilize the whole aboriginal population” but its “real object 
will be the annexation of aboriginal Formosa”.12 Soejima was delighted.13 Two days 
after Yanagiwara concluded negotiations on June 21 1873, Grand Councillor Saigō 
Takamori dispatched agents to survey Taiwan and Southern China. He also appointed 
Major Fukushima Tadashige (Reisuke) as Japan’s consul in Amoy. 14  Imperial 
                                                          
8 As part of his investigation of the March 1867 massacre of American sailors by the aborigines (Rover 
incident) LeGendre demanded that the Qing authorities punish the culprits and to exercise formal 
jurisdiction in line with international law. Otherwise he warned that the southern territories could end 
up as targets of western imperial designs. Chinese authorities considering the great price in money, 
effort and lives that the proposal entailed, remained unmoved. They responded to LeGendre’s overtures 
by insisting that Beijing held sovereignty over the entire island but the aboriginal territory to the south 
lay outside of China’s legal jurisdiction and administration. See Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and 
Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan”, in The American Historical 
Review Vol. 107, No. 2 (April 2002), p. 395.  
9 McWilliams, “East Meets East”, pp. 242-3. 
10 Leonard Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture in Taiwan, 1874“ in The Journal of Modern 
History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jun., 1965), p. 172.  
11  Contrary to these claims LeGendre stated in June 1867 while exploring Taiwan:”If the native 
territory is not Chinese in population, it is Chinese in fact . . . having a sort of preemption claim on it”.  
See Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, p. 39. 
12 LeGendre explained: When this has been done, and after the Bontans have been reduced or have 
submitted, Japan will declare that, as the pacification of the island depends upon its being occupied by 
a civilized power, since it had been found vacant and the Japanese forces are there, there they shall 
remain; and that, for the benefit of the whole civilized world the aboriginal portion of Formosa is 
declared to be annexed to the Empire of Japan. See Ibid., p. 139. 
13 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, p. 707. 
14  It was probably in early December 1873 when Fukushima submitted his report for a Taiwan 
expedition to Iwakura pointing out the absence of Qing authority in South Taiwan. On December 17 
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Councilor Itagaki and General Saigō Tsugumichi (1843-1902), the younger brother of 
Takamori, also endorsed a military expedition. Furthermore, on 8 March 1873 sailors 
from the Oda prefecture, in Japan proper, were once again mistreated by the 
aborigines. Saigō in a letter dated August 3 1873 he informed Prime Minister Sanjō 
Sanetomi that domestic discontent was pilling up and the Imperial Guard was 
adamantly asking for swift action against Taiwan.15 The aggressive tendencies that 
had not found an outlet in Korea had to be directed elsewhere. A far away adventure 
was preferable than another domestic one. On November 11 1873 a warship was sent 
to Taiwanese waters and at around the same time 8 army officers departed for China 
to collect intelligence disguised as students.16 The overseas campaign would yield 
only benefits for the Meiji government. It would reassert Japan’s position in Asia, test 
the reorganized Meiji armed forces, calm the internal tensions, acquire recognition by 
the foreign powers, and secure the country’s southern borders. If Tōkyō managed to 
annex the island would obtain its entrance in the group of the imperial powers 
discarding once and for all the title of the backward, endangered, semi-colonized 
nation as early as 1874. Even if that was not the case, a western-style punitive 
expedition against savages that often threatened the navigation in the Far East could 
gain the sympathy of the powers and define the Japanese as civilized in contrast to the 
barbarous aborigines.17 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ōkubo Toshimichi received the reports of the agents that surveyed Taiwan in line with Saigo’s orders. 
Ibid., p. 722. 
15  The historian Edwin Pak-Wah Leung suggests that Ryūkyūan crews were mistreated by the 
aborigines numerous times in the past; Tōkyō decided to redress the 1871 incident to satisfy the 
agitated expansionist elements in Japan. These disappointed by the lack of action against Korea rallied 
around Etō Shimpei who had launched a massive anti-government rebellion in February 1874 in Saga. 
See Edwin Pak-Wah Leung, “The Quasi-War in East Asia: Japan's Expedition to Taiwan and the 
Ryūkyū Controversy” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1983), pp. 262-265.  
16 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, pp. 718-722. 
17  The Japanese press throughout this period highlighted the nation’s civilization mission and 
challenged the western view of the country as semi-civilized. The pressure exerted by the foreign 
powers on Japan could be displaced onto the aborigines. To emphasize Japan’s progress and cultural 
superiority in Asia the press described the enemy, the aborigines as cruel, flesh eating barbarians. 
Newspapers often exaggerated the aborigines’ ferocious and inhuman nature. The 16th April 1874 
edition of the Yūbin hōchi shinbun portrayed them as “wild and rapacious, have large bodies and are 
very strong”. Some journalists perpetuated the image of the native Taiwanese as cannibals. Japan 
Daily Herald published on May 25 that they live “by eating the meat of the people they defeat in 
battle”. Journalist Okada Jisuke, in his May 1874 reports exalted Japanese martial valor in contrast to 
the cunning barbarians who “do not know ethics”. The pictorials depicted the Japanese in a progressive 
light, robust, modern, dressed in Western attire in contrast to the wretched savages in order to signify 
the cultural abyss that separated them. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi shimbun published on April 16 1874 
read: “…Our proud regiments and stately armies are now headed toward that lone island. In a matter of 
ten days, the Rising Sun flag shall shine its light in the four directions, and with that, the righteousness 
of our nation shall be known to all. Surely this cannot fail to be a moment when our hearts as humble 
subjects will dance with emotion! And at that time, we shall succeed in shaming the Westerners”. See 
Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages”, pp. 339-406. and Matthew Fraleigh “Japan’s First War 
Reporter: Kishida Ginkō and the Taiwan Expedition “ in Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, (May 2010), 
p. 53.  
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Finance Minister Inoue and his Deputy Shibusawa Eiichi, (1840-1931) 
expressed their disagreement to the proposed expedition on November 26 1872. 
Reforms at home and maintenance of peaceful relations with China had to be Japan’s 
priorities as Inoue affirmed on December 18. Kido Takayoshi, Minister of Education 
and Grand Councilor and Itō Hirobumi, the Minister of Civil Engineering and also a 
Grand Councilor were also against it. Military unpreparedness as Yamagata put it was 
the main but not the only obstacle. Due to the fiscal difficulties and the instability of 
the new regime the government at the time chose to dispatch an envoy to negotiate 
with Beijing.18 Soejima before obtaining his appointment claimed: “No one except me 
is able to prevent foreign powers aiming at Taiwan from impeding our imperial 
undertaking, to convince Qing China to cede the aboriginal territories to us, to bring 
the land under civilization, and to gain the confidence of the inhabitants. I entreat your 
Imperial Majesty to send me to China to ratify the treaty, and to proceed to Beijing to 
convince foreign delegations not to question the treaty with China, to confer with the 
Qing government on the Audience Question, and to give prior notice to the 
government of a punitive expedition to Taiwan. And, with the expedition, we should 
clarify the demarcation of Taiwan and develop half of the island”. To the agitated 
troops anxious to attack the unruly tribes, namely the Botans or Boutans that had 
murdered imperial subjects he announced that: “they would be called upon to occupy 
aboriginal territory, to colonize it, and to consolidate that area as the southern gate of 
the Japanese Empire”. On February 17, he disclosed to Ōkuma: “I am fairly confident 
of obtaining half of the island through negotiations. Resort to arms may be 
unnecessary even if the entire island is desired. I believe that this opportunity must 
not be missed in order to obtain half of the island now and to acquire the entire land 
through negotiations in four or five years”.19  
Thus, the expedition would not solely be a righteous enterprise to demonstrate 
Japan’s determination to protect its people to the civilized nations of the world. Nor a 
mere act to elevate its prestige.20 Under the initial direction of Soejima and after his 
resignation in October 1873, of Ōkuma Shigenobu, the new Finance Minister, the 
savages’ chastisement evolved into an organized plan for the seizure of the entire 
island. According to a Foreign Ministry official, Soejima was concerned about the 
rumor that Berlin, among other suitors, was interested in Taiwan and desired to act 
first and seize it on Tōkyō’s behalf.  On the other hand, Inoue Kaoru while in favour 
of annexing foreign territory disapproved the expenditure that such an expedition 
would demand. He stressed on November 18 1872 that Taiwan is a strategically 
important island, desired by the Great Powers and therefore, Beijing amidst great 
                                                          
18 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, p. 709 
19 Ibid., p. 711. 
20 Ōyama Tsunayoshi vice-governor of Kagoshima declared upon hearing the news of the massacre on 
31 August 1872: “'I, Tsunayoshi, plead with the government to launch a punitive expedition to chastise 
the aborigines for the sake of imperial prestige. I would therefore like to be authorized to borrow 
battleships and annihilate the ringleaders and then enhance imperial prestige overseas and console the 
anger of the victimized islanders. I beg the government to grant my request”, see Ibid., p. 701. 
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difficulties could be persuaded to surrender it to Japan. The Daijōkan and in particular 
Sanjō on March 9 1873, before the departure of Soejima’s mission to Beijing alarmed 
by his overtures dismissed LeGendre’s propositions and gave specific instructions to 
the Japanese ambassador to avoid friction with the Qing government. Upon Soejima’s 
return in Tōkyō on 25 July 1873, regardless of the mission’s presumed success, the 
government’s priority was the debate about Korea, the political crisis that was 
dividing the nation. It was only after the official settlement of the Korean issue in 
October 1873 and Soejima’s resignation that Sanjō instructed Ōkubo, the Home 
Minister, and Ōkuma to investigate into the Taiwan incident in early January 1874. 
On January 29 and while tensions were still high, Ōkuma in turn assigned to 
Yanagiwara and his colleague Tei Nagayasu to submit a report on the matter. On 
February 6 they presented “The outline of the disposition of the Taiwanese aboriginal 
territories”. The Cabinet on the same day approved their proposal and granted 
500,000 yen for the dispatch of an expedition.21    
In the draft the capture of South Taiwan was presented as the Japanese 
government’s duty. Furthermore, Japanese consuls should be dispatched to Taiwan 
“to undertake public education by telling the Chinese in these places the sincere desire 
of Japan to open up the aboriginal territory and civilize the tribes”.22 Iwakura after 
hearing the content of the recommendation exclaimed "I hope a plan will be adopted 
to make it our dependency”.23 In his 28 March correspondence with Ōkubo the former 
disclosed that Saigō had proposed to him the seizure of the aboriginal territories. 
However, the Cabinet did not include such a directive in its subsequent guidelines.24 
If an annexation plan was to be implemented it was highly classified, known only 
among the main directors of the operation. The pretext for action was the massacre of 
the Ryūkyūan and Oda sailors and its evident objective the demonstration of 
sovereignty over the Ryūkyū Islands. Subduing the barbarians was an action to avert 
further attacks on Japanese subjects in the future. Inclined to maintain friendly 
relations with China, Tōkyō decided to dispatch another ambassador to Beijing to 
negotiate and reassure the Chinese that neither the Ryūkyūan issue nor the imminent 
conflict in South Taiwan signified hostility. On 8 April Yanagiwara Sakimitsu was 
named Minister plenipotentiary to Beijing while the imperial edict of 4 April 1874 
appointed Saigō Tsugumichi as “Commander in Chief in Charge of the Barbarian Part 
of Taiwan”. Admiral Akamatsu Noriyoshi (1841-1920) and Major General Tani 
Kanjō or Tateki (1837-1911),25 were appointed as his second in command.26 6 ships, 
                                                          
21 Ibid., pp. 723-724. 
22 Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International 
Society, (New York, 2009), p. 152. 
23 Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture”, p. 175. 
24 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, pp. 725-726. 
25 General Tani envisioned the seizure not only of the aboriginal part but of the Qing possessions in the 
North as well. In the future Japan could use the island as a base for hostile operations against China, 
sending “robbers to instigate rebellions” and taking advantage of the chaos to obtain parts of the 
country. That was the predisposition of Tani, one of the most important members of the mission. See 
Danny Orbach, ““By not stopping”: The first Taiwan expedition (1874) and the Roots of Japanese 
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three transport and tree gun vessels were chartered for the mission. Saigō intended to 
annex the island and distribute plots of Taiwanese land to his men convinced that the 
castigation of the natives would not be provide sufficient satisfaction to the zealous 
ex-samurai from Satsuma. His troops were named “colonizing soldiers” (shokumin-
hei). A concurrent edict addressed to him read: “the purpose is to induce the 
aborigines to become civilized gradually after subduing them and finally promote 
salutary enterprises between them and the Japanese government”. These stationing 
military colonists would be installed in small branch camps that would form the basis 
of permanent settlements along the Taiwanese coast.27 300 women and even children 
were said to have followed the soldiers as many of them believed that they would be 
permanently settled in the island. Saigō’s associate Kodama Toshikuni who was 
dispatched to gather intelligence in Taiwan, advocated the reclamation of land for 
agriculture and the permanent settlement in the island. By early March Saigō had 
undertaken full scale military and colonization preparations in secrecy in order not to 
provoke protests by the foreign envoys. Ōkuma began to acquire planting seeds for 
cultivation in Taiwan.28 According to some sources 2/3 of the amassed forces were 
made up by laborers, men able to establish a military colony by constructing barracks, 
encampments, wells, roads and bridges.29 LeGendre was appointed military advisor to 
the expedition and was promised the title of the governor if Japan acquired Taiwan 
permanently. 30  Finally Ōkuma was named Director of the Bureau of Aboriginal 
Affairs on Taiwan with headquarters at Nagasaki subordinated to the Cabinet.31 Saigō 
in line with the decree of the 6th of February was ordered to limit and concentrate his 
action on the military campaign and leave diplomacy to the government. In case of 
Chinese of Western protests he had to appeal to “the imperial throne for orders”.32 
The expedition was to be accompanied by two American advisers: Lieutenant 
Commander Douglas Cassel (1846-1875) with the task of finding suitable places for 
the establishment of colonies in the eastern coast of Taiwan and Lieutenant James R. 
Wasson who had been appointed the director in charge of the necessary field works.33 
On the 2nd and 13th of April the British Minister in Japan Sir Harry Parkes 
enquired Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori if Tōkyō had obtained Beijing’s 
permission for the proposed campaign. If the Qing government considered the 
Japanese action hostile and war broke out Britain had to prohibit the employment of 
British citizens and ships in the conflict .34 At the same time he telegraphed to vice 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Military Disobedience”, in The Journal of Japanese Studies, Volume 42, Number 1, (Winter 2016) pp. 
49-50.  
26 Ibid., p. 39. 
27 Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages”, p. 397. 
28 Orbach, ““By not stopping””, p. 38. 
29 Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture”, p. 175. 
30 Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, p. 62 
31 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, pp. 726-727. 
32 Orbach, ““By not stopping””, p. 40. 
33 Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture”, p. 176.  
34 The British ship Yorkshire was contracted by the Meiji government to take part in the campaign 
besides the Japanese Nisshin and Takeharu. The Yorkshire at the end was ruled out whereas two British 
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Admiral Charles Shadwell (1814-1886) at Hong Kong to keep him abreast of the 
developments. Shadwell dispatched the warship Hornet to inspect the island’s ports 
for the time being; more British vessels would menacingly follow in the area unless 
Tōkyō showed restrain. 35  In addition fearful of a protracted conflict that would 
endanger British commercial interests in Taiwan36 and the Far East in general Parkes 
convinced the Spanish and Russian Ministers to declare their neutrality in the event of 
an upcoming war. On 9 April Parkes questioned Terashima as to the purpose of the 
endeavor and the location of the Meiji troops’ landing. The next day the Japanese 
Foreign Minister replied that that the expedition’s aim was not to wage war on China 
but to make Taiwan’s coasts safe for every nation’s sailors and castaways.37 He also 
cited similar retributive actions taken by the powers in the past.38  Under Parkes’ 
influence the Japan Daily Herald edition of 17th April criticized the American 
advisers’ association with an unjustified attack upon Chinese territory. As a result 
John Armor Bingham, the new Minister after DeLong’s departure in September 1873, 
stated on 19 April that involvement of American vessels and personnel to a campaign 
against China would be a violation of the 1858 Sino-US treaty and international law. 
The US Minister demanded to see Beijing’s written consent to the expedition. 
Bingham partially to avoid the infringement of the Sino-American relations ordered 
the exclusion of the Americans and of the transport ship New York from the 
campaign.39 The German Minister Max von Brandt also warned that the expedition 
would result in failure and confided to the other foreign envoys that a bloody war 
between Japan and China was very probable. Ōkubo and the rest of the Council of 
State did not expect such a reaction and shocked by Westerners’ immediate change of 
heart decided to postpone the campaign on 19 April 1874. The Americans in 
particular had chiefly encouraged and formulated the Taiwan policy 40  and had 
                                                                                                                                                                      
assistants, named P. Manson and Patterson annulled their contracts after Parkes’ protests. See 
Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, p. 138. 
35Leonard Gordon, “The Cession of Taiwan: A Second Look” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 45, 
No. 4 (Nov., 1976), p. 551.  
36 The ports of Taiwan were opened to foreign trade since the 1860s. In 1873 the exports and imports of 
Tainan-Takow (Kaohsiung) ports amounted to 602.826 pounds and those of Keelung and Tamsui to 
473.964. Britain held the lion’s share of this trade but German merchants had started making headway 
in the 1870s. Robert Swinhoe (1836-1877) the British consul at Tainan in 1861 proposed to his 
government the seizure of the island’s east part as a penal colony. See Fox, Britain and Japan, p. 284. 
37 Orbach, ““By not stopping””, p. 41. 
38 Adoption of Western civilization went hand in hand with adoption of Western imperialistic practices. 
In other words colonialism was not the result but a prerequisite in the path to modernization and a 
means of finally resisting the Western encroachment. See Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages”, pp. 
391-392. 
39 On 24 April 1874 Ōkuma ordered the American experts to remain in Japan. Cassel and Wasson had 
already left for Taiwan but the New York, still anchored at Nagasaki, was detained. On 4 May Saigō 
agreed to send back the two advisors but he never did. See Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial 
Venture”, pp. 176-177. 
40  Besides LeGendre, J. M. Batchelder an American merchant in China supplied intelligence on 
military installations in Taiwan and even proposed to Ōkuma the acquisition of three of his ships for 
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convinced the Japanese of the legitimacy of their undertaking. Besides, preventing the 
savages from endangering lives and trade in the Far East served a greater 
humanitarian purpose. Meiji leaders believed that Western governments would look 
favorably on any action aiming to improve conditions in Formosa.41 When Parkes 
learned from Soejima on 7 August 1873 the Japanese intention to attack the 
aborigines he did not express any objection. That was also the case with the Ministers 
Thomas Francis Wade of Britain and Frederick F. Low42  of the United States in 
Beijing. 43  However Wade, brought up to speed by Parkes, informed the Zongli 
Yamen on 18 April of Tōkyō’s intentions and instructed the British merchants and 
consuls in China to refrain from any kind of cooperation with the Japanese against 
China. The stunned Chinese responded that they had complete ignorance of Japanese 
plans44 and they had not granted their permission. Japan at the time of the Saga 
rebellion (February-April 1874) appeared to them politically and economically unable 
to undertake an overseas campaign. Finally they claimed jurisdiction over the entire 
island of Taiwan. Wade, conscious of the Chinese feebleness, was concerned that the 
expeditionary force would attempt the capture of the island with or without the 
consent of Beijing or even Tōkyō’s for that matter.45  
Saigō Tsugumichi with the imperial edict of 4 April did not feel obliged to 
respect the foreigners’ wish or the government’s frustrating and humiliating decision. 
Waiting in Nagasaki with his 3,658 men, including 295 Satsuma volunteers he grew 
restless.46 A disgraceful annulment of the expedition or suspension of the operations 
would enrage the soldiers thirsty adventure and glory soldiers. The Japan Daily 
Herald published on 18 May that soldiers were threatening to decapitate Saigō in case 
the enterprise was annulled. On the 27th he sent Fukushima with 270 soldiers on 
board of the Yūkōmaru47 to Amoy in South China. The latter reached the city on 3 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the expedition. See Joyce C. Lebra, Ōkuma Shigenobu: Statesman of Meiji Japan, (Canberra, 1973), 
pp. 25-26.  
41 Sandra Caruthers, “Filibustering to Formosa: General Charles LeGendre and the Japanese” in Pacific 
Historical Review, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Nov., 1971), p. 449.  
42 Low did not voice his disapproval at the time. However, he preferred that Japan attacked Korea 
rather than Taiwan as he wrote to DeLong on 26 December 1872: “It seems to me that if the Japs are 
really spoiling for a fight they had better go for Corea (sic). In that case the sympathy and moral 
support of all the Treaty Powers could be counted on”. See McWilliams, “East Meets East”, p. 263. 
43 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, pp. 727-729. 
44 In contrast to Beijing’s ignorance the Qing officials in Fukien, witnessing Japanese agents surveying 
Taiwan in late March suspected that a hostile action was probable. See Mizuno, “Qing China’s 
Reaction”, p. 106.  
45 Fox, Britain and Japan, p. 290, 298. 
46 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, p. 729. 
47 In May 1874 the government bought thirteen vessels for 1,506,800 yen to replace the revoked 
foreign ships. The contract for the transportation of troops and supplies was awarded to the Mitsubishi 
steamship company due to Ōkuma’s close relations with Iwasaki Yatarō (1835-1885) founder of the 
company. It was the start of a promising partnership. The government found a keen collaborator to its 
schemes and developed the strategically crucial maritime sector against the foreign competitors; the 
ships were granted to Iwasaki as well as an annual subsidy of 250,000 yen after the end of the 
operation. In addition, it purchased the land facilities and 18 vessels of rival foreign companies, and 
transferred them to Mitsubishi strengthening the company and by extension the Japanese economy. In 
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May, delivered the news of the expedition via a formal letter to the Qing Viceroy of 
Fujian and Zhejiang48 and started assembling supplies for the incoming troops. The 
Viceroy condemned and demanded the annulment of the mission 8 days later. Back in 
Nagasaki the secretary of the Cabinet Kanai Yukiyasu (1833-1907) arrived at the city 
and ordered its governor to delay the departure of the warships. To avert the 
international crisis Ōkubo also rushed to Nagasaki to convince Saigō to comply with 
the Daijōkan’s new orders. He arrived there on May 3 but the second wave (4 
troopships) had departed the day before. The expedition was not canceled. It was 
authorized on the spot but post facto. Hereafter its aims were greatly restricted under 
the pressure of the foreign representatives’ protests. If China’s reaction was stiffened 
the government could claim that Saigō had acted as a marauder without Tōkyō’s 
approval in an effort to evade the international complications. On 4 May Saigō, 
Ōkubo and Ōkuma agreed to proceed with the punishment of the savaged but to 
dismiss the rest of the foreign advisors and possibly abandon the colonization plan. 
Tōkyō’s secret plan for the swift capture of the island was unexpectedly compromised 
by the Foreign Ministers. On 17 May 1874 Saigō left for Taiwan with the rest of his 
forces on board of the Takasago Maru (Takasago was the name given to Taiwan by 
the Japanese in the Tokugawa period) steered by the Captain A.R. Brown, a Scot, who 
had remained on board despite Parkes’ efforts.49 Saigō landed 5 days later. On 16 
May Prime Minister Sanjō approved formally the fait accompli; the government came 
to understand that the revocation of the nation’s first military venture abroad could 
result in embarrassment and further discontent at home.50 
On 6 May 1874 the Yūkōmaru having left Amoy the previous day reached 
Liangkiau Bay (Hengchun) in Taiwan’s southernmost tip. Upon landing 51  on the 
morning of the 8th, the Chinese interpreter of the mission approached the friendly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
exchange it was Mitsubishi that transported the government’s troops during the Satsuma Rebellion in 
1887. Mitsubishi bolstered by state subsidies and operated by foreign technicians, workers and 
instructors, opened up the Yokohama-Shanghai (1875), Taiwan and Korea lines and forced out of 
competition the British "Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company" that was operating in the 
Far East. See Kozo Yamamura, “The Founding of Mitsubishi: A Case Study of Japanese Business 
History” in The Economic Development of Modern Japan, 1868-1945: From the Meiji Restoration to 
the Second World War, vol. 1, ed. S. Toliday, (Cheltenham, 2001), pp. 350-356. Iwasaki’s and 
Mitsubishi’s participation in the 1874 expedition is considered by some a selfless, virtuous patriotic 
deed to this day. See Mark Munsterhjelm, “Corporate Protectors of State Sovereignty: Mitsubishi’s and 
a Taiwan Affiliate’s Accounts of Relations with Taiwan Aborigines” in Asian Ethnicity, Vol. 15(3), pp. 
361-369.  
48 The Viceroy was not thrilled about the news: “If Japanese enter the central region of Taiwan, I will 
demand the local authorities to defend with the troops and local militia. However, if the Japanese only 
seek revenge on the aborigines for killing the Ryukyu victims, we will reason with them…”. See 
Chang, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony, p. 63. 
49 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, 730. 
50 Orbach, ““By not stopping””, p. 45. 
51 The transfer of men and supplies ashore was quite “confused” for the “official reporter” of the 
expedition, the American journalist House. It was fortunate that the local tribes were friendly and did 
not attack the unorganized landing troops on the spot. They were lacking modern equipment and the 
outdated logistics system did not differ substantially from what was used in the 16th century. See 
Edward Howard House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, (Tokyo, 1875), pp. 46-53. 
362 
 
natives of the village called Sialiao and invited them to the Japanese campsite. They 
were told that they Japanese came to punish the Botan tribe, responsible for the 
massacre of the emperor’s subjects. Many were recruited to dig trenches and build 
cottages for the Japanese while two of them were retained as interpreters. Employing 
the service of these interpreters the Japanese contacted the local tribes who, except the 
Botans and their allies Kusukuts, welcomed the expedition.52 The Chinese residents 
did not offer any opposition. Two days later Fukushima, Wasson and Cassel decided 
to move the camp near Sialiao. On 10 May Admiral Akamatsu and General Tani 
arrived at the site with 500 men and six days later supplies, especially timber for the 
construction of loggings, laborers and more troops reached the camp. On 17 May 100 
Japanese in a reconnaissance mission two miles eastward from their camp were 
attacked by some natives and lost two men. Akamatsu on board of the Nisshin 
surveyed the southern shores until the 19th when his crew was fired upon by the 
aborigines.53 Akamatsu and the two American experts interviewed the chieftain of the 
local tribes, Yee-suk known as Isa, who suggested caution in dealing with the 
ferocious Botan tribe. A skirmish took place on the 17th but the decisive battle 
occurred on 22 May when Colonel Sakuma Samata’s (1844-1915) men engaged the 
enemy. Samata already a hero of the Saga rebellion was to be a general and the fifth 
colonial Governor-General of Taiwan in April 1906. In the battle of Sekimon 
(stonegate) 30 to 50 Botans, among them their chief and his son, were killed. The 
Japanese lost 6 men. The victors took the heads of 12 fallen enemies according to the 
medieval samurai custom.54 On the same day Saigō, upon disembarking from the 
Takasagu Maru among 1500 soldiers and workers, ordered his soldiers not to loot, 
rape, or harm “innocent aborigines”.55 On 21 June two Chinese warships appeared 
menacingly two miles off the Japanese camp. On the 23th high rank Qing envoys met 
with Saigō at Liangkiau to deliver the Fukien Viceroy’s response to his letter 
presented by Fukushima 20 days earlier. The Chinese stated that the island belonged 
to China and the invaders after the eradication of the savage pockets had to surrender 
the area to Beijing. They also suggested that they partecipated in the military 
operations alongside Saigō’s forces. The commander politely rejected the idea, 
maintained that these regions were not under the control of China and declared that 
the future of Taiwan did not depend on him. He was just directing the campaign; the 
rest was in Tōkyō’s hands. Similar meetings took place for the two following days.56   
                                                          
52 James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: history, people, resources, and 
commercial prospects: tea, camphor, sugar, gold, coal, sulphur, economical plants, and other 
productions, (London-New York, 1903), pp. 126-127.  
53 Ibid., p. 132.  
54 Fox, Britain and Japan, p. 296. 
55 These orders were not obeyed to the letter. Akamatsu, Tani, Cassel and Wasson repeatedly faced 
insubordination, violent behavior towards the Taiwanese coolies and “shameful illicit relationships 
with women”. Wasson in particular in his report to Ōkuma lamented the soldiers unorderly attacked the 
enemy against orders. At the battle of Sekimon Admiral Akamatsu admitted “that the men had acted 
without orders”.  See Orbach, ““By not stopping””, pp. 47-48.  
56 House, The Japanese Expedition, pp. 78-79. 
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On 25 May Saigō conferred with Yee-suk and four minor leaders at his camp. 
He announced his objective to vanquish the Botans and the Kusukuts and asked for 
their collaboration. LeGendre had advised Saigō Tsugumichi that certain tribes could 
be allied against the hostile Bontan tribe, by promising them a reward in the form of 
the Bontans' lands.57 Yee-suk accepted but objected to the Japanese proposal to lease 
a piece of aboriginal land on the East coast of Taiwan.58 After the Sekimon battle the 
Japanese force pressed forward looking for the Botans’ main settlement. It was 
evident that the enemy could not put much of a fight. Tōkyō had misjudged the 
population, political organization and manpower of the tribes in the interior of South 
Taiwan. According to Yee-suk assessments the entire 18 tribes of the Liangkiau 
valley could amass only 2.360 men. The rival Botans and Kusukuts clans numbered 
250 and 190 fighting men respectively whereas the Japanese detachment consisted of 
3,500 troops. Without proper maps, locating their villages, a process which involved 
the crossing of steep mountainous regions with inexistent roads and swollen streams 
under extreme heat, was more challenging than the fight per se.59 On 2 June, Tani’s 
group was supposed to explore the interior but lost its way and small squads set out to 
find it. Saigō divided his force in three columns and set the 1st of June as the date for 
the commencement of operations in the interior.60  When the main force marched 
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58 In the 15 May edition of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi shimbun the journalist Kishida Ginkō (1833–1905) 
justified Saigō’s attempt to establish a colony: "The major purpose of this expedition is to expand the 
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imperial nation will shine to the whole world”. On 15 May, he stressed: “Our government is now 
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operations in the land that lies to the south of the border with Chinese territory. Once they capture this 
land, they will make it a colony and then proceed to station troops throughout the land lying south of 
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the native savages and thereby expanding the territory of our imperial state”. On 13 June 1874 the 
journalist proposed yet again the colonization of the island whereas on his 28 June report he exalted the 
fertility of its soil. See Fraleigh “Japan’s First War Reporter’, pp. 54-60. 
59The entire campaign cost 542 lives to the Japanese: 530 from illnesses and 12 as a result of the 
fighting. See Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the 
Chinese Empire, 1860-1882, (London, 1980), p. 196. 
60 The first column led by Tani headed towards Hongkang in the North with 500 men. The second, 
comprised by 300 soldiers, set course for Sekimon under Saigō. Akamatsu’s column with 400 soldiers 
marched southwest to Chiksia, looking for the Kusukut base. See House, The Japanese Expedition, pp. 
115-116. 
364 
 
against the Botans’ base it discovered the graves of the Ryūkyūans murdered there in 
1871.61 After a day traversing the jungle and overcoming obstacles set up by the 
enemy, they approached their objective; after some sporadic enemy fire tha tresulted 
in a few casualties the village was evacuated by its inhabitants that fled to the 
mountains. The settlement was burned to the ground by the invading force. 
Akamatsu’s force en route to Kusukut suffered the losses of 3 men while 2 more were 
wounded but eventually occupied the village and torched it. Guards were set to patrol 
the deserted villages and the jungle paths and burn any villages that were associated 
with the enemy tribes. The main force retreated to Sialiao. On 4 June Saigō declared 
that the aborigines were subjugated.62  
In the evening following the Sekimon battle the leader of the Hongkang 
village rushed to the Japanese headquarters to request Tōkyō’s official protection.63 
The annihilation of the fierce Botan tribe compelled the aborigines to submit to the 
conquerors. On June 9 a conference was held with the friendly tribes and the leaders 
of the conquered local villages. The aborigines received Japanese flags to hang at the 
entrance of their settlements as protection from their enemies; it was a sign of 
allegiance.64 They also received gifts and money. The Japanese side requested and 
obtained in return the right to temporarily establish ports on Taiwan’s east coast. On 
11 June Akamatsu and Fukushima landed with 50 men at Kenting the site of the 
Rover Incident and distributed flags to the local chiefs. By the end of July South 
Taiwan’s tribes had surrendered to the Japanese. However the foreign objections,65 
the island’s unsanitary environment and the diseases that decimated the occupying 
force denoted that the plan to settle former Satsuma samurai on the island had to be 
abandoned. Saigō was himself suffering from the boredom and the tropical diseases 
due to the bad water and food was searching for a honorable excuse to leave after the 
end of the hostilities. Tani, noticing that as time passed the men’s morale and 
discipline declined, requested from Tōkyō a detachment of military police to restore 
order. However, according to the volunteer in the expedition Adachi Tsunayuki only a 
small number of men wished to remain in the island.66  One of Saigō secondary 
objectives was the importation and cultivation of foreign plants. For this purpose 
during these rather dull days he sought to establish a small experimental farm; the 
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plan was abandoned because the proprietors of every suitable area demanded huge 
compensations for the concession of their land.67  
The Chinese were informed about the Japanese operation by Wade in April. 
However, the Zongli Yamen reacted only after the 11th of May 1874, when news of 
the troops’ arival at Amoy reached Beijing. On that day an official protest was sent to 
Tōkyō stating among others that Soejima during the previous year did not say 
anything about an armed intervention; in any case Japan ought to have consulted 
China before acting. Li Hung-chang suggested on 10 May the immediate dispatch of 
the director of Foochow Arsenal Shen Pao-chen (1820–1879) to Taiwan immediately 
with ships and troops to prevent the Japanese from landing.68 His plead was endorsed 
by the throne despite the critical domestic situation of the Qing empire.69 Shen was 
appointed Special Imperial Commissioner with diplomatic and military powers by the 
Qing emperor on 14 May.  In June Yanagiwara initiated negotiations in Shanghai but 
they soon came to a deadlock.70 In Beijing he met with the Ministers of Zongli Yamen 
during August without much success. P'an Wei, the provisional treasurer of Fukien 
warned the Japanese envoy that 10,000 Qing troops were on their way to Taiwan.71 
Both sides were immovable to their positions. Yanagiwara was defending his 
country’s legitimate claim to subdue the savages under international law while the 
Chinese systematically refused to comply with Western law and practices. The 
Japanese envoy insisted that Beijing had been promptly notified whereas the 
Ministers asserted their competence and right to manage Taiwan without Japan’s 
assistance. Tension was growing. In the end of July LeGendre departed for South 
China to enter into negotiations with the Qing Viceroy in Fukien. At Swatow 
(Shantou) he witnessed in person the Chinese military preparations. Heavy taxes were 
being levied to the provinces south of Canton to fund the military preparations. In 
Shanghai and Tianjin, the Chinese were constructing fortifications in case the 
Japanese attacked .72 Upon his arrival at Amoy on August 6 he was arrested by the US 
marshal stationed at the Amoy consulate in accordance with Bingham’s orders but 
was immediately released.73 In the same time the Japanese were also preparing for 
war: three new steamers were purchased abroad and the garrison in Taiwan grew up 
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to 6,000 men. On 8 July 1874 the cabinet decided not to back down even at the risk of 
war. Capitulation on this issue would be construed as a sign of weakness on the part 
of the Meiji government. Prime Minister Sanjō stressed that "the Japanese 
government has decided to go to war, if [it is] unavoidable” and in the same time an 
imperial proclamation of war to China was drafted.74 The Ministers of the Army and 
Navy were instructed to devise war plans but Yamagata felt pessimistic about the 
prospect of an engagement. On the 15th Yanagiwara was ordered to explain to the 
Qing Ministers that: 1) South Taiwan was “truly unclaimed aboriginal territory” and 
thus Japan’s action righteous, 2) the territory would be colonized for humanitarian 
reasons, 3) if Beijing desired the land seized by the Japanese, it had to compensate 
them with around 6 million Mexican silver dollars and guarantee its effective 
governance. The issues of Korea and Ryūkyū were to be addressed by the Japanese 
envoy but if China desired to settle these issues with war, Tōkyō would be ready to 
meet it in the battlefield. On 18 July, Iwakura disclosed that Japan would not 
withdraw even if China explicitly demanded it. 75  A limited colonial adventure 
threatened to escalate into a full-scale war. Soejima, Yanagiwara, Sanjō and the Saigō 
brothers endorsed the prospect of a war to settle every unresolved issue with Beijing. 
Vice Admiral Shadwell believed that diplomatic rupture was certain since Japan 
appeared to be establishing a colony instead of abandoning the island. Furthermore, 
Minister Wade, anxious to prevent a conflict detrimental to the Far East trade, 
proposed arbitration to both sides. Both Yanagiwara and the Qing authorities refused 
his proposal.76 
On 1 May Ōkubo was appointed High Commisioner and Minister 
Extraordinary. Since he felt responsible for the launch of the mission he wanted to 
assume negotiations and resolve personally the critical issue by taking Yanagiwara’s 
place. The orders he received the following day were the same with his predecessor’s 
but he was invested with the power to decide on war if he deemed it unavoidable. He 
arrived at Beijing on 10 September accompanied by LeGendre and the French legal 
advisor Boissonade.77 His plan was to gain recognition for the expedition’s legitimacy 
and an indemnity, which would uphold Japan’s prestige, in exchange for the 
withdrawal from the aboriginal territories. Li favored this arrangement but war 
seemed still probable.78 During September, Ōkubo conferred with Prince Kung. To 
Kung’s claims he replied that the imposition of taxes did not constitute effective 
control; lack of punitive measures after the aboriginal atrocities against foreign 
castaways and the Yamen’s declarations to Yanagihara in 1873 meant that Japan had 
                                                          
74 Gordon, “Japan's Abortive Colonial Venture”, p. 179. 
75 Fox, Britain and Japan, pp. 299-300.  
76 Ibid., p. 303.  
77 Boissonade appeared skeptical about the legitimacy of Japanese actions in Taiwan: "If one nation 
takes the action to civilize the barbarians without first inquiring the intention of the neighboring nation 
that is adjacent to the barbarian territory, the action is considered inappropriate in diplomatic manners 
and constitutes a mistaken strategy of the nation." See Chang, From Island Frontier to Imperial 
Colony, pp. 49-50. 
78 Mizuno, “Early Meiji Policies”, pp. 730-733. 
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not invaded Chinese territory. If aboriginal Taiwan belonged to China why did 
Beijing fail to punish the savages that had killed foreign sailors? The Chinese side 
rejected these arguments pointing out that China had its own gradual system of 
assimilating its subjects and that this was far older than the Western international law. 
According to them, Japan had bluntly invaded Chinese territory.  
Little progress had been achieved and Wade offered his mediation during the 
negotiations on 26 September. Ōkubo rejected his offer as did the Yamen the day 
before. On 5 October Ōkubo threatened to leave Beijing as a means to pressurize his 
interlocutors. Five days later however he proposed that Beijing established a definite 
boundary between its domain and the aboriginal area. If the Chinese did not reply in 5 
days, the negotiations would be terminated. The boundary proposal was eventually 
rejected. In the meantime, Ōkubo admitted to Wade and the French Minister Francis 
Henri Louis de Geofroy (1822-1889), that Japan as an exchange for its withdrawal 
wished only the vindication of its honour and a monetary compensation. On 18 
October, the Yamen Ministers promised to govern the savages and “to pay 
compensation to these Japanese who had suffered at the hands of the aborigines”. 
Consequently Ōkubo demanded 3 million Mexican dollars. Beijing’s response was 
that Japan had only spent 500,000 dollars. The compensation was to be called relief 
money for the victims’ families and it was to be delivered after the withdrawal of 
Saigō’s force. On 23 October the Japanese commissioner departed from Beijing in 
protest: “Japan has no other way but to proceed with her original plan and annex the 
territory which she now occupies”.79  
Wade in order to satisfy Ōkubo’s wish for a written assurance for payment 
rushed to the residence of the Qing Grand Secretary to extract a declaration of the 
exact amount China would offer. Despite Beijing’s efforts to secure foreign 
mediation, believing that it would favour its cause, eventually it was Ōkubo that 
enjoyed the Russian, British and French Ministers’ sympathy. On 25 October the 
Yamen informed Wade that it was inclined to pay 500,000 taels (750,000 mexican 
dollars), 100,000 for the Ryūkyūan victims and 400,000 as compensation for the 
buildings and roads the Japanese had built in Taiwan.80 In addition Ōkubo demanded 
an official recognition of Japan’s action as righteous. Wade persuaded him to accept 
half the money in advance and the remaining sum after the evacuation. The dates of 
the evacuation and of the payment were to be decided later. On 31 October 1874, the 
Beijing Agreement was signed: Japanese action to “protect its subjects” was deemed 
legitimate, consolation money was paid to Tōkyō and Beijing promised to keep the 
aborigines under control.81 Previous correspondence and records of this issue were 
discarded by both countries. On 1 November Ōkubo parted for Taiwan to inform 
Saigō of the termination of his mission. The British diplomatic authorities in both 
                                                          
79 Fox, Britain and Japan, p. 306.  
80 Payson J. Treat, “Early Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (Mar., 1932), pp. 22- 23.  
81 Leung, “The Quasi-War”, p. 277.  
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countries were relieved and Bingham was likewise pleased for the peaceful settlement 
of the dispute.82  
In order to secure Saigō’s cooperation Ōkubo was accompanied by 
Higashikuze Michitomi (1834-1912) the grand chamberlain, equipped with an 
imperial edict ordering the evacuation of the island. Before leaving the island on 3 
December the commander-in-chief proclaimed to the aborigines that the land was 
being ceded to the Chinese government in accordance with its request, and he urged 
both the friendly and the hostile tribes to obey their new masters.83 Saigō and his men 
were received as heroes in Yokohama amidst festivities by the enthusiastic crowd.  
On 16 November, Ōkubo and emperor Meiji asked Parkes to thank Wade for his 
assistance. 84  In April 1875, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs that had been 
created the year before to gather intelligence and handle the issue was abolished.85 
The expedition, the expense of which was initially estimated at 500,000 yen had cost 
Japan between 7,700,000 and 9,500,000 yen depending on the source.86  
The modest but humiliating indemnity obtained from Beijing was not the main 
prize for the Meiji leaders. Japan by organizing a punitive expedition had acted as an 
imperial power and got away with it. In addition, the Chinese tacitly accepted Japan’s 
claims on the Ryūkyū Islands and its right to intervene in an area under their nominal 
control. More importantly Tōkyō, despite its susceptibility to foreign pressures, was 
able to direct the former samurai’s aggressiveness away from home and augment its 
prestige abroad. Furthermore, Japan projected an image of modernity and civilization 
that sought to convince the West of its distinctiveness vis-à-vis the backward, 
decaying, and inferior Far Eastern nations. It was the quest for parity not strategic 
necessities that drew Japan towards war or the establishment of its first colony. 
Western press praised and acknowledged Japan’s “generosity” in surrendering 
Taiwan back to China and for acting chivalrously for the sake of the whole civilized 
world. For instance, on 6 December 1874 the New York Times suggested about the 
matter that: “Japan proved itself the honorable and generous nation we now know it to 
                                                          
82 Caruthers, “Filibustering to Formosa”, p. 452. 
83 Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, p. 241. 
84 Ōkubo in February 1875 mentioned to the emperor the benefits of his successful mission: the status 
of Ryūkyū was clarified, the abuses to the imperial subjects were vindicated, security in those waters 
was consolidated and Japan’s influence was augmented. To these exploits he added the "early 
recognition by the foreigners that Japan was capable of preserving law and order”. Thus a step towards 
the revision of the unequal treaties was achieved. LeGendre observed that the campaign provided the 
armed forces with valuable experience. The Qing governor of Foochow was also delighted in a 
perverse way. He told Wade that the fact that the Japanese lost 800 men due to illnesses was gratifying. 
However, not everyone was content. The Japanese Navy Minister and Councillor Kido Takayoshi 
resigned in April in protest to the government’s reckless Taiwan policy. See Fox, Britain and Japan, p. 
309-310.  
85 House, The Japanese Expedition, p. 223. 
86 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, p. 199. 
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be”; Japan was "…the youngest member of the family of civilized nations…”.87 That 
was exactly what Meiji leaders longed for.  
A positive consequence for China was the eventual recognition of its 
sovereignty in Taiwan by the foreign powers. At the same time however, Beijing’s 
slow reflexes and military unpreparedness have been clearly demonstrated. 
Furthermore, Japan’s adoption of western practices to resolve the issue eradicated Li 
Hung-chang’s hopes for an Asian alliance to cope with the Western threat.88 During 
the first months of 1875, the Chinese made some vigorous attempts to assume 
authority over the savages of the interior. In January however, two Chinese were 
murdered in an aboriginal village in south Taiwan. Beijing after witnessing Japan’s 
comfortable subjugation of the savages dispatched 500 men to Sai-tao to retaliate. 
Half of them fell victims to the natives’ guerrilla tactics.89 Under Qing rule the island 
lacked social order and firm administration. Immigrants from mainland China and the 
aborigines were in a constant conflict as the Chinese were penetrating the interior to 
secure arable land and exploit the island’s natural resources. The aborigines’ 
determination to protect their ancestral homes signified a vicious cycle of mutual 
vendettas, atrocities and warfare. Several dozen official expeditions were organized 
against the “raw savages” between 1875 and 1895.90 159 sizeable rebellions took 
place during the period of nominal rule by the Qing. Beijing after almost losing the 
island in 1874 came to revaluate its strategic position. Thus, Taiwan’s development 
and pacification was seen for the first time as an essential part of the Qing broader 
policy of “self-strengthening”. Shen Pao-chen, the orchestrator of the island’s defence 
against Saigō’s forces, was the first of a series of Qing governors that sought to erect 
fortifications, build roads and consolidate Qing rule in Taiwan to prevent further 
discretions. As a result of another external threat, the French occupation of Keelung 
and Tan-shui during the Sino-French conflict of 1884-1885, Taiwan was proclaimed a 
Qing province; previously Taiwan and the Pescadores comprised a prefecture under 
the jurisdiction of the provincial government of Fukien.91 
 
                                                          
87  A British reporter sarcastically pointed out that the Japanese some years ago used to murder 
shipwrecked seamen. Beheading and conquering a feeble barbarian tribe in Taiwan did not 
automatically mean that Japan was an equal partner of the civilized nations. See Caruthers, 
“Filibustering to Formosa”, p. 453. 
88Ibid., pp. 455-454.  
89 Caruthers, Charles LeGendre, pp. 168-169.  
90Robert Gardella, “From Treaty Ports to Provincial Status, 1860-1894” in Taiwan: A New History, ed. 
M. A. Rubinstein, (New York-London, 2007), pp. 180-181.  
91Ibid., pp. 188-191. 
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11.2 The conquest, administration and function of Japanese Taiwan 
 
Modern Taiwanese history commences with the occupation of the island’s 
southern part by the Dutch East India Company in 1624. Taiwan was known to the 
West as Formosa (beautiful) a denomination given by passing Portuguese mariners in 
1517. The Dutch after overwhelming the Spanish garrisons located in the north, 
expelled their competitors in 1642 and held the entire island until 1662. In 1644 the 
Manchu dynasty also known as Qing ousted the Mings and ruled China until 1911. 
General Cheng Ch’eng-Kung (Koxinga), a Ming loyalist born in Japan, tried to 
overthrow the Manchus but after a series of defeats he led his troops against the Dutch 
in Taiwan. In 1662 the Dutch governor surrendered and Cheng established a Chinese 
type administration sympathetic to the Mings but hostile to the ruling dynasty in 
Beijing. Eventually the Qings attacked, destroyed and absorbed the defiant Ming 
stronghold in 1683. Throughout the centuries immigrant waves hailing from Southern 
China mainly from the Fukien and Kwantung provinces populated the island. The 
Fukianese known as Hokkien or Hoklos due to their different dialects and customs 
were distinct from the Hakkas that had inhabited the island long before them (10th 
century), although ethnically they were both Han Chinese. The larger numbers (70% 
of the population) of the Hoklos allowed them to expel the Hakkas minority (15%) 
and obtain the most fertile plains; disputes among them were quite common. After 
212 years of rule, Beijing ceded the island to Japan in 1895 as a result of its 
astonishing defeat during the Sino-Japanese war. 
The island’s remote interior was the homeland of Taiwan’s 9 major aboriginal 
tribes. The three largest, the Ami, the Paiwan and the Atayal, make up to this day 85% 
of all aborigines. The more “advanced” tribes were living in the lowland area, paid 
taxes in kind to Beijing and practiced agriculture whereas the more turbulent “raw 
savages” survived by hunting in the forests and mountains having minimal contract 
with the settler society or the imperial state.1 Tribal conflicts and violent episodes 
with the Chinese inhabitants and Qing authorities were frequent. Typically, when 
immigrants mistreated or infringed on aboriginal territory Taiwan’s ancient 
inhabitants ambushed them and in return the Chinese attacked aboriginal settlements. 
Due to these guerilla actions, many aborigines were killed and others decided to move 
to the mountains. Qing immigration regulations and the absence of a firm central 
government in Taiwan led to communal violence and constant uprisings. To eradicate 
these phenomena Qing officials banned Chinese citizens from penetrating native lands 
and marked the aboriginal territory by a trenched boundary to restrict the raiding 
uncivilized savages in the interior. During the last period of Chinese rule, military 
pacification campaigns and a state policy to gradually civilize the lowland, “less 
barbarian”, “ripe” aboriginals was implemented.2   
                                                          
1 John Cooper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province?, (Boulder, 2003), pp. 12-38.  
2Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, (Ithaca-London, 2013), pp. 15-27. 
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The new Japanese masters of Taiwan in order to justify their presence there 
and present it as a restoration of their supposedly former rule gave prominence to 
fictitious or marginal historical facts. After 1895, the 1593, 1609 and 1616 
expeditions to the island were suddenly recalled while others claimed that Taiwan was 
settled by Japanese Wakō pirates and merchants that had to abandon it under the 
pressure of the Tokugawa seclusion policies in 1628. Thus, the Takasago colony in 
the northeast coast had been regrettably relinquished.3 Japanese scholars sought to 
legitimize Tōkyō’s possessions historically. In 1930 the author Fujisaki Seinosuke 
emphasized Taiwan’s strong ties and subordination to Japan, a colonial relationship 
that dated back to Hideyoshi’s era.4 The same kind of pseudo-scientific rhetorichad 
been employed to rationalize the seizure of the Ryūkyūs and Korea as well. It goes 
without saying that the legend of Koxinga, the son of a Japanese mother and the brave 
hero that fought against the barbarian Manchus and the European imperialists was 
appropriately exploited.5 Koxinga was famous even before the Japanese seizure of 
Taiwan; during the Tokugawa era, novels, poems, toys, a shrine in Kyōto and 104 
plays exalted his loyalty and courage, traits that derived from his Japanese 
inheritance. A Taiwanese temple in his honour dating from 1662 was elevated to a 
State Shintō shrine by the colonial authorities in January 1897. This way the 
deification of Koxinga came to glorify not only the patriotism of a particular samurai 
but also the virtues of his Japanese mother, virtues that both colonizers and colonized 
should admire.6 
Koxinga’s descendants briefly returned to the island in 1874 under Saigō 
Tsugumichi; their second stay lasted from 1895 to 1945. The lack7 of preparation and 
                                                          
3 Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 12. 
4 Mark E Caprio, Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945, (Washington 2009), p. 
73. 
5 This Japanized model hero was cited during the Pacific War as a reference to Japan’s southward 
expansion against the West and as Hideyoshi’s worthy successor. See Marc Andre Matten, “The 
Japanizing of a Chinese hero: the role of Koxinga in the Japanese colonial discourse” in Japanizing: 
The Structure of Culture and Thinking in Japan, ed. P. Lutum, (Berlin, 2006), pp. 167-176, 186.  
6 In the beginning of the 20th century the author Kashima Ōkō wrote about Koxinga: “...if his spirit 
was still with us, he would be pleased that Taiwan now belongs to Japan and that he himself would 
now be a Japanese hero”. At the same time Takekoshi Yosaburō started his momentous work The 
Japanese Rule in Formosa by stating that: “...the island, which China had torn from Koxinga’s 
descendants by intrigue, bribery, and brutal force, passed again into the hands of the Japanese, in 
whose veins flows the same blood as filled those of Koxinga”. The author Yoda Momokawa suggested 
in 1894 that the island’s occupation would ease Koxinga’s soul. In the same manner, the famous 
ultranationalist Tokutomi Sohō celebrated Koxinga’s Japaneseness and Taiwan’s recovery with a poem 
published in 1895. See Ibid., pp. 182-185. 
7 Some historians pointedly refer to Japan’s lack of colonial tradition and experience before 1895 to 
illustrate its confusion on how to administrate its first colony. However, as this research previously 
demonstrated this kind of imperial tradition, fueled mainly by ancient semi-mythical religious schemes 
as well as actual facts, was well imprinted in the minds of modern Meiji expansionists. 19th century’s 
Social Darwinism, new imperialism theories, pan-asianism and the civilizing mission complemented 
Japan’s bid for an empire. As for the matter of being experienced in ruling distinct or kin ethnic groups 
and foreign territories one must not neglect Japan’s colonial like rule over the Bonins, the Ryūkyūs and 
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of definite plans on how to rule Taiwan demonstrates that the seizure of the island 
was more occasional and opportunistic than meticulously outlined or deliberate. The 
annexation was a result of the sweeping victory over China and the jingoistic response 
of the public which encouraged territorial expansion. Both the Meiji leaders and the 
ecstatic public agreed that Japan for its sacrifices should be rewarded with territorial 
compensations at China’s expense as the other powers had done. Liaodong’s 
retrocession meant that at the very least Taiwan had to be held on at any cost. Navy 
officers were perhaps the only ones to deem the island as essential for the nation’s 
future security. In the hands of another power it would endanger Japan’s position in 
the Far East and shatter its ambition to expand commercially and politically in the 
South. 8  In this sense, early Japanese colonialism was reactionary, a mere 
precautionary measure to counter forthcoming western encroachment. Prime Minister 
Itō Hirobumi was convinced and pressed for Taiwan’s annexation in the Shimonoseki 
peace talks. On 10 May, he appointed Admiral Kabayama Sukenori as the first 
Governor-General in Japan’s colonial history. However, it was predominantly the 
search for prestige, diplomatic pressures and the struggle for equality rather than 
economic or strategic concerns that led to the decision to annex the island regardless 
of the subsequent reasonings that were in line with new imperialism’s oratories.9  
The occupation of the Pescadores Islands 30 miles west of Taiwan occurred on 
26 March 1895 during the peace negotiations by a Japanese expeditionary force.10 
The Chinese fortified positions in the main islands were bombarded by 9 cruisers and 
2 gunboats and then overrun. The whole operation took three days and was completed 
with minimal casualties.11 Taiwan’s capture proved to be more challenging. The fall 
of the Pescadores chain alarmed Taiwan’s population and spread the belief that a 
Japanese invasion was impending. The Qing governor of the island, Tang Ching-sung 
(1841-1903) organized fervently the islands fortifications but failed to install a unified 
chain of command among the various defence units at his disposal. Besides the lack 
of modern firearms his biggest problem was the unruly behaviour of the Qing troops 
dispatched from the mainland to assist the local forces in repelling the Japanese. In 
Taipei on 22 April clashes between the distressed local population and Qing soldiers 
resulted in 40 dead and wounded for both sides. When the news of the island’s 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Hokkaidō. The process of devising policies for Taiwan, an “outer territory”, as well as its exploitation 
shared many traits with the administration of these "inner lands".  
8 One of Ito’s advisors suggested at the time: “Taiwan…can control maritime rights in the Yellow Sea, 
the North China Sea and the Sea of Japan. It is the door to Japan’s defense. If we lose this good 
opportunity, the island of Taiwan will be taken by other powerful countries within two to three years”. 
See Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 32. 
9 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes Towards Colonialism, 1895-1945” in The Japanese Colonial 
Empire, 1895-1945, ed. R. Myers, M. Peattie, (New Jersey, 1984), p. 82. 
10 Turnbull White, The war in the East; Japan, China and Corea: A complete history of the War, its 
causes and results, its campaigns on sea and land, its terrific fights, grand victories and overwhelming 
defeats, (Philadelphia 1895), pp. 651-652.  
11 Edward I-te Chen,” Japan's Decision to Annex Taiwan: A Study of Ito-Mutsu Diplomacy, 1894-95” 
in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Nov., 1977), pp. 64-67.  
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cession, according to the treaty of Shimonoseki, circulated the population participated 
in patriotic demonstrations in cities and towns. That same day (April 17) a petition 
was transmitted to Beijing in protest. The appeal stated that the island’s inhabitants 
felt abandoned by the Imperial Court but were eager to fight and die against the 
Japanese “Dwarf Chieftains”.12 Two days later the Zongli Yamen informed Governor 
Tang of the official cession of the island to Japan that was to take place in two 
months’ time. Tang decided to not comply with these orders. The cable also stated 
that the Taiwanese would be allowed to immigrate to mainland China within two 
years; those that desired to stay would become Japanese subjects in accordance to the 
peace treaty. Finally, the Yamen urged the population not to resist the occupation out 
of fear of Japanese retaliations in the mainland. Βesides, the island’s remote position 
was difficult to defend after the fall of the Pescadores and resistance would be a waste 
of lives and funds for China. Tang warned the westerners residing in Taiwan’s ports 
that riots and violence was imminent and asked them to request their governments’ 
gunboats as a means of preventing the invaders from landing. He even suggested to 
French and British officials the lease of the island or of its resources so that they 
would intervene on China’s behalf. The retrocession of Liaodong gave Tang hope and 
in mid-May he approached in secrecy German and Russian officials at first and then 
Spanish and Americans as well. None of these countries showed any interest. 
Dishearteningly the sister republic of France did not dispatch its fleet to Taiwan’s 
rescue.13 In the meantime many wealthy inhabitants and officials fled to China and 
outbreaks of disorders became more frequent while mob rule was exercised by local 
gangs. Li Ching-fang, son of Li Hung-chang, the “traitor” that had agreed to Taiwan’s 
cession, was ordered by the Court on 18 May to visit the island and formally turn it 
over to Japan. Two days later another communication instructed Tang to order all 
civil and military staff to evacuate the island. This humiliating decree spurred Tang 
into action. On 23 May, an announcement by Taiwan’s merchants and gentry 
proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Formosa in Taipei; on the 25th, Tang 
was elected its first President and a parliament was formed. The Republic was 
autonomous but not independent. Tang’s mission was to rebuff the Japanese and 
eventually return the island to China. Since his effort to sell Taiwan failed he believed 
that a supposedly democratic western type parliamentary administration would attract 
the Powers’ sympathy and recognition. He used his presidential title only with foreign 
                                                          
12  Chinese animosity towards Japan was still high; For instance, Nanjing’s governor in a 
communication on the 30th of April asked from Tang to “never surrender to Japan”. Similarly, Tang 
wrote to Beijing on 6 March: "I shall encourage all the generals and soldiers to defend until the death”. 
In late April, the British Consul in Tamsui, Lionel Charles Hopkins (1854-1952) was officially 
informed by the Taiwanese authorities that British rule was preferable to the Japanese one. It seems 
that Tōkyō chose the least hospitable territory to establish its first colony. See Leonard H. D. Gordon, 
“The Cession of Taiwan: A Second Look" in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), 
pp. 562-565.  
13 Harry J. Lamley, "A Short-lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan's Resistance against Japan" in 
Taiwan in Modern Times, ed. P. K. T. Sih, (New York, 1973), pp. 255-266.  
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envoys and he reassured Beijing that he would continue acting as the Qing governor 
of the island as before.14 
In the meantime, Li’s son had transferred Taiwan and the Pescadores to 
Tōkyō’s plenipotentiary Kabayama Sukenori on 2 June in a ceremony that took place 
on the Japanese ship Yokohama Maru offshore the Keelung shore.15 Chinese military 
forces, however, defied the agreement and joined the Republic’s militia and volunteer 
Hoklo and Hakka bands, constituting in theory a formidable force of about 100,000 
men. The lawless, factious character of the Taiwanese after centuries of uncontrolled, 
quasi-anarchical way of living was not yet infused with a sense of unifying island 
patriotism.16 On 29 May the Japanese Imperial Guards First Mixed Βrigade landed 
southeast of the city in a small village called Audi. Its 7,000 men were deployed from 
Port Arthur to tropical Taiwan in haste, still in their winter uniforms under the 
command of Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (1847-1895). 500 Chinese tried to 
oppose their disembarkation but were driven off. On the following day four more 
transports increased the number of the Japanese occupation force to 12,000. In the 
outskirts of Keelung, Qing forces made a stand in the Kinchu-chang village but were 
eventually overwhelmed and dispersed. The 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment and a 
company of engineers under the command of Colonel Kojima captured Keelung on 3 
June with the loss of 1 officer, 3 enlisted men, and another 25 wounded. The Chinese 
lost 250 men. The town was previously shelled by the Japanese fleet led by the 
admiral Arichi Shinanojō (1843-1919).17 On the following day news of the defeat 
reached the Republic’s capital Taipei. Tang and his associates fled to the mainland 
whereas the guard of the city disillusioned and unpaid looted the city’s arsenal, 
burned down the government’s seat and attacked civilians. Some of Taipei’s 
inhabitants invited the Japanese troops to restore order in the capital. Thus, on 7 June 
the city was conquered and the Taiwanese republic was abolished after just twelve 
days. When the heavily fortified port of Tamsui was captured by a handful of 
Japanese without firing one shot on 9 June, ending the plunder and riots there, the 
opposition in the North collapsed. 
Itō had hastily designated in an edict the departments that were to rule the 
colony as early as 8 May 1895, less than a month after Taiwan’s cession. These were: 
Civil Governance, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Production, Military Affairs, Judiciary 
and Transportation. Kabayama, confident that armed resistance would soon be 
                                                          
14 Ibid., pp. 270-275. 
15 The treaty accorded the previous day was an administrative document that dealt with the inventory of 
public properties, the expulsion of the Qing troops, and the relocation of political authority over the 
island. See Gordon, “The Cession of Taiwan”, p. 561. 
16 Marco Zagarola, Taiwan-Formosa: Da Shimonoseki alla fine del Secondo Conflitto Mondiale, 1895-
1945, vol. 1, Ph.D Dissertation, Sapienza University of Rome (1991), pp. 82-88. 
17 James W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: history, people, resources, and 
commercial prospects: tea, camphor, sugar, gold, coal, sulphur, economical plants, and other 
productions, (London-New York, 1903), pp. 291-299. 
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silenced in the entire island, proclaimed his new government 18  in Taipei, now 
renamed Taihoku on 17 June.  The first provisional19 administration was set up as 
follows: the Governor-General's Office was held by himself, the Military Bureau by 
Major-General Ōshima Yoshimasa (1850-1926), the Naval Bureau would be placed 
under Rear-Admiral Tsunoda Hidematsu, and the Civil Affairs Bureau under Mizuno 
Jun (1851-1900). Most of the posts were manned by employees from the Army 
Ministry. The Military Bureau was subdivided into the Director's Office and the 
departments of Artillery, Engineering, Gendarmerie Paymaster, Cash, Provisions, 
Medical, Judicial, Telegraph and of the Post Office. The Civil Affairs Bureau was 
constituted by the Agricultural and Industrial office, the Financial office both led by 
Hashiguchi Bunzō, while the Educational office was under Isawa Shūji (1851-1917), 
the Home office under B. Maki and the Foreign Office under H. Shimamura. 
Taihoku’s first prefect was Rear-Admiral Tanaka and the first commissioner of 
Customs was S. Nomura.20 Due to the anti-Japanese resistance, military rule was 
proclaimed after 18 July which typically lasted until March 1896.21 During the first 
years of the occupation civil administration existed only on paper since military 
provisions remained in force.22 
                                                          
18 This was the proclamation posted in the city: “His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, having acquired by 
cession from His Majesty the Emperor of China, under the Treaty of Peace concluded at Shimonoseki, 
on the 17th day of the 4th month of the 28th year of Meiji, the full and perpetual sovereignty of the 
Island of Taiwan and the Islands appertaining or belonging thereto, and the Islands composing the 
Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying between the 119th and 120th degrees of Longitude 
cast from Greenwich and the 23rd and 24th degrees of North Latitude, together with all fortifications, 
arsenals, and public property on said Islands. Now therefore, I, Admiral Viscount Kabayama Sukenori, 
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Governor of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and their dependencies, have, by 
Command and in the Name of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, taken possession of the ceded Islands 
aforesaid, and as His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Governor of Taiwan, the Pescadores, and their 
dependencies, I have assumed the administration and government thereof. All inhabitants of the ceded 
territory peacefully pursuing their ordinary and lawful vocations will receive full and constant 
protection”. See Ibid., p. 312. 
19 On 8 August, the Army Ministry reaffirmed this administrative structure this time dropping the word 
“provisional”. On this occasion however, more army and navy officers were employed in the colonial 
government while the civilian offices were reduced in number. See Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai, Taiwan in 
Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Engineering, (London-New York 
2009), p. 53. 
20 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, p. 313. 
21 Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire, p. 53. The historian Shinobu Ōe considered the period until March 
1896 as the first phase of warfare in Taiwan. The second lasted until 1902 when the Japanese finally 
managed to quell the main pockets of resistance. The last period ended in 1915 when most of the 
aborigine tribes residing in the mountainous regions were brought forcefully into submission. Ōe sets 
the number of Taiwanese and Chinese casualties for the initial phase at roughly 14,000 and for the 
second period at 17,000. See Shinobu Ōe, “Shokuminchi ryōyū to gunbu. Toku ni Taiwan shokuminchi 
seifuku sensō no ichi-zuke o megutte” [Colonial possessions and the military: On the historical 
evaluation of the colonial war of subjugation in Taiwan] in Teikokushugi to Shokuminchi [Imperialism 
and Colonies] ed. A. Yanagishawa, (Tokyo 2001), pp. 68-72.  
22 E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945, (Cambridge 1977), p. 9. 
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On 21 June Ōsaka Fourth Division reserves landed on the east coast and 
captured the main towns of Lotung and I-lan. After the fall of the Republic, a 
successor state in the far South emerged to carry on the fight against the invaders. 
General Liu Yongfu (1837–1917) stepped in and became the Republic’s leader in the 
South on 26 June. Making Tainan his state’s capital he prolonged the war and the life 
expectancy of the Taiwan Republic. The colonial government’s first task was to 
pacify the whole island. A direct landing to Tainan, the army’s main objective, was 
out of the question due to the summer monsoon. Hence the Imperial Guards were 
ordered to assault the enemy’s capital by land taking the road along the western coast. 
Their march southwards had already commenced on 11 June. As they moved deeper 
in enemy territory they unexpectedly faced a better organized and more vigorous 
defense. Due to guerrilla activity behind their lines the Japanese troops were forced to 
halt their march for almost a month. Artillery and the cavalry could not make their 
way in the interior due to the dense vegetation and the lack of passable roads. After 
the pacification of the Hsinchu area on 22 June, they were frustratingly bogged down 
there. The insurgents, mere “brigands” for the Japanese, were attacking the invaders’ 
supply lines, telegraphic poles and wooden bridges. On 10 July, the Hakka militia lost 
200 men due to the Japanese attack in Chienbishan city that cost them 11 dead. The 
next day an even more meaningful and monumental event took place. On 11 July 
Sergeant Sakurai with 34 men and their provisions left Taihoku for Tokoham but 
were ambushed by 600 Taiwanese guerrillas. Surrounded by the enemy, Sakurai, 
according to the legend, motivated his men to “die fighting gallantly”. A corporal 
fighting side by side with his men supposedly exclaimed “Comrades, pardon me that I 
go before you” and “long live the empire” before leaving his final breath. The 
remaining committed suicide, sinking their bayonets to each other’s chests, to deprive 
the “brigands” the satisfaction of victory over imperial troops. On 15 July 
reinforcements from Taihoku caught up with the assailants and avenged the massacre. 
The Taiwanese militia encouraged  by their success were now ambushing Japanese 
guards and civilians even in the proximity of the capital. These raids prolonged the 
war, buying time for the local resistance until the Powers’ coveted intervention, which 
was never to come. Similarly, Beijing unable to formally aid the resistance after 
ceding the island put its faith in Western mediation.23 The Japanese decided to stiffen 
their stance and wipe out any opposition in central Taiwan. Several expeditions were 
dispatched to scatter the guerilla gangs and the armed partisan bands in late July. 
Villages that formerly flew white flags and posted declarations of submission to 
Tōkyō when Japanese soldiers passed by, were now considered de facto insurgent 
bases and were burnt to the ground for their treacherous disobedience. The occupying 
forces could not easily distinguish between agitators and civilians and willing to set 
an example they terrorized the entire population.24 
                                                          
23 Zagarola, Taiwan-Formosa, vol. 1, p. 91.  
24Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 9.  
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During the first two weeks of August, a series of battles was fought and the 
occupation army, reinforced by troops from Taihoku, captured Beipu and Miaoli and 
other villages in central Taiwan. On 27 August, the battle of Baguashan near 
Changhua was won by Prince Yoshihisa’s approximately 15,000 troops. Central 
Taiwan was finally pacified. All in all, the Japanese employed a fighting force of 
40,983 men with another 20,621 serving in non-combatant roles. Malaria, floods, 
exhaustion and tropical heat started taking their toll. Only 396 Japanese died in action 
during the entire campaign; 10,236 had perished from diseases.25 Prince Yoshimasa 
himself would eventually succumb to malaria. 26  From 26 May to 15 November 
38,798 cases were directed to the local military hospitals for treatment.27 The Imperial 
Guards who had been stationed in the battlefront the longest, lost in the process many 
thousand men by sickness. In need of replenishment and reorganization the unit’s 
7,000 troops made camp at the city of Changhua. During the opening of the third and 
final phase of the war the Japanese sought to conquer Yanlin and dispatched scouting 
detachments further south. On 1 September, these detachments were forced to retreat 
north due to the locals’ stiff resistance. Reinforcements and supplies were gathered 
and a plan to capture Tainan was devised. On 3 October, the Imperial Guards 
commenced once again their southward advance and won the battle of Chiayi six days 
later. In the meantime, the Second (Sendai) Division, which had been assembled at 
the Pescadores, was preparing to land in the proximity of the Republic’s second 
capital. The 7,200 men of the Ōsaka Fourth Division in the Pescadores would also 
participate in the southern expedition; Tainan would be attacked by three directions.28 
On 10 October, 5,600 men led by Prince Fushimi Sadanaru (1858-1923) landed north 
of Tainan whereas a slightly larger force under the famous general Nogi Maresuke 
(1849-1912) headed for Takow. The whole expeditionary force numbered 
approximately 20,000 men, more than enough to overcome the Republic’s defenses. 
Despite suffering relatively heavy losses the three columns accomplished their goals 
and gradually approached Tainan. On 18 October, Liu in desperation disguised 
himself and crossed to the mainland, avoiding arrest only by mere chance. Despite the 
Republic’s capitulation on the 21st, battles against local guerilla bands would 
continue for the following month. Kabayama, following the cease of the resistance in 
Tainan, declared on 18 November that Taiwan was pacified in a telegram to the Chief 
of the Army General Staff in Tōkyō. However, parts of South Taiwan, the central 
highlands and the east coast were not yet entirely captured. Hakka guerrillas and 
irregulars would continue to harass the newly installed Japanese authorities for many 
years to come.29  
                                                          
25 Barclay put the number of fatalities by disease during the campaign at 4,000 and added that another 
27,000 had to be hospitalized mostly in Japan. See George W. Barclay, Colonial Development and 
population in Taiwan, (New Jersey 1954), p. 136.  
26 Donald Keene, Emperor of Japan:  Meiji and his World, 1852-1912, (New York, 2002), p. 509. 
27 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, pp. 326-330, 365. 
28 Lamley, "A Short-lived Republic”, pp. 290-295. 
29 Ibid., pp. 276-280, 294-295. 
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Despite the inhabitants’ unexpectedly hostile disposition the Japanese finally 
had placed Taiwan under their control. The Taiwan Affairs Bureau (Taiwan 
Jimukyoku) set up by Prime Minister Itō on 13 June 1895 (law no. 74) in Tōkyō to 
supervise Taiwan was abolished the following year. Itō Miyoji (Chief Cabinet Clerk), 
Kawakami Sarōku (Vice Chief of Staff), Kodama Gentarō (Vice Army Minister), 
Yamamoto Gonnohyōe (Vice Navy Minister), Hara Kei Takeshi (Vice Foreign 
Minister), Suematsu Kenchō (Chief of Legislation Bureau), Tajiri Inajirō (Vice 
Finance Minister), and Den Kenjirō (Chief of Communications Bureau of the 
Ministry of Communications and Transportation) and the Prime Minister constituted 
the Bureau. These Ministers and agents lacking colonial experience could not agree 
on the status of Taiwan; Was it to be ruled as a foreign territory or as a special 
province like Okinawa and Hokkaidō where assimilation (dōka) was the state’s main 
policy? They turned to foreign experts and advisors from the greatest European 
empires to find the solution. In 1895 many were not even conscious that Japan had 
obtained a colony according to the legal scholar Nakamura Tetsu. William Montague 
Kirkwood (1850-1926) proposed the British model of “association” whereas the 
French jurist Michel Revon (1867-1947) stood for assimilation, illustrating the 
conflicting colonial methods of their respective nations. The British and Dutch models 
were based on indirect rule and the principle of racial apartheid. The French model’s 
assimilation was costlier but the coveted Japanisation of the inhabitants would ensure 
Taiwan’s possession in the long run.30 
 
Kirkwood in his “Opinion paper on the issue of the Taiwan system” submitted 
on 30 April 1895 to the Ministry of Justice proposed the treatment of Taiwan as a 
crown colony, as a distinct legal entity institutionally distinct from mainland Japan.31 
The only common ground with Japan proper would be the subordination to imperial 
rule rather than to the constitution. In line with his theory he suggested the 
appointment of a civilian bureaucrat as director of the colony’s administration who 
would operate under Tōkyō’s authority, the establishment of an independent policy-
making instrument responsible for Taiwan’s administration, the creation of a body to 
legislate distinct and appropriate laws for the colony, and the preservation of the local 
laws and customs.32 The administration’s success would depend on the governor’s 
ability to set up and use a legislative council partially made up by natives; local 
administration should be left to the Chinese residents while Japanese courts would 
handle civil appeals.33 After explaining the specifics of the British Crown’s colony 
system in 7 colonies he concluded that this model suited better Japan’s colonial 
                                                          
30 Reo Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition: Colonial Lessons for Contemporary State-building, Ph.D 
Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2011, pp. 53-54. 
31 Toyomi Asano, Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no hōteki kōzō [Legal structure of the Japanese colonial 
empire], (Tokyo 2004), pp. 37-38. If this proposition was not accepted, Kirkwood further proposed two 
alternative “relationships” between Taiwan and Japan: federation of conjoined states such as in the 
American case and incorporation as Britain’s Wales and Scotland. See Eiji Oguma, The Boundaries of 
'the Japanese': Volume 2: Korea, Taiwan and the Ainu 1868-1945, (Baldwyn North 2017), p. 58. 
32 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 54-55. 
33 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation, p. 71.  
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administration. In July 1895, he further declared: “The institutions of Taiwan should 
be decided by the prerogatives of the emperor without the legislative review of the 
Imperial Diet. It is a legitimate constitutional action. The review of the Imperial Diet 
is required only when the budget of Taiwan is to be appropriated from the imperial 
treasury”.34 
 
Revon, influenced by France’s colonial rationale, believed that Taiwan could 
be gradually integrated and assimilated to the conqueror’s political and cultural 
sphere. On 22 April 1895, he stated that Japan "should assimilate [Formosa and the 
Pescadores] as fully as possible, and therefore, [Japan] must plan on making the 
islands a prefecture of the empire in the future, if not now”. Large waves of Japanese 
immigrants and the imposition of the mainland’s legal codes were steps towards 
assimilation. In order to prevent confusion and unrest in these first crucial steps 
Japanese civil law should be implemented gradually for the time being. In the future 
and when Taiwan was completely pacified its judicial integration to Japan’s system 
could be more safely attempted.35 In the same manner, initial administration should 
initially enjoy some liberty of action but in the long run the island had to be 
transformed into a “true prefecture” under the government’s direct jurisdiction. The 
pattern of gradual assimilation had precedents in French Africa but more suitably in 
Hokkaidō (1869) and Okinawa (1879) after their annexation. They were both 
considered backward territories populated by savages as was the case of Taiwan. For 
instance, prefectural level elections in Hokkaidō were held in 1901 and in 1912 for 
the Okinawans; it was as late as 1944 that the Taiwanese were given the right to vote 
in an effort to embody them fully in the war effort. Conclusively both Revon’s and 
Kirkwood’s point of view was that initially, Taiwan should be governed in line with 
its laws and customs but ultimately its barbarian institution had to be put aside or 
completely replaced by modern and sophisticated institutions.36 
 
The liberal politician Hara Takeshi (1856-1921) as member of the Taiwan 
Affairs Bureau evaluated the suggestions of the two foreign advisors. On 2 February 
1896, he decided that "Taiwan may have a system slightly different from the main 
lands, but will not be considered to belong to the colonial type". His ideas included 
gradual implementation of the mainland’s laws, legal and political incorporation into 
the Japanese structure, assimilation (naichi enchō shugi or doctrine of homeland 
extension) and administration directly accountable to Tōkyō instead to a colonial 
structure in Taiwan (Taiwan’s tax affairs, military and communications would be 
regulated by the respective ministries in Japan). The last recommendation divided the 
members of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. Many found it impractical and costly. Being a 
native of Japan’s northeastern area (Tōhoku), the region that supported the shogunate 
                                                          
34  Lung-chih Chang, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty 
Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874-1906 Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University 
Cambridge, (May, 2003), pp. 172-173. 
35 Asano, Shokuminchi Teikoku, p. 37. 
36 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 56-57. 
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and had been defeated, Hara had little chance of winning over the Satsuma, Chōshū, 
Tosa, Hizen clique that dominated the Meiji government and military after the 
Restoration. Clan nepotism was partially responsible for the rejection of Hara’s 
proposals. 37  Hara retorted that to treat Taiwan as a colony would bring about 
inconsistency in the metropolis’ legislation and could provoke diplomatic problems 
with the foreign countries.38 As for his assimilation strategy he justified it by calling 
attention to the geographic proximity and racial affiliation between Japan and 
Taiwan.39  
 
The everlasting problem of the unequal treaties, so detrimental for Japan’s 
image, and the pursue of nominal equality troubled Hara as well. The abolition of 
extraterritoriality in Japan with the July 1894 “equal” treaty with Britain was a source 
of pride and optimism for the Meiji government. According to its provisions, Tōkyō 
had two years to implement modern western laws. However, in the meantime Taiwan 
was formally made part of the Japanese territory where the new legal codes had to be 
applied as well.40 Japan’s decision not to directly apply modern civil laws in primitive 
Taiwan could result in the treaty’s annulment. The historian Kawashima Shin stressed 
that the identification of Taiwan as a hindrance to the treaty revisions reveals the 
Japanese perception of international order at the time and explains their effort to 
present their colonization effort as a glorious task to the world, a task previously 
belonging solely to the West. To avoid any contradictions and obstacles during the 
treaties’ revision process Spanish and German diplomats were informed during these 
talks by the Japanese Foreign Ministry that Taiwan will not become a zone of 
exclusion but part of Japan. Even if the mainland’s westernized laws were not to be 
eventually applied, Tōkyō at the moment sought to demonstrate that Taiwan belonged 
to it in diplomatic terms in order to eradicate any foreign interest on the island.41 The 
                                                          
37 Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2, p. 98. 
38 The politician Takekoshi Yosaburō and Prime Minister Katsura Tarō in a diet session in 1905 were 
criticized for using the term colony for Taiwan. The comment that spurred the debate was made by 
Katsura: "With regard to the question of whether Taiwan is the same as the Japan proper or a colony, it 
is no doubt that Taiwan is a colony that is different from the homeland”. The idea that Japan was 
imitating the western ravenous powers was “horrifying” to a nation that used to be afraid of western 
colonialism. Japanese and Taiwanese not only shared cultural and racial traits but also the fear of 
European colonial domination. This contradictory behaviour, admiration and aversion to colonial 
practices, partially explains Japan’s ambiguous and perplex attitude towards Taiwan (partial 
application of the constitution, indecision between differentiation and assimilation, confusion on how 
to run or even call the colony). The Japanese were reluctant to recognize Taiwan as a colony as the 
term had a negative connotation in western discourse for the Meiji leaders since it implied white 
exploitation of the African and Asian races; for domestic and diplomatic reasons the term colony 
(shokumin) was dropped and the term settlement (takushoku) was adopted to describe Taiwan. See 
Haruka Nomura, “Making the Japanese Empire: Nationality and Family Register in Taiwan, 1871-
1899” in Japanese Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (May 2010), p. 69.        
39 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 58-59. 
40 The Governor-General proclaimed on 22 February 1896: "the treaties of commerce and navigation, 
tariff regulation, and other arrangements existing between Japan and various treaty powers" apply to 
Taiwan. See Seiji Hishida, “Formosa: Japan's First Colony” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 22, 
No. 2 (Jun., 1907), p. 272.  
41 Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2, p. 102. 
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fear of Western intervention partially prompted Hara and many of the Japanese elite 
to support the position of assimilation. Direct implementation of the mainland’s laws 
in Taiwan would prove Japan’s sovereignty over the island. The American legal 
advisor to the Foreign Ministry, Henry Willard Denison (1846-1914) believed that 
Japan should not incorporate conquered peoples into the nation or grant them 
citizenship rights.42 Denison came up with a discriminatory legal system based on the 
individuals’ ethnicity as a solution. Westerners and Japanese in Taiwan were to be 
subjected to modern civil, commercial and criminal codes whereas the locals would 
be permitted to follow their own customs for the time being.43 The Taiwanese had 
been practicing their different laws for centuries and were not ready for the Japanese 
institutions according to Kirkwood. Thus, Denison advocated the implementation of a 
new legal code just for Taiwan. In March 1898, Itō contemplated the unequal treaties 
issue with his trusted advisors. They feared that the fragile Taiwanese colony would 
be subjected to foreign domination if the westerners were not confined in the island’s 
treaty ports. Ordinance number 8 of the 23rd of June 1898 wholly embraced 
Denison’s recommendation.44  
 
The Organic Regulations of the Government of the Governor-General of 
Formosa (Taiwan Sōtokufu), of November or December 1895 set up the colony’s 
administration. The Governor-General, as in the French, German and British cases, 
was responsible to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, established by imperial ordinance 
87 in 1896 after the abolition of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. 16 months later the 
Ministry was also abolished and its functions were transferred to the new Taiwan 
Affairs Bureau under the Prime Minister (law no. 295). The Bureau was transformed 
into an office of the Home Affairs Ministry in February 1898 (law no. 24). In 
October, it was again abolished and Taiwan was placed under the direct supervision 
of the Home Affairs Ministry (law no. 259). 45  The government consisted of the 
Governor-General’s Secretariat, the department of Civil Affairs or Civil 
Administration Department (Minsei-bu), the Army Department and the Naval staff all 
under the Governor-General’s authority. The Governor of Civil Affairs supervised the 
administration and finances in Taiwan. 46  Through several minor departments he 
                                                          
42 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation, p. 72. 
43 Applying one set of legal codes for the Japanese and foreigners and another for the natives meant 
that the Japanese enforced extraterritoriality in Taiwan. See Toyomi Asano, Teikoku Nihon no 
shokuminchi hōsei: hōiki tōgō to teikoku [The Legal System of the Japanese Empire: The Integration of 
Legal Domains and Imperial Order], (Nagoya 2008), p. 106. 
44 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 60-62.  
45 Noboru Asami, Japanese colonial government, (New York 1924), pp. 13-14. 
46 Taiwanese finances were provided for by two accounts: the special accounts adopted in 1899 and the 
local tax accounts in 1898. The annual revenue for the special accounts came from Tōkyō subsidies and 
the colonial government’s income. These funds were used to manage the administration’s expenses. 
The goal was to increase the revenue, gradually decreasing the central government’s financial 
commitment so that the colony could gain its fiscal autonomy. The local taxes revenue came from taxes 
on property, business, rentals, land and other miscellaneous taxes. Business revenues were divided 
among the heads of the Railway, Monopoly, Civil Engineering Bureaus as well as the chiefs of the 
prefectures and the head of the Customs House. Local taxes defrayed expenses for local administrative 
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controlled the colony’s finance, education, communication, commerce and industry, 
public works, railways, monopolies, customs, surveys and general affairs. The last 
branch was subdivided into four offices: domestic affairs, foreign affairs, legislation 
and education. 47  The Army Department was made up by the General Staff, the 
Administrative Staff, the Judicial Section, the Intendance Corps, the Medical Corps 
and the Veterinary Corps. The Naval Staff was subdivided to the Chief Staff Officer, 
Administrative Staff Officer and the Naval Interpreters.48   
 
The Governor-General was given the rank of shinmin, the highest of the four 
bureaucratic grades in Japanese officialdom. In this way, they enjoyed the same 
privileges of protocol as the Prime and Cabinet Ministers and the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court in Tōkyō. They came from the military: The ranks of general, admiral, 
lieutenant general and vice-admiral were eligible for the post. Hara Takashi pushed in 
vain for civilian administrators under the direct supervision of the central government 
instead. A military oriented colonial administration meant that army leaders would 
have a bigger say in Taiwan than the diet in Tōkyō. The uprisings and the continued 
local guerilla warfare in the island however, seemed to justify the successive 
appointments of Government-General from the ranks of the military from 1895 to 
1919 when the system was abolished.49 This study will examine the activities of the 
first four Governor-Generals: admiral Kabayama Sukenori (10 May 1895-2 June 
1896), lieutenant general Katsura Tarō (2 June 1896-14 October 1896), lieutenant 
general Nogi Maresuke (14 October 1896-26 February 1898) and lieutenant general 
Kodama Gentarō (26 February 1898-11 April 1906).50 If we exclude Kodama the 
average length of tenure was two years and one month, too short to gain a deep 
knowledge of the island’s conditions.51 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and government offices (education, police, civil works, sanitation, repairs) and were collected by the 
chief of every prefecture. The budget for revenue and expenditures under the local taxes account was 
prepared by the chief of Civil Affairs taking into consideration the estimate of apportioning expenses 
for each prefecture. In December 1896, the Central Treasury was established in the colony’s capital and 
branch offices were set up in 6 other towns. See SOAS Presbyterian Church of England Foreign 
Missions Committee Archive (henceforth cited as PCE-FMC), series IV: Formosa Print Periodicals, 
box 7B, file 4, “Summary of the Administration in Taiwan (Formosa)”, Japanese Government, 1909, 
pp. 24-26. 
47 Hishida, “Formosa: Japan's First Colony”, p. 269.  
48  SOAS PCE-FMC, series IV: Formosa Print Periodicals, box 7B, file 4, “Summary of the 
Administration in Taiwan (Formosa)”, Japanese Government, 1909, p. 11.  
49 The historian Atsushi Yamada made the argument that in fact the army had dominated the colony 
until 1919. From 1919 until 1936 civil administration superseded the rule of the military. During the 
final period of the Japanese presence in Taiwan, from 1936 to 1945, the military rule and the civilian 
administration were merged or interchangeable. See Atsushi Yamada, Nihon no Chōsen, Taiwan shihai 
to shokuminchi kanryō [Japanese rule and bureaucracy in Korea and Taiwan], (Kyoto 2009), p. 43.  
50 Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of The Systems of 
Political Control” in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 30 (1970), pp. 127-128.   
51 Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Formosa Today: An Analysis of the Economic Development and Strategic 
Importance of Japan’s Tropical Colony, (New York 1942), p. 161. 
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The Governor-Generals were given almost unlimited powers in ruling the 
colony in order to pacify it. For some members of the diet this semi-independent 
dictatorship was an emergency and a temporary measure.52 The Governor-Generals 
had the command of the colonial garrison. Furthermore, they had the authority to 
"control general political affairs"; to "control officials under [them]"; to "command 
the military and naval forces" and the right to issue executive ordinances carrying the 
same effect as the laws of Japan. As Shinmin they answered directly to the Emperor 
for their colonial and administration policies.53 However, the Organic Law of 1897 
made clear that "in controlling general political affairs of Formosa, the Governor-
General shall accept supervision from the Premier." The imperial ordinances No. 86 
and No. 9 of 1896 and 1897 respectively somewhat limited their authority. For 
matters concerning finance, banking, customs, mail and telegraphic services they 
were held responsible to the Finance Minister and the Minister of Correspondence.54 
Taiwan’s Governor-General held the power to cancel any decision of the provincial 
governors and dismiss or appoint officials of the lowest rank. If he was able to obtain 
imperial approval he could even impose penalties upon the higher-level bureaucrats. 
According to article 4 paragraph 1 of the 1897 organic law: “He shall accept the 
direction of the Ministers of Army and Navy in matters concerning military and 
personnel administration of enlisted persons”. Paragraph 3 asserted: “He shall accept 
the direction of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and of the Navy in matters concerning 
the island's defense and mobilization projects" and "He shall obey the commands of 
the Inspector-General of Military Education in matters relating to military education". 
Finally, article 7 paragraph 2 specified that “He shall report to the Ministers of Home 
Affairs, Army and Navy and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Navy when he 
decides to use the colonial garrison for the maintenance of public order”.55 
 
The Governor-General possessed legislative authority as well. He was 
authorized to enact executive ordinances that concerned administrative affairs called 
furei, prefecture orders called shūrei and subprefecture orders called chōrei. Any 
infringement to the furei gave to the Governor-General the right to impose a fine of 
200 yen or imprisonment of up to one year without resorting to a judicial court. The 
second kind of ordinances according to the “Law relating to Laws and Ordinances to 
be enforced in Formosa” for which imperial approval was required, through the Prime 
Minister, was called ritsurei (administrative orders with legal effect). These orders 
had the same effect as laws in Japan proper. The Governor-General could enforce any 
mainland law as he saw fit, through an imperial ordinance, bypassing the diet. In 
addition, the ritsurei were duly approved by the Consultative Council (Hyōgikai). 
                                                          
52 A British voyager in Taiwan wrote in his 1904 book The Japanese in Formosa that Japanese rule 
was “based on the model of our Crown Colony administration”. He concluded that Tōkyō espoused the 
British pattern of colonial rule, but in a more militaristic and authoritarian way. See Takeshi 
Komagome and J. A. Mangan, “Japanese colonial education in Taiwan 1895‐1922: precepts and 
practices of control” in History of Education, 26:3 (1997), p. 311. 
53 Yamada, Nihon no Chōsen, Taiwan, p. 43. 
54 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa”, pp. 132-133. 
55 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 
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This was not a decision-making instrument and was consisted entirely of Japanese 
officials, mainly naval and army officers, presided by the Governor-General.56 He was 
the only one with the authority to propose, withdraw and amend bills. The Council’s 
members were: The Governor of Civil Affairs, the heads of the military departments, 
the chiefs of all bureaus, the chief justice and the public prosecutor-general of the 
court of appeals, two counselors or legal advisors and three bureau members. Besides 
approving the laws of the colonial administration, the Hyōgikai addressed financial 
and public works related issues.57  
 
The broad legislative powers, mainly in the form of the retsurei (decrees as 
laws) ordinances, entrusted to the Governor-General to maintain social order after 
Taiwan’s occupation were challenged by the diet. The diet was the only law-making 
institution in accordance with the Japanese constitution of 1889. The Meiji 
Constitution did not contain any provisions in regard to colonial annexations in the 
empire. The inland’s political condition, the population’s hostility and the notion that 
Taiwan’s traditions and customs were completely different from those prevailing in 
Japan brought about the Governor-General’s investment with extraordinary powers. 
In March 1896, Law no. 63 was approved by the diet with the provision that its 
enactment would be a temporary measure; its duration was set for three years.58 
Therefore, the diet’s legislative powers were bypassed and the constitution was only 
partially applied59; some Japanese laws would be selected and imposed. Law 63 was 
put in effect again in 1899, 1902 and 1905 despite the liberals’ objections on the 
constitutionality of the proposed legislation. The liberal parliamentarian Takata Sanae 
(1860-1938) was among those deputies who objected. Mizuno Jun (1851-1900) 
Taiwan’s first Governor of Civil Affairs from 1895 to 1897 replied in the Lower 
House: “The entire Constitution cannot be applied in Formosa. On the contrary, the 
Government proposes to exercise sovereignty as far as possible on the basis of the 
Imperial prerogative. The provisions of Chapter Second of the Constitution cannot be 
enforced to Formosa. Hence the Government declares that legislative matters 
delegated to parliament in the motherland are to be dealt with in Formosa by orders of 
the Governor-General in accordance with powers delegated to him by general law”. 
The government was unwilling to discuss further the law’s constitutionality and in 
later years pointed out that the law has already passed and was now a legal 
precedent.60 In 1897 the scholar Ume Kenjirō (1860-1910) proposed that the rights of 
                                                          
56 Shodō Kō, Taiwan sōtokufu [The government-general of Taiwan], (Tokyo 1981), p. 223.  
57 Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa”, p. 136.  
58 Takeshi Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō [Cultural integration in the Japanese 
colonial empire], (Tokyo 1996), p. 33. 
59 Partial application of the constitution meant in practice that the Taiwanese were Japanese because 
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60 Asano, Shokuminchi Teikoku, p. 39.  
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the Japanese citizens should be extended to the Taiwanese as well because Imperial 
rule was based on impartiality and justice.61 Law professors and constitutionalists 
such as Hozumi Yatsuka (1860-1912) argued that the constitution should be enforced 
in its fullest in Taiwan whereas others like Mitsue Ichimura (1875-1928) were against 
its application. Finally, the scholar Tatsukichi Minobe (1873-1948) proposed the 
constitution’s partial implementation.62 For financial matters and the revision of laws 
the Governor-General was required “to ask the Diet for opinion”. The controversial 
Law 63 was eventually superseded by Law 31 in 1906. Thus, the ritsurei were 
restricted only to issues not yet covered by the law. Furthermore, they could not be 
conflicting with laws in Japan proper that had been issued by means of imperial 
ordinances and were applicable also in Taiwan or with laws proclaimed especially for 
the colony.63 
 
Due to the prolonged resistance, the Governor-General and his staff were 
granted in 1896 considerable authority. Thus, they proceed unhindered in imposing a 
military and not a civilian rule in the colony. Every Governor-General who was by 
definition closely associated with the ranks of the army did not feel that he had to 
conform to Tōkyō’s directives. The central government promoted the policy of 
assimilation of the Taiwanese but the military, having other priorities, set forth its 
own political agenda. Concurrent implementation of assimilationist and 
“differentiation” policies resulted to a complicated and contradicting legal framework 
for the island’s inhabitants.64 Itō Hirobumi’s plan of the 21st of May 1895 intended to 
place the Governor-General’s authority under the planned Taiwan Affairs Bureau. 
Furthermore, Hara’s pleads for a civilian Governor-General’s were vetoed by the Vice 
Chief of Staff, Kawakami Sōroku on the grounds that the army needed freedom of 
action to suppress the rebels. The Army and the Navy Ministers had the power to 
bring down the government if one of them decided to resign; according to the law 
these posts had to be filled by active officers. Kawakami even ignored the emperor’s 
preference for civilian administration in Taiwan stated in late August 1897. Some 
scholars argued that party politics and Tōkyō’s constant interference may have led to 
destabilizing consequences in the colony. The promulgation of Law 63 was a field of 
power struggle and a victory of the military at the expense of the civil administration 
and the diet. In Japan where the military had a preponderant political status and an 
overbearing influence upon the society, the Governor-Generals and his associates, 
hailing from the army, were immune to possible criticism and pressures by the liberal 
deputies in the diet. 65  Ranking army and navy officers’ in the colony saw the 
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Governor-Generals as patrons and colleagues. These close relations meant that the 
military held many of the offices of the colonial government and exerted great 
influence over domestic matters. Every Governor-General vigorously guarded his 
autonomy in Taiwan. From 1896 to 1915 the post was occupied strictly by Chōshū 
men. The General Staff saw Taiwan as its private outpost, as a great opportunity to act 
without civilian restrictions and implement its belligerent and expansionist aims. The 
island’s pacification and transformation into a military foothold was the first step 
towards the subjugation of South China and the South Seas.66 
 
The Governor-General also had the power to establish or abolish courts in the 
colony and to appoint or dismiss public persecutors and judges. He also had the 
authority to suspend a judge or reduce his salary considerably. Thus, the judiciary was 
subordinated to the executive. The actual administration of the law was at the 
Governor of Civil Affairs’ hands. In May 1896, a Supreme Court (Hōto Hōin) and a 
court of appeals were set up in the capital Taihoku, the seat of the colonial 
government. This measure was followed by the establishment of local courts in fifteen 
districts, each one equipped with public prosecutors. No channels of appeal to the 
Supreme Court in Tōkyō were made available. The court system employed in Taiwan 
had nothing to do with the one in metropolitan Japan. Another controversial matter 
erupted in the diet this time on whether colonial courts should be treated as ordinary 
courts, similar to the mainland ones, or as special courts in a special territory. In line 
with the ritsurei 16 issued on 19 July 1898 three district courts (chohō-hōin) and a 
court of appeals (fukushin-hōin) were inaugurated in Taiwan. The latter had a civil 
and criminal division each presided by three judges. The district courts were also 
divided to civil and criminal branches and had the competence to examine 
preliminarily criminal cases. In the first 20 years of the Japanese occupation the 
colonial government, facing budgetary limitations, did not appoint many legal 
professionals and did not spend funds to bolster Taiwan’s judiciary. In 1898 any 
person qualified to be an attorney was authorized to act as one. In 1900 the Regulation 
of Formosa Relative to Practicing Attorneys, identical to the law in force in Japan, 
was issued. From 1901 these agents were required to be registered in the official 
attorneys’ list.67  
 
The case of the First Chief Justice of the High Court of Taiwan, Takenori 
Takano 68  is enlightening. Takano was conducting a prosecution involving high 
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officials in the colonial administration under suspicion of corruption. He also 
criticized the military police’s cruel methods. Governor-General Nogi, willing to 
silence any scandalous rumours and considering Takano’s actions as civilian 
meddling in his rule, attempted to oust him. Takano was recalled to Tōkyō where 
some cabinet Ministers tried to convince him to desist from his investigation. When 
he declined they ordered him to retire in October 1897. Takano claimed that he was 
free from executive interference under article 58 of the constitution (judges were 
immune to dismissal or involuntary transfer)69 but his removal was explained on the 
grounds that Taiwanese courts were not ordinary courts and in any case, they were 
outside of the constitution’s area of jurisdiction. Takano rejected their bidding as 
illegal and returned to his post in the colony.70 The day before the corruption case was 
to be tried, 16 police officers and constables arrested him in the courthouse. The 
majority of the judges in Taiwan supported him but could not overrule Tōkyō’s and 
the colonial government’s decision. The application of the constitution and the 
protection of judges to Taiwan became again a heated debate in Prime Minister 
Matsukata’s cabinet. In July 1897, the colony’s Supreme Court was temporarily 
abolished. The opposition and some cabinet members supported Takano’s case and 
harshly attacked the government in December. Matsukata resigned in January 1898. 
Takano asked the next Prime Ministers Ōkuma and Itō for his moral exoneration and 
he further appealed to various courts but in vain.71  
 
The first colonial laws were nothing more than punishments copied from the 
military code of justice for the rebels. Military tribunals with extraordinary authorities 
were hastily established;72 the first was set up in November 1895 in line with the 
Regulation regarding the Organization of the Taiwan Governor-General Courts. 
According to the Dispositions for Taiwanese Military Criminals the penalty was 
always death. However, few insurgents were actually put to trial. Most of them were 
hurriedly executed. Only 41 of 345 criminal cases in the tribunal involved the offense 
of rebellious activities between November 1895 and 31 March 1896. The Penalty 
Order for Inhabitants of Taiwan (ordinance no. 4) made the provisions of the army 
and navy criminal law during wartime applicable to cases of homicide, rape and 
robbery without the right of appeal. It was succeeded by the 1898 Bandit Punishment 
Law, a particularly harsh law whose aim was to terrorize the “bandits” into 
submission. Takano demonstrated sympathy for the guerilla fighters; many of them 
were not persecuted during his tenure in 1896-1897. In 1897 district courts imposed 
death on only 54 out of 526 rebel cases. The police were so corrupted that its 
members exhorted money from the Taiwanese in order to not charge them with made 
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up crimes. The official report entitled “Actual conditions in Taiwan” presented some 
time in 1896 to Prime Minister Matsukata admitted that the Japanese military: 
“violently abused the native inhabitants, struck them without reason, forced them to 
sell their goods at a low price; or, in the name of requisition, seized their goods, 
occupied their houses and ancestral halls; or arbitrarily suspecting them (of some 
crime), arrested natives and slaughtered them”. Destruction of temples and schools, 
excavation of tombs, disdain of local customs was not a part of an assimilation policy 
but random violence.73 Early in 1897 Chief Justice Takano accused the Japanese 
police of arresting and torturing inhabitants arbitrarily. The only civil law of the initial 
period of the Japanese occupation was the Civil Litigation Order for Inhabitants of 
Taiwan. This stressed the employment of local customs to resolve lawsuit cases, 
without the right of appeal. No civil law was applied until July 1898 (ritsurei no. 8 of 
1898 enforced the Civil, Commercial and Criminal Law).74 
 
Before the capture of the island in 1895 Qing codes and customary law were 
in effect. The former concerned family matters, loans and land transactions. The latter 
such as the Yeh-chu, the Yung-tien, the Ti-chi, the Tien Pledge, and the T’ai mostly 
regulated old land ownership issues. Due to the absence of a Chinese central 
administration the Taiwanese were accustomed to solving their differences by 
themselves. In 1899, trials in Taiwan were aligned to the Japanese penal codes that in 
turn were adopted from the western style legal systems. In this sense, the 
modernization of the Japanese society in western terms was duplicated on another 
“backward” Asian society that until then had been influenced by Chinese practices. 
Of course, not every aspect of enlightened legislation was put in practice; for 
example, suffrage only existed in the metropolis and not in the colony. Conscription 
was not implemented as it would bring the untrustworthy Taiwanese into the ranks of 
the military.75 The Meiji legislators believed that an outright application of Japan’s 
westernized legal system in Taiwan was not possible due to the island’s particular 
conditions.76 Besides the furei and ritsurei ordinances, legislation in Taiwan can be 
subdivided into further categories: “Legislation of Emergency” according to Article 8 
of the 1889 Japanese constitution and “Supplemental or auxiliary Legislation” 
promulgated by the colonial police for the punishment of offenders. Lastly 
international treaties like the unequal treaties had to be observed in Japan’s colony as 
well. Taiwan from 1895 to 1922 was ruled via special legislation and regulations; 
from that point on and until 1945 most Japanese laws were directly enforced on the 
colony in what Caroline Ts’ai describes as “extension of Japan proper”. The central 
government’s power in Taiwan was limited to appointing and removing Governor-
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Generals, promulgating imperial ordinances, bureaucratic organization, approving 
laws issued by the Governor-Generals and authorizing the colony’s budget and the 
Finance Prosecuting Office’s right of inspection. The historian Takekoshi Yosaburō 
correlated the Governor-General post with the colonial system implemented in French 
Indochina: the Viceroy was above the law, controlled the military and civilian affairs 
and in case of need he could declare martial law.77  
 
The Governor-General’s ordinances were imposed to the people through local 
administrators, governors, mayors or even village leaders in line with the Organic 
Regulations of the Local Governments (Sōtokufu Chihōkan Kansei) of March 1896. 
Local administration was divided in 3 prefectures-provinces (Chō or Shū) and 3 sub-
districts; in municipalities and counties (Shi and Gun) and finally towns and villages 
(Gai and Shō).78 The province was ruled by the provincial governor (Shū-chiji) or by 
the district governor (Chō-chō). They enforced the central government’s laws, had the 
authority to devise their own, supervised local affairs and administrated their 
respective zones of authority. They were assisted in their task usually by a Secretariat, 
the Department of Civil Administration, and a Provincial Police Headquarters. A 
council presided by the Shū-chiji and made up by lower officials and the most 
illustrious residents of each province was more decorative than functional. In case 
military force was needed the provincial governors had to request the Governor-
General’s approval beforehand. In case of emergency however they could ask directly 
the regional commanding officer to employ his troops. Violation of the provincial 
governor’s orders entailed imprisonment of up to two months or a fine of up to 70 
yen. Ritsurei No. 3 of 1904 provided that these governors could arbitrate civil 
disputes within their area of jurisdiction. Gun was run by the Gun-shu and shi by the 
shi-chō, or mayors. The mayors were also the heads of the Shi council, an advisory 
organ that made administrative recommendations to the central government. It also 
promulgated municipal orders and regulated the municipality’s taxes and budget. Its 
members were mainly selected among the most prominent locals by the Mayor. The 
Shi and Shū councils were not decision-making institutions since they were 
completely dominated by Japanese officials and their decisions needed the approval 
of the central colonial authorities anyway. Lastly the towns’ and villages’ elders ought 
to assist their superiors in their executive administrative tasks. The majority of the 
headmen were Japanese. A fraction of these positions was entrusted to the Taiwanese 
and then only to those that had been educated in Japan. Shō was subdivided in Ho and 
Kō, the last level of local administration in Taiwan. The Ho-Kō system was 
exclusively manned by locals as we will see later. Police departments were erected in 
each of the Shū, Shi, Gun, Gai and Shō and these police stations had even smaller 
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branches scattered in every corner of the colony. In 1897 the prefectures were 
increased to 6 with three district offices with general offices, police offices and 
industrial (exploitation) offices subordinated to them. The following year the 
prefectures were again reduced to 3 and 4 district offices.79 Between 1895 and 1909 
the first five governor-generals altered the formation of prefectural and district 
administrations 8 times. These revisions and the constant reshuffling of personnel 
proved the confusion and the lack of a definite colonial policy.80 
The colonial state almost from the start approached the wealthy and influential 
Taiwanese in an effort to utilize their social influence to ease Japan’s rule over the 
island’s population. Considering the inhabitants’ fame, property and willingness to 
cooperate the Japanese employed them in lesser administrative positions. By doing so 
the new rulers redistributed the resources of authority. However in some cases, 
especially during the first phase of the colonial dominion, aspects of traditional social 
structure were maintained as auxiliary to Japan’s still precarious rule. 
After the occupation, some gentry, merchants and scholars decided to 
collaborate with the new rulers. Many of them however, in order to escape the 
advancing occupying forces and later to avoid the “dwarf” domination fled to China. 
Voluntary submission on the part of gentry and scholars signified a privileged and 
enhanced role in the new established colonial society. On 21 June 1895, some of I-lan 
region’s literati hailed the Japanese army as protectors of peace and order in the island 
by hanging banners that welcomed the troops. Similar incidents took place in many 
town and villages throughout Taiwan especially in July and August. The island’s 
literati not familiar with the Japanese language tried to find employment in teaching 
or medicine. However, the western style medicine and modern schooling put forward 
by the rulers brought about the economic deprivation of this influential social class. 
Suspicions about their anti-Japanese activities eliminated the privileged status that 
they had enjoyed during the Qing era. However, many of the literati either 
collaborated or demonstrated indifference for the new regime.81   
In the beginning the Japanese relied upon the more familiar Qing institutions 
for administrating Taiwan. Right from the start they utilized the system of town and 
village headmen to approach the inhabitants. Early in 1895 the gentry of the colony’s 
capital asked permission by the Japanese authorities to hold public meetings and to 
establish some kind of local bureaus to protect the law-abiding citizens from the 
attacks of partisans and Japanese alike that molested women, seized property and 
mistreated the loyal people of the communities. Some kind of local organization was 
needed amidst this uncertain and unsettling initial period. On 8 August, the first pao-
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liang chu bureau was created with the goal of maintaining order, redressing 
grievances and working for the public interest. If the initial period of operation bore 
fruits, the colonial state would then assume its funding and eventual expansion 
elsewhere. In late September, the central pao-liang chu was awarded its first funding. 
The upper class members that managed the branches were granted some privileges 
and had to report to the Governor-General government. In exchange, the merchants 
and upper-class members signed statements of loyalty and promised to abide by the 
Japanese rules. Twenty branch offices mushroomed in the following months until the 
end of the war. The Japanese by collaborating with the local elites gathered 
information about the rebels’ hideouts, placated the most influential part of the 
population and made a step towards the consolidation of their power. On 19 October 
1896, a similar association called Shen-shang hsieh-hui or Shinshō Kyōkai in 
Japanese was set up in Meng-chia by Taiwanese merchants with the goal of 
promoting economic development and association between colonizers and colonized. 
Financial difficulties and the end of the war made the existence of these offices 
obsolete. The ties established with the elites during this troublesome era were not 
entirely disrupted. Many of the pao-liang chu collaborators were appointed as minor 
functionaries, interpreters, clerks, and local government advisors (sanji). For example, 
Lin Yao-t'ing after welcoming the Japanese troops in his town Taichū (Taichung) in 
August 1895 advanced to honorary positions such as councilor and supernumerary of 
the town’s court. Yang Chi-ch'en, ex member of the pao-liang chu office, was 
awarded the right to sell opium in his district in 1897. The scholar Shintarō Shirai 
during the period 1896-1899 negotiated the terms of the rebels’ surrender in central 
Taiwan through the assistance of the local literati. When in March 1900 the police 
arrested some innocent villagers in Northern Taiwan the local elites helped to diffuse 
the situation. This episode demonstrates that these collaborators were acting as 
intermediates between the police and the villagers, between Taihoku and the general 
population that is.82  
The first three governor-generals concentrated their attention on how to give 
an end to the endless guerilla warfare that embarrassed and endangered Japan’s initial 
colonial undertaking. Despite the declaration of civil rule in the island in March 1896, 
its administration remained preponderantly military oriented. 83  The colony was 
practically under constant martial law. Until 1898, when competent colonial 
magistrates took over, no sound administrative base or long-term civil policies were 
formed. Tōkyō faced with the stubborn rebels, financial limitations and the unsettling 
watchful eye of the westerners was struggling to retain control. After three years of 
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continuous insurrection, scandals 84  and rapid turnover of incompetent Governor-
Generals, Japan’s colonial experiment in Taiwan seemed destined to fail. 
 
Kabayama’s rule was marked by the war of occupation and the constant 
violence it brought in Taiwan. Stubborn resistance, ambushes and diseases due to the 
island’s tropical and inhospitable environment account for the Japanese frustration 
and atrocities. Terror was seen as an instrument to instill awe and fear and also to 
provide a stern warning to the locals that fighting back or assisting the insurgents was 
futile. Between 16 and 22 June 1896, 30 villages (4,295 houses) were burned to the 
ground as a response to a revolt that had broken out in Yunlin in central Taiwan.85 A 
contemporary witness affirmed: “During the punitive campaign, the number of 
bandits, implicated persons and suspected persons killed was considerable, and 
private houses destroyed by fire actually exceeded three thousand". In July, the 
Governor-General in order to quell the resistance requested persistently and received 
reinforcements from Tōkyō.86 Kabayama was also suspicious of the conservative pro-
Chinese literati and gentry in Taiwan, whom he believed to be inciting anti-Japanese 
feelings. The cruel treatment only managed to stiffen resistance to the conquerors. 
Denison, who was in Taiwan at the time, provided some fragments of the rebel 
leaders rhetoric: “…all must pay tribute to the Japanese, that not even the pig, dog, 
cat, goose, or chicken would be exempt from taxation; and that the Chinese should not 
close their doors against the Japanese, but give freely to the conquerors of all they 
had, even to the women [sic], who should be placed at the disposal of the soldiers”.87 
On 24 June 1896, Kabayama prohibited the acceptance of gifts by the colonial 
officials. This practice was widespread during the Qing period but the new rulers 
strived to prove their moral superiority compared to the oppressive and corrupted 
Chinese. Discrediting the previous regime in a constant and prejudiced way was a 
method to highlight the benefits of Japan’s impartial, benevolent and generous rule. 
At the end of 1895 Mizuno Jun tried to show the difference between the political 
cultures of Japan and China. When rumours about an impending bandit attack reached 
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the capital, he reassured the inhabitants that the Japanese army would be there to 
guarantee their safety.88 
 
When the skillful politician Katsura Tarō took over in June 1896 expectations 
were high. When he assumed office he declared himself to be a gradual assimilationist 
like Hara and Itō.89 Katsura acknowledged that his predecessor’s excessive use of 
force against the civilians fuelled further resistance. The problem was the army 
officers’ racist and brutal treatment in the pacified territories they were tasked with 
administrating. Thus, Katsura promoted a policy of cooperation and friendly relations 
with the local elites. Soon however, after his appointment he requested from Tōkyō 
the dispatch of an additional 2,300 policemen and 1,500 gendarmeries to expand 
Japanese authority in every corner of the colony. The second Governor-General was 
eager to turn a blind eye to the harmful habit of opium smoking as long as the 
inhabitants were cooperative and did not threaten his power. He also planned to give 
amnesty to the rebel leaders in order to persuade them to surrender. His other goal 
was to bring about the improvement of transportation and of public health. In 1896, he 
wrote to Itō: “…the way to care for the natives is to show them kindness and the most 
easily perceived kindness is better safety and health”. In relation to the state of the 
communications he declared in 1897: “If we cannot open these shipping routes 
(Japan-Taiwan-China-Philippines), the development of Taiwan is at an end… with 
such poor communications, who would risk the heat and plague to go there? If we are 
to have no immigrants to Taiwan, how can we built commerce and open up the 
land?”90  His ultimate goal was the penetration of South China. Before having the 
opportunity to implement his ideas he was recalled in Tōkyō after just four months 
because his presence was deemed more essential there.91  
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In October 1896 another army officer, Lieutenant General Nogi succeeded 
Katsura. Nogi firmly believed that the application of Western style legislation in a 
place as ill prepared for these fundamental reforms as Taiwan would cause more 
social unrest. The new Governor-General adopted his predecessor’s idea to substitute 
the local military administrates with civilian ones but not his leniency towards the 
rebels. This fact further strengthened the opposition. His tenure was characterized by 
the enhanced presence and role of the police. The 70 inspectors and 700 policemen in 
North Taiwan in 1895 increased to 3,270 by late 1897, distributed to the numerous 
new police branches as far as the island’s southern tip. This rapid expansion however, 
meant that many of the officers were not trained or properly qualified to assume their 
duties. Police officers besides maintaining public order were now entrusted with 
broader tasks such as overseeing public sanitation. To facilitate the island’s 
governance Nogi replaced the 12 sub-districts in Taiwan with 78 managements 
offices (bemmusho) under the jurisdiction of each province and recognized as official 
administrative units, towns and villages (Gai and Shō). Every management office was 
divided into three sections: general affairs, police affairs and tax affairs. In November 
1896, he instituted the Pacification Office to deal with the aborigines. Its goals were 
to open up natural resources, promote economic development and halt the atrocious 
head-hunting practice. Having in mind the reduction of expenses Nogi tried to cut 
down on the presence of the military 92  in his administration and to promote its 
substitution by the less expensive police personnel. His triple guard system (sandan 
keibi sei) divided the island into three areas. The mountain and forest zone was 
assigned to the military and the gendarmerie, the cities and villages to the police and 
the rest to a mixed force. Each force had its own chain of command. These measures 
deteriorated Taiwan’s already restive atmosphere and even increased the colonial 
government’s expenses. The police’s tasks coincided with those of the administration 
generating even more confusion. The management offices were inadequate to perform 
their designated duties and proved very expensive too as they were manned by 
handsomely paid but inefficient Japanese bureaucrats. Placing emphasis on the 
function of these offices while the local elites were being totally ignored was Nogi’s 
greatest mistake. Furthermore, the third “intermediate” zone was not clearly defined 
and discords between the police and the military were often.  Civilian abuse was not 
eradicated either. Nogi failed despite enjoying freedom of action in accordance with 
the Governor-General system and Law 63.93  
 
The first three governor-generals failed to achieve financial independence for 
the colony or even a suitable environment to attract capitals that would mitigate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
colony’s products and displaying Taiwanese aborigines side by side with Ainus and Okinawans. See 
Lone, Army, Empire, pp. 53-55. 
92 Another measure that he took in order to check the army’s influence in Taiwan was to transfer the 
telegraphic and postal services from the military’s jurisdiction to the civil authority during his tenure. 
See Marco Zagarola, Taiwan-Formosa: Da Shimonoseki alla fine del Secondo Conflitto Mondiale, 
1895-1945, vol. 2, Ph.D Dissertation, Sapienza University of Rome (1991), p. 258. 
93 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 175-178.  
395 
 
Tōkyō’s economic commitments. The year 1898 constitutes an epoch-changing 
threshold between the earlier unproductive colonial rule and the subsequent efficient, 
pragmatic, consistent administration under the direction of talented bureaucrats. 
Indeed, legislation and reforms after February 1898 were scientific, modern and 
enlightening, or to put it better were presented as such in order to earn the world’s 
approval. In reality Japan’s rule continued to be oppressive and violent as any other 
policy of colonial control and the new reformers devoted their efforts in exploiting 
and further tightening Tōkyō’s grip in Taiwan. Regardless of their motives the island 
entered a new era of planned capitalistic development, of economic profitability for 
the foreign masters and of sounder and more methodical governance. Starting from 
the new Governor-General and his Chief of Civil Affairs the Japanese showed great 
enthusiasm about their first colonial endeavour and curiosity about their new colony; 
they set out to study as “scientifically” as possible the colonized and make them loyal, 
healthy and productive in a way that none of the imperial powers ever attempted. 
Drafts, charts and surveys were employed as evidence of Japan’s ability in colonizing 
and as a way to control more effectively its subjects; statistics were the episteme of 
colonial government. Land, population, 94  mineral resources, hygiene, education, 
literally every aspect of the colonial society was registered and accounted for. Taiwan, 
as Japan’s first colony, was the nation’s “colonial laboratory”, a test for further 
empire-building.95 Successful colonization not only would set the pattern for colonial 
policies in Korea and Manchuria.96 It would also make Japan appear as bearer of the 
civilizing mission to those both within and outside its boundaries and a peer among its 
western counterparts, finally gaining their recognition and respect.  
In 1896 almost 7 million yen was allocated to the colonial government by 
Tōkyō and another 6 million the following year as subsidies. The colonial 
government’s tax revenue was 2,7 million in 1896 and 5,3 in 1897. During the tenures 
as heads of Civil Affairs of Mizuno Jun, the most important bureaucrat of the colony 
before 1898, and his replacement Sone Shizuo (1845-1903), a Finance Ministry 
official, the colonial administration aggrandized numbers and costs without tangible 
results. By late 1897 the perpetuation of violence, of scandals and of high expenses 
had shaken Tōkyō’s confidence in Nogi’s administration. Serious discussions about 
selling the colony, viewed as a burden, a luxury or a nuisance by some97 to France for 
                                                          
94 The Japanese reported the population of the island as 2,587,688 in 1896 and 3,123,302 in 1905, a 
remarkable increase of 21% in nine years. See Office of Population Research, “Colonial Demography: 
Formosa” in Population Index, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Jul., 1944), p. 150. The first population census, 
organized in 1905, roughly showed that the inhabitants of Chinese origin numbered over 2,800,000, the 
aborigines about 135,000, and the Japanese officials and colonists, excluding the military, some 
50,000. See Komagome and Mangan, “Japanese colonial education”, p. 313.  For the detailed official 
results of the 1905 census see: Committee of the Formosan special census investigation, The Special 
population census of Formosa, (Tokyo 1909), p. 31.  
95 Yamamoto, Nihon shokuminchi keizaishi kenkyū, p. 4.  
96 Asano, Shokuminchi Teikoku, p. 4. 
97 The journalist Kuga Katsunan in April 1898 wrote: “Hainan Island, Hong Kong, Samsah Bay, 
Chusan island, and their coastlines, have all been occupied by others. Even though Taiwan and the 
Pescadores look on to Southern China, they are set to become practically no more than isolated South 
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100 million yen made their appearance.98 The budget for the colony in 1896 was 
10,610,000 yen of which only 2,620,000 were actually received. In 1897 many argued 
that the tax payers’ money had to be invested in more crucial economic sectors at 
home amidst Tōkyō’s modernization efforts.99  In January 1898 when Itō became 
Prime Minister, Nogi and Sone were recalled. Kodama Gentarō, one of the army’s 
most prominent figures, was appointed as Taiwan’s Governor General in February. 
For the post of the chief of Civil Affairs, Katsura proposed Gotō Shinpei a medical 
doctor and the chief of Home Ministry’s Sanitation Bureau.100  
 
The Minister of Finance, Inoue Kaoru was not sure about Gotō and had him 
present his ideas about Taiwan in a memorandum. Gotō passed the test with flying 
colors; his memorandum called “Rehabilitation of the Taiwan Administration” shaped 
the Japanese colonial policy until 1915, when the last of his protégés left the 
Governor-General administration. In his memorandum, Gotō lamented the colonial 
authorities’ disregard of the Taiwanese practices and administrative institutions. 
Instead of spending money Tōkyō could adopt traditional methods of control such as 
policing, village adjudication and tax collection that were already familiar to the 
colonized. Abrupt modernization for Taiwan was not feasible at the moment. For 
Gotō the Governor-General government ought to be more efficient and smaller in size 
in order to cut down the expenses. Lastly Taiwan should be developed through deficit 
financing by floating government bonds: the government had to invest more money 
than it actually pocketed with the expectation that enhanced economic activity would 
make up for the deficit. The money had to be used for the construction of railways, 
harbors, artillery batteries, sewage systems. Gotō concluded that monopoly on opium 
selling and a new tax reform could diminish the colony’s economic reliance on Japan 
proper. Inoue and other cabinet members were convinced. Gotō appeared more 
inclined to embrace the more economic and efficient, in establishing control, British 
paradigm than assimilation, which appeared to him as impractical for the time.101 
  
Gotō’s approach was more methodical than the ones employed by previous 
colonial bureaucrats. He saw himself as the physician and the Taiwanese as the 
backward, “ill” population to be medically treated and brought to modern, civilized 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Sea islands, worthless for our China policy. Do not British or German ships already sit in Samsah Bay, 
in Taiwan’s immediate neighbor, Fujian? Japan is increasingly being ejected from Far Eastern affairs. 
Today the occupation of Taiwan seems more like a burden”. See Lone, Army, Empire, p.  43. Many 
perceived the colony as a luxury but for the agronomist Nitobe it was “a necessity”. See Inazo Nitobe, 
“Japan as a Colonizer” in The Journal of Race Development, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Apr., 1912), p. 359. 
98 One newspaper article at the time reached the conclusion that: “no benefit left, no cost that will be 
repaid, no prospect of quelling bandits, and no way to control foreigners [there]. Japan keeps Taiwan 
only because abandoning the territory would damage Japan’s international standing and inhibit Japan’s 
advancement”. See Nomura, “Making the Japanese Empire”, p. 76.         
99 Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, p. 17. 
100 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, pp. 81-83.  
101 Ibid., p. 83. Gotō declared that it would take at least 80 years of cultural assimilation until the 
colonized reach the level of the Japanese. See Leo Tsu-Shin Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial 
Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation, (Berkeley-London 2001), p. 25. 
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life. His prescription was a thorough survey of the island’s society and the application 
of “principles of biology” in line with the Social Darwinist norms. The Japanese 
colonizers, were like doctors, 102  seen as absolute superiors, spiritually and 
technologically. On the other hand, the Taiwanese were the uncivilized patients in 
need of enlightenment and of the metropolis’ intensive care. Gotō, at some point, 
professed that colonial policy had to be “based on thorough research”.103 As he told to 
Kodama: “We cannot suddenly change the eyes of a halibut to look like those of a sea 
bream. Likewise, the fact that we need to respect customs comes from the principles 
of biology”. In contrast to Hara and others that saw Taiwan, Okinawa and Hokkaidō 
as integral parts of the empire, Gotō was well aware that Taiwan was just a colony. 
Upon arriving there to take his post on 28 March 1898 he declared: “In substance, 
Taiwan is a colonial territory; it is indeed our nation's only colonial territory, and will 
be our training ground in colonial policymaking”. Thus, western colonial patterns 
were useful and applicable. He suggested that some of the native customs and 
institutions of the Qing period should be maintained in the interest of Japan’s rule. In 
this way Gotō put forward a new special legal system for Taiwan, influenced by 
Western and Chinese law that set the example of the Japanese administration that was 
to come in Taiwan and Korea. For example, despite the grandiose proclamations 
about “enlightenment” the ancient custom of flogging, 104  banned in metropolitan 
Japan, was deemed as useful by Taihoku and was maintained because of its efficiency 
and low cost.105 The Japanese were anxious to make their first colonial undertaking a 
success,106 not only to serve the sole interests of Japan but also "to satisfy their pride 
                                                          
102 Gotō’s associate Takagi Tomoe wrote in 1902: "There are always the missionaries working as 
pioneers in those foreign colonies. This is not the case with Japan. On this matter, Mr. Goto's view is to 
make the doctors as substitutes for the missionaries.” See Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial 
Colony, p. 190. 
103 Yao Jen-To, “The Japanese Colonial State and Its Form of Knowledge in Taiwan” in Taiwan Under 
Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: History, Culture, Memory, ed. L. Ping-Hui, D. Der-wei Wang, 
(New York, 2006), pp. 42-46.  
104 According to the 1904 Fine and Flogging Law, the detainees had the right to select detention, 
flogging or fine. Most of the times they opted for prison because of their low living standards. Another 
suppressing measure was the 1906 Taiwan Vagrant Control Regulations which gave the police the 
power to punish any troublemakers in the colony and compel them into forced labour. See Wang, Legal 
reform, p.  48. 
105 Wang, Legal reform, pp. 47-51. The violent actions undertaken by the colonial state on numerous 
occasions were contradictory to the scientific and civilizing process. Employing corporal punishment 
and outmoded Taiwanese customs was incompatible with the modernity and the enlightenment so often 
quoted by the Japanese imperialists to justify their rule. See Nadin Heé, “Taiwan under Japanese Rule. 
Showpiece of a Model Colony? Historiographical Tendencies in Narrating Colonialism” in History 
Compass, 12/8 (2014), pp. 632–641.  
106 Takekoshi Yosaburō while visiting the colony in 1904 exclaimed: “Japan can point to her success 
thus far in Formosa as a proof of her worthiness to be admitted into the community of the world’s great 
colonial powers”. Japan’s success was extraordinary, taking into consideration the lack “of capital, but 
also of able and powerful merchants”. After passing the “first examination as a colonizing nation” 
Japan as a worthy imperialist could in the future become the “Queen of the Pacific”. Rear-Admiral 
Tōgō Minoru (1890–1962) triumphantly wrote in 1916: “We have admirably transformed this chaotic 
situation, restored peace, established order … The reason for our distinguished record in colonization is 
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of possession and to gain repute among the powers". Tōkyō’s policies were not put in 
practice to benefit the Taiwanese, albeit they incidentally brought about: "the highest 
material standard of living that is available to ordinary citizens anywhere in the Far 
East, with the possible exception of Japan itself."107 Taiwan was a test of Japan’s 
status as a power and thus it was an experiment that had to succeed. Successful 
colonization according to the principles of Social Darwinism meant that Japan as a 
strong state had the right to absorb weaker nations and further expand.108  
 
The Kodama-Gotō era can be divided in two periods: the emergency phase 
from 1898 to 1902 and the development phase from 1902 to 1906. During the first 
period, the pacification of the island was set as a priority. This is when the police 
presence was intensified and the study of old customs was put forward with the goal 
of finally controlling the riotous population. Taiwan’s institutions had to be improved 
and modernized but the island was not yet ready for the direct implementation of 
more sophisticated laws like those in effect in Japan. In May 1901, the chief of Civil 
Affairs attacked through an article the assimilationist policymakers in Tōkyō and 
stated that Taiwan required at least for the time being a special and distinct legal 
framework.109 
 
Gotō espoused Kirkwood’s theories about indirect rule: "In order to govern 
Taiwan with success, the metropolitan government should interfere with colonial 
affairs as little as possible. It is necessary to delegate full authority to the governor-
general and to sanction the autonomous actions of the colonial government”.110 The 
fact that in his office he held a great selection of western works on colonialism is 
often cited to show his adoption of foreign models of ruling.111 He presented his 
tenure’s programme in a lecture about colonial administration in 1915: "When we 
took possession of Taiwan, there was no pre-determined policy available. Governor-
general Kodama thus decided the following outlines to be the foundation of 
governance: (1) To base the administration on scientific research, especially on 
biology. (2) To increase the harmony between the civilian and the military officials. 
(3) To investigate the land and people while tackling the urgent affairs. (4) To 
research the legal relations between Taiwan and the homeland. (5) To substitute 
sanitation facilities for religion as means of colonization. (6) To adopt special 
methods for the police, legal and economic organizations. (7) To pacify the "bandits" 
and "savages" with the priority on the "bandits" and (8) to deal with the national or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the result of the Japanese race’s unique ability to rule another people and our skill in colonial 
management…”.  See Ching, “Becoming ‘Japanese’", pp. 15-17.   
107 M. A. Aziz, Japan’s Colonialism and Indonesia, Ph.D Dissertation, Leyden University 1955, pp. 7-
10.  
108 Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, p. 85-86.  
109 Ibid., pp. 92-93.  
110 Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony, p. 175. 
111 Gunnar Abramson, "Comparative Colonialisms: Variations in Japanese Colonial Policy in Taiwan 
and Korea, 1895 ‐ 1945," in PSU McNair Scholars Online Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 5 (2004), p. 
18.  
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racial awareness with appropriate measures”.112 On a different occasion, he explained 
his “biological politics”. In one memorandum to Kodama he affirmed: “Any scheme 
of colonial administration, given the present advances in science, should be based on 
principles of Biology. What are these principles? They are to promote science and 
develop agriculture, industry, sanitation, education, communications, and police force. 
If these are satisfactorily accomplished, we will be able to persevere in the struggle 
for survival and win the struggle of the "survival of the fittest." Animals survive by 
overcoming heat and cold, and by enduring thirst and hunger. This is possible for 
them because they adapt to their environment. Thus, depending upon time and place, 
we too should adopt suitable measures and try to overcome the various difficulties 
that confront us. In our administration of Taiwan we will then be assured of a future 
of brilliance and glory”. 113  He went on to claim that: "The essence of colonial 
management lies in the foundation of biology and today's scientific progress. What I 
meant by the foundation of biology is to improve scientific ways of life such as trade, 
industry, sanitation, education, communication and policing. Based on this 
foundation, we can face up to the struggle for survival and realize the law of survival 
of the fittest. Just like those animals that adapt themselves to the environments and 
survive, we should adjust ourselves according to time and places. By so doing, we can 
overcome all kinds of difficulties and devise the appropriate schemes in order to 
achieve the glory of Taiwan management”. As he explained to Inoue Kaoru in early 
1898: “The essence of British colonial policy is not drastic legal reform, but the use of 
'conveniences of civilization’ namely, the scientific facilities such as railway, 
sewerage, steam boat, telegraph and hospitals, etc., to change the attitudes of the 
people”.114 The Chief of Civil Affairs never really intended to confer equal rights or 
self-government to the Taiwanese. He was reluctant to introduce enlightened 
principles of modern civilization such as freedom or democracy to “rough and 
infantile people”.115 The civilization he promoted was material and not spiritual.   
 
In the early 1880s a debate, prompted by the unequal treaties revision, was 
held on whether foreigners should be allowed to live in Japan, among the Japanese. 
The mixed-blood idea (the Japanese originally consisted of different racial groups 
such as Southern Islanders, Koreans, Ainus. Hence this theory justified Japan’s 
colonial domination over its kin nations) was in line with modern anthropology but 
for those that professed the purity of national essence,116 the Japanese society should 
                                                          
112 Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony, p. 205.  
113 Chang Han-Yu and Ramon H. Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development Policy in Taiwan, 1895-
1906: A Case of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Aug., 
1963), p. 438.  
114 Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony, pp. 197-198. 
115 For Gotō the mentality of the natives was “naive and childlike”. He deemed his posting in Taiwan 
as “exile”. See Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2, pp. 116-117, 126. 
116 The historian Taguchi Ukichi (1855-1905) believed that the Japanese are “racially distinguished” 
from the Yellow race and “racially similar to peoples of India, Persia, Greece and Rome”. See Leo 
Tsu-Shin Ching, Tracing contradictions: Interrogating Japanese colonialism and its discourse, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California (1994), p. 52.  
400 
 
not be tainted by foreigners. The Meiji leaders, by incorporating the Ainus and the 
Ryūkyūans clearly favoured the “mixed-blood” approach and by 1895 many in Japan 
appeared in favour of assimilating the Taiwanese as long as they adopted the 
benevolent programme of Japanization. Racial affinity and cultural proximity was a 
double-edged sword. On one hand, many based on these traits believed that 
assimilation and eventually, adoption into the imperial family state was possible.117 
Others however, tried to exaggerate the differences between colonizers and colonized 
to elevate Japanese prestige and to maintain authority over the ruled, making Japan 
appear as a Western colonial power. Seven months after Gotō took office he realized: 
“…There was nothing different between Japanese and Chinese [in Taiwan] in skin 
color and all other physical features. This situation is highly different from how the 
Dutch, the French or the Spanish held and ruled over their colonies. Therefore, if [we 
Japanese] do not behave ourselves discreetly and maintain our dignity I believe it 
would be difficult to make the newly incorporated people respect us with all their 
hearts. Why do I say so? If [the Chinese in Taiwan] cut their hair and put on western 
clothes they would become totally the same as us; nay, their physique may be superior 
to the Japanese...”. He wanted the Taiwanese to respect Japan’s authority, but not to 
make them fully Japanese (discriminatory assimilation). Nitobe Inazō, the architect of 
Taiwan’s modern sugar industry, was also worried that the smaller physical stature of 
the Japanese in relation to Chinese and Taiwanese could harm their status as rulers. 
To make up for this deficiency Nitobe proposed further coercion as well as grandeur; 
government buildings had to be constructed in a way that would instill owe to the 
natives. It was a way to overcome the inferiority complex and the anxiety that the 
Taiwanese and Japanese were similar and both threatened by the West.118 Nitobe is 
attributed with the iconic phrase “colonization is the spread of civilization".119  
Taiwan can be considered an exploitation colony where the rulers were an 
absolute minority among the natives. Whereas French assimilationism embraced a 
romantic civic and republican universalism, the Japanese version was rather racial;120 
                                                          
117 Japan was trying to prove to the West that it was a civilized state and in the same time to convince 
the other Asian nations that its “colonialism was fundamentally better than European tyranny because 
of the racial affinities”. See Ying Xiong, Representing Empire: Japanese Colonial Literature in 
Taiwan and Manchuria, (Leiden 2014), p. 31.  
118 Feelings of inferiority towards the more advanced and menacing western nations and of superiority 
over the more backward Asian and African nations placed Japan in the middle position of the racial 
hierarchy according to some scholars such as the famous author Natsume Sōseki (1867-1916) and 
Fukuzawa. See Robert Thomas Tierney, Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in 
Comparative Frame, (London, 2010), pp. 17-26.  
119 Lung-chih, From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony, p. 200.  
120  For the colonial expert Tadao Yanaihara (1893-1961) assimilation was not the early 
administration’s main policy. It was only a scheme to differentiate Japanese colonialism from its 
western counterparts and silence those in Taiwan and Japan that were calling for the colony’s political 
autonomy. Yanaihara argues that the assimilation rhetoric and the militaristic rule constitute the two 
most fundamental characteristics of French colonialism. Japanese colonialism partially shared these 
characteristics. However, the French case derived from the 18th century enlightenment philosophy: the 
colonized possessed the capability to become French and have the same rights as the French. For the 
Japanese, political rights are only assured after the colonized have completed the process of becoming 
Japanese. Thus, Japanese assimilation was based on the ethnocentric, militaristic, racist and 
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the goal was the integration of the Taiwanese as (lesser) members in the Yamato 
family.121 In theory the whole population of the colonies, and not a few native elites, 
would be given equal rights at some point. Education, of the Japanese language that 
is,122 was the means by which assimilation would be accomplished.123 The first step 
was assimilation before integration. The goal was to transform the peripheral peoples 
into Japanese (to make the colonized as similar as possible to the colonizers), before 
granting them the status of Japanese citizen just like it happened in Hokkaidō and the 
Ryūkyū islands.124 It was deemed risky to grant citizenship rights lightly to peoples 
whose loyalty was problematic or else the metropolis itself would be in danger of 
disintegration. 125  Japan was not a superpower. Its limited resources meant that 
realistic priorities and a gradualist approach had to define its incorporation of foreign 
territories.126 
Gotō also promoted a centralized bureaucratic organization to take charge of 
the colony. Every facet of political, economic, and social policy was to be decided by 
the Civil Affairs Department, subject to the approval of the Governor General. 
Kabayama hired many colonial employees from Kagoshima, his home city. 127 
Ishizuka Eizō (1866-1942), who was to be the colony’s 13th Governor-General, 
lamented the low standard of these men,128 the mismanagement and the corruption 
                                                                                                                                                                      
nationalistic conviction of the superiority of the Japanese spirit. Ching, “Becoming ‘Japanese’", pp. 98-
99. 
121 Sayaka Chatani, Nation-Empire: Rural Youth Mobilization in Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, 1895-
1945, Ph.D Dissertation Columbia University 2014, p.7. 
122 Only through the unique and sacred Japanese language could one become a real Japanese according 
to colonial educators. Faye Yuan Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of 
Taiwan and the South, (Honolulu 2003), p. 129. 
123 Chikashi Furukawa, Taiwan, Kankoku, Okinawa de Nihongo wa nani o shita no ka: gengo shihai no 
motarasu mono [What did Japanese do in Taiwan, Korea, Okinawa:  results of linguistic control], 
(Tokyo, 2007) p. 24.  
124 Komegome, Shokuminchi teikoku, pp. 58-59. 
125 Political and administrative autonomy could prove fatal for Tōkyō’s long-term grip over Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese, as the Ryūkyūans and the Ainu before them, had to be politically, spiritually and 
culturally assimilated for the metropolis’ national security and well-being. Hara on 2 January 1899 
wrote in favour of the assimilation doctrine and warned that “appeasement buys peace in the short 
term” but can be dangerous in the future. Isawa Shūji, Taiwan’s Education Bureau Chief from 1895 
until 1897, could not agree more: “In order to maintain order in a new territory, in addition to 
conquering it externally through force, it is necessary to conquer its spirit, dispel its old national 
dreams, and realize a new national spirit. In other words, it is necessary to pursue Japanization”. 
Japanization would be achieved mainly through education as in the other two peripheral territories. See 
Matsuzaki, Institutions by Imposition, p. 63. 
126 Ching, Tracing contradictions, pp. 86-89. 
127 The pacifist author Uchimura Kanzō sarcastically commented: “Of Satsuma [the government’s] 
misrule in Formosa, it is all too painful for us to tell. The Land of the Virtuous in extending its 
‘virtuous rule’ over its newly acquired colony, has converted it to a den of robbers and extortioners. 
Formosa that was got as a guarantee of the peace in the East now proves a ‘thorn in the flesh’ of the 
nation that got it, and a fear of disintegration of the empire from which it was gotten”. See Urs Matthias 
Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on 
National Identity, 1895-1904, (London-New York 2009), pp. 48-49.  
128 According to a field report written in 1896 “it goes without saying that they have poor experience 
and talent in regard to their professional duties; and in addition, not only are they often not well-versed 
in their role, but they also (pass their time in) amusement and idleness, and avoid matters with the 
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that tormented the first administrations. Gotō Shinpei implemented financial 
rationalization and a drastic cost cutting policy. 129  He reduced the number of 
prefectures to 3 and the branch offices (bemmusho) to 45. Special appointments were 
discontinued and 1,080 officials were removed. Gotō travelled to Japan throughout 
1898 to find and recruit young and qualified officials such as: Nitobe Inazō 
(agricultural development); Hampei Nagao (construction), Tatsumi Iwai (finance), 
and Nakamura Zekō or Yoshikoto (1867-1927) (monopoly bureaus). Other posts were 
manned by capable prefectural officials or university graduates that constituted Gotō’s 
team in the Civil Administration department. The group met regularly to decide upon 
new policies and Gotō as the director always pushed for better performance and 
efficiency. A measure that was to enhance the rulers’ authority was the separation of 
the colonial officials from the populace. The Chief of Civil Affairs instructed these 
particular bureaucrats to wear distinct uniforms and live in designated compounds.130 
Therefore, the pillars of Japan’s colonial policy in Taiwan after 1898 were efficient 
organization and the British tactic of impressing the colonized through uniforms, city 
planning and architecture. The adoption of this policy masked Japanese insecurity; 
they tried to prove that they were superior, modern, and different from the uncivilized 
Taiwanese from any point of view.  
Gotō overstated the importance of Taiwan’s successful colonization to Japan: 
“Our nation’s history as a Colonial Power commences with the story of our 
administration in Formosa, and our failure or success there must exercise a marked 
influence on all our future undertakings”. However, Japanese colonialism did not 
commence in 1895 with the acquisition of Taiwan. The colonization of Hokkaidō and 
the Ryūkyūs set the pattern for the administration of Taiwan and later of Korea. 
Taking this in consideration we can divide the Japanese colonial period in two parts: 
the internal “secondary” colonialism from 1868 to 1895 and the external expansion 
from 1895 until 1945.131 
General Kodama Gentarō’s contribution in the colony’s administration is often 
overshadowed by his Chief of Civil Affairs’ fame. Before becoming Taiwan’s fourth 
Governor-General, he had a great military reputation and was considered one of the 
army’s most prominent officers. He had participated in the Boshin war, the quelling 
of the Saga and the Satsuma rebellions and later he had served as head of the Army 
War College and Vice Army Minister. Concurrently with his colonial post he was 
appointed Army Minister from December 1900 to June 1901. Officially he served as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
excuse of illness” and “government officials in Taiwan are, for the most part, (none but) inferior 
employees, ones who seek an official career in a new territory either because they cannot obtain a 
posting in naichi, or because they could not retain their position as officials in naichi due to their bad 
job performance”. See Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2, p. 45.  
129 Ts’ai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire, pp. 53-54.  
130 Han-Yu and Myers, “Japanese Colonial Development Policy, pp. 437-438.  
131  Hui Ju Chang, Victorian Japan in Taiwan Transmission and Impact of the ‘Modern’ upon the 
Architecture of Japanese Authority, 1853-1919, Ph.D Dissertation, University of Sheffield (December 
2014), pp. 257-259, 294. 
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the colony’s director, but in practice he was number two after Gotō. His views 
reflected part of the views of the late 19th century-early 20th Meiji upper classes. For 
the military, Taiwan was not just an outer territory but a spearhead of Japan’s survival 
and further expansion.   
In July 1895 Tōkyō’s diplomatic authorities formally informed Russia, France 
and Germany, the members of the Triple Intervention, that Japan had assumed control 
of Taiwan. The following month the sea boundary between the Philippine island chain 
and the Japanese colony was delimited.132 Fearful of foreign influence and political 
penetration the new rulers tried to isolate the colony form the outside world except 
from Japan.133 Mass Chinese immigration into the island was discouraged and western 
commercial interests were obstructed as much as possible. Many western merchants 
trading the island’s products pre-colonially in the designated treaty ports abandoned 
their operations due to Tōkyō’s favouritism towards Japanese businesses. 134 
Expulsion of foreign merchants was also achieved through hostile measures directed 
against them and the state monopolies of the colony’s most priced products. 135 
Interaction between the Taiwanese and South Chinese became more difficult. 
Furthermore, the Taiwanese that were allowed to travel in mainland China could do 
so as Japanese nationals after May 1897 and were always shadowed by the Japanese 
authorities.136  The Japanese Foreign Ministry had to provide for their security in 
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China and in many occasions the Japanese consulates’ guard intervened on their 
behalf in Chinese treaty ports like Fuzhou and Xiamen.137 Albeit without the same 
citizen rights as the Japanese, the colonized made use of this protection to enhance 
their commercial activities in the mainland.138 
On a broader level Taiwan was to serve as Japan’s base of operations in the 
imperialistic field. The colony would act as a conduit through which Japanese 
influence and capital were to augment Tōkyō’s interests and enable territorial 
expansion in south China and beyond. Katsura declared: “If we want to frame a policy 
for managing Taiwan, we must formulate a policy toward China. This requires 
devising policy for managing south China, and to accomplish that, we must manage 
the harbor of Amoy and Fukien. If we intend to do these things, we must ultimately 
consider a policy that relates to South-East Asia”.139 In 1896 he claimed: “… the 
development of Taiwan should not be confined to the island, but should be planned in 
terms of an advance into a wider area”. In the summer of 1896, while writing to Itō, 
he added: “We must make Southern China, the Fukien zone, ours, and establish a 
close connection with Amoy”.140 He continued: “…in political and trade terms, Amoy 
will be our most important point, serving as a new channel for our ways and goods. 
With this, we can nurse our possibilities in the Fujian region and be ready when 
opportunity appears…” and “…We should hold matters in the north and push south, 
reaching out from the Japan Sea to the China Sea and all parts of the coast”.141 
Kodama was of the same opinion. In his “Fourteen-point Memorandum on the Past 
and Future Administration of Taiwan of 1899”, he stated: “In order to accomplish 
nanshin [southern expansion doctrine] ... we should make it our policy to gain a 
predominant commercial influence in South China and the South Seas”.142 Fukuzawa 
Yukichi commented after the acquisition of the island: “…now that Taiwan has 
become already our territory, we must defend it like our mother country and must not 
lose one inch of our land… Depending on the case, we may be forced to attack, as 
well. Because it is a rule that if you want to protect a hundred percent, you will have 
to have a hundred and thirty or hundred and fifty per cent. Thus, we must be prepared 
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that, if we want to protect Taiwan, we might have to move forward and protect 
territory outside of the island”.143 His grandiose plans for Asia had been revealed 
earlier, in 1882: "We shall someday raise the national power of Japan so that not only 
shall we control the natives of China and India as the English do today, but we shall 
also possess in our hands the power to rebuke the English and to rule Asia 
ourselves”.144 In 1899 Mizuno Jun stated: “If our country had not taken possession of 
Taiwan, it is clear that some other country would not have failed to seize it as 
Germany had done in Jiaozhou Bay or Russia in Dalian and Lüshun…”. An 1899 
Nippon newspaper editorial claimed that given that the colony was a “total failure in 
economic terms… whether (we) either make it a stepping-stone in the Empire’s 
southern advance, or at least a lock-and-key for the empire’s southern portal, we 
should not necessarily balk at spending ten million yen in government funds”. An 
Asahi newspaper editorial of the same year stated: “In the treaty of Shimonoseki (our) 
demand for the island of Taiwan is one based on primarily on military strategic 
motives… This island cannot avoid being extremely unsuitable for the opening of 
land for development and colonization.145 The historian and journalist Tokutomi Sohō 
perceived Taiwan as a natural “footing for the expansion of Greater Japan” in the 
South even before the acquisition of the island: “Taiwan is a strategic point, like 
Japan's south gate. If Japan intends to expand its territorial map of the Greater Japan 
Empire toward the south, there is no room for discussion about whether Japan has to 
go through this gate... It is natural... to expand to the Strait of Malacca, the 
Indochinese and Malay Peninsulas and to the South Seas islands through this gate... If 
we do not acquire it today, some other power will take it in the future. Taiwan is an 
easy prey in Asia”. Katsura claimed that “the areas in South China ought to become 
like the Korean Peninsula” and concluded that “it is not difficult to expand political 
and commercial strength to the South Seas in the future from the base of Taiwan”.146 
In this sense the financial loss for the mother country was deemed as secondary in 
comparison to the colony’s strategic value.   
Although the veterans of the 1874 campaign never abandoned the dream of 
Japan’s return to Taiwan, the island’s occupation was more of an adventurist 
byproduct of the Sino-Japanese war and less the fruit of a long term official strategy. 
Japan’s focus on Taiwan was not constant. It was Korea rather than Taiwan that had 
dominated Meiji foreign policy for decades. This fact is verified by Japan’s initial 
confusion in governing the island. Taiwanese resistance shook the invaders’ 
confidence in their civilization mission and transformed the project of a peaceful 
administration into a military campaign for years to come. Gotō admitted Tōkyō’s 
unpreparedness: "The Japanese occupation of Taiwan was the unexpected result of the 
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Sino-Japanese war. We were not yet prepared for any civilized colonial policy”.147 In 
any case, Japan was now in possession of a colony and sought to make the most of it 
amidst the international imperialistic struggle. Kodama in 1900 at a conference of 
island administrators presented his long-term goals: “In recent years, the European 
powers have expanded their influence in Asia. How should we meet this threat? The 
military strength of the West is derived from their science and knowledge. Asian 
countries cannot match them in this area.... For this reason, the Western powers have 
been able to oppress the peoples of the Far East. In order for us to acquire the power 
to oppose them so that we can continue to dominate in the Far East and pre-serve the 
peace, there is no other recourse open to us but to acquire more knowledge and 
increase our wealth.” He concluded: “Today's most urgent task is to develop the 
resources of Taiwan. Taiwan cannot ignore the challenge of economic warfare, the 
trend so prevalent in the world today. As the island's production will soon double, this 
will enable us to keep pace with the progress of other countries in the world. Japan 
and her territories will then be on an equal footing with the European powers in the 
event of economic warfare”. The message was clear; Japan had to acquire more 
territories, exploit their resources and challenge the economic predominance of the 
other empires. Taiwan had to be developed agriculturally in order to supply food and 
raw materials to the mother country in this conflict; industrial development was 
reserved for the metropolis alone.148 
 
Japan chose to develop Taiwan into a major source of foodstuff and planned 
its actions accordingly. Increased demand for foodstuff in Japan signified the island’s 
transformation into an export orientated economy. Thus, the industrial sector did not 
receive governmental support. Besides the production of sugar, Taiwan’s industry 
remained underdeveloped whereas it’s agricultural output slowly but steadily 
increased.149 Farmer associations promoted agricultural education to the Taiwanese 
farmers and new fertilizers, irrigation systems and seeds were gradually adopted.150 
During the 1890s, the share of Taiwan’s exports to the metropolis rose from 10% to 
30%.151 The pacification of the colony was the priority for the Japanese in the first 
years. Subsequently a sound financial foundation had to be placed in the colony. The 
Triple intervention and the Russian threat in the North signified a period of 
reconciliation and collaboration with the colonial powers. Hence for the time being 
any expansionistic tendencies had to be suppressed and a more opportune occasion, 
such as the First World War, had to be found. Kodama, despite popular belief,152 
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certainly though so: “internally we must develop our rule, and externally we must 
maintain a good-neighbor policy to avoid causing international problems as much as 
possible while taking measures to control commerce with the Qing and the South 
Seas” and “the management of the South Seas is still an ideal and is not yet ripe to 
embark on”.153  
Kodama during a speech in June 1898 declared: “my duty in Taiwan is to 
administer, not to conquer”. He continued by explaining to his officers the main goals 
of his administration: economic development and safety.154 Thus, Gotō and Kodama 
were in agreement and set their priorities accordingly: economic development and 
internal stability in the colony were the requisites for the metropolis’ prosperity and 
the potential expansion in the South. With this objective in mind they set out to 
subjugate and “modernize” the Chinese and aborigines, to introduce a modern land 
registry, to improve the island’s infrastructure, to make the colony economically 
independent, to boost productivity and to study the local customs after 3 years of 
administrative mismanagement and failures. In this endeavour Tōkyō’s contribution 
and aid was not just desired but necessary. Japanese capitalists hesitated to invest in 
the unruly island and so it was the colonial state that undertook its economic and 
infrastructural development.155 The central state had to be Taiwan’s main investor. 
Infrastructure was the lure used to attract and convince those few Japanese 
entrepreneurs that had the required business acumen and capital to operate abroad. 
Until 1899, due to the unequal treaties, Japan was in no position to protect its industry 
and domestic market through tariffs. In 1895 the country’s industrial base was weak 
and susceptible to foreign pressures.156 In an atmosphere of declining public support, 
Taihoku had difficulties to even borrow or attract capital from Japan. The resources of 
the island had to be exploited to the fullest to make the colonial endeavour 
sustainable. Law no. 75 of 20 March 1899 made provisions for the issue of Formosan 
industrial bonds to the amount of 3,500,000 yen for the purpose of building railways, 
surveying the land, constructing forts and erecting government buildings. During the 
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1900-1906 period, the colonial state, issued bonds with a par value of 25 million yen 
to boost local entrepreneurship. Between 1896 and 1910 a total sum of around 80 to 
90 million yen flowed from the metropolis to the colony.157   
To develop the colony a serious capital influx was required. The two main 
sources of income for the colony were the Public Loan Bonds and the subsidies by the 
central government. In 1896 expenses for the war and the colony’s administration cost 
the central government 11% of its annual budget or 18 million yen. From 1895 to 
1902 this sum amounted to almost 7% of the national budget. In 1896 Taiwan’s 
military expenses, which were disbursed from a special military budget separate from 
the colony’s budget, accounted for more than half of the island’s total expenditures. 
Taiwan was a serious burden on Japan’s economy. Tōkyō had to make the colony 
financially self-sufficient or abandon the project. 158 Annual administrative 
expenditures for 1896, 1897, and 1898 were 9.6, 10.4, and 11.2 million yen 
respectively. 80% of these expenses were allocated for administrative purposes, 
leaving just 10% for infrastructural and economic projects. Gotō initially asked for a 
debt issue of 100-150 million yen (deficit financing). The Japanese government would 
absorb Taiwan's debt issue and within a prescribed period the colonial administration 
would return this amount with interest to the Japanese government. In order to extract 
a positive answer from Tōkyō, Gotō limited the sum to 60 million yen. After Ōkuma’s 
succession by Yamagata in November 1898 the issue was reopened. Gotō approached 
Sakatani Yoshio (1863-1941), an official of the Finance Ministry who told him before 
departing for Taiwan: "If you need money, please do not hesitate to let me know”. 
Τhanks to Sakatani’s efforts the Cabinet was persuaded. Gotō’s and Kodama’s 
personal ties with other politicians in the diet resulted in the acceptance of the bill on 
22 March 1899 but only for 35 million yen on the condition that the colonial 
government would repay the sum through its own treasury.159 As a result 68% of 
government expenses were dedicated to economic projects, three times the amount 
earmarked for administrative purposes in 1899-1905. In the same period 31.2 million 
yen were distributed accordingly: 54% for railway construction, 17% for the land 
survey, 18% for bonds to compensate for annual land payments, 7% for harbour 
expansions, 4% for government facilities and prisons.160 The construction of public 
works mobilized the colonial economy and generated tax income which helped reduce 
the rampant deficit. Taxes and price control through government monopolies on the 
island’s products was another source of revenue: opium (March 1896), salt (May 
1899), camphor (June 1901), tobacco (March 1905)161 and wine (1922).162 Lastly in 
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order to gain more revenue out of the Taiwanese bad habits the colonial government 
authorized gambling on 22 June 1906.163  
 
Other sources of income for the government was the taxation of tea (levied in 
October 1896), sugar (levied in March 1896), mining (levied in September 1896), 
registration taxes, custom duties and funds transferred from the previous year’s 
account. Furthermore, the Chinese land taxation system issued in 1886 was employed 
by the Japanese authorities until 1904 when the “Regulations for Land Taxes” were 
issued. Initially the taxes on exports and tonnage dues were based on the Chinese 
practices but the “Regulations for Export and Clearance of Formosa” and the 
“Regulations concerning Tonnage Dues” were both issued in July 1899. In June 1902, 
the “Regulations for Tax on Playing Cards” were enforced. In case someone was 
unable to pay his taxes, his property could be confiscated.164  
In Taiwan the economy was characterized by the predominance of the 
traditional agricultural sector. In 1901 most of the people lived in rural areas and were 
absorbed in the agriculture (68% of the total). The agricultural labour force comprised 
74% of the total in 1905.165 Farms existed on a local village scale and were operated 
for local subsidence.166 Modern methods were lacking as well as the adaptation and 
commercialization of the produced goods. The primitive transportation system 
hindered domestic trade which was less prosperous than the “external” trade with 
China and other countries.167 Thus one of the most urgently needed projects was the 
island’s land reform. The colonial government relied on land taxes to reduce the 
financial strain on Japan. The first three Governor-Generals employed the land system 
based on the cadastral surveys of the Qing. Hastily, and with inaccurate land records 
that had been compiled after the war, the first colonial administrators acknowledged 
the pre-existing land possessions in order to initiate tax collection. As in the Qing era, 
the land tax was paid by the large land-holders to the central authorities while rents 
were collected from the “small land-holders”, the second owners. The Land 
Investigation Bureau, established in September 1898, enacted the land survey in the 
Taihoku area which was carried out in the same manner that it had been performed in 
Japan proper in 1874.168 It was extended to northern Taiwan and to the whole island 
by 1903, boosting the colonial state’s revenue. Yet fearing the social disruption that a 
new land policy could bring, the new reform was fully implemented only in 1905. In 
preparation, Taihoku expanded the transportation system and built up the police force 
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in case rebellions broke out. Each prefecture had its branch office and survey teams 
consisting of clerks, translators, village headmen and technicians. The engineers 
classified the land according to its productivity, and drew boundaries between towns 
and villages; every one of them was precisely located and meticulously registered in 
the new administrative maps. The individuals who actually lived on the land and were 
recognized by the peasants as the landholders were made the legal owners by buying 
out the absent holders’ rights. Land reform encouraged the creation of small scale 
family farming rather than the development of large scale plantations. Unclaimed land 
was considered public property and was transferred to Japanese farmers. Clarifying 
land ownership, discovering “hidden” lands and increasing tax revenue were not the 
only goals of the government.169 Topographical survey, was a tool in finding and 
eradicating rebel pockets in the island as well. This fact explains the urgency and the 
scale of the undertaking. 5,225,000 yen were invested in the project which was 
conducted by a total of 1,670,000 mobilized personnel. The 867,000 acres yielding 
revenue previously, became 1,866,000 acres under Gotō’s direction. 37,896 maps, 
9,610 cadasters and 5,624 volumes of land rent registration were accumulated.170 For 
the Taiwanese this scientific approach to colonial engineering meant more taxes and 
further subjugation to Tōkyō’s rule. For a Japanese historian “the land survey 
business had played a decisive role in helping the government-general in Taiwan to 
control the Han people as well as consolidate its foundation for governing”. In 
addition, the revenue from the land tax rose four-fold between 1896 and 1905, 
increasing from 752,000 to almost 3 million yen, becoming a major source of income 
for the colonial regime. Indeed, in 1895-1920 the land tax constituted 34% of the 
colonial treasury’s official income. 171  The Taiwanese were taxed more than the 
Japanese inhabitants of the island and certainly more heavily than they were under the 
Chinese regime.172  
 
The colonial government published in 1896 the “Regulations relating to the 
Special Disposition, Sale and Letting of Formosan Forests and Plains” and in 1901 the 
“Regulations for the Formosan Public Reservoirs and Water-Course” to encourage the 
expansion of the island’s agricultural output. Due to these efforts, the arable land was 
increased and tracts of “wild land” were opened up for the Japanese immigrants and 
capitalists.173 In September 1900, an agricultural association (nōkai) was created in 
San-hsin village of Hai-shan county of the Taihoku district. The association was set 
up and directed by colonial officials that collaborated with the local landlords and 
experimented with innovative farming techniques. In the capital, the Central 
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Agricultural Research Bureau was founded in 1903; it was the first large organization 
to engage in the scientific study of Taiwan’s agriculture. Below this bureau at the 
district level, experimental agricultural stations were established at Taipei, Hsinchu, 
Taichū, Tainan, Chiayi, and Kaohsiung with the support of the colonial authorities.174 
The Japanese government, since private initiative was scant, undertook the colony’s 
development. Investments in the island opened new employment opportunities that 
considerably alleviated the local population’s resentment. Taiwan’s per capita output 
growth rate rose from about 0.3% of the late Qing period to more than 2% in the 
Japanese era, whereas Taiwanese income growth rate per capita rose from 0.3% to 
0.94%.175 Irrigated land increased by almost 30% between 1895 and 1900. Livestock 
and off farm employment was increasing by 2,65% per annum between 1901 and 
1940.176 Sugar production increased 11-fold over 15 years, and rice production also 
saw significant increases. In 1900, Taiwan's sugar exports to Japan were valued at 
1,538,000 yen while the total of the sugar imports from other sources into Japan 
proper amounted to 26,607,000 yen.177 Meiji leaders kept investing, ignoring the grim 
financial situation and the voices that wanted Taiwan abandoned, so that Taiwan’s 
agricultural potential could be expanded in a way that complemented Japan’s 
industrial development. Therefore, the Taiwanese had to become hard working 
producers and consumers of the metropolis’ commodities. Low cost agricultural 
goods from the colony such as sugar facilitated the metropolis’ shift towards 
industrial expansion, strengthened capital accumulation for its capitalists and even 
contributed to the reduction of the Japanese workers’ living costs.178 
 
When the island was ceded to Tōkyō, Chinese officials and intellectuals 
protested against the “selling of national territory” and dreamt the day when Taiwan 
would be reunited to the mother country once again. Beijing however, had neglected 
Taiwan for two centuries having considered it troublesome and a liability, a “ball of 
mud”. 179  Thus in 1895 the island’s infrastructure if not ancient, was outmoded. 
Expenses for education, health, agriculture and transportation comprised roughly 37% 
of the colonial budget between 1898 and 1905.180 During the first seven years Tōkyō 
allocated 35 million yen for the creation of harbours, roads and railways.181 In the 
colonial capital Taihoku, the new rulers imported Japanized western architectural 
techniques to raise their own status both internationally and in the colony; the new 
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imperial subjects had to be reminded of their inferior status vis-à-vis the rulers. 
Boulevards and prestigious public structures were erected in resemblance to Paris’ 
urban organization. The city’s walls and Chinese temples that stood in the way of the 
modern town planning were gradually torn down. Appealing houses for the Japanese 
officials were built in the new residential districts; a new more impressive official 
residence for the Governor-General as well as Shintō shrines were created.182 In order 
to prevent outbreaks of epidemics and make the road system “adaptable to the life of 
civilization”, public works were necessary. As early as 1895 the drainage-work in 
Taihoku begun under the direction of the British engineer Barton (William 
Kinnimond Burton 1856-1899) employed by the Home Ministry. Ten miles of drains 
along with street paving and improvement in Taihoku cost the government 350,000 
yen. The major Taiwanese cities were reshaped to project the rulers’ modernity and 
prestige.183 By 1903, Taiwan was electrified, making it the first region in East Asia, 
after Japan, to be modernized in this way. In the colonial era hospitals, market halls, 
theatres, assembly halls, parks, post offices, banks, elementary schools, universities 
and research stations were built for both practical and ideological reasons.184  
 
By 1905 10,000 kilometers of highways were constructed. The first modern 
roads were constructed by the army in order to penetrate and pacify the island’s 
interior. A brigadier general was placed in charge of the task of repairing and 
expanding the roads. 185  The colonial government paid two Japanese steamship 
companies 800,000 yen annually to connect the island with China and Japan. Keelung 
harbour was improved and fortified between 1898 and July 1903 at a cost of 2 million 
yen.186 In addition the port cities of Tamsui, Takow, and the Pescadores, fortified 
earlier by the Chinese, were further reinforced by the new rulers. The postal system of 
mainland Japan was almost entirely adopted by the colonial authorities on 1 April 
1896. By 1903 there were 109 post offices in the island. Over 2,000 miles of telegraph 
and 600 miles of telephone wire, while cables between the colony and Japan were 
laid.187 Telephone stations were first built in 1897 in the Pescadores and then in 
Taiwan.188 
Before 1895 the Chinese had constructed a 42-mile railway line between 
Keelung and Hsinchu. The private Taiwan Rail Company was set up in the fall of 
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1896 but failed to attract funds and was dissolved.189 Investing 40 million yen the 
Japanese government built the Taihoku-Takow and Taihoku-Keelung-Tamsui lines in 
1904-1905.190 The line leading from Taihoku to the south cost nearly two million yen. 
The railway was initially under the direct control of the Military Department. In 1897, 
it came under the control of the Civil Department with the goal of eventually 
entrusting the project to a Japanese private railway company. Lack of entrepreneurial 
initiative propelled the Governor-General Government in 1898 to declare its intention 
to continue the completion of the railway network itself. Under the direction of Chief 
Engineer Hasegawa, work was commenced in 1899 on the southern line from Takow 
leading to Tainan.191 
The law for the “Formosan Public Works Loan” sanctioned the budget of 
28,800,000 yen for the construction of public railways in Taiwan. As early as 
September 1895, the government promulgated the “Regulations for Placer Mining and 
Temporary Mining Industry”. In the same month detailed regulations for the 
production, protection and control of mining in Taiwan were issued with the 
ordinance no. 6. The colonial government tried to survey the ores and soil after April 
1896 but the endeavour was discontinued in 1897 because of lacking funds. The 
project was revived in 1905. In 1896 there were 64 mining lots; in 1901, they had 
increased to 186.192 On 7 September 1896, the colonial state acquired the propriety of 
the mines and sold them to Japanese capitalists. Supplementary clauses were amended 
on 5 October 1898. The fee, that had yet to be determined, would be paid to the 
colonial government after applying for a license to the prefectural administration. 
According to the regulations only Japanese subjects could buy and manage the 
colony’s mines.193  
Imperial customs houses were built starting from March 1896 in Tamsui, 
Keelung, Amping, Takow and Tainan. At the time of the occupation the Chinese 
custom duties were adopted. In February 1896, the custom laws and regulations in 
force in Japan were applied to the colony as well. In July 1899 the rate of custom 
duties were applied so that the custom duties became identical with the ones of the 
mother country with the exception of export and clearance duties.194 To simplify and 
promote trade the first Governor-General issued ordinance no. 19 called the 
“Regulation for the Sale of Weights and Measures in Formosa” in October 1895. The 
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system was completed after the supplementary November 1900 law that was put in 
practice after May 1901.195 
In July 1895, a Sanitary Bureau was created. In March 1896 the sanitation of 
the entire island, except the one pertaining to the military, came under the Civil 
Affairs’ jurisdiction. Sewages were inexistent and the Taiwanese used to drink dirty 
water from muddy rivers. A sewage system was established initially in Taihoku and 
later in other cities; wells were constructed as well. Regulations for the prevention of 
infectious diseases were handed out and in 1898 the island’s medical network 
organization was laid out in the Regulations for the Taiwan Public Physicians’ 
Candidates. In May 1896, hospitals were built in Taihoku, Taichū and Tainan and in 
every other district, Pescadores included, as diagnostical centres sprung out. Nearly 
half a million yen was allocated for the construction of hospital buildings, the Taihoku 
hospital costing $262,000 as the largest. A medical school was established in 1899 to 
prepare young physicians for their arduous tasks in a semi-tropical territory. Due to 
these provisions, the mortality rate dropped every year after 1899. In addition, the 
practice of female infanticide by the poorer families fell in the decline under the 
Japanese rule.196  
The Japanese struggled to make Taiwan a healthier place to live and a 
welcoming ground for entrepreneurial activities that would encourage Japanese 
immigration and investments.197 Davidson set the Japanese population of the island, 
besides the military, to 40,000 in 1903. The majority of them originated from Kyūshū 
in south Japan. In 1900, Japanese males had reached the number of 13,316 and the 
females to 5,680, a total of 18,996. In 1899, there were 8,601 males, and 2,544 
females, a total of 11,145.198 In 1906 a few farm families migrated to Taiwan under 
the auspices of the colonial government. In 1909 the authorities tried to attract more 
Japanese by offering plots of land to immigrants that would create permanent 
settlements that would develop the island’s eastern part; that year there were 790 
Japanese farmers in the colony. By 1911 only 231 Japanese agricultural families had 
                                                          
195 Ibid., p.  63.  
196 Ibid., pp. 20-23. Many modern Taiwanese influenced by these figures and the presumed 
modernization and development that the Japanese brought in the island expressed their sympathy for 
Tōkyō’s rule. It is probably the only case that a sizeable part of the colonized nurtures warm feelings 
for its oppressors. See Chih Huei Huang, “Ethnic Diversity, Two-Layered Colonization, and Modern 
Taiwanese Attitudes toward Japan”, in Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy, ed. 
A. D. Morris, (London-New York 2005), p. 134.  
197 Few Japanese decided to move to the colony due to its unhealthy and tropical climate. In addition, 
parts of South China, which were targets of Japanese expansionism, were overpopulated and destitute, 
unsuitable as outlets for the metropolis’ population. See “Japan and the partition of China”, The Kobe 
chronicle, n. 164 vol. VII, Wednesday 22 August 1900, pp. 161-162. Uchida, the Japanese Minister to 
Beijing after 1901, thought differently. He believed that business opportunities in China should not be 
abandoned to westerners and as many as Japanese as possible should settle in the country. See “Japan 
in China, views of the Minister at Peking”, The Japan Chronicle, n. 280, Wednesday 12 November 
1902, p. 477.  
198 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, p. 594.  
415 
 
settled in Taiwan.199 It is evident that Taiwan was not able to accommodate Japan’s 
surplus population as many imperial advocates had claimed before 1895. Japanese 
immigrants despite Tōkyō’s promises and facilitations in Taiwan kept flocking to 
Australia and North America. From 1896, when the first civilians were permitted to 
enter the colony, and until 1942 the Japanese population of the island never exceeded 
6% of the total population.200 
In November 1895, the ordinance regarding the Taiwanese prisons and the 
provisional prison regulation were issued. In June 1896, the first prisons were built in 
Taihoku and 20 other places. In February 1899, the management of the prisons was 
placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Governor-General. In the same year projects 
for a new prison were laid down with an approximate cost of 800,000 yen. Corporal 
punishment and manual labour were common in these institutions. 201 Police 
administration was established with the arrival of the first inspectors at Taihoku in 
July 1895, attached to the Civil Administration Department. 202  Under Gotō the 
police’s role was greatly enhanced. From 3,020 patrolmen in 1897 the figure rose to 
4,061 in 1899. A police academy established in June 1898 ensured the officers’ high 
standard training. From 1898 to 1904 the expenditure regarding the police accounted 
for 40-48% of the total civil administration expenditure. Some 1,254 or 23.2% of the 
total in 1900 were Taiwanese that were employed as patrolmen, 203  but top 
administration posts remained in Japanese hands. Policemen were paid a handsome 
salary and were promised attractive promotions. Each pocket of resistance was 
isolated and eliminated from north to south and by 1903 the last group surrendered in 
Tainan to the local militia and police.204 The Police Headquarters was erected in 1901 
within the Civil Affairs Department. However, the Police came to be more important 
than the civil administration and it was expanded to an unprecedented level according 
to paragraph 22 of the November 1901 revision (“Bureaucratic system of the 
government-general of Taiwan”). With the 1901 reform the Governor-General split 
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Taiwan into two areas of police jurisdiction, each directed by a police superintendent 
(keishi). The box system was adopted and during the first year of this reform, 101 
dispersed police boxes were constructed. The reorganization systematized the 
appointment of policemen in the central administration thus making it impossible in 
the later years to separate the two branches. As with the police, the branch-prefecture 
chiefs were also given in October 1901 the power to intrude in numerous aspects of 
the private life. They were charged with tasks concerning the aboriginal lands, the 
forests, the mines and even the tax administration. The 1901 local reform instituted 20 
prefectures on the island; this system would be maintained until 1909. Senior or junior 
officials that had served in the colonial bureaucracy for 5 years could be appointed 
prefectural chiefs, in line with the “Special appointment order of local staff of the 
government-general of Taiwan”. The same apparatus was employed to promote police 
officers with 5 years of service to police inspectors. The appointment of the latter as 
sub-prefectural chiefs was institutionalized by the 1901 reform, making the following 
years even more difficult to separate local civil administration from police 
administration.205  
All these tasks were entrusted to Japanese colonial officials, carefully selected 
and trained after the establishment of a corps of career civil servants by Gotō. High 
standards for the employment of officials meant the blocking of further entry or the 
expulsion of Japanese adventurers seeking “golden opportunities” in Taiwan’s 
administration.206 The first colonial functionaries can be divided in three categories: 
technical support, administrative assistance and police. Most of the candidates that 
took the general examination to find employment in the colonial government were 
teachers, police officers and correction officers.207 Their privileged status over the 
locals gave to many a sense of superiority and satisfaction. Many of them were ex-
samurai; their adherence to bushido values was translated into the military’s 
prevalence over civil administration in the colony.208 Government officials enjoyed 
special treatment. Depending on their years of service and family members they 
received payment, medical treatment under Taihoku’s expenses and frequent leaves of 
absence. 209  The functionaries that were eventually appointed in the colony were 
looked down upon by their colleagues in Japan proper who used demeaning terms to 
describe them. Japanese citizens residing in the colony “were considered lesser 
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citizens, the dropouts of Japanese society”.210 During the entire colonial period only 
32 Taiwanese passed the upper civil service examination and were employed by the 
colonial state.211 Many of the officials in Taiwan came from Japan’s other colony, 
Okinawa. These bureaucrats, assimilated already into the Japanese culture and mind-
set would now try to transform the Taiwanese into loyal and law abiding imperial 
subjects.212 Ιn the coming years Taiwanese would be employed as colonial agents in 
Manchuria in what the historian Masao Maruyama (1914-1996) described as “the 
transfer of oppression”.213 
Taiwan was gradually becoming a police-state. The 1900 Taiwan Press Law 
placed the Press in Taiwan under central control and censorship. In the same year the 
Taiwan Peace Preservation Regulation that mirrored the law that was in force in Japan 
from 1887 to 1898 was enacted. This Regulation gave to the colonial authorities the 
right to expel from the island anyone that misbehaved. 214  Chinese language 
newspapers were circulating in Taiwan but were not allowed to express any hostility 
towards the colonial regime. In 1899 Gotō shut down two newspapers critical of his 
policies and inaugurated the Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shimpō, to praise and serve the 
colonial administration. Later Japanese newspapers, backed up financially by 
Taihoku, would naturally praise the educational efforts and Taiwan’s unprecedented 
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economic development. Those articles also pointed out the backwardness of the island 
before 1895 elevating Japanese successes. Chinese practices and customs as the 
infamous foot binding, deemed as primitive were criticized whereas adoption of 
Japan’s civilized and modern culture was lauded. The previous Qing functionaries 
were criticized as corrupt and the resources of the fertile island wasted because of 
their misappropriation and oppression.215 The Japanese Taiwan Shinpō edition of 15 
December 1896 stated that Taiwan by becoming Japan’s colony had risen in status 
and finally appeared in the world stage. 216  Some western reporters adopted the 
rhetoric.217 The Taiwanese and some Japanese218 were not so enthusiastic about the 
colonial rule however. A contemporary popular song during Kodama’s administration 
mentioned the hardships and poverty of the island’s farmers.219 
On the eve of the Japanese colonial period, Taiwan’s monetary system had 
been almost entirely metallic, and paper money was virtually unknown to most of the 
local population.220 At the time of the Japanese occupation in Taiwan a broad number 
of coins were in circulation: Qing and foreign paper money, “republican” coins, the 
local Tamsui tael, the Mexican dollar and even convertible bank notes and coins of 
the Bank of Japan used by the provisional Japanese government. Although Japan had 
changed its currency system to the gold standard in October 1897, silver currency 
continued to circulate in Taiwan further contributing to a state of confusion. In 1898 
after examining carefully the conditions in the island, Tōkyō decided to adopt one-yen 
silver coins as the standard ratio to gold to be fixed occasionally by the Governor-
General government. The Bank of Taiwan issued bank notes convertible to one-yen 
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silver coin, called silver notes, but failed to gain the trust of the Taiwanese. In March 
1897, law 38 entitled: “Regulation for the Bank of Taiwan” authorized the bank to 
issue banknotes and exchange these notes for the one-yen silver coin. The Bank was 
formally instituted in June 1899.221 A new bimetallic system was introduced. The 
Bank, that had branches in Taiwan222 and China (Amoy, Hong Kong) alike,223 also 
took charge of the colony’s treasury and was under the control of the government. It 
was established to “facilitate and encourage Japanese business in Taiwan”. The 
colonial government facing economic difficulties declared in March 1898 that it was 
accepting silver coins for tax purposes. 224  This chaotic situation was further 
exacerbated in June 1904 when the Bank of Taiwan attempted to issue currency on 
the basis of gold. By 1906, four parallel types of money were circulating on the 
island. The First World War brought inflation that threatened the stable circulation of 
hard cash.225 
The problem of opium use was one of Taiwan’s most crucial social problems 
at the time of the Japanese annexation. An outright ban of the drug would intensify 
the unrest and the anti-Japanese feeling. The Japanese thought that they might as well 
gain something out of it. In contrast to what they did in Qing China the treaty powers 
in Japan pledged to prohibit the exportation of opium. Meiji Japan was the fit 
abstinent state that had to cure the ailing, addicted and hopeless nations of Asia. After 
1895, opium use in Taiwan became a Japanese problem as well; 170,000 or 6% of the 
population were addicts in the first years of the occupation. Gotō’s plan for the opium, 
formulated even before his appointment in 1898 and already espoused in 1896 by 
Mizuno Jun, was to monopolize the manufacture, control and circulation of the drug. 
This way licensed smokers were administered limited quantities reducing the amount 
over time. According to Gotō’s plan, opium could contribute annually 1,6 million yen 
to the government. The Taiwan Opium Law was put in effect in April 1897. By 1901 
the Opium Monopoly Bureau was established by the Governor-General 
administration. The latter granted opium selling licenses to almost 1,000 members of 
the Taiwanese elite. Arrests for violations of the Opium Law decreased spectacularly 
from 1,046 in 1901 to 56 in 1905. Taiwan nippō, the Japanese newspaper edited by 
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Naitō Torajirō or Konan (1866-1934), was portraying Taihoku’s policy as a 
humanitarian act to save the “backward” locals.226 For Katō Hisayuki, a bureaucrat of 
the Home Ministry Sanitation Bureau in 1906, preservation of the harmful habit was 
contrary to Japan’s civilizing mission in the colony.227 Despite the criticisms, the 
practice continued, yielding positive results; according to official records, by 
September 1901 37,072 people had stopped smoking opium. The number of opium 
addicts, which was 170,000 in 1900, dropped to 130,000 in 1905.228 Before 1925 the 
income derived by the opium monopoly was 40% of the annual special budget of the 
colonial government. Control of the addicts, the inspection of their names, addresses, 
and licenses was naturally assigned to the police.229  
Besides opium and camphor, which we will examine later in relation to the 
aborigine problem, sugar was the most profitable sector of Japan’s economic activity 
in early colonial Taiwan.230 Initially due to the hostilities, in 1900 the island’s sugar 
production fell to 63% of that of 1895. In 1901 the agronomist Nitobe Inazō was 
appointed to promote and experiment on Taiwan’s sugar production. From 1902 to 
1904 as head of the Taiwan Sugar Business Bureau, he carried out his ideas: new 
seeds were used in experimental stations, water and fertilizer inputs increased, and 
additional modern mills built.231 A training school for sugar engineers and a Cane 
Experiment Center were later created. His efforts and the colonial government’s 
guarantee of the average profit for the first investor, providing a subsidy equal to 6% 
of the capital invested in five years, almost immediately attracted Japanese capital. 
Irrigation, transportation and raw materials were promised as well.232 Modern refining 
machines were leased to the farmers and subsidies for irrigation works were granted 
by the colonial regime. In 1900 the Seitō Kaisha Ltd company with a paid-in capital 
of 500,000 yen, created the first large scale factory in Kaohsiung. These enterprises 
enjoyed the Bank of Taiwan’s favourable terms of financing, besides Taihoku’s 
generous assistance. 233 2,500 acres of land were donated to the company. Another 
sugar plant was created at Kyoshito near Takow on 11 December 1901. The biggest 
shareholders were the Imperial Household and the Mitsui Company.234 The sugar 
industry’s growth as well as the economy’s as a whole had little impact upon the 
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locals. For the islanders, the only available occupation was farming since all business 
and government posts were taken by the colonizers. The Taiwanese farmers, with the 
1902 “Regulations for the Encouragement of the Sugar Business”, had to sell their 
cash crops to designated Japanese capitalists. They also had to comply with 
production quotas and pay heavy taxes in order to retain their property. Through 
monopolies and oligopolies Tōkyō came to control the colony’s economy and all 
profits were absorbed by the colonial regime and the Japanese businessmen. While 
trade with the metropolis was timidly expanding235 the Taiwanese peasants continued 
living at subsidence levels. 236  Taiwanese educator Lim Bo-Seng admitted around 
1900 that the Japanese were in charge of the commercial and industrial operations 
whereas manual labour activities such as farming were entirely left for the local 
population.237 
In 1904 Kodama was in a position to decline half of Tōkyō’s subsidies; 
henceforth Taiwan would be financially sufficient and not a burden to the national 
treasury. Taiwan had become financially independent.238  Gotō and Kodama, their 
priority of exploiting the island’s resources aside, had also to pacify and govern the 
local population which was still unruly. For this reason, they employed the carrot and 
stick strategy; modern, humane and enlightened measures were accompanied by 
police oppression and the military’s brutality.  
Next, the unequal relation between the colonizers and the colonized, both 
Chinese and aborigines, will be presented. The lack of a national identity and of a pre-
colonial political order facilitated Japanese occupation and assimilation. The Chinese 
inhabitants during the Qing period identified themselves as Hoklos and Hakkas based 
on their place of ancestry. When the colonial state enacted legislation treating them as 
equal subjects a new common identity started taking shape. In addition, the Japanese 
did their outmost to treat them as a different national body in their effort to shatter 
their long cultural ties with China. The presence of the foreign Japanese signified the 
fostering of a distinct national consciousness that came to be “Taiwanese”. The 
Japanese used the term Taiwanese in their census reports and “islanders” or “natives” 
in common speech.239  
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Taiwan’s colonial authorities calculated Taiwanese losses during the first 6 
months of the conflict to 10,000 dead and 8,000 prisoners. From 1895 to 1902 there 
are 8,000 clashes documented between locals and colonial troops.240 These conflicts 
were of local rather than island-wide proportions. The Japanese authorities, due to the 
absence of a unified rebel authority, had to deal with each resistance group separately. 
On the other hand, the exodus of Chinese loyalist literati and gentry after the signing 
of the 1895 treaty signified that many of the potential leaders of opposition could not 
harass the Japanese administration. Many of those that chose to remain in the island 
recognized the new colonial regime and even collaborated with it.241 In 1899 Japan 
enacted the Nationality Law (kokusekihō) granting nominally Japanese nationality to 
its Taiwanese subjects. However, the main criterion to award nationality, the family 
register system based on the Family Register Law of 1871 was never enforced in the 
colonies. 242  Legally only a “child whose father was Japanese” was considered 
Japanese. On 27 March 1896, Taiwan’s Civil Governor Mizuno Jun announced that 
the rights and duties of imperial subjects were not effective in the colony. Thus, the 
Taiwanese were now only partial Japanese like the Ainus or Okinawans. In the 
summer of 1899 the Japanese government announced that the inhabitants of the island 
had Japanese “status” and that the constitution “had already been extended to 
Taiwan”.243  
 
The most famous apparatus of colonial control over the Taiwanese subjects is 
the baojia or hokō system. A similar system of collective responsibility was in 
existence in Tokugawa Japan known as Gonin Gumi. In the summer of 1896, the head 
of the Bureau of Home Affairs, Furushō Kamon (1840-1915) met an elderly man in 
south Taiwan, who suggested the employment of the ancient baojia system as a means 
to pacify the island. Furushō supposedly took the man’s advice and organized the 
local self-defence forces of a friendly village in the Chiayi area of central Taiwan 
under the oversight of the police. By September, the guerillas in the area were 
dispersed and the experiment was deemed successful. The Governor of Taihoku 
followed suit: On 29 October 1896 Furushō spread implemented the system of local 
armed protection to the entire island. A set of criteria for the organization of “self-
rule” and “self-defense association” were put in place. The system was put in effect in 
1896 but it was only after 1898 that its potential as a local policing institution was 
realized and efficiently employed. The system was institutionalized in August 1898 
with a law passed by Governor-General Kodama. The joint responsibility structure 
was enforced only to the Chinese settlements. During the following years all local 
governments organized their respective communities under the hokō system in line 
with Taihoku’s supplementary regulations. Ten households comprised one kō, and ten 
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kō formed one ho. Every ho and kō unit was headed by an elected agent for two years; 
the results of the elections had to be announced and approved by the local Japanese 
authorities. If the latter found the candidate unsuitable, new unit elections were 
ordered. These headmen were usually Taiwanese elders (hosei) that with the passing 
of the time came to be identified as the local elite. Under this system village-level 
militias (sōteidan or able-bodied corps) were developed as an auxiliary force to the 
Japanese police.244 These militias were mobilized against rioters and bandits offering 
to the Japanese valuable assistance in thwarting guerilla activities. An average 
company was comprised of 40 men between the ages of 17 to 40. The local police 
chief trained, supervised and equipped these men whenever necessary. The system 
was so efficient that by 1903 the Japanese were committing only 30,000 men (army, 
police) to control a population of 3 million inhabitants. Patrolling and maintaining 
social security was not the only task of the hosei collaborators. Sanitation measures, 
agricultural instructions, precautions against natural disasters and bandit activity, 
monitoring of population movement, tax collection,245 close collaboration with the 
local police and frequent reporting of suspicious activities, household registrations, 
and dealing with crimes and riots were enforced through the system. When someone 
living in a kō was found guilty for an offence or for breaking the hokō rules, each 
household head was fined for his failure to inform the authorities. Furthermore, locals 
were selected through the system and forced to repair and built roads and bridges. 
Expenses were paid by the households. The headmen were not paid but were given 
gifts and certain privileges such as business opportunities or appointments to 
government posts.246 In late 1901 in central-south Taiwan a local riot erupted and 
many Japanese officials were murdered by the insurgents. The village of Puzijiao was 
required to pay an enormous fine of 2,400 as it had been negligent by “not keeping 
the unrest from developing into a riot” and for not notifying the local authorities.247  
 
Another instrument of control was the re-implementation of old Taiwanese 
customs. By reviving familiar institutions employed by the previous Qing 
administration Taihoku found a way to pacify the local population, clarify the land 
propriety rights on the island and set up an acceptable legal framework. Gotō believed 
that the compilation of records for Taiwan’s land and populace was economically and 
politically wise. After his appointment, he invited academics from Japan to study 
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Taiwan’s customs and traditional laws. Nakamura Zekō as the head of land 
investigation bureau was the first to study the local population’s customs in 1898. In 
November 1901 the endeavour was intensified; a committee “for the investigation of 
old customs and practices” (Rinji Taiwan kyūkan chōsakai) was established with the 
task of studying and codifying of Qing-era laws. The commission was formally 
instituted by the imperial ordinance no. 196 of 1901. Its highest decision-making 
organ was a 15-member committee headed by the chief civil administrator. Initially, 
work was divided between two divisions; the first one was in charge of the legal 
system and the second of the economy. The scholar Okamatsu Santarō (1871-1921)248 
was made chief of the first section and Naoya Akuzawa handled the second. Each 
division appointed a member in charge of a team of researchers, clerks and 
interpreters. Chinese were hired to assist the Japanese personnel in translating old 
Qing codes and collecting information during their field trips in Taiwan and southern 
China. The headquarters were at Taihoku with branches at Taichū and Tainan. A 
designated department in Japan, at Kyōto Imperial University, was the “intellectual 
nerve center”. The commission’s research topics reveal Gotō’s political priorities. 
Besides the researchers’ reports he tried indirectly to demonstrate that Taiwanese 
customs were different from the ones practiced in the mainland China thus 
discrediting any cultural ties and stating that assimilation was feasible.249 The second 
section after studying credit, commerce and property systems, concluded its tasks in 
1905 and was disbanded. The legislature section examined the private law practices 
regarding land and civil affairs (inheritance, marriage, family), as well as affairs 
concerning administration and business. 250 The aim of this large-scale scientific 
undertaking was the consolidation of Japanese rule. The Japanese colonial-state 
deeply penetrated the everyday life of common people. Okamatsu Santarō through his 
research and field trips provided the colonial authorities with information and 
recommendations to better understand and control the local population. Okamatsu 
believed the Japanese laws to be very sophisticated for Taiwan, being products of 
western legislation. Long enduring traditions were gradually prohibited as they were 
considered incompatible with the modern and scientific Japanese patterns.251 
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Besides indirect and subtle measures, Gotō and Kodama employed a range of 
contradictory tactics to achieve their goals spanning from diplomacy and flattery to 
sheer violence and even treachery. In order to arrest the almost 30 bandit (dōhi) 
leaders that had a following of 20,000 insurgents in 1898 they appeared ready to 
pardon them. However, the police’s role was intensified and military campaigns in the 
interior were also employed in the same time.252 The ritsurei no. 24 issued on 17 
November 1898 entitled as the “Bandit Punishment Ordinance”, aimed at squashing 
any pocket of resistance in Taiwan targeting not only the rebels but those that gave 
shelter to them as well. The courts during the Kodama administration were harsher 
than their predecessors during the tenure of Takano.253 According to the new law 
almost all bandits were sentenced to death: “The leaders and instigators are sentenced 
to death. Those who participate in the decision-making or commanding are sentenced 
to death…”. As a result, in 1899 death sentences regarding cases of banditry increased 
to 60% and to 74,3% in 1902. Kodama proclaimed magnanimous terms to those 
guerrillas that were willing to surrender. After the surrender ceremonies that were 
attended by the Governor-General himself took place and the former bandits were 
placed under strict police surveillance. On 22 May 1902, the colonial authorities held 
ceremonies for the surrender of a bandit group at Taichū. After the end of the banquet 
the doors were closed and all of the unarmed men, 275 in total, were fired upon and 
massacred. The same tactic was repeated 6 more times in different locations. Gotō’s 
mafia like methods (bloodshed and narcotics) did not provoke a scandal, bring 
dishonour or effect his resignation. The military approved his tactics while the diet 
had not any say in the colony.254 In May 1899 for example, a bandit leader called Lin 
Shao Mao, who had his base in Houbiling in South Taiwan, was promised that if he 
surrendered his fort he could maintain his troops free and armed. He was also offered 
2,000 yen to distribute among his men and land free of tax. This kind of promises was 
rarely kept by the colonial authorities. In 1902 colonial troops surrounded and killed 
Lin and his men; 200 people died and Houbiling was raised to the ground.255 11,950 
dōhi were killed in total between 1898 and 1902 (3,279 during the pacification 
campaigns, 5,673 after they were arrested and the rest 2,999 were sentenced to death 
according to the Bandit Punishment Law).256 
Fukuzawa on the Jiji Shinpo editorial of the 22nd of May 1895 appeared to 
lose patience with the island’s obstructive and unruly population: “By all accounts, 
our goal for managing Taiwan refers only to the land and resources of the island. We 
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should resolutely implement all sorts of new policies without considering the native 
population." On 14 August 1895, he maintained: "In order to pacify the island and 
develop the rich resources with the hands of our Japanese people, the goal of 
managing Taiwan should focus solely on the land while ignoring the natives. We 
should first issue orders to correct all the barbarous customs such as men's wearing 
pigtails and women's foot-binding. Opium-smoking should be strictly prohibited as in 
Japan proper. We should punish without reservation those who break the law. And we 
should consider those who cannot bear the pains of reform as beyond our civilization. 
They should be banished”. On 31 July 1895, he stated once again: "There are two 
major purposes for our occupation of Taiwan. The first is to make the island the 
bastion of our future expansion to China and the South Sea. The other is to develop 
the rich resources of the island, transplant our manufacturing industries, and 
monopolize the commercial rights". He continued: "After the banishment of the Qing 
people in Taiwan, we should encourage the Japanese citizens to migrate to the island 
and to start industry, trade and commerce. This is the only way to make Taiwan a 
permanent domain of our empire". 257  Government officials too examined the 
eventuality of removing the non Japanese form Taiwan. The 1896 field report entitled 
“Actual conditions in Taiwan” to Matsukata asserted: “Possession of the island in 
question by the Empire being principally necessary in terms of national defense, (we) 
will either endeavour to expel the native inhabitants and transplant Japanese nationals; 
or, with development of rich resources as (our) primary (purpose), lull the native 
inhabitants into peacefulness and utilize their capital (and) labour.258  
Starting from 1897, Nogi begun appointing the Taiwanese elite to counselor 
positions in local governments. The Japanese cooperated with influential and wealthy 
families like the Lins that owned large estates and private armies and customarily 
controlled entire communities. Kodama and Gotō further promoted the collaboration 
with the local elites by approaching the literati. In 1895 the literati of the island 
numbered 30 to 40,000, 1,5% of the total population. Two methods were employed to 
impress and appease the local gentry. The first was tours to factories both in the 
colony and the metropolis to show them the wonders of the Japanese civilization.259 
The second was holding feasts in honour of the elderly. Previously, this custom only 
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existed in mainland China but not in Taiwan.260  In March 1900 Kodama instituted 
and presided over the poetry group called Yōbunkai (Gathering to promote literature) 
in Taihoku in an effort to win over the literati and obtain their collaboration. Kodama 
considered them as a means to exert a more positive influence over local 
communities. The Yōbunkai was a gathering during which the gentry members were 
indoctrinated into the benefits of Tōkyō’s civilized rule. Branches were later 
established in other cities in Taiwan and the Pescadores. Murakami Yoshio, governor 
of Taichū after 1897, and Isogai Seizo, Tainan’s perfect, invited the local literati to 
their residences for social meetings. Governor-General Nogi inaugurated in October 
1896 the practice of conferring honorary insignia (“gentlemen’s medals”) to the 
educated and influential inhabitants. By the end of 1897, 400 medals were granted in 
Taiwan and the Pescadores. Kodama adopted the conciliatory custom and in addition 
he regularly organized the “feast of the elders’ ceremony” in 1898-1900. The first 
ceremony of the kind out of a total of four was held in Taihoku on 17 June 1898 in the 
Governor-General’s banquet hall. Kodama personally attended all of them and 
granted gifts. On his trips in South Taiwan in 1899-1900, he held receptions and 
established rapport with the educated locals of each area inducing loyalty and trust to 
his regime. On another occasion on 15 March 1900 Kodama and Gotō invited 151 
gentry members in Taihoku to present to them the Japanese modernization 
programme and gain the guests’ support and admiration. They were toured to the 
capital’s facilities (prison, post office, courts and plants) by their hosts during the 
course of the following days. The Taiwanese appeared impressed by the level of 
material civilization reached by their rulers. Gotō used to preach the benefits of “new 
learning”, western science and technology over the outmoded Confucian teachings in 
his meetings with the island’s literati. Many applauded the colonial state’s 
modernization efforts and were convinced to send their children to Japanese 
schools.261 
 
The main tool to achieve assimilation was education.262 Many Taiwanese that 
experienced the Japanese educational system wished to become imperial subjects and 
tried to behave as Japanese. Tōkyō however, despite the proclamations for equality, 
never considered them to be Japanese or to possess the rights of Japanese.263 In 1897, 
one Japanese principal stated at an entrance ceremony: “Our work on this island 
represents the first effort in 2500 years to apply Japanese education to 
foreigners…educators of the world are watching for our success or failure”.264 Isawa 
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Shūji was the first Chief of the Education Bureau265 of the colony with the task of 
modernizing Taiwan’s educational system between 1895 and 1898. Isawa reached the 
island on 16 June 1895, accompanying the first Governor-General; he submitted his 
first plan 4 days later.266 Securing interpreters and translators was the first order of 
business;267 the new colonial administrators and military authorities were unable to 
understand the local dialects and the island’s inhabitants did not speak Japanese.268 
Isawa founded the Japanese Language School in Taihoku in May 1896 and 14 
elementary schools for the Taiwanese were built throughout the island during his first 
two years in office. In the next years, 19 more were built with the local districts 
covering the expenses which were paid by the local villages through taxes. In 1898 
these schools were transformed into “public schools”.269 Isawa had the long-term goal 
of free universal elementary education in the colony.270 Taiwanese children of all 
social classes were welcomed in his system. In October 1895, he declared: “To make 
the people of Taiwan into Japanese we should not resort to military force. We are 
educators, and educators must instead expend immense energy and have the utmost 
dedication to their cause”.271 
Isawa initially established the Shizangan (Zhishanyan) Academy; the first 
class took place on 26 July 1895. In the inauguration speech Isawa explained to the 
amassed crowd that the Taiwanese and the Japanese had common cultural heritage; he 
continued by stressing that after the expulsion of the Qing the new subjects ought 
loyalty to the Japanese divine dynasty.272 In January 1896, 6 teachers were massacred 
by the rebels on the site.273 A Japanese shrine was erected at Shizangan and Shintō 
ceremonies were conducted annually in the memory of those who had given their 
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lives to education.274 Isawa travelled extensively in Japan to convince teachers to 
disregard the risks and dedicate themselves to the enlightened cause of educating the 
Taiwanese. 275  Moreover, the Chief of the Education Bureau tried to persuade 
Taiwanese families to send their daughters to Shizangan and created the first school 
for aborigines in Hengchun.276 Japanese children had more options: general education 
(elementary and higher education) and normal school education. Higher general 
education, the middle schools, and an all-girls high school were later established. In 
June 1897, the first elementary school for Japanese children was founded in Taihoku. 
In July 1898, the elementary school organization for the colony was promulgated by 
an imperial ordinance. As a result, 4 elementary schools were established at Taihoku, 
Keelung, Shinchiku and Tainan.277 
Isawa travelled to Tōkyō in April 1897 to request more funds for his 
educational projects. The diet gave in to his calls for more common schools on the 
island. By 1898 Isawa had overseen the building of seventy-six common schools.278 
Among them, there were 16 Japanese language schools and 36 branch institutes. The 
curriculum’s aim was to assimilate the ruled into Japanese culture; Japanese language 
was the main subject, replacing Chinese and Confucian textbooks. Isawa eventually 
accepted the teaching of Confucian texts to make the schools more appealing to the 
Taiwanese.279 Military oppression and the lack of Chinese classical education made 
the Taiwanese parents unwilling to trust their children’s’ education to the new 
regime.280 Japanese textbooks promoted advancement and individual capabilities but 
the ones taught to Taiwanese children promoted mostly loyalty, cooperation, and 
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morality. They were also taught Japanese history as part of their own history. 281 
Further schooling was not encouraged and was limited to those students that had the 
potential to be teachers and doctors. Later, Gotō himself instructed the teachers to not 
over-educate the Taiwanese; further instruction could be expensive but more 
importantly detrimental to Japan’s long-term grip on the island.282 Taiwanese students 
could study engineering, science, technology, medicine but the subjects of law, 
politics, and social sciences were forbidden for their allegedly disruptive potential.283 
Carefully selected Taiwanese students were permitted to continue their studies in 
Japan. The first arrived in Japan in November 1895.284  
Right from the beginning, Isawa was in search for the most appropriate 
educational programme for the colony. In 1895, he visited the Presbyterian 
missionary Thomas Barclay (1849-1935)285 to study the western methods of educating 
the Taiwanese. 286  Western missionaries were operating schools and hospitals in 
Taiwan long before the arrival of the Japanese. Many Taiwanese had converted to 
Christianity but the majority remained faithful to Buddhism, Confucianism and 
Taoism as in mainland China.287 The British Presbyterian mission had been based at 
Tainan since 1865.288 At around the same time a Catholic mission settled in Daitōtei. 
In 1872 the Canadian Presbyterian mission opened their headquarters at Tamsui.289 
After January 1898 a regulation asserted that any private or religious educational 
institution in Taiwan could be established or abolished only with the Governor-
General’s permission. 290  No serious clash between Taihoku and the missionaries 
occurred; many Christian educational facilities continued their operations unhindered 
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since the Japanese favoured modern scientific learning over the outmoded Chinese 
teachings.291 
In 1898 Isawa proposed to the Government-General the creation of more 
Japanese language schools, of elementary schools for Japanese children and of more 
public schools for the Taiwanese. In that year however, the diet decreased the funds 
available for Taiwan by four million yen, or almost 30 percent. The civil 
administrator of Taiwan, Mizuno Jun had decided in 1897 to spend the following 
fiscal year’s budget on military and police buildup. Isawa found these investments 
counterproductive; for him education was a more efficient instrument than the 
army.292 In any case Isawa’s education-related projects were scarcely funded. He also 
learned that for the next fiscal year, the colonial government was inclined to increase 
investments on the colony’s schools by only 100,000 yen. Isawa appealed to 
Governor-General Nogi to gain support for his plans that had been already approved 
by Tōkyō. When Nogi rejected his appeal Isawa resigned on 29 July 1898.293 After his 
resignation Isawa remained in the colony as educational consultant to the Governor-
General Government until 1899. In the first year of Kodama’s tenure 74 schools were 
opened with 274 teachers and 7,836 students. In the same time, every village 
possessed one of the old Chinese schools, with which the government did not 
interfere.294 In 1899, 1,496 instructors were employed in these traditional schools 
teaching 27,568 students.295 Future educational programmes were mainly based on 
Isawa’s ideas.296 
The proclamations about the civilizing of the Taiwanese through education 
were shattered under the pressure and the preponderance of the military in the colony. 
Economy, legislation, and the relations between the colonizers and the subjugated in 
these first years of Japanese rule were not regulated in line with the patterns of 
modern civil administration. Every aspect of economic and social life in a military 
orientated colony was rather dominated by the needs and aspirations of the army. The 
authoritarian and bellicose character of early Japanese colonialism is easily 
perceivable through Taihoku’s interaction with the island’s inhabitants, both Chinese 
and aborigines. It was in that occasion that the façade of the enlightened, benevolent 
and sympathetic ruler resonantly collapsed. For the army, administering the colony 
was a task too important to be entrusted to the diet and the political parties. According 
to the “Chronicle of the Police Affairs of the Taiwan Governor-General’s Office”, the 
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office at a certain point suggested the expulsion of the Taiwanese from the 
strategically important island so that loyal subjects from the Japanese Home Islands 
could populate the colony making it safer. On 25 May 1898, the parliamentarian 
Takeuchi Musashi described the colony as “the only territory that Japan gained in 
exchange for the blood of our forty million people”. In the same session, the goals for 
Taiwan were set: “simplify the legal system, utilize local customs, save cost, extend 
benevolence equality, and gradually bring [the people] to civilization”. In many 
occasions Taiwan was described in the General-Government office records as the 
“key gate” in the south to point out the island’s importance and purpose for the 
metropolis.297 
 
The aboriginal problem was synonymous with the exploitation of the island’s 
camphor supplies, the most profitable of the colony’s products. The first Governor-
General, Kabayama, remarked not long after his arrival in Taiwan: “In order to 
colonize this island, we must first conquer the barbarians”. However, at the time there 
were more urgent issues to settle. 298  The indigenous tribes were called hillsmen 
(takasago) or barbarians (banjin) by the colonial authorities who saw them as the next 
savage people to civilize.299  The aboriginal population according to an unofficial 
estimation was about 14,000 by the end of Qing rule. They were deemed to be of 
Malay origin and were classified in 9 distinct tribes.300 This classification was based 
on the field work of the anthropologist Inō Kanori (1867-1925). He visited aboriginal 
villages in May 1897 studying their customs, culture and social organization. His 
work entitled Conditions among Taiwan's Aborigines published in February 1900 
arranged hierarchically the tribes from civilized to savage and renounced the 
simplistic Chinese classification of “cooked” and “raw” barbarians.301 Through his 
writings he criticized the Qing for neglecting and oppressing the aborigines and 
presented Japan as benevolent and humane. Japan committed to scientific rule and the 
civilizing mission paternalistically saved the aborigines, the eternal victims, from the 
“cunning and crafty Chinese”. 302  As reported by official colonial reports “the 
savages” despite their low level of organization and numbers were occupying 6/10 of 
the island. The government’s goal was dual: “bringing pressure upon them and that of 
gradually inducing them to enlightenment”. Additionally: “the northern savages are 
vindictive and they have the habit of collecting skulls. They stubbornly rejected our 
kind effort to tame them and attacked us violently.303 Those that have submitted can 
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trade with us and receive medical attention and agricultural implements”. Their 
presence obstructed the camphor production and thus the problem had to be dealt by 
the police.304 
Taiwan during the Qing and colonial era was divided into 3 zones. The 
Chinese settlements on the west plains, an area between these settlements and the 
savage border populated by semi acculturated indigenous and the savage territory 
where the “raw savages” lived. The rich in natural resources territory was however, 
outside the Qing’s civil administration. The frontier zone was gradually decreased 
because of the Chinese and “cooked” aborigines’ infringements aiming to secure 
employment in the production of tea and camphor. The Qing effort to increase the 
island’s profitability and assimilate the indigenous was directed by a General Bureau 
of Camphor Affairs and a Bureau of Pacification and Reclamation. In late 19th 
century increased Chinese military colonization, pacification campaigns, and a system 
of frontier garrisons to keep “the savages” in check were employed as well.305 On 31 
March 1896, the Japanese reinstated the Office of Pacification and Reclamation 
(Bukunsho) to deal with the aborigines and address the camphor issue. 11 of these 
offices were established along the old Qing border, 8 of them in the same location as 
the Chinese stations. Their goal was to open the aboriginal land for economic 
development, gather intelligence on the savage social and political structures and 
regulate the relations between the Japanese, the aborigines and the Chinese. In early 
1896 Kabayama wrote to Prime Minister Itō requesting 236,871 yen for the project. 
He backed his idea by claiming that the aborigines’ "hearts must be won over first" in 
order to open the camphor areas for the Japanese immigrants and avoid disputes. In 
March, his request was granted but a more limited budget was allocated. That meant 
that the facilities built between the 2nd of June and the 3rd of August 1896 were 
somewhat understaffed. One interpreter, two clerks, two engineers, and a few 
policemen (not as many as Kabayama had asked for) manned these stations. The head 
of the Industrial Development Bureau, Oshikawa Noriyoshi ordered the Bukonsho 
offices in order to gain their trust to explain to the indigenous that the Japanese would 
be better rulers than the hated Chinese. He also ordered them to distribute prizes to the 
loyal villages which facilitated camphor production in their respective areas. The 
disobedient villages would not be granted gifts or firearms that were so important for 
the aborigines’ subsistence hunting. 306  Three months after the creation of the 
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Bukonsho offices military police were dispatched to the aborigines’ areas since 
violence against Chinese workers and settlements was on the rise. The camphor’s 
economic significance for the colonial revenue explained the fact that these offices 
reported back to the Industrial Development Bureau’s Chief, who then reported to 
Mizuno, the Chief of Civil Affairs.307 On 31 October 1895, the colonial authorities 
proclaimed the “Regulations for the Management of Government Forests and the 
Camphor Industry” which transformed the island’s wastelands and forests into state 
property if those who owned the land could not prove their ownership. Those lands 
for which no license could be produced were declared void and their output was 
confiscated. The colonial state issued permits to sell the land to some chieftains and 
Han Chinese but by 1900 most of them had lost their rights to produce camphor by 
selling their rights to Japanese capitalists. After the creation of the Taiwan Camphor 
Bureau in 1899 and the proclamation of the Camphor Monopoly in the same year the 
Japanese started replacing the customary system in an effort to rationalize the 
production.308  
The first contact with these tribes occurred during Japan’s colonization effort 
of Taiwan in 1874 as we already examined.309 Let’s take a step backwards and see 
how the Japanese treated the aborigines in the aftermath of the occupation. After 1895 
and during the initial years of colonial domination, Tōkyō found itself amidst a 
guerilla war against the Chinese inhabitants and was still not in a position to exploit 
economically the island. Thus, the Japanese appeared more tolerant or indifferent 
towards the indigenous tribes. Indeed, the very first administrators were genuinely 
well-disposed and fascinated by the mysterious tribes. 310  In some cases the new 
colonial authorities collaborated with some aborigine villages in the foothills against 
the Chinese rebels that sought refuge deep inside the savage lands. The “savage 
frontier” was terra incognita for almost a decade of Japanese rule. It was only when 
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the colonial state wished to penetrate the mountainous interior and exploit the 
profitable camphor trees that interaction with the aborigines was increased. After the 
consolidation of Japan’s power during the Kodama administration and the pacification 
of the island presumably in 1902, when the resistance was officially proclaimed 
suppressed, Tōkyō focused its energy to the savage frontier.311   
 
Mizuno Jun on 31 August 1895 claimed that after centuries of animosity and 
warfare between the aborigines and the Chinese settlers, the Japanese should adopt a 
policy of benevolence towards the indigenous so that “submission to our authority 
will not be a difficult task”. He added: “…Like the previous administration [Qing], 
we should establish a Pacification-Reclamation Office which will gather the heads of 
the tribes together and other savages and distribute cloth, tools, and hold feasts with 
drinking. If we add to this earnest and untiring moral instruction, we should be able to 
produce good relations and can expect to harvest camphor trees in peace, produce 
camphor, manage the mountain forests, cultivate the savage lands, and build roads [in 
the savage territory]”. The first Governor-General Kabayama and his chief of Civil 
Affairs Mizuno Jun were veterans of the 1874 expedition.312 They were aware of the 
“savage border” and convinced about the Chinese supposed cruelty, incompetence, 
corruption and avarice; for them the victimized indigenouss had to be protected and 
brought into civilization. On 25 May 1895 Kabayama made a stop in the Ryūkyūs, on 
his way to assume Taiwan’s administration, where he conferred with local Meiji 
officials asking advice on how to rule uncivilized peoples. He explained to the heads 
of the civil and military bureaus his general policy in regard to the savage tribes: He 
suggested “paternalistic affection” and “kindly justice” for these unfortunates. On 25 
August Kabayama concluded: “The savages [seiban] are extremely ignorant and 
simple, but...once they harbor ill feelings toward a person, it is difficult for them to 
change course; over 200 hundred years of their enmity with the Chinese and several 
rebellions is ample proof of this tendency; if we are to cultivate this island, we must 
first tame the savages. If at this time upon meeting our men, they should think we are 
like the Chinese, it would certainly result in them becoming a big hindrance to our 
enterprise; this government must therefore adopt a policy of attraction and 
leniency...”.313  Furthermore, the second Governor-General, Katsura Tarō upon his 
arrival in 1896, issued some edicts to his subordinates according to which the 
                                                          
311 Ronald G. Knapp and Laurence M. Hauptman, “"Civilization over Savagery": The Japanese, the 
Formosan Frontier, and United States Indian Policy, 1895-1915” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 49, 
No. 4 (Nov. 1980), p. 649.  
312 Both of them had orders to investigate conditions in Taiwan in the summer and autumn of 1873. In 
August, they met people and surveyed the land in preparation for the proposed expedition. Earlier, in 
May, Mizuno distributed Japanese products to the aborigines and noted their “goodwill”. Kabayama 
had a similarly amicable experience at the Nanwo village in September 1873. Influenced by 
LeGendre's reports Mizuno and Kabayama came to the conclusion that the savages could be 
enlightened and that their violent behaviour was due to Chinese brutality and negligence. They returned 
to the island to tour its southern part in March-April 1874. See Barclay, Japanese and American 
Colonial Projects, pp. 99-111. 
313 Ibid., pp. 73-65.  
436 
 
aboriginal way of life should not be altered for the time being and they should be 
treated kindly to inspire respect in return. He noted: “the education of aborigines 
cannot be neglected even for one day… It goes without saying that it is necessary to 
cultivate ideas of empire, and at the same time their intelligence should be 
developed”. In December 1896, the third Governor-General, Nogi Maresuke, during a 
bureaucratic meeting, claimed the importance of calming the people’s hearts in order 
to avoid the alienation and resentment of the native population.314 
Accordingly, the first official contacts with the aborigines embodied this 
sentiment of leniency and appeasement. On 2 September 1895, Hashiguchi Bunzō, 
head of the Industrial Development Bureau and Taihoku’s Governor Tanaka set out to 
meet the indigenous of modern Daikei, southwest of the colonial capital. Their aim 
was to declare to the aborigines that Japanese rule had now replaced the Qing in 
Taiwan. Hashigushi distributed cloth, alcohol and blankets to the first 23 savages they 
encountered on the 8th of September. They accepted the gifts, expressed their relief 
for the Qing withdrawal and 4 of them came to Taihoku for a tour of the government 
facilities. Hashigushi recounted this episode on 22 October 1895 in his speech to the 
Tōkyō Geographical Society in his effort to draw the public’s attention to the colony 
and the “aborigine border”. In mid-September, he ordered sub prefect Kawano 
Shuichirō to organize the first official Japanese embassy to Yilan aboriginal lands.315 
Hashigushi wrote that the aborigines’ hate for the Chinese was so great that were 
happy to see their houses burned by the Japanese military. Their feelings towards the 
Japanese however were “extremely good”. Not every initial contact between the tribes 
and the Japanese were felicitous though. For example, a 14-member mission directed 
by Chief Fukahori Yasuichiro was slaughtered by natives in January 1897 while 
inspecting the road connection between Taizhong to Hualian. Upon Tanaka’s and 
Hashigushi’s mission reports, submitted on 9 September 1895, Mizuno established the 
first office to handle aboriginal affairs in Taikōkan (Modern day Dasi District) 16 
days later. The station was built near the aboriginal territory and was given an 
operating budget to strengthen bilateral ties through distributions of food, blankets 
and alcohol. Hashigushi appeared also skeptical about the attitude of the Japanese 
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settlers in the mountainous areas; most of them sought to make as much money as 
possible in a short period of time and leave. Troublemakers and profit seekers could 
disrupt the colony’s harmony.316 
Despite the “cordial” bilateral relations Tōkyō put forward more abusive 
measures. In September 1896, Ordinance no. 30 made entrance to the savage area 
possible only after the issuing of a permit. The Japanese adopted in 1897 the 18th 
century Qing aiyu-sen or guard line strategy to protect the civilians and camphor 
workers from indigenous aggression. The guard line was fifty to a hundred feet wide 
and was created by cutting a path along the crest of mountains. It climbed up and 
down mountains and dense forest and was constructed around the uncontrolled 
aboriginal territory. Entrenchments and wooden barriers were erected along the line. 
Every half mile guard houses were built supplied with firearms, field-guns, grenades, 
mortars, bamboo drums and later telephones manned by 2-3 policemen.317 Every 4 or 
5 houses a superintendent station was placed equipped with alarms. In later years the 
line was reinforced by barbed wire and electric fences. The guard line was placed 
under the authority of the police and thus the whole system became more efficient and 
centralized. The line was gradually advancing thus decreasing the savage territory 
pushing the aborigines further up the mountains or into submission. At times, the 
colonial authorities could blockade the interior, cut off supplies, such as salt, and 
starve into submission the troublemaking villages. The fence served to confine the 
tribes. The artificial border separated the civilized from the barbarians; beyond the 
border the savages could live as they pleased as long as they remained in barbarian 
territory. The rest that inhabited the “civilized territory” would be governed under the 
policy of direct assimilation.318 Those that finally submitted were given agricultural 
implements and land for cultivation. Certain tribes were granted the right to trade but 
this too was suspended when they became unruly and violent.319 The guard line’s 
extension brought about the appropriation of land first in the outskirts of Taihoku and 
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Taiwan Kyōkai’s bulletin: out of the 1300 Japanese women in Taihoku 800 were prostitutes, geishas 
and bar girls. In the same year a Nippon newspaper edition described Taiwan as a “dumping-ground for 
people from naichi”. See Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2, pp. 46-47. 
317 Ōe, “Shokuminchi ryōyū”, pp. 72-73. 
318 Caprio, Japanese Assimilation, p.  76. 
319 Semple, “Japanese Colonial Methods”, p. 273. 
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eventually up to the eastern regions.320 The owner-less land was automatically seized 
by the colonial government.321  
In March 1898, Japanese workers were murdered by an aboriginal tribe 
signifying that the policy of appeasement had failed. The politician Mochiji 
Rokusaburō (1867-1923) criticized the colonial administration’s adoption of Qing 
measures. A more drastic policy had to be put forward. In June 1898, the Offices of 
Pacification and Reclamation were abolished by the new Governor-General 
Kodama.322 In October 1900, Governor-General Kodama made clear that the period 
of moderation for the aborigines, as Mizuno had envisaged it, was over: “These days 
the various enterprises in the plains are gradually coming together. As this work 
advances, we must shift our military forces to the savage territory. But those who live 
there are stubborn, and live like wild beasts; if we hold feasts for them and adopt a 
policy of attraction, it will take long months and years for them to reach a certain 
degree of evolutionary development. Such slow and inconclusive measures should not 
be the basis for the urgent and pressing business of managing a new colonial 
possession. We must decisively and quickly eradicate all obstacles in our path”. 
Military campaigns were now organized to subjugate the agitators. In March 1903, 
Kodama and Gotō arranged a conference with the participation of high officials and 
Mochiji Rokusaburō, now councilor in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, with the 
objective of finding a solution to “the Aborigine problem”. Mochiji believed that the 
colony existed not for the welfare of the colonized but for the economic advantage of 
the homeland. In his paper “A Position Paper on the Problem of Aborigine 
Administration” he explained that the Shimonoseki treaty gave Japan jurisdiction over 
the Chinese population of the island; the savages were beyond the reach of Chinese 
authority and since they were not Beijing’s subjects they could not be considered 
Tōkyō’s subjects after 1895 either. Their lawless status meant that they were not 
protected or included in any protocol and treaty. As animals they did not have any 
rights. The previous administrators mistakenly tried to negotiate and ally themselves 
with a lesser race. In Social Darwinist terms, the barbarians had to be assimilated or 
be exterminated in the "racial struggle for existence."323 In April 1898, he exclaimed: 
“Until we solve this problem with the Aborigines, we will not have sufficient cause to 
boast to the outside world of our nation's will and ability to expand and be 
enterprising. The Aborigine territory occupies 56% of the island's surface, and is a 
storehouse of mineral, forest, and agricultural wealth. Unfortunately, the savage and 
                                                          
320  Τhe author Robert Tierney described the Japanese system of rule towards the aborigines as 
“expropriation by dispossession”. See Tierney, Tropics of Savagery, p. 43. 
321 Ching, Tracing contradictions, pp. 86-89. 
322 Barclay, Japanese and American Colonial Projects, pp. 89-93.  
323 In the same paper, Mochiji bluntly proposed the annihilation of the savages: “… I refer to the 
problem of aboriginal lands from the point of view of the empire, there is only aboriginal land but not 
an aboriginal people. The problem of aboriginal land must be dealt with from an economic perspective 
and its management is an indispensable part of fiscal policy…It is not a problem than one can hope to 
resolve by ethical means”. Japan had to “to exercise violence in order to put an end to violence” and 
display its “warrior spirit”. See Tierney, Tropics of Savagery, pp. 44-45. 
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cruel Aborigines have thrown up a barrier to this storehouse of natural resources”. 
Mochiji’s theories were put later into practice.324 Similarly, two newspaper articles by 
the Taiwan Nichi nichi Shinpō, established in 1898, proposed cruel measures to deal 
with the aborigine problem. In the 6th of October 1905 edition, the eradication of the 
barbarians was suggested but at the same time the unfeasibility of the project was 
understood since they were hidden high in the mountains. An editorial published 
either on the 15th or on the 18th of March 1906 described the indigenous as ignorant 
and violent beasts and thus their breed had to be halted.325  
 
By mid-1898, the camphor from the Taikōkan area was processed by the 
Nakamura and Komatsu companies which employed Chinese labour but Japanese 
techniques and equipment. Nakamura also employed almost 1,000 Japanese 
immigrants but the aboriginal attacks and mortality rate due to malaria made Japanese 
work force hard to attract. On 13 September 1896, 23 Chinese labourers were 
beheaded by local tribes. In the entire island, 79 attacks took place in 1897, 271 in 
1898, 293 in 1899 and 314 in 1900 effectively preventing the authorities from 
exploiting the island's camphor forests.326 By 1898 the camphor companies and the 
colonial state started employing Chinese and friendly aborigine guards (1,100 men 
that year) to keep aggressors away from the production facilities. These forces were 
responsible in turn for almost 500 indigenous deaths between 1898 and 1901. Paying 
all these government and private forces signified the importance that the camphor 
foreign trade held for the ravaged colonial treasury. Camphor export, except for the 
first year of colonial domination, steadily generated an income rate of 15-25% of the 
colonial revenue.327 Nitobe Inazō was interested in the frontier tactics employed by 
the Americans. They confined the indigenous tribes with the use of guard lines, that 
were constantly advancing to appropriate Indian land, and they launched punitive 
expeditions. In January 1900, the First Secretary of the Legation of Japan in 
Washington requested information on the US Indian policy. In 1906 Oshima Kumaji, 
Chief of Civil Administration of Taiwan, was sent to the US “to study the systems of 
government and education of the American Indian.". This kind of enquiries went on 
until June 1910.328  
The Nanzhuang Incident of July 1902 or Nanshō in Japanese is an example of 
Tōkyō’s newly adopted ruthless tactics. One of the biggest areas of camphor forests 
                                                          
324 Barclay, Japanese and American Colonial Projects, pp. 140-145. 
325 Chang, Marshaling Culture, p. 51. 
326 The tribe called Atayal was considered to be the most savage; the majority of the violent episodes 
occurred in their lands, in eastern Taiwan. In 1903 the Japanese reinforced their guard lines with 
electric fences to keep the natives away from the camphor workers. The Atayal in response killed 
several Japanese. In 1906, they beheaded another 36 of them. The tribe was eventually encircled by the 
army and brought into submission. Years of resistance and defiance towards the outsiders fostered a 
distinct “Taroko” national identity that persists to this day. In addition, the boundaries and 
classification drawn by the colonial state created new community identities. See Scott, “Making 
Natives”, pp. 6-9. 
327 Barclay, Japanese and American Colonial Projects, p. 132.  
328 Knapp and Hauptman, "Civilization over Savagery", pp. 649-651. 
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was located in Nanzhuang. By early 1897 two Japanese companies (Fuji shōkai and 
Kōshō gōshi kaisha), after purchasing the nominal rights, employed more than 200 
Japanese workers in the camphor mountains. On 29 January 1898, 6 Japanese and 23 
native firms established the Nanzhuang Camphor Association with the goal of 
improving the quality of the product and eliminating the illegal producers. The 
Governor-General government started prosecuting the illegal producers, routing the 
workers and destroying their stoves. In 1900 the tribes living in the hills around 
Nanzhuang did not receive their mountain fees, payment for the use of their lands that 
is. This and other transgressions gave rise to a riot. The colonial authorities dispatched 
a company from the Xinzhu garrison to restore order on 6 July; three days later a 
second infantry company arrived to disperse the 800 aborigines led by the Hakka Ri 
Aguai. The rebels attacked and dispersed the labourers working in the camphor 
industry and destroyed guard stations and camphor facilities in the mountains. The 
anti-guerilla campaign took the Japanese army two months to complete. To quell the 
riot the colonial state employed the army, and both the national and local police. 
Artillery bombing and then infantry charges annihilated the riot hotspots one by one. 
On 17 November 1902, some 20 tribesmen came down from the mountains to 
surrender but they were ambushed and gunned down by the Japanese soldiers. It is 
apparent by the cruelty of the Japanese reaction that the colonial state used the riot as 
a means to eliminate not only their rights but the producers themselves in order to 
facilitate the Japanese industrial capitalism’s penetration in Taiwan’s interior.329 The 
previous gradual assimilation tactics seemed unable to yield any positive results. The 
fifth Governor-General Sakuma Samata (1844-1915) from 1906 to 1915 put in 
practice a different, less sophisticated policy called “Five year plan to conquer the 
Northern Tribes”. By 1913-1914 he had dispatched 12,000 troops to the mountainous 
interior to subjugate the natives. The long warfare cost Japanese colonial forces nearly 
10,000 lives, while an untold number of aborigine lives were lost through conflict and 
starvation.330 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
329 Tavares, “The Japanese Colonial State”, pp. 361-380. 
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12.  Japan and the scramble for China 
 
Japan emerged victorious and as a colonial power after the Sino-Japanese war. 
However, the strategic anxieties about the future of Qing China and concerns over the 
even more precarious Korean issue were not mollified by the victory. On the domestic 
front, Itō allied himself with the Liberal party under Itagaki to counter Yamagata’s 
growing influence. This extraordinary manoeuvre did not work in the long run; in 
August 1896, Itō was dismissed and in September Matsukata took his place. Itō 
returned to power on 12 January 1898 but on the 30th of June of that year, Ōkuma 
took over for the next 5 months. His successor, Yamagata held the office from 8 
November 1898 until September 1900 when he was succeeded by Itō’s 4th 
administration. As the founder and leader of the Rikken Seiyūkai party, Itō ruled until 
June 1901, when Katsura Tarō’s term started. The political instability of the time was 
aggravated by disputes over military spending and personal inter-parliamentary 
rivalries. What initially spurred the deep political crisis and plunged the startled 
country into an everlasting syndrome of revanchism and distrust towards the West 
however was the Triple Intervention.1 
The infuriated public opinion, ecstatic up to that point about the Japanese 
victories on the warfront, criticized Itō’s government for the inability to predict that 
harsh peace terms upon China would mean the intervention of the foreign powers. 
Despite the latter’s frequent offers to mediate and their warnings, Itō and Mutsu did 
not lower their demands on China. The British were the first to propose a cease fire 
and a peaceful solution fearing the disruption of their trade in the East. The other 
powers reacted only after the astonishing realization that Japan would be the definite 
victor of the war and China was on the verge of collapse. Japan’s Foreign Vice 
Minister, Hayashi Tadasu admitted that while a Western intervention was anticipated, 
its “extent” was not.2 
The Japanese demand for Liaodong’s annexation was upheld during an 
imperial conference in Hiroshima, the war capital on 27 January. On 4 April 1895, 
Tōkyō began laying the ground work for a favourable diplomatic outcome by 
communicating its peace terms to London, Washington, Paris, Saint Petersburg but 
not to Berlin to Aoki’s discontent.3 At the beginning of February Kimberley, the 
                                                          
1 Michael A. Barnhart, Japan and the world since 1868, (London 1995), pp. 24-25.  
2Itō in a conference in Hiroshima on 27 January 1895 acknowledged that Tōkyō’s demands could 
provoke a reaction on the part of the West. See Urs Matthias Zachmann, “Imperialism in a Nutshell: 
Conflict and the 'Concert of Powers' in the Tripartite Intervention, 1895”, in Japanstudien, Vol. 17 
(2005), p. 60.  
3  Ibid., p. 61. Aoki, Japan’s ambassador in Berlin, lamented his government’s disregard towards 
German interests. He was of the opinion that Japan had to approach Germany and form an alliance with 
Berlin or London against the “invader of the Far East”, Russia. See Tajima Nobuo, “Overview (1) 
Japanese-German Relations in East Asia, 1890–1945” in Japan and Germany: Two Latecomers on the 
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British Foreign Minister, already informed by his Minister to Russia that Saint 
Petersburg was promoting the idea of active involvement in the Far East, met with the 
German ambassador Hubert Paul Gustav Graf von Hatzfeldt (1831-1901). The latter 
did not “oppose the idea of a joint intervention” alongside Britain. The same offer was 
made to Lobanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, by the German Chargé d’Affaires in 
Saint Petersburg. At the beginning of March, Berlin instructed its Minister to Tōkyō, 
von Gutschmid (1843-1905) to appeal to the Meiji government for moderation. At the 
same time Lobanov revealed to Nishi Tokujirō, the ambassador to Russia, that 
potential Japanese mainland annexations could cause complications. On 5 April, he 
declared to the British Minister to Russia that Tōkyō’s control of Shandong or of the 
Liaodong peninsula would jeopardize independence of Korea and China. On the exact 
same day however, Katō managed to secure Britain’s neutrality by pointing out to 
Kimberley the mutual benefits of the commercial clause sin the Shimonoseki treaty.4 
Russian policy was determined in a conference on 11 April 1895. Whereas 
Lobanov proposed a conciliatory stance after Britain’s refusal to intervene, the hard 
line advocated by the Finance Minister, Sergei Witte prevailed. Witte was of the 
opinion that if Russia could not obtain Port Arthur, the gate to Southern Manchuria, 
no one else should have it.5 Japan had to find restitution elsewhere; the Russian 
Minister to Tōkyō, Khitrovo confessed to Mutsu on 14 February 1895 that Saint 
Petersburg would not object to Japan’s seizure of Taiwan.6 Paris, already allied to 
Russia to counter the Triple Alliance between Germany, Italy and Austria, followed 
Saint Petersburg’s course of action as an act of solidarity, according to statement 
made by the French Foreign Minister, Albert Auguste Gabriel Hanotaux’s (1853-
1944) on 10 June 1895 during his parliamentary speech. Since France was lacking 
substantial interests in the Far East it would very much prefer to remain neutral. After 
Berlin’s resolute stance and alignment with Saint Petersburg, however, Paris could 
not afford to stay idle and risk its diplomatic isolation.  
Germany retained commercial interests in the Far East and the trade clauses of 
the Shimonoseki treaty were equally advantageous for both Berlin and London. 
Additionally, up to that moment Berlin had maintained amicable relations with Tōkyō 
a fact that explains the German reluctance to intervene during the initial phases of the 
conflict. Therefore, while the Japanese government might have anticipated a Russian 
or British reaction, the German manifestation of ill will caught it completely off 
guard. Political aspirations and irrational concerns were the components that would 
eventually formulate German actions on the matter. Kaiser Wilhelm’s II obsession 
                                                                                                                                                                      
World Stage, 1890-1945, Vol. 1, ed. Kudō Akira, Tajima Nobuo, Erich Pauer, (Folkestone, 2009), pp. 
3-4.  
4 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
5 On 17 April 1895, Witte pointed out that until the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway Russia 
had to oppose any annexations of northern Chinese territory by any power. Russia’s Far East strategy 
revolved around maintaining temporarily the status quo. See Ibid., p. 74. 
6Munemitsu Mutsu, Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–5, (Tokyo 
1982), p. 227. 
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with the racist idea of Yellow peril is well documented. 7  Germany consistently 
pursued a policy of encouraging Russian and French involvement away from Central 
Europe. Moreover, as previously noted, the Kaiser and chancellor Hohenlohe in 
November 1895 were examining the acquisition of Formosa before it was ceded to 
France as feared. In the same month, the German Minister to China Gustav Adolf 
Schenck zu Schweinsberg, (1843-1909) proposed to his government to lease a 
Chinese port in the Pescadores or Kiaochow in Shandong. It is apparent that Berlin 
was seeking a naval base to compete with the rival powers and expand its political 
and commercial influence in the East. This could be achieved by an agreement with 
the victorious Empire of Japan or by collaborating with the disgruntled and ready for 
action Russia. On 2 April, Aoki suggested to the German Foreign Office that if Japan 
was allowed to retain Port Arthur, Germany could find itself with a province in South 
China. The bribe was rebuffed since by that time Wilhelm was confident of gaining 
his precious base by working together with his civilized western partners and not with 
the heathen, barbarian and greedy Japanese. On 26 April the Kaiser wrote to the Czar 
that Germany was to support Russia in exchange for a sea port in China.8 Von Brandt, 
an expert on Far Eastern affairs, had suggested earlier in April that an anti-Japanese 
intervention would result in the seizure of a naval base all the same and moreover it 
would have the effect of placating Saint Petersburg in Europe, hopefully alienating it 
from its French ally.9 
On the same day that China and Japan signed the peace treaty, Lobanov 
requested Paris’ and Berlin’s collaboration in safeguarding “Europe’s interests”. 
Later, on 17 April von Gutschmid was instructed by the German Foreign Ministry to 
deliver a note alongside his French and Russian colleagues. Lobanov on the 19th 
asked London to join forces with Russia, Germany and France to force Japan into 
relinquishing Liaodong. Kimberley rejected the proposal revealing London and 
Tōkyō’s closer diplomatic ties.10 Meanwhile Aoki in Berlin had been deliberately left 
in the dark. The German authorities would express no malcontent regarding Tōkyō’s 
demands upon China until the 18th of April. On that day however, the secretary of the 
German Foreign Office communicated, to Aoki’s complete surprise, that since Japan 
had not heeded the previous warnings, it would now to face the consequences of its 
actions. On 23 April, the three Ministers to Japan visited Hayashi separately to deliver 
their ultimatum on Liaodong and offer a friendly advice to Japan “to renounce the 
                                                          
7Just a few days before the Intervention, his adviser and ex Minister to China and Japan, von Brandt 
had suggested the establishment of the “United States of Europe” as a counterweight to the Asian 
menace. See Zachmann, “Imperialism in a Nutshell”, pp. 76-77.  
8Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan since Perry, (New York, London, 1949), pp. 252-253. 
9  Frank W. Iklé,” The Triple Intervention. Japan's Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism” in 
MonumentaNipponica, Vol. 22, No. 1/2 (1967), p. 127.  
10 When Kimberley met Katō Takaaki in London, he stressed that Great Britain had no reason to 
deprive from Japan the “reasonable fruit of her victories, although they have much preferred no 
disturbance in status quo”. See Aleš Skřivan, Sr. and Aleš Skřivan, Jr., “Great Powers and the Sino-
Japanese War 1894–1895” in Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Vol. 2 (2015), 
p. 41.  
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definite possession of that peninsula” since “the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula 
is a threat to the capital of China, that it would render illusory the independence of 
Korea, and that it would be a perpetual obstacle for pacifying the Far East”.11 Von 
Gutschmid arrogantly added that Japan should comply since “fighting the Great 
Powers would be hopeless”. The tactless German diplomat exceeded his mandate by 
bluntly threatening the astounded Hayashi.12 
The Meiji government had to counter the foreign threat and the people’s 
heated reaction. The fear of military action was painfully real. A menacing Russian 
fleet of 30 vessels that had been assembled in Vladivostok actively operated in 
Japanese waters during the final stages of the Sino-Japanese war.13 A month before 
the Intervention, Kurino Shin'ichiro (1851-1937), the ambassador to Washington, 
intercepted and reported to the Foreign Ministry the information that the Russians 
were gathering 30,000 men in Northern Manchuria, aiming to expel the Japanese from 
Korea and Liaodong. 14  Moreover, the rumour that Russian forces were ready to 
embark for the Orient from the Black Sea port of Odessa placed further pressure upon 
Tōkyō.15 Mutsu reported that Russian vessels in the Far East were placed on alert and 
in Vladivostok the governor general of Eastern Siberia had 50,000 men ready to 
march on a moment’s notice. 16  In view of the grim situation Itō proposed three 
courses of action to the Imperial Council: reject the “advice” even at the risk of war, 
call an international conference or submit to the allied demands. The leaders of the 
military, Yamagata and Saigō Tsugumichi argued that the bulk of the army was still 
in China, the navy exhausted, the supplies drained and a war against three powers a 
lost cause. The military capabilities of mainland Japan were scant. The second option 
was opposed by Mutsu. 17  He would instead attempt unsuccessfully to elicit the 
diplomatic support of the US, Italy and Britain. 18 As a last desperate resort the 
retrocession of the peninsula except for Port Arthur was proposed on 30 April but the 
three Ministers did not give in. On 4 May 1895, the Japanese government announced 
the acceptance of the joint “friendly advice”. Itō’s government arranged for the 
emperor to announce the retrocession on 10 May in the hope that the public would not 
                                                          
11 Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p. 203. 
12Zachmann, “Imperialism in a Nutshell”, pp. 65-67. 
13Iklé, “The Triple Intervention”, p.  128 
14Yanaga, Japan since Perry, p. 249  
15 The French ambassador to Tōkyō, Harmand fabricated similar stories. See Mutsu, Kenkenroku, pp. 
211, 243. 
16 Ibid., p. 244. 
17 In the event of a conference every power would try to insert its interests complicating the situation. 
Additionally, a conference could encourage and give valuable time to China to rebuild its forces. Ibid., 
pp. 250-251.  
18 Kurino from Washinghton and Katō from London informed Tōkyō that the United States and Great 
Britain had decided not to intervene in the affair. From Rome Takahira Kogorō reported that the Italian 
government was well disposed towards Japan and “was contemplating some action”. Italy’s Foreign 
Minister Blanc revealed to Takahira that on 27 April Rome had rejected Berlin’s invitation for common 
action. He also appeared eager to mobilize the other powers in stopping the anti-Japanese intervention.  
See Ibid., pp. 213, 241. 
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criticize his edict. 19  A new treaty was signed in Beijing on 8 November; as 
compensation for Liaodong and Port Arthur, Japan obtained another 30 million taels 
as war reparation. By the end of the year Tōkyō’s forces had evacuated the 
peninsula.20 
When the news was made public, the press, amidst an atmosphere of general 
dissatisfaction, attacked the government for its military vulnerability and its 
diplomatic unpreparedness. The denial of Japan’s legitimate and hard-won gains 
shocked the nation and led some ultranationalists to ritual suicides and anti-
government riots.21 The government responded by dispersing the protesting rallies 
and by censoring the hostile newspapers. Yet it was unable to erase the terrible 
humiliation. The lesson derived from the Triple Intervention was that formidable 
armed forces that would ensure Japan’s survival and gain the respect of the Great 
Powers were needed.22 To that end the mobilization of the nation’s entire resources 
was necessary. The notion of using the indemnity and the fiscal budgets for the future 
military build-up, as the best way to protect the nation’s interests, was gradually 
becoming more popular. Following the popular slogan “endure privation for the sake 
of revenge”, Tōkyō expanded its fleet and its land forces: in March 1896 the army 
decided to increase its peacetime forces from around 50,000 to 164,000 men and from 
200,000 to 545,000 in wartime.23 On 12 April 1895, Yamagata predicted: “It is certain 
that the situation in Asia will grow worse in the future […] and we must make 
preparations for another war within the next ten years”. Only brute military force 
made sense in a hostile, highly competitive international system.24 Army Minister 
Katsura fixated on the question of military expenses asserted on 23 June 1898 that if 
the diet or even the constitution stood in the way of Japan’s post war military build-up 
they had to be suspended.25 After all these painful lessons the Japanese “…do not to 
seem to appreciate the value of diplomacy, except as preliminary to the use of force” 
                                                          
19 Ian Nish, Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942: Kasumigaseki to Miyakezaka, (London-Henley-
Boston, 1977), p. 41. 
20Skřivan, Jr., “Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War”, p.  41. 
21 Mutsu, among other, lamented the retrocession of Port Arthur the capture of which cost so “much 
Japanese blood”. He chose to ignore how much more Chinese blood was spilled as a result of the 
Japanese atrocities. See Mutsu, Kenkenroku, p.  252. 
22Iklé, “The Triple Intervention”, p.  129. 
23 In 1895, military expenditures weighted down the state budget with 11 million yen. 5 years later this 
amount had reached to almost 60 million yen. In total, between 1896 and 1905 the navy’s total 
expenses amounted to 213 million and the army’s to 101. The government introduced new taxes in 
March 1896 and December 1898. When these proved insufficient, loans were concluded in London, a 
step never taken by the previous administrations out of fear of foreign intervention. See Urs Matthias 
Zachmann, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on 
National Identity, 1895-1904, (London-New York 2009), pp. 47-50. 
24 Skřivan, Jr., “Great Powers and the Sino-Japanese War”, p. 42. 
25 Stewart Lone, Army, Empire and Politics in Meiji Japan, (New York 2000), p. 61. 
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as the British diplomat Satow prophetically asserted on 26 March 1898.26 The West 
had created a monster which without a doubt would turn at some time against it. 
If Japan could not at the moment afford the implementation of such a policy 
against the West, perhaps it could do so against Korea, which certainly appeared as a 
more feasible objective. Tōkyō enjoyed an exclusive status of predominance there and 
was witnessing the increase of the Russian influence after the war with preoccupation. 
Itō and Inoue wanted to proceed with the “egyptianization” of Korea by subtly 
penetrating its economy and extracting further concessions. 27 Yamagata and 
                                                          
26  George Alexander Lensen, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895-1904: The 
observations of Sir Ernest Satow British Plenipotentiary to Japan (1895-1900) and China (1900-1906), 
(Tokyo 1966), p. 29. 
27Τhe July 1899 edition of the Tōkyō based journal Taiyō read: “the means of extending one’s territory 
without the usage of troops is… railway policy”. The Japanese interest for the control of Korea’s 
railways was manifested in the early 1890s by the army, financiers based on the treaty ports, and a few 
capitalists and Ōsaka merchants. In 1891, the assistant chief of the army’s general staff Kawakami 
proposed the establishment of a railway line between Seoul and Pusan to facilitate the advance of 
Japan’s forces in case of a future conflict. With the backing of the Dai-Ichi bank a feasibility study was 
undertaken by a team of specialists. In August 1894, Ōtori extracted from the Koreans a provisional 
agreement granting Japan the right to build lines between Inchon, Pusan and Seoul. In November, a 
group of 100 technicians under Sengoku Mitsugu started planning the routes meant for military use and 
estimated to cost 2 million yen. The Korean government acknowledging the value of these lines and 
despite the previous agreements rejected for some time Inoue’s demands during the winter of 1895. 
Without the capital to build them themselves they preferred that the construction was completed by 
anyone else but the Japanese. In February 1895, a group of Japanese entrepreneurs decided to establish 
a new bank in Korea as well as the ventures of building the Seoul-Inchon and the Seoul-Pusan lines. To 
their disappointment, the rights of the Seoul-Inchon line were granted to an American businessman in 
April 1896. Shortly after, the French secured, with the mediation of the allied Russians the Seoul-Ŭiju 
line. Prime Minister Matsukata (after September 1896) was also in favour of securing economic 
concessions in Korea. The government’s plan was not to contest the Americans and even facilitate 
them to build the line. After its completion, Tōkyō would purchase the railway’s rights. In May 1899, 
the line was indeed bought for 1,720,452 yen by the treasury since the capitalists’ contribution was 
close to minimal. In September 1898, the Korean government entrusted the Seoul-Pusan line to a 
namesake Japanese company. This notable result was materialized after years of lobbying by the 
Japanese community in Korea. The settlers not only stressed the “urgent necessity” of the undertaking 
to Tōkyō but also bribed the Korean Foreign Minister to accept the Japanese offer for the railway line 
of strategic value and decline the French bid. According to the stipulations of the agreement 
construction would initiate in 1901 and would be completed within 10 years. After the surveys that 
took place in February 1899 the outrageous amount of 25 million yen was deemed as necessary for the 
completion of the project. When the Foreign Ministry appeared reluctant to invest heavily abroad while 
the internal conditions were far from prosperous the promoters turned to the Army; army Minister 
Katsura Tarō promised to fund the project from his ministry’s secret service funds. The leading 
promoter Ōzaki Saburō employed lobbying and political maneuvering for three years until the 
establishment of the Seoul-Pusan company. To persuade investors he turned to a nationalistic oratory: 
“It is your duty as a citizen to buy our stock”. Without Japanese control of this line, Korea would fall 
into the lap of another power, the motherland would be in peril and the lives lost during the war would 
have been wasted. During the summer of 1893 the line was partially funded by the Ministry of Finance 
and Transportation but just 70 out of the total 270 miles were created. Thus, the only crucial railway 
line not in Japanese hands was the one connecting Seoul with Ŭiju. Its rights were finally purchased in 
1903 but the construction costs exceeded by far the government’s capabilities. The project was 
completed on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war for the imminent military operations. Besides the 
railways, Tōkyō sought to control the maritime lanes as well. Mitsubishi was given funds in October 
1876 and in 1881, in order to link Nagasaki with Pusan and Nagasaki with Wŏnsan respectively. In 
1890, a different company inaugurated the Ōsaka-Pusan line. The establishment of the Dai-Ichi and of 
58 bank branches in Korea contributed to the expansion of Japanese trade facilitated by the close 
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Matsukata wanted the same but looking past the consequences or the powers’ 
conflicting interests. After the Intervention however, Seoul realized that it could turn 
to the foreign powers to counter the asphyxiating Japanese pressure;28 between 1896 
and 1900 the Korean leaders granted to American, German, Russian, British and 
French investors rights to build factories, railways and mines. In the spring of 1896 
the Japanese merchants and settlers residing in the treaty ports protested against the 
Korean court’s decision to grant these constructions rights to foreigners.29 
As already seen, amidst the excitement of the upcoming victory some 
Japanese diet members, prior of the Shimonoseki treaty, set the price of peace 
extremely high for China. Gotō Shōjirō, in particular, in a lengthy memorandum 
called for the occupation of Beijing, Korea, Manchuria in the final days of the war. 
These grandiose plans were cancelled by Tōkyō’s capitulation before the allied 
coalition. In mid-June, 33 patriotic deputies insisted that it was critical to expand 
military armaments, reform foreign policy and preserve Japanese influence in Seoul. 
Active involvement in Korea was not to be abandoned despite the complex 
situation. 30  Lieutenant General Miura Gorō’s succession of Inoue as Resident 
Minister in Seoul was a clear indication of Tōkyō’s aspiration to brush aside Western 
influence and to reinstate its exclusive control in the country. In late September 1895, 
Miura without conferring with the new Foreign Minister Saionji Kinmochi decided to 
approach the deposed regent (Taewongun). The regent was to take control of the 
government, continue the war-time reforms, maintain the pro-Japanese members of 
the administration and restrain the hostile to Tōkyō Min function. For Miura, the 
ungrateful court with its “arbitrary” stance, constant interference in politics and 
possible collaboration with Russia or China jeopardized the reforms and Japan’s 
influence. Miura and Okamoto Ryūnosuke (1852-1912), a member of the Japanese 
legation, devised a plan to remove the Min obstacle on the 3rd of October. 5 days 
later, on 8 October 1895 Japanese “activists” stormed the palace and knifed Queen 
Min to death. The corpse was burned and the assailants fled unobstructed. With 
Japanese troops controlling the court without Tōkyō’s knowledge, the regent 
immediately seized control and installed pro-Japanese agents in the Ministries of 
Finance, Home and Military Affairs. Shortly after the assassination, Miura evidently 
content stated that “Well, Korea is finally in Japan’s hands. I am relieved”.31 Tōkyō 
upon hearing the news reacted not so much out of indignation for its representative’s 
heinous actions but out of fear of the subsequent international outrage and ire of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
proximity of the two counties. See Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword The Japanese Penetration of 
Korea, 1895-1910, (London-Berkeley, 1995), pp. 140-157, 245-255. 
28 King Gojong was reliant on foreign diplomacy and aid. He also implemented a programme of self-
strengthening to counter the threat against Korea’s integrity. On 12 October 1897, he proclaimed the 
establishment of the Korean Empire and in August 1899 he presented a constitution that elevated him 
to absolute ruler holding judicial, legislative and executive powers. See Ibid., p. 131. 
29 Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945, (London 2011), 
pp. 52-53. 
30Duus, The Abacus, pp. 104-107. 
31 Ibid., p. 111.  
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Korean population. Komura Jutarō relieved Miura and Inoue was sent to investigate 
the incident. In the meantime, the assailants were arrested and tried in Tōkyō but were 
set free on the grounds of insufficient evidence.32 The coup in contrast to Miura’s 
belief, depleted Japanese influence, plunged Korea into chaos and improved Saint 
Petersburg’s position in the country. Court members and Min sympathizers took 
shelter in the Russian delegation in Seoul. From there they organized a counter attack 
against the Japanese-held palace on 28 November and in early February 1896 they 
occupied government offices, attacked the Japanese garrisons and damaged the Seoul-
Pusan telegraph line. Under the pretext of protecting their legation, 150 Russian 
marines were relocated form Inchon to the capital on 9 February. On the next day 
King Gojong, fearful of his life after his wife’s assassination, took refuge in the 
Russian legation now guarded by Korean and Russian troops. 33 Later in the day 
Komura’s collaborator, Prime Minister Kim Hong-jip (1842–1896) and his reformist 
colleagues were beheaded by the enraged mob. Russian predominance was 
consolidated when the king after consultation with the Russian first consul Karl 
Ivanovich Waeber (1841-1910) appointed a new government consisting of pro-
American but mainly pro-Russian Ministers.34 
After the Triple Intervention, Yamagata, who preferred Japan’s penetration in 
the more populous and rich southern China, was one of the few to advocate in favour 
of a collaboration with Saint Petersburg, which could actually protect Japanese 
interests in the North. Putting aside the belligerent sentiments and anti-Russian feeling 
after the Intervention, Komura and Itō cynically sought to bargain with Waeber in 
early March 1896 by renouncing any demand for exclusive Japanese influence in 
Korea. The secret memorandum of 1 May acknowledged the political status quo and 
accepted the King’s sojourn in the Russian legation (he remained there until February 
1897). Both sides were allowed to maintain four companies of troops in the peninsula 
granting to Tōkyō at least a sort of military balance. On 17 May, Yamagata travelled 
to Saint Petersburg to formalize the deal and propose to Lobanov a declaration of a 
joint Russo-Japanese guarantee of Korean independence. During these talks, the 
division of Korea at the 38th parallel and the practicability of a bilateral protectorate 
were secretly discussed. Saint Petersburg confident that sooner or later it would seize 
Korea’s full control rejected these proposals. The final draft of 9 June 1896 provided 
for Korea’s fiscal reorganization and legal reform as well as the creation of modern 
police and military forces; until that moment came Russian and Japanese troops 
would be stationed there to guarantee law and order in the country. Tōkyō was 
allowed to maintain 200 men to guard the telegraphic lines and 800 to protect its 
nationals in the treaty ports. The Russians had to employ the same amount of troops. 
Before dispatching additional men, each side had to inform and acquire the consent of 
the other.35 Nevertheless, when Yamagata was signing the agreement he was unaware 
                                                          
32Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1963), pp. 44-45. 
33 Ibid., p. 49. 
34Duus, The Abacus, pp. 117-118. 
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of the conclusion of a Russo-Chinese anti-Japanese alliance a few days earlier. 
Russian influence was growing at Tōkyō’s expense.36 Weaber with promises of loans, 
telegraphic lines and military instructors secured mining rights in April and in 
September timbering rights near the Manchurian border. 
In September 1897, Weaber’s successor Alexey Nikolayevich Shpeyer (1854–
1916) persuaded Gojong to dismiss every foreign adviser and tried to take charge of 
the reform process.37 When in February 1898, Shpeyer requested the lease of a small 
island (Chollyong-do) off the port of Pusan the Korean Foreign Minister denied. As a 
result, Shpeyer demanded his dismissal. King Gojong gave in under the pressure of 
his Russian advisers. In the following weeks, Korean malcontent led to anti-Russian 
protests in Seoul and on 22 February 1898 a violent incident against a Russian 
interpreter took place. The Russian first consul demanded the punishment of the 
assailants in an arrogant and tactless tone. He declared to the new Japanese Minister 
Katō Masao that the country was hopeless, unfit to rule itself and as such it had to be 
partitioned between Saint Petersburg and Tōkyō. On 7 March, Shpeyer enquired 
Gojong if his country wished to continue receiving Russian military and financial 
assistance. On the next day, under the influence of Katō, the Koreans responded 
negatively to the ultimatum. As a result, the Russian government relocated Shpeyer to 
Brazil, withdrew its advisers and closed down the Russo-Korean bank bringing the 
Japanese back in the game. The failure of Russian policy in Korea made Saint 
Petersburg more conciliatory towards Japan. Hayashi Tadasu, who had become the 
Japanese Minister to Russia, informed Foreign Minister Nishi in early January 1898 
that the Czar wished to do away with the mutually detrimental friction. Furthermore, 
he was willing to acknowledge Japan’s predominant status in Korea. A month later 
Hayashi conferred with the Russian Foreign Minister, Mikhail Nikolayevich 
Muraviev (1845-1900) on the possibility of a joint protectorate over Korea. On 17 
March 1898, Muraviev vaguely responded that Saint Petersburg might refrain from 
interfering in Korea. Two days later Itō’s administration suggested the Man-
Kankōkan (Manchuria-Korea exchange): freedom of action in Korea for Japan in 
exchange for its recognition of Russian predominance in Manchuria. The result of 
these negotiations was the Nishi-Rosen convention on 25 April 1898. Both states 
recognized the independence of Korea and pledged not to interfere in its domestic 
affairs. Moreover, each party had to once again notify the other before dispatching 
instructors and advisers there. Article 3 recognized Japan’s sphere of influence over 
                                                          
36 In May 1896, a Korean delegation led by the murdered queen’s brother met with Russian officials in 
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inquiry about the prospect of a loan and military assistance. Shortly after, a Russian military mission of 
4,000 men was dispatched to train Korea’s obsolete army and in the summer a Russian financial expert 
was sent to Seoul to manage the proceedings of the Russian loan. See Ibid., pp.  650-655. 
37 Duus, The Abacus, pp. 120-122. 
450 
 
Korea since Russia was pledging not to dispute Tōkyō’s preponderant economic 
interests in the peninsula.38 
Katō believed that Saint Petersburg abandoned Korea because of the anti-
Russian sentiment there, choosing to consolidate its predominance in Manchuria and 
Liaodong instead. An ice-free port and the trans-Siberian railway were enough to 
make Russian presence in the Orient felt. Hayashi interpreted the Russian change of 
heart as an effort to avoid Tōkyō’s alienation.39 By March 1899 however, the new 
Minister to Seoul Alexander Pavlov (1860–1923), unwilling to admit defeat, had 
requested and obtained the lease of several whaling stations along the Korean coast. 
During the previous year, Katsura and Prime Minister Ōkuma agreed that the 
Japanese leasing of land in the strategically located port of Masanp’o had to be done 
under the disguise of a private undertaking. Ōkuma’s fall from power in November 
and the constant changes of the Foreign Ministers thwarted these plans. On 28 March, 
Yamagata obtained the cabinet’s authorization for a secret 500,000 yen military fund 
to be used for territorial purchases in Masanp’o and on the island of Koje-do (also 
known as Koha), the navy’s preferable target, pre-empting the Russians. When in 
spring Pavlov set his sights on the land adjacent to Masanp’o’s foreign settlement, 
Katsura sent money to a Japanese merchant in Pusan, who at first bought off high 
ranking Korean officials and finally in June purchased the land that Pavlov was 
eyeing. During the year, Russian warships provocatively kept on docking in the port 
increasing tensions and the chance of a conflict. In the end, war was averted in the 
spring of 1900 when the Russian government pledged to take possession of land 
located only within the foreign settlement’s limits whereas Tōkyō would exploit 
privately-owned land exclusively for the use of the city’s Japanese settlement. Both 
sides renounced their claims on Koje-do proving that at the time no one was willing to 
risk a full-scale war.40 
The Great Powers capitalizing on Japan’s success started carving up the dying 
Qing Empire. On 1 June 1895, The Russo-French entente through the Russo-Chinese 
Bank provided the Chinese with 400 million francs in order to assist the repayment of 
the first indemnity instalment to Japan. In May 1896 and March 1898, the British 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the German Deutsch-Asiatische Bank contributed 
16 million pounds each for railway and mining rights which Beijing ceded in 
exchange. In the meantime, Russian influence was growing. Witte, taking advantage 
of the loan talks, met with Li and proposed the following: Russia would guarantee 
Chinese territorial integrity and enter a defensive alliance to safeguard against another 
act of Japanese aggression in exchange for decreased tariff rates, extraterritoriality, 
the right to dock at Chinese ports, railway concessions in Manchuria, permission to 
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garrison troops and finally the administration for 15 years of the territories through 
which the Tran-Siberian would cross. The Li-Lobanov treaty was signed on 3 June 
1896 in Moscow.41 On 27 March 1898, Saint Petersburg obtained the lease of Port 
Arthur and by a supplementary agreement on 7 May, it gained exclusive commercial 
rights in Manchuria and the Chihli province (including Beijing). On 6 March 1898, 
Berlin obtained the highly coveted naval base of the Kiautschou Bay for 99 years; 
Guangzhouwan in South China was granted to the French with a treaty on 10 April 
1898. The crisis reached its peak when London dispatched warships to anchor side by 
side with the Russian vessels in Port Arthur in January 1898. Britain in the end 
grabbed Kowloon and Weihaiwei on 1 July 1898, almost a month after the Japanese 
evacuation of the port (27 May).42 The Jiji shimpō of the 3rd of December 1897 
spread further anxiety to the populace by pointing out that a second Triple 
Intervention to deprive Japan of Taiwan was underway.43 
On 10 January 1898, Εmperor Meiji worried about the European ambitions in 
China convened an assembly of his top statesmen (genrō). Itō’s administration 
favoured a more restrained foreign policy based on subtler means, less formal.44 
Tōkyō traumatized by the Triple Intervention was not materially and psychologically 
ready to undertake a dynamic line of action. The Prime Minister did not relinquish his 
non-intervention policy despite the impending danger: “The powers may begin to 
divide China at any moment now. Under these circumstances, the paramount and 
imperative goal of our country must pursue is this: to place our own country in the 
position of unbridledindependence, so that we cannot be touched by anyone”. To 
further justify his neutral policy he mentioned Japanese economy’s 
undercapitalization as well as the country’s political and social instability. Japan at the 
moment could not act forcefully, not because of moralistic sentiments of solidarity 
towards China but because it was lacking the means to do so. For instance, on 9 May 
1898 both the Japanese and the British consulate were burned down by Chinese 
revolutionaries but Tōkyō chose to ignore the transgression.45 
On 11 June 1898, the Qing emperor Guangxu approved and proclaimed a 
series of reforms suggested to him by the scholar Kang Youwei (K'ang Yu-wei 1858-
1927). Kang in his memoranda was advising the throne to follow Japan’s lesson: 
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create a parliament, establish a constitutional monarchy and swiftly move towards a 
modern capitalist economy. During the next 100 days, laws regarding the 
modernization of national institutions, the establishment of a new educational system 
and the reorganization of the army among other, brought about a Chinese version of 
the Meiji Restoration.46 Claude Maxwell MacDonald, the British Minister, hailed the 
reforms but a reorganized, invigorated China was certainly not in the powers’ best 
interests.47 Japan despite self-complimenting itself for being the protector and the one 
modernized and civil country of the orient did not embrace China’s enlightening 
movement. Only Itō, himself harbouring reservations, met with Qing officials, passed 
along some advice and toured the country in September 1898. On the 20th he met the 
emperor and Kang in Beijing but to no tangible result. The very next day the 
reformation effort was capsized by coup d'état launched by the conservative Empress 
Cixi. Many reformers were executed despite Prime Minister Ōkuma’s petition for 
moderation, Kang fled to Japan and the emperor was forced into exile. On the 30th an 
anti-foreign riot took place in Beijing which compelled the powers to land some 
troops. The country once again appeared at the edge of destruction. A relatively weak 
China was a potentially valuable stooge and in any case more preferable than a China 
in ruins. Tōkyō, as many Japanese believed, had to manage Chinese reforms, lead the 
country out of its predicament and even undertake its protection.48 
Ōkuma’s restrained foreign policy much like Itō’s was criticized by the press 
as weak and indecisive. However, he delivered an ambiguous speech to the members 
of Tōhō Kyōkai (Oriental Association) in late October 1898, which was memorable. 
Reflecting upon China’s degradation he asserted among others that “our empire has 
the duty to aid and protect China” and “a neighbouring country whose race is close, 
whose writing is the same…could pretty much make China flourish” and “rescue the 
Chinese from their present state of wretched misery”. Ōkuma closed his speech 
amidst enthusiastic applause: “…one cannot take away somebody else’s country, but 
if somebody else offers it, in this case–a gift not accepted, on the contrary, brings 
evil”. Contrary to his conviction that China’s integrity must be maintained he 
admitted that Japan as a last resort and “appropriate measure of defense” should take 
its share of territory like the other powers would.49 
The post-war period was one of trust and amicable relations between China 
and Japan. Beijing having second thoughts on its alliance with Russia and feeling 
threatened after the German usurpation of Shandong was willing to collaborate with 
Tōkyō. General Kawakami starting from December 1897 initiated a course of military 
training and cooperation with the Qing army authorities. The Japanese Minister to 
China Yano Fumio (1850-1931) in the spring of 1898 invited large numbers of 
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Chinese students to study in Japan. Additionally, between 1898 and 1899 the Japanese 
government invested heavily in the iron mines of Hubei in northern China. The newly 
found amicability between China and Japan made an alliance appear feasible. When a 
Qing plenipotentiary arrived from Beijing in May 1899, Yamagata suspected that his 
objective was an anti-western alliance and thus Tōkyō had to politely reject it.50 A 
tangible result of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement was the non-alienation agreement 
of the Fukien province, opposite of Taiwan, concluded with the Zongli Yamen on 22 
April 1898. It did not secure a privileged position or commercial concessions for 
Japan; it only reassured Tōkyō that the territory would not be granted by Beijing to 
another power. 
The great chance for Japan to prove its elevated international position and gain 
the respect of the powers came with the culmination of the anti-foreign feeling in 
China with the Boxer rebellion and the subsequent allied expedition in Beijing in the 
summer of 1900. In Japan, the incident is known as the “North China Incident”. 
Tōkyō chose to side and closely collaborate with the West against Beijing 
demonstrating restraint, duplicity51 and the docility required to assuage the Powers. 
Domestic political instability52 and the perception that the rebellion could be quelled 
by the Qing authorities explain Tōkyō’s initial inertia. On a deeper level this 
instability and the financial strains caused by the extensive military build-up of the 
previous years obliged Japan to pursue a status quo policy; it was in Japan’s best 
interest to avoid the dismemberment of China by the powers at a time when Tōkyō 
was unable to assert vigorously its claims. Despite the rebels’ attacks mainly on 
missionaries and Chinese Christians beginning from the summer of 1899, Nishi, now 
Minister to Beijing, reassured Foreign Minister Aoki (in office from November 1898 
to September 1900) on 28 April 1900 that there was no need for action: “This 
problem is in no way related to our interests and to become involved would only end 
by damaging Chinese feelings”. By May 1900 the disturbances had reached the 
outskirts of Beijing and alarmed the small western community in the capital’s foreign 
legation quarter. For Nishi, the rebels were not anti-Japanese but anti-Christian.53 
Accordingly, when the allied powers landed marines to guard their Beijing legations 
in mid-May the Japanese contingent of 24 soldiers was deemed deliberately small but 
“sufficient” for Japan’s plenipotentiary. However, the Foreign Minister argued that a 
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more sizeable, numerically equal force was needed in order to defend Japan’s 
standing alongside the allied troops. For the time being though, Itō’s advice to 
Yamagata and Aoki was to refrain from dispatching troops until the powers made 
such a request. On 8 June, Nishi upon hearing that the Boxers had cut off the road 
connection between Beijing and Tianjin finally asked for 500 men to be sent to 
Tianjin. In Beijing, the allied corps under the British colonel MacDonald failed to 
avert the murders of the secretary of the Japanese legation Akira Sugiyama on 11 June 
and of the German Minister Clemens August Freiherr von Ketteler (1853-1900) nine 
days later. On 13 June the Boxers massacred Christians, razed churches and burned 
the Japanese legation in the capital.54 
It was only then when the Meiji leaders and prominent political figures, such 
as Konoe, the chairman of the Pan-Asian political movement Tōa-Dōbunkai, realised 
the gravity of the situation. While the majority of Yamagata’s administration adopted 
a cautious, wait and see stance, Konoe sensing that the demise of the Qing Dynasty 
was close reflected on the possibility of a new Chinese reformist regime in the south 
of the country under the joint protection of Japan, the US and Britain. Others called 
for the army’s forceful intervention to secure Tōkyō’s share of the spoils in the 
impending scramble for China.55 Europeans respected power and Tōkyō had to show 
it even at the expense of its fellow Asians.56 Minister Katsura appeared sceptical 
about the prospect of large-scale land operations. On 12 June, he recommended closer 
collaboration with the allies, discreet non-committal action and the use of the Navy 
“wherever possible”. Nonetheless, the Minister of the Navy, Yamamoto Gonbee or 
Gonnohyōe (1852-1933) pointed out that limited risk, in this case the involvement of 
just the marines, meant limited rewards at the peace table.57 Katsura and Yamamoto 
with the tacit consent of Yamagata agreed to pursue a subtler policy in the North and 
press for concessions in the South. On 15 June 1900, the government authorized the 
dispatch of two infantry battalions (3,000 men) to Tianjin under Fukushima Yasumasa 
(1852-1919), now a Major General. The Army Minister exalted Fukushima’s mission: 
“…Even if your squad is completely destroyed, our nation will be entitled to great 
rewards in the future”. On the 16th Aoki declared servilely to London that: “If the 
British authorities agree, the Japanese government can immediately dispatch a 
sizeable rescue force. Should the British government not approve, Japan will hold 
back”.58 He presented a memorandum to the representatives of the powers in Tōkyō 
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expressing his government’s desire to act in unison with the powers on 23 June 1900. 
On 6 July, Aoki made the same suggestion to Washington.59 
Fukushima’s force was ordered to set sail on the 18th of June 1900, a day after 
the capture of the Dagu forts by the allies. On 21 June, the Qing government finally 
sided with the rebels and declared war on the foreigners pushing London to formally 
request Japan’s participation in the conflict. Aoki prudently conferred with the foreign 
representatives in Tōkyō and obtained their approval for a large-scale Japanese 
expedition on the mainland. Japan to reassure the powers’ suspicions and make its 
cooperation count acted only after their desperate call for assistance. On the other 
hand, to avoid the international indignation in case that its forces appeared in Beijing 
too late to save the besieged foreigners, Katsura had already assembled in Hiroshima 
the 5th division since the 26th of June. On 6 July, Yamagata’s government responded 
positively to the British appeals (3 and 5 July) for an extensive military operation;60 
the 5th division under Lieutenant General Yamaguchi Motoomi increased the number 
of the Japanese troops in China to nearly 22,000, the largest contingent among the 
allies.61 London amidst its commitments in South Africa during the Boer War (1899-
1902) dearly desired the substantial presence of a friendly army to act as 
counterbalance to Russia’s ambitions. To sweeten the deal for Tōkyō, London’s 
plenipotentiary promised a financial contribution of one million pounds on 14 July 
1900.62 The cabinet rejected the offer. Once again Katsura instructed Yamaguchi to 
refrain from independent action and to keep an eye on the Russians. In fact, Terauchi 
was dispatched to Tianjin on 13 July 1900 to guarantee the harmonious co-existence 
between the Russians and the Japanese on the battlefield. Yamagata’s approval of the 
German general Waldersee on 8 August as supreme commander of the allied forces 
while Japan was deploying the most men and warships proves Tōkyō’s unwillingness 
to displease the West. This decision proved to be unpopular among the Japanese 
people. On 14 August, the international army entered Beijing, relieving the hard-
pressed legations and ending the first phase of the war in success.63 
                                                          
59 Paul A. Varg, “The Foreign Policy of Japan and the Boxer Revolt” in Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 
15, No. 3 (Sep., 1946), p. 280.  
60 A first appeal for the immediate dispatch of 20 to 30 thousand Japanese troops had been made on 23 
June by the British Minister in Japan under the instructions of Salisbury, Prime Minister and head of 
the Foreign Office. Germany and Russia though refused to grant their consent. See Ibid., pp. 280-281. 
61  Itō, whose opinion as an experienced statesman had particular gravity among his colleagues, 
expressed his misgivings for such a commitment. Yamagata nevertheless was convinced that close 
association with the powers would keep Saint Petersburg in check and would avert a second European 
anti-Japanese intervention. See Barnhart, Japan and the world, pp. 30-31. 
62  In the beginning of August 1900, London’s financial offer to Tōkyō was made public by the 
newspaper Kokumin Shinbun. The public was shocked to discover that the Beijing expedition was 
nothing but an arrangement between mercenary leaders having been previously convinced that Japan 
was accomplishing a glorious act in the name of humanity in accord with the other great nations. What 
made an even worse impression was the conviction that Japan’s admission to the exclusive club of the 
civilized nations was granted under the condition that Tōkyō’s forces had to operate as proxies of the 
British crown. Using foreign states as tools for the sake of their own interests in Africa (against Paris) 
and in Asia (against Saint Petersburg) was a typically British practice. For others, London’s invitation 
for joint action was a token of goodwill and recognition. See Zachmann, China and Japan, pp. 144-145 
63 Lone, Army, Empire, pp. 79-80. 
456 
 
Katsura convinced that "it would be a tragedy to set one foot wrong at the very 
last moment” ordered the return of the bulk of the Japanese forces in Hiroshima in 
October.64Japan’s two-fold policy of acting in unison with its allies and of preserving 
the Qing empire’s territorial integrity was successful. The Boxer protocol of 7 
September 1901 among other provided for reparations of 450 million taels to the 
allied powers, the apprehension and punishment of the main rioters, temporary control 
of strategic areas, the right to protect the legations in Beijing and the demolition of the 
Dagu forts. Komura, the Japanese Foreign Minister after September 1901 signed the 
protocol on Japan’s behalf. During the long treaty negotiations, he sided with the 
American representative William Woodville Rockhill (1854-1914) to impose less 
harsh terms on Beijing, such as a reduced indemnity, and to avoid China’s partition 
after the Boxers’ defeat. On 22 December 1900, they opposed suggestions to 
demolish Chinese arsenals and to raise the Chinese tariffs. On 18 September 1900, 
Japan and the US jointly opposed Berlin’s invitation to continue the operations in 
order to arrest and punish the remaining Boxers in Northern China. Komura played a 
cautious game avoiding isolated diplomatic actions. Japan would withdraw its forces65 
and re-establish its diplomatic services in China according to the actions of the other 
powers.66  
In general, the foreign press, especially the American, exalted the discipline, 
valour and bravery of the allied Japanese soldiers in China. However, there were also 
voices, triggered by the ever present yellow peril perception, and warnings about 
Japan’s actual level of civilization and Tōkyō’s megalomaniac aspirations. To silence 
these fabrications the Japanese Foreign Ministry sponsored a campaign, as it did 
during the Sino-Japanese war, to shape a more positive image in the West through the 
power of bribery.67 In early July 1900, the Chinese emperor sent telegrams to the 
allied headquarters pleading for peace. The message conveyed to Aoki on 11 July 
mentioned the common cultural ties, asked for Tōkyō’s mediation and even suggested 
                                                          
64 Ian Nish, “Japan's Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
20, No. 4 (Aug., 1961), p. 450. 
65 Aoki had communicated to the allied forces that “after suppressing the Boxers and restoring peace in 
China, all countries should simultaneously withdraw their forces”. The Foreign Minister at the time 
planned to deploy the departing troops in Korea as a response to Russian actions in Manchuria. Katsura 
decided to retain some forces alongside the powers in Beijing and withdrew the bulk of them. Ian Nish, 
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1984-1907, (London, 1985), pp. 
16-17. 
66 Varg, “The Foreign Policy of Japan”, pp. 283-285. 
67 Aoki to “guard against Japan being misunderstood or misrepresented in Europe and America” and to 
disperse the rumours of an anti-Western Asian alliance sent 10,000 yen along with telegrams reporting 
pro-Japanese news to the Japanese legation in Berlin in July 1900. The Japanese Minister in Germany, 
Katsunosuke Inoue (1861-1929) was responsible for their distribution to the rest of Europe. To cover 
the US market the New York Herald was selected; its 9 July edition had to remove an article entitled 
“yellow peril”. In August, the Foreign Minister sent 2,000 yen to influence the French newspapers. 
This tactic was also employed during the Russo-Japanese war to silence racist anti-Japanese overtones 
in the foreign press after a cabinet decision in December 1903. See Robert B. Valliant, “The Selling of 
Japan. Japanese Manipulation of Western Opinion, 1900-1905” in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 29, No. 
4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 416-421.  
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an anti-Western alliance. After the destruction of China, the telegram continued, 
Japan would surely fall prey to America’s and Europe’s predatory instincts. Aoki 
reservedly responded that since Beijing failed to subdue the rebels, Tōkyō’s mission 
was to rescue the foreign residents and not to attack China. Japan projected itself as a 
modern civilized nation in contrast to the Chinese or even Russian barbarianism. Τhe 
war reports of the domestic press, under heavy censorship by the army authorities, 
exalted the heroic deeds and proper conduct of the average Japanese soldier as well as 
his humane behaviour towards the local populace.68 
In the meanwhile, Tōkyō, staying true to its limited policy in the North, chose 
to overlook any pretext that would justify an involvement in Korea. Foreign Minister 
Aoki instructed the Minister to Seoul, Hayashi Gonsuke (1860-1939) to refrain from 
any questionable activity on 19 June 1900. Hence, Hayashi rejected King Gojong’s 
proposal of alliance against the Boxers in late June. In mid-July, the US Minister 
Horace Newton Allen (1858–1932) echoing the alarming rumours that Chinese armed 
forces were about to cross the Yalu and enter Korea stressed to Hayashi that measures 
should be taken to protect the foreign residents in Northern Korea. The Japanese 
diplomat refused to raise the subject with his government and responded to Allen that 
such a decision had to be taken after consultation with Saint Petersburg. Despite his 
apparent aloofness Hayashi was indeed alarmed by the distressing Russian military 
presence in Manchuria in early July 1900,69 and he came up with counter measures in 
case of Korea’s partition. While the other powers were distracted in China, Japan and 
Russia could proceed unhindered to a fait accompli in Korea: the country would be 
divided or at the very least the port of Inchon could be acquired and turned into a 
Japanese military base; Yamagata’s cabinet prudently rejected the scheme. Hayashi’s 
initiative was picked up on by the Russian Minister to Japan, Alexander Petrovich 
Izvolsky (1856-1919). Conferring with Itō on 19 July, he proposed Korea’s partition. 
Aoki was not the only one to rebuff the proposal. Gotō Shimpei and the asianist 
Konoe aspired to Japan’s absorption of the entire Korean peninsula. In a meeting on 
23 July 1900, they agreed that an aggressive foreign policy coupled with expansion, 
even at the risk of war, would act as remedies for Japan’s injured honour and 
socioeconomic problems. After presenting his views to Katsura, Gotō returned to 
                                                          
68The press also spoke highly of the soon to be allied British, illustrating vividly the two nations’ 
friendly, sportsmanlike competition to distinguish themselves in the battlefield, as it occurred for 
instance at Taku. The Dai-Nippon Junmin journal described how cordially the Japanese were 
welcomed by the enthusiastic population. On the contrary, the Japanese press portrayed the Germans 
and the Russians as uncivilized murderous villains or as cowards and lazy at best. The journalist Taoka 
Reiun (1879-1912) discovered that censorship made his presence in the front futile just two days after 
his arrival at Tianjin and along with other disillusioned reporters left China. See Zachmann, China and 
Japan, pp.140-143. 
69 On 11 July Russia announced the dispatch of its forces in Manchuria. By mid-July 100,000 troops 
had overrun Manchuria to protect the lives and property of Russian subjects from the Boxers as well as 
railway concessions. The campaign cost the Russians some 200 casualties and was completed with the 
capture of Mukden (now Shenyang) on 18 September 1900. See David Schimmelpenninck van der 
Oye, “Russia’s ambivalent response to the Boxers” in Cahiers du monde russe [Online], Vol. 41/1 
(2000), p. 76. 
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Taiwan a week later and started planning an offensive in South China. 70  Konoe 
overjoyed by the cabinet’s decision to reject the division of Korea with Saint 
Petersburg used his political influence to incite a war with Russia.71 
In the aftermath of the North China Incident, as the Japanese call it, Yamagata 
stressed in a memorandum that Japan had to contain Russian influence in Korea while 
asserting its influence in the South, namely in Fukien and Chekiang: "By this means 
we can in future build up opposite Taiwan special strength which will serve in time of 
peace as the focus for trade and industry within China. Thus we can hold in our grasp 
the 'throat of the Far East' and keep in check any intrusion by an enemy".72 Fukien 
was considered by the Meiji leaders strategically and commercially linked with 
Taiwan as the April 1898 non-alienation pact had shown. Additionally, the city of 
Amoy, the main port of the province, was believed to be the hideout of anti-Japanese 
secret societies and Taiwanese dissidents. For the sake of Japan’s sole “external” 
colony Fukien had to be directly or indirectly controlled. On 1 February 1900, 
Foreign Minister Aoki suggested to Yamagata’s cabinet an inquiry to Beijing asking 
for railway rights in Fukien, Chekiang and Kiangsi. Consequently a treaty similar to 
the one making railway concessions in Shandong to Germany was presented to the 
Zongli Yamen on 5 June. Japan, however, was the only power to receive an 
unfavourable answer by the otherwise subservient and anaemic Qing government 
after March 1899 when they had rejected Italian demands regarding San Mun. 
The stationing of allied troops after the signing of the Boxer protocol in 
essential locations such as Beijing, Shanghai and Manchuria made China’s partition 
appear imminent. In Japan, patriotic leagues and action groups, tired by the 
government’s overly prudent policy demanded independent and forceful action. Saint 
Petersburg and London should not be dividing the spoils amongst themselves 
according to some patriotic journalists. Since the situation in northern China had 
reached a stalemate, the southern provinces appeared as a feasible and more 
promising target for Tōkyō’s expansionistic designs. Home Minister Saigō 
Tsugumichi, Navy Minister Yamamoto73 and Katsura, the former governor general of 
Taiwan supported the project. Katsura in particular aspired to turn Amoy into the 
centre of Japanese political and economic activity in the southern Chinese provinces. 
Accordingly, Kodama Gentarō, the colony’s 4th Governor-General sought to expand 
Tōkyō’s influence by promoting cultural and commercial enterprises over the Taiwan 
Strait. For this reason, his civil governor Gotō Shinpei undertook a series of visits to 
                                                          
70 Lone, Army, Empire, pp. 81-83. 
71 Konoe’s followers planned to covertly support the actions of the Boxers in Manchuria to justify an 
eventual armed intervention in Korea. On 24 September, Konoe to attract public support created the 
Kokumin Dōmeikai association in his effort to promote political activism. Another asianist, 
Gen’yōsha’s leader, Tōyama Mitsuru visited Itō in his private residence on 17 August to convince him 
to exert a more aggressive policy in regard to Russia. See Ibid., pp. 82-83.  
72 Nish, “Japan's Indecision”, p. 450. 
73 In early 1898 Yamamoto, backed up by Army Minister Katsura suggested to Itō that Japan in 
exchange for Weihaiwei’s surrender to the British had to demand the designation of Fukien as Tōkyō’s 
exclusive sphere of influence. See Duus, The Abacus, p. 170. 
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Chinese officials and Japanese merchants at Amoy. In the summer 1900 during the 
Boxer rebellion Sun Yat-sen, the famous Chinese revolutionary leader with ties to 
Tōkyō, hatched a plan with Kodama to utilize Taiwan as a base for Sun’s projects in 
South China. Supporting Sun would yield territorial rewards for Japan in case of 
success and Kodama ordered Gotō to help the rebels capture the city of Waichow 
(Huìzhōu) east of Canton. Sun’s field commander Cheng Shih-liang had assembled 
600 men in Guangdong for this purpose in August 1900. This unit clashed with the 
Qing forces sent against them in September. Beijing’s troops were defeated; many 
joined Cheng’s army and large amounts of weapons fell in rebel hands during the 
following two weeks. Sun from Taiwan ordered Cheng to march towards Amoy 
where Japanese supplies and munitions would be available. The Chinese 
revolutionary even appointed a local provisional government, which included many 
Japanese. Fresh Qing reinforcements however caught up and crushed his forces on 
their way to Amoy. Sun, unable to offer any kind of tangible help, sent Yamada 
Yoshimasa to disband the rebels.74 The future president of the Republic of China 
attributed the failure of his movement to the change of the political scenery that had 
taken place in Tōkyō, with Yamagata’s cabinet stepping down in September 1900.75 
On 10 August 1900, Tōkyō decided to act. Katsura instructed Kodama to 
prepare an expeditionary force to land and take control of Amoy. By 13 August, Vice 
Navy Minister Saitō Makoto (1858-1936) laid out the plan: the city would be captured 
by 300 marines from two or three patrolling warships. On the 14th the day that the 
Beijing legations were rescued, the commander of the Japanese navy in the area was 
authorized by Yamamoto to land marines ashore in case the Japanese residents were 
in peril. The Navy Minister’s actual words were: “…Also should unrest appear in the 
Amoy region, or some other opportunity arise, work with our consul and, on the 
pretext of defending local Japanese residents, land a number of marines”. Kodama 
complained to Katsura about the small number (300) of the marines that could be 
deployed at Amoy. To confront the 2,000 Chinese, reinforcements from Taiwan 
would be needed. The colony’s governor general impatiently urged Terauchi, the Vice 
Chief of Staff on the 17th to act: “We should occupy Amoy at least and without delay. 
Since we need a pretext it is no good to leave things to our consul”.76 On 23 August 
Kodama finally received the government’s authorization to dispatch one infantry 
battalion, two artillery batteries and one company of engineers (a total of around 
1,000 men) providing that the naval commander deemed it necessary. Tōkyō gave to 
the navy the upper hand in a relatively small-scale operation.  
                                                          
74 Sun delivered Yamada’s eulogy after his death at the hand of the Chinese forces.  He said that: “he 
came forward and went to his death in battle for the cause of righteousness. Truly he sacrificed himself 
for humanity and became pioneer of the New Asia”. See Marius Jansen, “Japan and the Chinese 
Revolution of 1911” in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, Part 2, ed. 
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75 Marius B. Jensen, “Opportunists in South China during the Boxer Rebellion” in Pacific Historical 
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76 Lone, Army, Empire, p. 85. 
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The pretext for an intervention was soon found. On the evening of 24 August, 
a Japanese Buddhist temple in Amoy caught on fire under suspicious circumstances.77 
The head priest, a man named Takamatsu, fled to the consulate and reported that the 
shrine was burned by the Chinese mob. The Qing authorities and some foreign 
diplomats implied that the fire was set by Takamatsu himself.78 On the same day, at 
the request of the Japanese consul at Amoy, Ueno Sen'ichi a small number of marines 
landed to protect Japanese nationals, the consulate and the East Asia Academy, a 
Japanese educational institution. A second group followed on 25 August but Gotō, 
who was in Amoy at the time, noticed that these forces were inadequate and shared 
his concern with the naval commander. The latter after conferring with Ueno asked 
for Kodama’s reinforcements on the 27th of August. The following day two infantry 
companies left Taiwan for the mainland. Kodama wished to send further companies 
as the chances of an anti-Japanese incident were increasing with the number of 
Japanese troops pouring into Amoy. The invasion was set for the 29th of August.79 
Gotō’s occupation plans were interrupted by the arrival of new orders from the 
Foreign Minister Aoki to Ueno on the same day: the marines had to withdraw to the 
consulate and the approaching vessels had to return to Taiwan as soon as possible. As 
Katsura had explained to Kodama the day before, to his frustration, the government 
decided to postpone and eventually call off Amoy’s occupation; by 7 September the 
Japanese troops had evacuated the city. During the previous days American, Russian, 
French and British ships gathered at the port and some of them landed small forces on 
5 September. The allied powers had the right to act in concert at treaty ports such as 
Amoy in cases of emergency. Still, Gotō on 30 August wrote to Aoki requesting the 
completion of the expedition.80 The Foreign Minister instead clarified to the western 
representatives in Tōkyō that the landings took place to protect foreign nationals and 
that the troops would be withdrawn once order was restored. Ueno’s response was 
                                                          
77A few days earlier on 10 August, Aoki had asked Kodama: “Is there any means to bring about a 
favorable anti-foreign disturbance in Amoy or Fuzhou”? See Ibid., p. 85. 
78 The American vice-consul Johnson investigated the incident and reported that the “temple” was an 
abandoned house rented by three Japanese priests who had removed everything of value just before the 
“arson”. On 18 August, the colonial government of Taiwan had “donated” 600 yen to the temple’s 
curators. Jensen, “Opportunists in South China”, p. 246. 
79 An ultimatum was presented to the Chinese authorities to demolish the city’s forts. On 28 August 
1900, the Japanese justified to the British government their actions at Amoy by claiming that the city 
had “frequently been the basis of secret and dangerous attempts against the security” of Taiwan. See 
Lone, Army, Empire, p. 86. 
80 On the very next day, Gotō was recalled to Taiwan and from there he immediately departed for 
Japan. In Tōkyō, he was briefed on the situation in the cabinet by Saigō Tsugumichi, who was in 
favour of Kodama’s plan. In Gotō’s telegrams to governor general Kodama in September 1900 it is 
conveyed that the blame for the mission’s abandonment should be placed on Itō’s fear of foreign 
reaction: “From the start the cabinet's views on Amoy were uncertain. Each Minister seems to have 
compromised his responsibilities and, when on August 26 [sic] Russia proposed the withdrawal of her 
troops from Peking, the cabinet received quite a shock and took the cowardly course. Moved by Ito's 
weak policy, they hoped, it appears, to rectify matters by passing the temporary responsibility to 
Consul Ueno [at Amoy]”. He added: “The reason for the cancellation of the Amoy incident is 
becoming clear. There were no diplomatic protests to interfere; in the final analysis, it was a failure 
caused by excessive fear. It is endlessly humiliating”. See Nish, “Japan's Indecision”, pp. 453-454. 
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similar when the western consuls asked him to order the withdrawal of the Japanese 
troops in Amoy. He refused on the grounds that the situation was still perilous and 
that anti-Japanese insurgents in the city were complotting against Tōkyō’s rule over 
Taiwan. In late August, the consuls pleaded directly to the Japanese government, 
causing great alarm and bringing back memories of the Triple Intervention. Itō, soon 
to be premier but at the time a mere adviser to the Foreign Ministry, urged Aoki and 
Yamagata to evacuate Amoy and refrain from an occupation that would dissatisfy 
primarily the British government. Prime Minister Yamagata’s cabinet complied since 
it had only authorized the navy’s action and not a full-scale invasion and occupation 
as envisioned by the Taiwanese duo. The prospect of the powers’ slightest discontent 
was enough to bring the Amoy incident to an inglorious end. On 29 August, navy 
Minister Yamamoto accused Katsura that is the army, for interfering in the naval 
operations at Amoy.81 Yamagata and Aoki took Yamamoto’s side. Taiwan’s governor 
general asked to be transferred in protest; after his demand was rejected he requested 
Tōkyō’s permission to resign due to his supposedly deteriorating health. Emperor 
Meiji sent a special emissary, Komeda to persuade Kodama to remain at his post. 
Komeda succeeded in his mission by reassuring Kodama that the throne still 
considered Taiwan as an important asset for the empire. After the fiasco and the 
accusations launched by the press, Yamagata’s cabinet announced its resignation to 
the emperor on 11 September 1900. 82  Japan, amidst political instability and 
indecision, had proved incapable to impose its claims across the Taiwan Strait or to 
even aid Sun’s revolutionaries and obtain a sphere of influence in the South.  
By the end of the Boxer rebellion, Russia had 50,000 men in Manchuria and 
was in control of the port of Niuchuang and of the Tianjin-Beijing railway line. 
Yamagata’s successor in October 1900, Itō was willing to negotiate with the Russians 
on the base of an exchange involving Korea and Manchuria.83 On 22 July 1900, 
Komura, at the time Japan’s plenipotentiary in Saint Petersburg, urged the imperial 
government to proceed with the Russians to the delimitation of their respective 
spheres of influence. Four days later Aoki and Komura prepared a draft that was to be 
presented to the new Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Nikolayevich Lamsdorf 
(1845-1907). On 15 August Komura informed his government that Lamsdorf had 
rejected the proposed Manchuria-Korea exchange and suggested the observance of the 
Nishi-Rosen convention. In early August, Witte, Saint Petersburg’s Far East expert, 
professed that Russia was unwilling to renounce its claims in Korea to obtain a free 
hand in Manchuria. Tōkyō’s efforts to achieve a diplomatic reconciliation eventually 
wore off. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Aoki instructed Inoue on 27 August 1900, 
                                                          
81 Ibid., pp. 453-455. 
82 Jensen, “Opportunists in South China”, p. 248. 
83As Itō commented on 10 September 1900, Japan’s entrenchment in Korea could prevent further 
Russian expansion. According to his statements made on 20 August 1900, Yamagata too believed that 
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now Minister to Berlin, to enquire the German government if it had any objections to 
Japan’s placing Korea under its sphere of influence. Aoki was convinced that 
Germany along Russia harboured territorial designs on China having witnessed the 
dispatch of additional German forces after the Beijing legations had been relieved. To 
drive a wedge between Berlin and its supposed ally Aoki was willing to “guarantee 
neutrality if German plans in China encountered opposition from any power, provided 
Germany undertook not to support Russia in any opposition which she had to Japan's 
activities in Korea”. Count Leyden, the German chargé d'affaires in Tōkyō assured 
the Japanese government that Germany had no objections regarding Korea or 
agreements with Russia.84 Japan had revealed its plans in Asia but gained Germany’s 
promise that a second Triple Intervention was not to be repeated.85 
On 19 October, the adamant anti-Russianist, Katō Takaaki took over the 
Foreign Ministry during Itō’s fourth and last administration. Besides Korea, Katō was 
coveting Manchuria; Japan had to act before the construction of the Trans-Siberian 
railway and possibly in cooperation with London to halt the Russian halt Russian 
expansion. Their troops had not evacuated the Chinese territory as decreed by the 
Boxer protocol despite Saint Petersburg’s pledge to withdraw its forces from 
Manchuria gradually. On 22 November 1900, a treaty between Russia and China was 
agreed that if ratified, would transform northern China into a Saint Petersburg 
protectorate. The draft was the brainchild of the Russian Minister of War Alexei 
Nikolayevich Kuropatkin (1848-1925) and provided for exclusive Russian interests, 
ignoring the principle of the “Open Door” to a huge area extending from Mongolia to 
Yalu River in Korea.86 In the spring of 1901 Katō lodged official complaints against 
Saint Petersburg’s actions in Manchuria and he approached London and Berlin for 
support.87 He even warned Beijing that a close association with Russia could bring 
                                                          
84 On 15 September, he declared that Germany’s “interest in Corea [sic] being only commercial, she 
has no intention to interfere in any way [in any] complication between Japan and any other power 
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86 The French chargé d’affaires in Beijing, Baron d'Anthouard described allied Russia’s policy in 
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treaty of the 28th of April 1899, Saint Petersburg promised not to interfere in the British sphere of 
influence in the Yangtze valley and London on its part to abstain from claiming railway concessions 
north of the Great Wall. See Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 126-127. 
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upon dire consequences and on 5 February he asked London’s cooperation.88 At the 
very least Japan had to be compensated with another chunk of Chinese territory.89 On 
5 April the meeting of generals and admirals presided by Yamagata, Ōyama and the 
Navy Minister Saigō Tsugumichi examined intelligence reports on the Russian forces 
in Manchuria. Despite Saigō’s hesitation, preparations were set in motion for 
emergency measures.90 A bellicose tone was evident in the diet and in the press. As 
part of a well defined anti-Russian policy Hayashi Tadasu, Minister to London after 
March 1900, proposed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Lansdowne (1845-1927) a treaty to safeguard their respective spheres of influence on 
7 April. In May, the attempt to lure Berlin in the Far East agreement failed but the 
British-Japanese negotiations were well underway. Izvolsky and Foreign Minister 
Lamsdorf realized that the Japanese meant businesses; an official declaration on 5 
April 1901 announced that Russia was abandoning Kuropatkin’s project.91 Japan’s 
diplomatic victory washed away some of the shame of the Triple Intervention. After 
the crisis Yamagata was convinced that the best way to counter the Russian pressure 
was through a powerful alliance. In a late April letter to Itō the experienced statesman 
presented his idea for an alliance with London and Berlin to prevent a third power 
from intervening in a Russo-Japanese war that was sure to come.92 
On 17 July 1901, Hayashi was ordered by the new Katsura administration to 
negotiate an understanding with London. Britain was already contesting Russian 
expansionism in Asia. Besides, for the officers of the Imperial Navy their counterparts 
of the Royal Navy were their “honoured former teacher”. 93  In September 1900 
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) pointed out the main pillars of 
Britain’s policy in China: cordial relations with Japan and the breaching of the Russo-
German ties.94 Unofficial talks between Hayashi and MacDonald, Consul-General to 
Japan after October 1900, started on 31 July in London but were made out of courtesy 
and were nothing more than a mere exchange of views. Itō’s term was to end abruptly 
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partly because of financial problems. On 16 July, the German diplomat von 
Eckardstein mentioned to Lansdowne that the Japanese were negotiating in Paris a 
loan that would act as a channel of rapprochement between Tōkyō and Saint 
Petersburg.95 Lansdowne alarmed by these reports told Hayashi on the 31st of July 
that a bilateral understanding had to be achieved to guarantee the status quo against a 
Russian encroachment in the East. Yamagata’s protégé Katsura was convinced that 
the goals of his foreign policy, the establishment of a protectorate over Korea and 
Russia’s containment could only be achieved by a considerable naval expansion and 
through an alliance with a Great Power. He and Yamagata were favouring an alliance 
with Britain whereas Itō backed up by Inoue believed that a compromise with Russia 
was still feasible. Itō believed that “Britain’s national strength was failing”. He 
wished to meet with the Czar’s officials and bargain on a Manchuria for Korea basis 
and follow up on Witte’s declaration in the summer of 1901 according to which such 
an agreement would be acceptable. Witte further promised to convince French 
creditors to finance a loan for Japan. On 11 September, Katsura approved Itō’s visit, 
since just the speculation of a Russo-Japanese arrangement could motivate an 
advantageous British counteraction. 96  Indeed, a first British draft of alliance was 
presented to Hayashi on the 6th of November. Itō during his visit in Saint Petersburg 
in late November 1901 exchanged views and proposals with Lamsdorf but to no avail. 
The inconclusiveness of these talks and the joint decision by the Emperor’s elder 
statesmen, Cabinet and Army to conclude an alliance with London sealed the deal. 
Katsura’s Foreign Minister, Komura contrary to Itō’s views exclaimed in December 
1901 that “if Manchuria becomes the property of Russia, Korea itself cannot remain 
independent”. For Komura, a settlement with Russia could not last in time whereas an 
alliance with London would enhance Tōkyō’s position in Korea. Amidst the Boer 
War and facing its own financial problems, Salisbury’s cabinet sought an alliance 
which would relieve the Royal Navy of its obligations in the Far East.97 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance’s practical aim was the accomplishment of naval 
superiority over France and Russia in the Far East. It was signed on 30 January 1902 
in London by Hayashi and Lansdowne. The first article recognized both countries’ 
interests in China but Tōkyō’s preeminence in Korea “in a peculiar degree politically 
as well as commercially and industrially”. The allies agreed to intervene (not jointly 
in Korea’s case) in the event of these interests being jeopardized by domestic 
disturbances or external danger. Article 2 declared the other party’s benevolent 
neutrality in case its ally became involved in a war. According to the third article, on 
the condition that the warring party confronted more than one opponents the other had 
to initiate hostilities and “conduct the war in common”. The pact was valid for 5 years 
covering geographically only the Far East despite London’s attempt to insert a clause 
                                                          
95 This rumour was a byproduct of Finance Minister Watanabe Kunitake’s (1846-1919) visit to Europe 
in July. See Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, p. 150. 
96 Ibid., pp. 147, 167-174. 
97 An alliance not only could enable London to reduce its naval strength in China but also to use 
Japanese dockyards and thus save money. See Storry, The Making of the Twentieth Century, p. 46. 
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for the protection of its interests in South East Asia and India. London was obliged to 
maintain considerable naval forces in East Asian waters and support Tōkyō’s actions 
in Korea. Many in Britain criticized harshly the provisions of an alliance which in any 
case pulled London out of its isolation.98 Japan had gained an ally against its mortal 
enemy; it had diplomatically outwitted the most experienced player in the game.  
Within 35 years of the Meiji Restoration Japan had managed, by employing 
just and unjust means like every other power, to annul the humiliating unequal 
treaties, defeat the greatest Asian empire, obtain a colony and a strong position in 
Korea and ally itself with the most prestigious of the Western powers. It had not only 
survived the distressing colonial outbreak of the late 19th century but it had secured a 
respectable place among the powers of the 20th century. Brushing aside, up to a point, 
the persistent racist prejudices of the West, Japan was finally awarded the right to 
survive and have a future. Victory over Russia99 in 1905 invested Japan with glory 
and spread hope, inspiration and self-respect to the other nations that could not escape 
the imperialistic grip.  
 
 
 
                                                          
98 Monger, “The End of Isolation”, p. 120 
99 The Russian-Chinese convention of 8 April 1902 provided for Manchuria’s gradual evacuation of 
Russian forces except for Port Arthur and the garrisons that protected the Russian railways. Precisely a 
year later the second evacuation stage had virtually come to a halt deteriorating the already stressed 
Russo-Japanese relations. The Anglo-Japanese alliance gave Japan confidence in its negotiations but 
was a source of frustration for the Russians. In August 1903 Japan’s proposal fluctuated from the 
solution of Man-Kankōkan to a joint declaration of Korea’s and China’s territorial integrity. After 
demanding an exclusive, preferential status in regard to Korea, Tōkyō consequently suggested that if it 
found itself obliged to send troops there, Saint Petersburg could also dispatch forces to Manchuria; 
however, these should “not exceed the number actually required”. Russia submitted a set of 
counterproposals two months later (5 October 1903) that included the demilitarization of Korea. 
Komura believed that Saint Petersburg’s proposals were a mere stratagem to gain time and tighten its 
grip on Manchuria. In any case Korea’s neutralization would annul Japan’s dominant position there. 
Korea’s demilitarization would be proposed by the Russians on three separate occasions without 
success. On 12 August 1903, the viceroyalty of the Far East was established at Port Arthur and in 
October the city of Mukden was reoccupied instead of evacuated, signaling Russia’s will to consolidate 
its position in Manchuria. On 30 October 1903, Tōkyō appeared willing to recognize Russia’s special 
interests but both parties were getting ready for the worst-case scenario. The negotiations were broken 
off on 4 February 1904, before the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway, and 4 days later the 
Russo-Japanese war erupted. Tōkyō rejected Beijing’s offer of military assistance as its aim was to 
capture the Russian possessions in Manchuria and avoid another outburst of the Yellow peril 
syndrome. See Storry, The Making of the Twentieth Century, pp. 53-63 and Nish, Japanese Foreign 
Policy, pp. 69-71.  
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13.  Conclusions 
 
   The need to solidify the achievements of the Italian Unification (1830-1870), 
consolidate its authority on the whole of the peninsula and deal with financial 
difficulties meant that the Italian government had to set as priority and dedicate itself 
entirely on the time-consuming process of restructuring and stabilizing the state. The 
lack of means and the economic recession coupled with the country's precarious 
position on the international scene, where it had no allies until the signature of the 
Triple Alliance in 1882, rendered any potential expansionist undertaking prohibitive. 
   Nevertheless, the imperialistic tendencies of identifying and establishing 
colonies around the world at the end of the 19th century and an impulse for expansion, 
interlaced with the ancient glory of the Roman Empire and the might of the Italian 
maritime republics of the Middle Ages captivated parts of the Italian ruling class and of 
the working strata. In a short period of time dozens of scientific-exploratory societies 
were established following the European example and the Italian explorers, 
overlooking the military and economic weakness of their country, dreamed about 
colonies all over the globe, and set about acquiring them.  
   So, they turned their attention to the familiar Mediterranean area. It was on 
the Libyan plains, in the period 1870-1890, that Rome after failures and frustrations 
secured an informal primacy. Rome fearing French expansionism, especially after the 
painful Tunisian fiasco in May 1881, concluded an alliance with the Central Powers. 
The relative improvement of its diplomatic position did not however bring about 
palpable results in the Mediterranean, since in July 1882 it missed the golden 
opportunity of consolidating in Egypt on Britain's side. 
   Since its efforts in the Mediterranean were unsuccessful Italy settled for an 
inferior alternative, the more distant, less familiar, less fertile, and strategically less 
important Red Sea where, since 1870, it had acquired the ownership of the obscure 
Assab. Having Assab as the starting-point of an expansionist policy, Rome expanded 
its influence on the surrounding African territories too, occupied Massawa in 1885 and 
founded its first colony, Eritrea in 1890. The seizure of the port of Massawa and 
Rome's aggressive policy in the region irritated Emperor Yohannes of Ethiopia. The 
Italo-Ethiopian relations, sometimes friendly sometimes strained during the reign of 
Yohannes and Menelik, experienced fluctuations and had a profound effect on later 
developments. Menelik put a violent end to the Italian ambitions and aspirations in 
Ethiopia with the famous battle of Adwa, in 1896. 
   The debacle of the Italian arms in this battle did not mean the forfeiture of 
interests and the automatic withdrawal from Eastern Africa. It did however, signify the 
neutralization of the Italian colonial project in Africa for fifteen years. That is to say 
that whereas Rome retained its dominions in the Red Sea and in the Indian Ocean 
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during the post Adwa era, it did not undertake a large-scale operation until 1911, when 
it also occupied Libya during the Italo-Turkish war (1911-1912).1  
   Through the juxtaposition of events and taking into account the particularities 
of the 1870-1896 period it was attempted to trace the ideological background, the 
nature and the causes behind the early Italian colonialism, to study its various 
components, to discover its true identity and to comprehend the historical evolution of 
the phenomenon as a whole. The theory that "there is no nation that does not 
automatically attempt to expand, there is no nation that does not seek to go beyond its 
physical borders"2 is valid but it cannot form the explanation of a phenomenon so 
complex; a phenomenon riddled with contrasts, misrepresentation, tangible 
contradictions and confusion as to its objectives.  
   The day after the Unification, Italy was a rural country with minimal foreign 
trade, insignificant industry, a constantly growing surplus of population and military 
forces inadequate in every respect. It had to establish law and order, balance the 
payments deficit and resolve, among others, the matter of the dispute with the Vatican.3 
The widely held belief that the establishment of commercial stations, the conduct of 
trade with the East and the development and expansion of the shipping would bring 
about the exit out of the economic recession, in which Italy had gone into the last 
decades of the 19th century, was proven incorrect in practice. It was sufficient however 
to give impetus and to lend a "financial tone" to the disposition of the Italians to acquire 
colonies. Simultaneously, geopolitical concerns, associated with the position of the 
country in the Mediterranean and in Europe, in light of the Berlin conference which 
saw every Powers bolstered, caused stress and nervousness in Rome. At a time when 
Britain was annexing Cyprus, Austria-Hungary was gaining control of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and France was receiving assurances about its interests in Tunisia, Italy 
with clean but empty hands felt reasonably wronged. There was no place for Rome's 
interests in the Mediterranean nor were they being recognized in general and as if that 
were not enough Austria-Hungary was not relinquishing the irredent Italian provinces. 
Rome's effort to expand in the Mediterranean or in Europe, interwoven with the 
safeguarding of the Italian territorial integrity and the establishment of the balance 
between the Powers, lent to its expansionist designs a geopolitical character coupled 
with psychological overtones. 
                                                          
1 For the Italian designs during the 20th century on Libya, its occupation and administration see 
Aggeliki Sfika-Theodossiou, Italy in the First World War. Its relations with the Great Powers and 
Greece, (Athens, 2004), pp. 26-28, M. Simon Cole, "Secret diplomacy and the cyrenaican settlement of 
1917", The Journal of Italian history, 2/2 (1979), pp. 258-280, Giacomo De Martino, Tripoli, Cirene e 
Cartagine, (Bologna, 1907), pp. 9-16, Brunello Vigezzi, "Ιl liberalismo di Giolitti e l'impresa libica", in 
Fonti e problemi della politica coloniale italiana, (Rome, 1996), pp. 1225-1247, Luigi Salvatorelli, 
Sommario della Storia d'Italia, (Turin, 1874),pp. 489-492, Cesare Salvati, Italia e Francia nel Sahara 
Orientale, (Milan, 1929), pp. 64-65. 
2 Robert Michels, L’imperialismo Italiano, studi politico-demografici, (Milan, 1914), p. 105. 
3 Giovanni Bosco Naitza, Il Colonialismo nella storia d'Italia (1882-1949), (Florence, 1975), p. 123. 
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   The period 1870-1914 is considered the age of the New-Imperialism, i.e. the 
outbreak of the expansionist phenomenon. During the "Scramble for Africa" and 
particularly between 1870 and 1890, Africa was essentially divided among the colonial 
powers. The Italians, who at the time were beginning to form a collective-national 
conscience, were deeply affected by the international system and the example of the 
rest of the Europeans. A colonial consciousness arose, under the influence of Europe 
and of the expedition societies, within which nationalism, racism, expansionism and the 
disposition for adventures to places unknown and exotic were merged.4 The occupation 
of colonies was not considered a luxury but a necessity, an asset necessary for the 
prosperity of the metropolis. The colonies were not presented as a means or an 
instrument for achieving a goal but as an end in itself. The acquisition of dominions 
overseas made their owner the arbiter of developments and it guaranteed him a position 
among the powerful nations of the world. This standing was fiercely sought after by the 
Italians, a standing that they thought it would negate the economic backwardness, the 
psychological insecurity resulting from the French provocations and humiliations, the 
country's fragile integrity and the geopolitical inferiority in the eyes of the Europeans. 
In this case, there is no question of megalomania but of mimicry, as the possession of 
colonies was the indicated way to achieve ascendancy for a modern state in the late 
19th century. 
   On the contrary, the issue of megalomania can be raised when "illusions of 
strength"5 and unfounded, fictitious and vague theoretical frameworks have an effect on 
the figures in charge of the country leading it to a path of confused and incorrect 
choices. In addition, the enthusiastic zest, the lack of experience and the marked 
immaturity with which Rome managed its colonial affairs put the geopolitical and 
financial needs of the country on the back burner. The rather facile installation in 
Eritrea made the Italians more careless and ambitious to the point that they considered 
the occupation of Eastern Africa as feasible, vastly overestimating their strength. This 
confusion between realism and utopian aspirations resulting from ignorance, conceit, a 
complex of pride and emotion, stemming from the glorious liberation struggles, and 
lastly from social Darwinism and the white supremacy theories ultimately brought 
about disaster.6 Therefore, the psychological factor, which is usually overlooked, must 
be also added to all the preceding elements of the Italian colonialism. 
   Another ideological pillar behind the birth and the formation of the Italian 
colonialism was the demographic problem, the management of the country's surplus 
population. The ambitious effort of settling Italian families in Africa and the search for 
fertile expanses, capable to solve the problems of unemployment and of agriculture, 
give to the phenomenon under examination a "proletarian standing". Crispi's 
                                                          
4  Isabella Rosoni, La colonia Eritrea, la prima amministrazione coloniale italiana (1880-1912), 
(Macerata, 2006), p. 34. 
5 Roberto Battaglia, La prima Guerra d'Africa, (Turin, 1958), p. 173. 
6 Christopher Seton-Watson, "Imperialism: the British and Italian experiences compared", in Italia e 
Inghilterra nell'età dell'imperialismo, (ed. E. Serra, C. Seton-Watson), (Milan, 1990), p. 20. 
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proclamations about annexing cultivable lands and relieving the farmers of the 
underdeveloped South influenced deeply the programme and the objectives of the 
Italians who propounded expansionism in Africa. Indecisiveness as to which policy 
should be pursued in the context of the settlers' installation in Eritrea and the numerous, 
conflicting and inconstant objectives caused the failure of Leopoldo Franchetti's 
agricultural-colonization project. The demographic factor, however, present in the 
proclamations and in political speeches, was practically absent from the designs of the 
Italian imperialists. 
   The Italian colonialists and Foreign Minister Pasquale Stanislao Mancini in 
particular, even distorted the principle of self-determination for which the Italians had 
fought for a few years before in order to justify the Rome’s right to possess and exploit 
foreign territories. The right of every people to live independently was translated by 
Mancini into an obligation and a calling of the more powerful people to intervene, to 
conquer and to civilize indiscriminately.7 
   Whereas the geographical centre of the Italian interest was reasonably the 
Mediterranean, the government of the country, for reasons already examined, turned its 
gaze to the Red Sea too. After the gradual conquest of Eritrea, Rome was beset about 
how it should administer its first colony. Was it an agricultural colony that would in 
parallel be a host to thousands of Italian settlers? Was it an economic colony that would 
be industrialized with the injection of capital from the metropolis? Or was it a strategic 
location that would serve the needs of the Italian fleet? Many years after its capture and 
amid infighting between the political and the military element in its interior, those in 
charge still had not reached to a decision.  
As far as the Italian policy in the context of the "Ethiopian problem" is 
concerned, in this case too there was a lack of a clear and unambiguous line.8 The 
militaristic (politica tigrina) and the diplomatic line (politica scioana) came into conflict 
and cancelled each other out demonstrating the limitations, the bankruptcy and the dead 
end in which the Italian colonialism in Africa had found itself. Although the battle of 
Adwa ended the Italian expansion itself, it did not bring about the end of its contrasts, 
contradictions and weaknesses. In Somalia the Italians from 1885 until the beginning of 
the 20th century did not find a way to make the colony profitable and functional. 
Wanting to evade their moral and financial obligations they chose the model of indirect 
imperialism, through private companies. This method of colonial administration did not 
bind Rome and made its presence in the Indian Ocean more discreet. When this type of 
management also failed, the Italian government was forced in 1904 to take over the 
administration of the colony to save face and prestige. 
                                                          
7 Cerreti, Claudio, "La questione Africana e i geografi del dissenso", in Colonie africane e cultura 
italiana fra Ottocento e Novecento. Le esplorazioni e la geografia, (ed. C. Cerreti), (Rome, 1994), pp. 
39-40. 
8 Ministero della Guerra, Comando del Corpo di stato maggiore-ufficio storico, Storia militare della 
colonia Eritrea II, (Rome, 1936), p. 15. 
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Carlo Zaghi suggested that the main trait of Italian colonialism is the desire of a 
"crucial section of the ruling class to adopt a foreign policy", the endorsement or 
imitation of models not corresponding to the Italian needs. Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937) perceived Crispi's presumable efforts to provide arable land to the poor southern 
peasants a "passionate imperialism, an oratorical imperialism with no economic-
financial base", a diversion to obstruct the socialist revolution from erupting. For the 
Deputy Napoleone Colajanni (1847-1921), Italy through colonies was moralistically 
trying to secure land and prosperity to the impoverished part of its population. The 
German historian Theodor Schieder (1908-1984) associated the origins of the 
phenomenon with the explosion of the population, perhaps to justify his own country's 
expansionist policies. In any case, in the late 19th century Italy’s population was 
increasing in a disproportional manner to the national economy. Alcide de Gasperi, the 
Prime Minister from 1945 until 1953, claimed in 1945 that "Italy never considered her 
African colonies as a tool of imperialism, but rather as a means for absorbing Italy's 
surplus population". Τhe economist Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961) attributed the genesis of 
the Italian colonialism to the predominant role of commerce, despite the widespread 
assumption that the Italian economy of the time was anaemic, in need of foodstuffs' 
imports (between 1871-1880 and 1881-1890 wheat production fell by 16% whereas 
imports rose by 80%) and unable to match foreign commercial competition. The author 
Emilio Sereni (1907-1977) went a step further. He innovatively asserted that finance 
capital, as Lenin defined it, was existent in Italy as early as the late 1870s when the 
bank Credito Mobiliare was financing industrial ventures; he also sustained that the 
involvement of the Rubattino company in Tunis and Assab were examples of efforts to 
maximize profits in a typical "capitalist imperialism" style. The disapproval of the 
renowned historian Angelo Del Boca of the way his country subjected and 
impoverished foreign populations is well documented. Colonies not only did not 
contribute the slightest to Italy's prosperity as R. Webster conveyed in his book 
"Industrial Development in Italy 1908-1915" but resulted in an unprecedented loss of 
lives and money. To the prominent historian Villari, colonies were in no position to 
facilitate Italian trade or to supply the Italian nascent industries with raw materials 
since: "[...] the territories acquired by...[Great Britain and France] are for the most part 
very rich in minerals and other raw materials, whereas those assigned by Italy...are to a 
large extent mountainous and sterile".9  
Thus, the economic explanation can be easily rebuffed: the stagnation of Italy's 
trade and national industry cannot justify a colonial empire. For others however, this 
very inefficiency and the luck of raw materials were the reasons which led Italy into the 
colonial arena. Many Italians expected that expansionism would partially contribute to 
the state's economic recovery. Τhe journalist Leone Carpi maintained that the notion of 
a flourishing economy as a prerequisite for expansionist policies is a "disregard to 
history" having probably in mind the Portuguese paradigm. In 1895 the Bulletin of the 
                                                          
9 Yemane Mesghenna, Italian colonialism: a case study of Eritrea 1869-1934. Motive, Praxis and 
Result, (Lund, 1988), pp. 7-19. 
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African Society of Italy revealed: "Given the economic inferiority of Italy compared 
with other nations; given the lack of a sufficient amount of the raw materials 
indispensable for the industrial development of the nation; and given the insufficient 
production of foodstuffs for its own inhabitants: it is only through colonial expansion 
that an improvement of the economic situation of the nation is possible".  
Under this spectre, declarations such as the following by Father Stella on 3 
October 1859 in East Africa made an overwhelming impression to those that hoped that 
the colonies would drag Italy into prosperity: "There are in this province only a small 
number of inhabitants. There is an immense amount of uncultivated land and 
fascinating plants all surrounded by the most beautiful and fertile mountains[...]". The 
Historical Right, members of the Radical Left and even the moderates of the Cabinet 
approved more or less vigorously the creation of an agricultural colony, the transfer of 
the excess population to an Italian controlled Africa as opposed to the immigration to 
inhospitable and abusive settings. Leopoldo Franchetti argued: "Italy is poor in capital 
but rich in [labor]...We need to invest the wealth which Italy is rich in".10 Nevertheless, 
Colajanni estimated the overall colonial expenditure between 1882 and 1897 to more 
than 400 million lire. The toll in lives he calculated at around 8,000. Senator Tancredi 
Canonico (1828-1908) in 1895 wondered why the government deemed necessary to 
send men and money in Africa when the Italian people lived in misery and even died of 
starvation.11 
Thus, the antithetical elements and the inconsistencies render the phenomenon 
difficult to clarify and to characterize. There are numerous contrasting elements that are 
not consistent with each other: the Italian economy's lack of funds with the intention to 
develop the colonies. The state deficit with the building of a powerful fleet. The 
civilizing task with brutal exploitation. Pacifism with conquests. Respect for self-
determination and rule by arms. The interest for the establishment of colonies and the 
disregard for their development. Insecurity and in the same time megalomania. The 
theory of aiding the weak and racism. Therefore, in order to reach safer results, it is 
necessary to include in this analysis all the various aspects of the phenomenon namely 
the ideological pillars and the economic, proletarian-demographic, commercial, 
geopolitical, militaristic and psychological factors. Italy had no need of colonies, 
markets and bases. The economic alibi was meant for the domestic audience. In the 
opinion of the author, the demographic argument is also unfounded, since the 
conditions of the colonies did not permit the immigration of Italian settlers en masse.12 
The only valid explanation of the Italian expansionism’s manifestation in Africa is the 
psychological factor, in other words the anxiety deriving from lagging behind and the 
insecurity caused from the precarious geostrategic situation of the country. After the 
liberation, the Italians felt that their national completion was the first step in their rise 
                                                          
10 Ibid., pp. 59-63. 
11 Ibid., p. 118. 
12 Angelo Omedeo, “La colonia Eritrea, condizioni e problemi” in Società Italiana per il progresso 
delle scienze, (ed. A. Οmodeo, V. Peglion, G. Valenti), (Rome, 1913), pp. 72-73. 
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to the status of a Great Power. Their economic backwardness, in relation to the 
economies of the industrialized countries, constituted an obstacle to this upward course. 
It was then decided to bridge the gap and conceal the disadvantage by acquiring 
colonies. Their occupation would present to the world a powerful and modern Italy, 
arbiter of developments and, in addition, it would contribute to the stability of the 
international system. For these reasons, the author would describe Italian colonialism as 
an essentially psychological phenomenon with geopolitical extensions.  
   Ultimately the majority of the choices, decisions and actions that the Italian 
colonialists took, although at the end of the 19th century might have seemed correct, 
were wrong and ended in complete failure as it is ascertained by the results.13 This fact 
is certainly not attributed to bad luck but to the very nature of the early Italian 
colonialism. The evolution of the phenomenon had disastrous consequences for Italians 
and Africans alike because the birth of the expansionist movement itself was a grave 
error. Its ideological base was not solid and suffered from contradictions and 
continuous shifts while in practice all the attempts and efforts of the Italian colonialists, 
were doomed in advance due to a lack of resources. The only way to avoid bloodshed, 
the burdening of the state's finances and the downfall of the Italian prestige in the world 
was to avoid the country's involvement in the colonial arena from the beginning. Italy, 
in 1870 did not have the industrial base, the financial and military means or at the very 
least the public’s universal support to carry out such a demanding and ambitious 
programme. It was the poor man's colonization (colonialismo della povera gente) and 
the poor man's imperialism (imperialismo straccione).14 Unfortunately, the defeat of 
1896 was not enough to bring Italy to its senses and to awaken it from its nationalist 
and imperialist obsession. On the contrary, it caused a sense of vindictiveness, 
                                                          
13 Remaining in control of Eritrea and Somalia, despite the defeat, cannot be counted as a success. 
Somalia especially was and perhaps remains the poorest region of Africa, see Romolo Onor, La 
Somalia Italiana, esame critico dei problemi di economia rurale e di politica economica della colonia, 
(Turin, 1925), p. 3. The Italian dominions in general could not "be considered rich countries", see 
Camille Fidel, Les colonies italiennes, Le vie technique et industrielle, (Paris, 1927), p. 1. The only 
ones who gained something positive from the undertaking were not, of course, the poor farmers of the 
South but the military and the industrialists in the fields of shipping and arms manufacturing. These 
were the only "winners" of Italy's involvement in Africa, see Sofia Μalgeri-Laura Tutinelli, "Il 
Risorgimento e il Colonialismo: analogie e differenze", in Cronache del colonialismo italiano, Il 
Corno d'Africa, ed. P. Dieci, M.R. Notarangeli, G. Pagliarulo, (Rome, 1991), pp. 164-165. Perhaps the 
one positive service that colonialism offered to Italy was the creation of a national identity and the 
rallying of the Italian society against the "common enemy".  At the end of the 19th century this enemy 
in Africa was the Ethiopians and some Somali chieftains. 
14 Francesco Surdich, Esplorazioni geografiche e sviluppo del colonialismo nell'età della rivoluzione 
industriale, fasi e caratteristiche dell'espansione coloniale, (Florence, 1980), p. 11. 
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maliciousness and psychological pressure, as evidenced by the unprovoked attack by 
the fascist regime against Ethiopia in 1935-1936 in which chemical weapons were 
used. 
Japan after the Restoration of 1868 was a poor, backward, semi-feudal, and 
fragile country. The Boshin civil war of 1868-1869 and the signing of the unequal 
treaties rendered the nation even more vulnerable amidst the frenetic international 
competition for concessions and economic privileges. Western domination was not an 
unfounded fear in a country that was dubbed by historians as “semi-colonized”. The 
country’s economy would be controlled by foreign financiers for decades to come and 
the government’s decisions were often susceptible to western pressures if not 
manipulations. Because of these reasons, but probably even prior to 1868, a reactionary 
siege mentality was developed among the Meiji leaders and commoners alike. Tōkyō in 
the midst of its modernization and westernization programme, as a measure to counter 
the external threat and safeguard the nation’s survival, had always its gaze fixed to the 
mainland. The late 19th century the Japanese perceived themselves as the 
underprivileged latecomers that had to catch up with the other contenders in the 
imperialistic arena. Suffering from limited resources the newborn state could not afford 
the luxury of distant and thus costly colonies in the European paradigm. Just 5 years 
after the unification the government was split over the debate about Korea’s possible 
invasion (seikanron), the nation’s closest neighbour. Remarkably, the following year an 
overseas colonial expedition was actually undertaken to capture Taiwan; it only failed 
due to the western and Chinese reactions.  
In the second chapter of the Japanese part, the ideological pillars of Japan’s 
expansion were presented. Pressure groups, surplus population and immigration to 
inhospitable places, theories about the divinity and invincibility of the Japanese race, 
pan-Asianism, social Darwinism, the mission to civilize, the quest for prestige and 
parity, mimicry of western patterns, militarism and an ancient legacy that seemed to 
justify imperialism formed the theoretical background that explain Japan’s late 19th 
century quest for an empire. There was a part of the population and of the ruling classes 
that genuinely believed in these aforementioned factors or at the very least cynically 
utilized them to promote Japan’s territorial aspirations abroad. 
Successful modernization at home, the self-congratulatory ideology of State 
Shintō and the trend of the time made Japan’s expansion appear as an act of 
benevolence towards its adjacent, more underdeveloped nations. Before expanding 
abroad however, the new leadership had to solidify its rule and authority in the 
Japanese archipelago. Initially the main Japanese islands were brought under 
submission and were ruled almost despotically by the Satchō leaders that came to 
dominate the government after their victory over the old regime. Clans were relocated 
or exterminated, people were taught the standard national language and made into loyal 
subjects and the entire nation suddenly acquired after centuries of division a common 
identity (internal colonialism). The pre-modern colonies of Hokkaidō (1869) and 
Ryūkyū (1879) were incorporated next and secured in the face of foreign penetration. 
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Chapter three described these developments. Strategic considerations about the safety 
of the nation spurred Tōkyō towards controlling, absorbing or reforming the decaying 
nation of Korea (protectorate). Despite the diplomatic classes with Russia and China 
and the cost in lives and money Korea finally became Japan’s in 1910.  
Lastly, the acquisition (1895) and the first administrations of Japan’s first 
colony was analysed. The ruthlessness of Tōkyō’s rule and the military authority’s 
prolonged domination over the civilian administration reveal the characteristics of 
Japan’s early colonial endeavour. The colony’s main utilization was as a base for 
further expansion towards Southern China (Amoy 1900) a fact that demonstrates the 
political preponderance of the military and of expansionists circles in the metropolis 
and periphery alike. Taiwan as the first overseas colony served Japan’s colonial 
experiment; colonial methods previously used in Hokkaidō and Ryūkyū were 
implemented while the way that Taiwan was managed set the pattern for the future 
administration of Korea. Kublin Hyman asserted: “It was in Formosa that Japan was to 
create the pattern of colonialism which was…to be applied in the administration and 
exploitation of such later conquests as Korea and Manchuria”. He also described 
Japan’s rule in Taiwan as “a highly centralized and authoritarian colonial 
administration”.15 In addition to a colonial laboratory, Taiwan was also seen as ticket 
for the admission in the prestigious club of imperial powers. Sound administration 
projected a modern and powerful Japan to domestic, Asian and western audiences able 
to engage in the grandiose task of civilization. Successful colonization and 
development of backward territories was part of the westernization process along with 
modern legal institutions and the construction of railways. In other words, Japan 
through its colony sought to obtain recognition and equality among the more advanced 
nations in the world. This explains the urgency, determination and brutality of the 
colonial state to quell any resistance and transform Taiwan into a seemingly profitable 
undertaking for the mother country. It also explains Tōkyō’s participation in the Boxer 
Rebellion (1899-1901) in compliance and consort with the rest of the Great Powers. 
However, dispute and finally conflict with Saint-Petersburg (1904-1905) over Korea 
cannot be attributed only to the quest for equality. Japan in the early 20th century, 
partially freed from the demeaning unequal treaties, strengthened by the alliance with 
Britain (1902) and militarily more apt was in a position to dictate and pursue its 
strategic interests. Far less vulnerable and fearful in the 20th century after the victory in 
the Russo-Japanese,16 Japan asserted its claims and finally annexed the strategically 
vital Korea (1910) dispelling the nightmare of the humiliating Triple intervention 
(1895).  
Japan’s lesser economic power relative to the expanding Western nations in the 
late 1800s signified a comparative inability to sustain colony-acquiring expeditions far 
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from home. The earliest Japanese colonies were not only geographically close to Japan 
but culturally as well, as they were populated by peoples sharing, most notably, literary, 
cultural, and religious affinities such as the Chinese ideograms and Confucianism.17 
Japanese colonialism was an anomaly because Japan was the only non-western power 
to engage into imperialistic ventures. Furthermore, Japan’s anomaly was clear since it 
was not considered an industrialized capitalist state as the other modern powers were, 
except for one exception (Italy), at the time it began its imperialist expansion. Scholars 
generally accepted the view that Japanese colonialism resembled the French model of 
assimilation more than the British model.18 But, it also differed from the French and 
German colonialism in that the colonies of Japan were racially and culturally much 
more similar to it than the colonies the French or the Germans occupied in Africa and 
Asia.19 Racial and cultural affinities gave a moral edge and a rise to the rhetoric of Pan-
Asianism which promoted the unity of Asian peoples against the foreign threat. By the 
end of the 19th century, there were few regions that had not been influenced by some 
forms of European expansionism. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, China, Korea, 
Taiwan, and even Japan itself had to cope with the formidable incursions of the 
European colonial powers. It was within this context that the Japanese imperialism 
assumed the self-proclaimed role as “the defender against the Western imperialism”.20 
The Japanese by criticizing the western ruthless exploitation of Asian peoples exalted 
their rule as benevolent, paternal, subtler, and fundamentally better than the 
European.21 Policy makers in Tōkyō justified their colonial expansion by claiming that 
Japan was not a conqueror, but a liberator, protecting backward Asia 22  from the 
Western menace. 23  The constant references to the success and benevolence of the 
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Japanese colonial rule in contrast to the exploitation by the west, found in official 
colonial documents point to an inferiority complex.24 
For Wu Rwei-Ren, the Japanese colonialism was a unique phenomenon: “There 
was a geographical, ethnic and cultural proximity between the colonizers and the 
colonized within this regional empire. This was exceptional among modem empires, 
which gave rise to a colonial discourse of assimilation that was uniquely Japanese. As a 
regional empire, Japan was able to exercise a kind of efficient political and military 
control over its colonies that was out of the question in the European empires. Thus 
Japan was able to develop a kind of tight economic integration with its colonies that 
was unprecedented in its European counterparts”.25 Many historians tried to associate 
early German colonialism with its Japanese counterpart. For example, Gotō Shinpei’s 
scientific and “biological politics” are considered a direct imitation of German colonial 
thinking. This kind of influence is only natural for a nation that turned to autocratic 
Berlin for institutional and modernization models. Many Meiji leaders, among them 
Gotō himself, had studied in Germany. Pro-German theorists dictated the newborn 
state’s policies.26 However, Tōkyō’s colonial rule was not an imitation but something 
utterly Japanese for the historian Ying Xiong. 27  Indeed, the ways with which the 
Japanese penetrated every aspect of their colonies’ daily life, meticulously organized 
their administration with a myriad of bureaus, controlled and exploited the population 
are uniquely Japanese. While the Europeans often neglected their colonial subjects 
soon after asserting their rule, Taiwan suffered from the metropolis’s excessive 
attention according to the renowned historian Kublin Hayman.  
Another distinctive trait of Japan’s expansionism in its earliest stage is the fact 
that it ran contrary to what Lenin has defined as the highest stage of capitalism, the 
intensification of western imperialism. For the Japanese history expert Jon Holliday it 
was “imperialism without capital”.28 Given Japan’s undeveloped capitalism in the late 
19th, it appears that the imperialistic expansion was fuelled more on ideology, 
psychology or strategic considerations than on capital. Hobson’s theory suggests that 
the existence of excess capital leads to seeking profits overseas. However, during this 
period Japan had no excess capital, ran a significant trade deficit, and, following the 
annexation of Taiwan, even had to borrow large amounts from Britain and the United 
States to finance its rapid industrial expansion. Lenin’s theory of imperialism 
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advocated that the capitalists wanted to employ surplus capital abroad to achieve higher 
profits than in the domestic market. This does not appear to apply to Imperial Japan, 
which throughout this period had been tormented by the lack of sufficient arable land 
and raw materials alike.29 For instance, most of the funds from foreign debt following 
the acquisition of Taiwan went for military expenditure, and only 3% of the funds went 
for the development of Japan's colonies. Schumpeter’s theory appears to have more 
validity. He wrote that imperialism represented the survival of older social structures, 
such as the warrior class, within a capitalist economy30. This theory seems to partially 
explain the attitude of Japan's leaders towards imperialistic expansion.31 
Japanese imperialism is often characterized as "self-defensive" imperialism or 
"petty" imperialism. The petty imperialism theory was first expressed by the economic 
analyst Takahashi Kamekichi (1891-1977) in 1927 to prove the qualitative difference 
between the advanced capitalist states like Britain or Germany and Japan.32 Japanese 
imperialistic aggression in the nineteenth century was generated under pre-capitalistic 
economic conditions. At the time, the Japanese economy was mainly based on 
agricultural production while the production systems were semi-feudal. 33  For 
Takahashi, Japan’s expansion was in response of external circumstances and cannot be 
explained simply by the needs or demands of the capitalistic class. The Marxist scholar 
Inomata Tsunao described 19th century Japan as a developing country, which had not 
yet reached the stage of finance capital but had adopted imperialist policies as a 
reaction to the western penetration in Asia.34 O. Tanin and E. Yohan, authors of the 
work Militarism and Fascism in Japan (1934) stated that until the Russo-Japanese War, 
Japanese imperialism was not a product of finance capital since the solid foundation of 
large-scale industry was absent and Japan’s domestic market was underdeveloped.35 
Illustrious historians such as Mark Peattie and Hilary Conroy agreed that economic 
factors were not decisive in the shaping of Japan’s early expansion. Yanaihara Tadao, 
the nation’s most influential colonial expert, claimed that Japanese imperialism had 
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more to do with the Euro-American imperialist competition and less with the export of 
financial capital, the formation of monopolies and overproduction. Failure to reach the 
stage of monopoly capitalism meant that Japan in the late 19th century was in “an 
earlier stage of imperialism”, and Japan’s imperialism was “a non-imperialist nation’s 
practice of imperialism”.36 For the author early Japan engaged in the race for colonies 
for reasons of geostrategic concerns connected to prestige and international diplomacy. 
The scholar Okakura Kakuzō or Tenshin (1862-1913) rightfully declared in the 
aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war: “as long as Japan indulged in the gentle arts of 
peace she had been regarded as barbarous, but victory in war had induced the 
foreigners to call Japan civilized.” Japanese politicians learnt “that imperialism and 
military dominance were indicators for civilization, whilst peace and closure denoted 
semi-civilized societies”.37 Tōkyō instead of being occupied itself by the West chose 
the road of militarism, imperial prestige, and colonial expansion. The path to survival 
and the right to exist passed through international recognition; modernization, 
militarism and the possession of colonies in the 19th century commanded respect. With 
the goal of augmenting their international standing and thus their country’s chances to 
survive the frenetic race for expansion, Japanese policy makers chose to side with the 
Western imperialists rather than the backward and victimized non-western nations.  
 
Many scholars compare the Japanese case of the 19th century with the British or 
German one. Although Britain was also an island state, it was technologically 
developed, robust, in possession of the most powerful fleet and most importantly most 
extensive empire in the world. The German Empire, although it too was formed late 
(1871) and bedevilled like Japan by the problem of overpopulation, did not share the 
same concerns about securing its independence as it was the superpower of the era, 
industrialized and militarily all-powerful the very next day after its unification. The 
indisputable similarity between the two states in the 19th century was the wide spread 
narrative of the “underprivileged latecomer” utilized by both states to justify their 
intention to upturn the international system’s status quo. Historians had argued that 
both Meiji Japan and Imperial Germany pursued a reactionary, authoritarian 
modernization that led eventually to totalitarianism. Even though this statement holds 
some validity for the 20th century, in the end of the 19th their potential, their 
aspirations and policies were diametrically different. Even if the political elites in both 
countries vigorously attempted to catch up with the rest of the world their actual 
differences were chaotic. 38  Militarily and politically Germany was a superpower; 
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economically it was highly industrialized and its banks and merchant class invested and 
active all over the world. On the other hand, Japan was feeble militarily, politically 
insignificant and economically backward. For instance, according to the historian L.H. 
Gann, Japanese banks never had an excessive supply of capital to be invested abroad 
before or during World War I. “On the contrary”, writes Gann, “one of Japan’s main 
economic problems was an extreme shortage of capital”. 39  Modernization and 
commercial or territorial expansion was pursued with great sacrifices made by the 
central state and not by individuals infused with entrepreneurial spirit.40  
 
Italian and German colonialisms share indubitably some common ground 
according to the historian Carlo Ghisalberti, who claims that both arose from private 
initiatives, missionaries and explorers that gave publicity to colonial matters among 
their contemporary compatriots. Moreover both states, embracing the prevailing 
militaristic and chauvinistic concepts of the late 19th century, aspired to imperial 
greatness; in this respect the inspiring, influential effect of Rome's imperial heritage 
was matched by Germany's world domination and Kaiser Wilhelm’s hegemonic 
ambitions. 41  Furthermore, upon the aftermath of the Italian and German states' 
formation, the ruling classes and the political leadership, personified by Bismarck and 
Cavour respectively, appeared disinterested about colonial expansion, having to 
confront more urgent socio-economic problems. According to Ghisalberti, the Italian 
and German governments never undertook seriously the project of establishing penal 
colonies and finally, both states happened to release their dominions abruptly after 
military defeat (officially in 1919 for Germany, 1947 for Italy), avoiding the 
decolonisation mess and the traumatic period experienced by other ex-colonial states, a 
fact that gave them the opportunity to acknowledge and reconcile with their oppressive 
past.42 For the German historian, Holger Afflerbach, besides the obvious commonalities 
of overpopulation and fear of being left out by the British and the French, early 
Germany and early Italy demonstrated the same reliance on the military in Africa. In 
other words, the military was the main factor behind the pursuit of colonial acquisitions 
and the means of their subsequent administration.43 However, he observed that the 
capacity and the prestige that the German forces enjoyed in Africa was superior to the 
Italian, particularly in the aftermath of the Adwa battle.44 
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In the author's view, it is imperative to re-enact the basic steps of the early 
German colonialism in order to examine its nature and eventually draw some more 
accurate conclusions in regard to its similarity with the Italian and the Japanese cases. 
The fact that in the late 1890s Imperial Germany launched an aggressive world policy 
is well known. Political, economic and military predominance led the ruling classes of 
the Wilhelmine period to pursue a European and global superpower status.45 It is worth 
asking however, how did Germany handle the first challenges concerning the heated 
colonial debate before the consolidation of its overwhelming power. Presenting the 
initial colonial policy of the Bismarckian era in summary and outlining the leading 
expansionist ideologies is essential in order to shed some light on the early German 
colonial policy. For this reason, we will briefly demonstrate the way that Berlin 
operated in Africa during the acquisition of its first colony, Namibia, and how it 
contrasted the acquisition of Italian Eritrea and Japanese Taiwan.  
Bismarck’s famous statement on 5 December 1888 that his "map of Africa was 
in Europe", meant that his priority was to prevent the formation of a hostile coalition 
that threatened Germany's hegemonial status in Europe by diverting tensions in the 
colonial periphery. 46  Despite his belief that the connection between colonies and 
commerce was illusive, Bismarck finally decided to reluctantly back the expansionists’ 
undertakings in order to appease them although he left the initiative to those 
experienced entrepreneurs, who were adventurist enough. In the 1870-1880s many of 
the exploration and scientific missions abroad were subsidized by the Deutsche Bank 
and the Diskontogesellschaft bank. During the 1882-1885 economic depression in 
Europe, the national-liberal Deputy Friedrich Adolf Hammacher (1824-1904) was 
claiming in the parliament: "The surplus production crisis could be surpassed by the 
opening of new trade outlets". Colonial propaganda, influencing the public opinion, 
stepped in to highlight the obvious solution: colonization could resolve the social and 
financial strains deriving from the crisis. Amid this climate, in the summer of 1883, the 
merchant Franz Adolf Eduard Lüderitz (1834-1886) acquired 900 square kilometres in 
Angra Pequenha, in modern day Namibia from the local chieftains. Soon after, he 
stipulated a convention with prominent bankers and industrialists, in anticipation of 
Berlin's typical official approval. Bismarck having established a mutual understanding 
with French president Ferry, in regard to Madagascar, Tonkin and Tunisia, as already 
explained, opted for the isolation of London. The Triple alliance, the Russian-British 
antagonism in Afghanistan and the precarious British position in Egypt gave a clear 
advantage to the German side. On 24 April 1884 Berlin declared that the German 
citizens and their properties in Namibia would be from then on under the state's 
protection. The British authorities of the Cape posed obstacles to the German 
penetration as they were already doing in the Fiji Islands, where German firms had 
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acquired sugar plantations in 1885. Britain’s ambassador in Berlin, was scolded during 
a meeting with the chancellor and warned that if his government continued to ignore 
legitimate German rights in the Pacific, it would render its position vulnerable against 
the other powers in Egypt.  
Gustav Nachtigal, the German consul in Tunis, acting as imperial commissioner 
on the Chancellor’s orders reached Cameroon, Togo and any other region in which 
German financial interests were active, especially the shipbuilding-trade company 
Woermann, and raised the national flag defying London. Berlin's agents acting 
resolutely expanded the boundaries of what had become thanks to Lüderitz the German 
South West Africa and founded the colonies of Togoland and Cameroon in July 1884. 
A heated rivalry erupted in East Africa amidst the press's battle cries, between German 
and British agents for the mainland possessions of the Zanzibari Sultan. The petty 
bourgeoisie always susceptible to nationalistic demagogy and illusions of splendour 
backed Bismarck on the 28 October 1884 elections. 47  The historian Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler identified Bismarck's late bid for colonies as "social imperialism" since its main 
aim was to "preserve the supremacy of the traditional ruling elites and the authoritarian 
power structure within the so-called Kaiserreich".48  
Between the middle of the 19th century and the early 20th two perceptions 
dominated the German colonial ideology. The "emigrationist" theory dictated the 
establishment of settlement-farming colonies as the answer to the vast overpopulation 
problem and the subsequent social issues that derived from it, which in turn led to the 
massive 19th century emigration flow. In this way Germany’s cultural and economic 
loss was transformed into overseas societies whose way of life, culture and economic 
contribution with the motherland would be protected by the German government.49 The 
German population rose from 41 million in 1871 to 50 million in 1890. In the three 
years between 1880 and 1882 half a million-people immigrated to the Americas.50 The 
emigrationist advocates set their sights on South America and specifically on Argentina 
as the most suitable host. Moreover, German commercial influence (informal 
imperialism) had already penetrated the region in a number of ways: capital 
investments, military presence, establishment of shipping lines, banks, factories.51  
In contrast, the economic theory viewed colonies as supplements to Germany's 
industrial and commercial development. Instead of large scale settlements, the 
importation of raw materials and agricultural goods as well as the formation of new 
trade opportunities were envisioned. 52  Eventual economic depressions or 
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overproduction problems would be resolved by an "export offensive" both overseas and 
in Europe; a relentless, omnipresent economic penetration under the aegis of central 
interventism was achieved before the turn of the century and at the same time 
safeguards against disruptive internal (liberal) social forces or foreign competition were 
put in place. German trade volume had been roughly doubling every fifteen years, from 
the 1840s to the 1910s and the country had progressively become a leading player on 
the stage of international trade. German industrialists and capitalists were interested in 
the tropical colonies, as reservoirs of raw materials such as rubber for their ever-
expanding industries. Amidst the strenuous 19th century economic antagonism, 
Berlin’s technical innovations, industrial reorganization (conglomeration) and policies 
of aggressive investment and economic expansion rendered Germany the world's major 
economic power, overthrowing the British at the end of the century.53  
Ideologically, the proponents of German expansion rarely brought up the 
justifying schemes of the civilizing mission of the third world’s unfortunates, so 
beloved by the French, British and Italian colonialists. Instead they were prone to instil 
the concept of work ethic to the colonized and to rationally exploit natural resources, 
securing the maximum profitability. When it came to colonies, business was priority 
and civilization had to wait. The explorer Carl Peters (1856-1918) once wrote: "all 
colonial establishments are in essence a business for the states". Theodor Gotthilf 
Leutwein (1849 -1921), Southwest Africa's governor from 1894 to 1904, conformingly 
stated: "The main purpose of all colonization is, if one leaves all made-up idealism and 
humanitarianism aside, a business. The colonizing race does not want to bring 
happiness to the indigenous population but looks after its own advantage and profit. So 
therefore, there is only one guideline for colonization and that is the pursuit of 
profitable business".54 
This brief outline is sufficient to help us trace the colossal gasp between the 
early Italian, Japanese and German colonialism, three cases that one could argue that 
they sprang out from identical ideological frameworks. These states were nurtured in 
the 19th century bigoted, militaristic, atavistic, pro-expansionist framework and were 
equally tormented by the population surplus question. Another interesting analogy was 
the ruling dynasties' inclination towards colonialism and some of their members’ 
enthusiastic participation in the endeavour. Beyond these points only striking 
inconsistencies are noticed. The most apparent is certainly the difference of their 
economic, commercial and mainly of their industrial capabilities. As far as Germany is 
concerned the economic explanation of imperialism makes sense. By the 1890s, it was 
an "economic giant with the world's most advanced technology and with a more 
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efficient business structure and a higher investment rate than Britain".55 Germany had 
already reached the highest level of capitalism (monopoly capitalism), that justified 
every economic theory of imperialist expansion. The eventuality of exclusion from the 
world's markets in a state so interconnected and reliant on trade was an actual menace 
whereas the Italian or Japanese call for raw materials was more elusive than real, a 
mere justification pretext. Germany actually needed rubber, chemicals, lumber for its 
industries and markets to export its surplus capital and its manufactured products. 
German entrepreneurs clashed with their French and British counterparts all over the 
globe in the race for concessions and privileges and demonstrated a mature capitalistic 
disposition towards investment. When Berlin could not contribute to high risk 
enterprises or support its colonies' infrastructural development, there were bankers and 
components of the politico-commerce-industrial complex ready to step in. As Bismarck 
wished to involve the government as little as possible financially and administratively 
in Africa these businessmen invested not heavily but in a consistent way, inconceivable 
in Rome or Tōkyō. In Italy and Japan, as we have seen, the industrial and foodstuff 
production could not cope with the demands. Indeed, Italy was importing capitals from 
France and Germany, and produced agricultural goods whereas Japan’s anaemic 
economy and meagre exports weighted upon the state budget. Furthermore, German 
expansionism was directed wherever business opportunities arose and established itself 
in regions that offered some kind of future profitability even if in some cases cash 
influxes were required from Berlin. On the contrary, the Italian equivalent was 
aimlessly directed at any available or suggested region, ending up controlling Eritrea 
and Somalia, maybe the most destitute territories in Africa after failing to acquire more 
vital regions. In Ethiopia, the Italians encountered the opposition of the most 
consolidated and militant African state. Japan, on the other hand after a series of 
humiliations had managed to acquire by 1895 only Taiwan, an unsanitary, 
underdeveloped, undesired island in the Far East. The locals expressed their loyalty to 
Beijing on numerous occasions, established two autonomous states and fought the 
hated invaders with everything they got for years. Conversely, no one claims that 
Namibia and Tanganyika were peaceful and rich worldly paradises; financially the 
majority of the German colonies relied on government support and, despite the 
investments, were not particularly profitable.56 Nor could someone argue that Berlin 
invested heavily in its colonies; none of the colonial powers did (the bulk of the British 
investments were not in its colonies but in America). Yet, they had been chosen in 
order to satisfy German interests and produce profits based on sound capitalistic-profit 
making reasoning and also to contest in equal terms the British and French imperial 
monopoly. Berlin did not contend itself with leftovers.  
This brings us to our next point. Germany after defeating Denmark (1864), 
Austria (1866) and France (1871) was vested in the prestigious aura of the 19th century 
rising world power. Energetic and vigorous, after centuries of internal division, it 
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launched itself forward. Already dominant in Europe, it envisioned for itself the role of 
a global superpower (weltpolitik) namely after 1891. Militarily superior, politically 
stable, industrially thriving it soon threatened to overthrow all the other protagonists. 
Equally important was the awareness of this power. Imperial Germany even before the 
Wilhelmine era not only spoke on equal terms in the aftermath of its foundation with 
the long-standing empires, even though it still did not possess a formidable fleet, but 
defied and even menaced and provoked the fear of its opponents. The initial concerns 
about the creation of a rival coalition supposedly aimed at liquidating the newly 
founded empire were rebuffed by Bismarck's brilliant divide and rule policy and put at 
ease until the First World War. Despite Germany's aggressive tactics and vulnerable 
strategic position, the country did not engage in any offensive or defensive European 
campaigns up until 1914.  
In the late 1870s Germany, military powerful and at the forefront of the global 
trade and industry, appeared attractive to Meiji leaders. By the 1880s German patterns 
appeared more adaptable to the Japanese case and German political theory was in line 
with Japanese conservative, nationalistic attitudes as opposed to those theories 
promulgated by the likes of Finance Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu, who was advocating 
the British-American liberal thought57 and a British style constitution.58 It was not only 
the educational system or the studies in the medical field that was adopted from the 
prestigious German model but a series of reforms, institutions and ideas that were all 
employed in the process of nation building and modernising.59 Their implementation 
was applicable due to the "affinity of the philosophical basis" of Japan's and imperial 
Germany's political systems and their "ethno-centric nationalism" according to the 
historian Bernd Martin. Indeed, the national ideology on which post 1871 Germany 
was founded on was Christian religion and long standing feudal-agrarian folkloric 
elements that provided a common origin and culture. As for the education, in the new 
born German Empire it revolved around moral discipline, obedience to one's superiors, 
Christian ethics and the exaltation of the German nationality. The indoctrination to 
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patriotic and military duty was analogous to the Japanese practices. 60  A growing 
orientation towards German patterns in law, economic and social policy, was promoted 
in the early 1880s as a conservative response to the Liberal Party and as a legal basis 
for revising the unequal treaties.61 German legal and constitutional models appeared to 
be more suitable and conforming with the Japanese norms of sovereign power and the 
role of the emperor.62 A centralized, statist type of governance, the existence of noble 
elites with bureaucratic functions, the dominant role of the military and the patriotic-
nationalistic ideals that seemed to shape the relationship between the people and its 
leaders were up to a certain degree commonly shared by the two societies. 63  The 
modern German state, constructed around the figure of the monarch, was established 
through "iron and blood" not vote and parliaments just as the Japanese state was in 
1868.64 Nevertheless by the end of the 19th century, besides these apparent similarities 
the two states had nothing else in common.65  
The chaotic difference between Germany's industrial and military capacity as a 
global superpower and an Asian, agrarian island state in the margin of the modernised 
world shaped their respective relations and attitudes concerning their foreign policy. 
Japanese economy was far less industrialized than Germany's and its trade largely 
controlled by foreign merchants enjoying treaty privileges. In regard to the current 
thesis, which highlights Italy’s and Japan’s expansionist tendencies and early colonial 
policy it has to be stressed once again that these two states were relegated to secondary 
international actors whereas Germany was the rising world power of the 19th and early 
20th centuries. The fact that all three were formed late, willing to challenge the 
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established state of affairs, which was perceived as unfair, and suffered from 
overpopulation are certainly important but not fundamental for the comprehension of 
their foreign policies and territorial aspirations. Italian and Japanese strategic 
insecurity, the anxiety and psychological pressure stemming from it, the 
underdeveloped economies, their limited military capabilities and marginalized 
international position in the second half of the 19th century were immensely more 
influential to their colonial policies. Thus, it is self-evident that these two countries 
were nowhere near on being on par with Germany, France or Britain. Instead they were 
closer at being "colonized", attacked or economically penetrated themselves. 
Scholars tend to compare Germany’s and Japan’s colonial history just because 
the history of early Italian colonialism has been neglected domestically and 
internationally. The economic weakness behind the Italian colonial project, the fact that 
it constituted an anomaly that did not conform to the widely accepted Marxist 
interpretation of imperialism, prompted the researchers to overlook and ignore the 
issue. But it is not only the foreign historiography which ignored the phenomenon. 
Even in Italy itself, over the last thirty years and until recently the country’s colonial 
history was a secondary and forgotten part of the national history. It seems that the 
Italian governments and academic circles had no desire to allow or to engage into a 
systematic study of the Italian presence in Africa, an event which would confront them 
with the mistakes of the past.66 The ignorance, the disregard for the foreign sources, the 
ambiguity and the lack of debate perpetuated the study of the events with blinkers on: 
the inconsistencies, the contradictions, the myths and the stereotypes about a 
"humanitarian" and "different" colonial administration. 67  In the post-war period no 
scientific study was undertaken by the State, which additionally allowed access to the 
relevant files of the Ministry of the Colonies to very few historians. The various 
obstacles and the limited access were holding back the work of aspiring researchers and 
provided ample proof of the statesmen's desire to conceal the reality, the defeats and 
their mistakes. Thus is explained, at least partially, the lack of comprehensive scientific 
studies on the matter and the relatively limited until recently bibliography.  
   The sole project towards the direction of authoring and publishing a complete 
official account of the Italian presence in Africa came to fruition with the publication of 
the L'Italia in Africa series in 1952. In the 50 volumes of this work the authors, most of 
them former officials and administrators of the Italian dominions, did everything 
possible to underline and to exalt the diversity of the Italian presence in relation to the 
other colonialists. Giorgio Rochat, an expert in colonial matters, argued however that 
the greater part of the 50 volumes was lacking "any requisites of seriousness and 
                                                          
66 Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller, "Introduction" in Italian colonialism, ed. M. Fuller, R. Ben-Ghiat, 
(New York, 2005), pp. 1-3. 
67 Giuseppe Finaldi, "Adowa and the historiography of Italian colonialism", Modern Italy, 2/1 (1997), 
pp. 91-92. 
487 
 
scientific nature".68 In post-war Italy the first impartial work on this subject that fully 
met the scientific historiographical criteria was the La Prima Guerra d'Africa by 
Roberto Battaglia, which was published in 1958. The second one chronologically was 
La Guerra Libica (1911-1912) by Francesco Malgeri in 1970. In the last 20 years, the 
removal of the restrictions and the renewed interest of the historians for this period 
gave new impetus to the development of courses and studies about the Italian presence 
in Africa. The works of G. Calchi Novati, R. Mori, G. Rochat, G. Procacci, C. Zaghi, F. 
Surdich, N. Labanca, and A. Del Boca offered new interpretations and scientific 
substance in the study of the phenomenon under examination.69  
Italian historiography suffers to some extent by the problem of subjectivity. 
Depending on the political beliefs (communism, liberalism, fascism) of the authors, the 
events are falsified, suppressed or overstated as seen fit. In our case it can be safely 
claimed that almost all the literature about the former Italian dominions in Africa that 
was published between 1922 and 1943 present the subject in an idealized manner, in a 
light of grandeur, pride, racism and militarism. On the contrary, most of the works that 
were published after the war, the criminalization of fascism and the rejection of 
everything that had to do with it, abound with reactivity, dogmatism, fury and 
emotional charge. The Marxist and liberal historians are usually excessively strict, 
sarcastic and aphoristic, a fact which of course affects to a large degree the objective 
and responsible report of events. Many of them, for example, due to humanitarian and 
economic reasons despise the imperialist aspirations of their ancestors, ignoring or 
suppressing the fact that the conquest of colonies by the Great Powers was a practice 
and an event acceptable and normal during the 19th century. I believe that had more 
serious research been undertaken both on Italy’s and Japan’s colonialism the myth of 
the supposed German-Japanese similarities would be torn down.  
On the other hand, and despite the ruling classes’ unwillingness to recognize 
Japan’s brutality in Asia, Tōkyō’s expansion was studied in greater length. Renowned 
and respected authors like W.G. Beasley, R. Myers and M. Peattie, I. Kiyoshi, R. 
Storry, A. Iriye, E. Oguma, I. Nish managed to shed light on a topic that, partially due 
to the linguistic barrier, would have otherwise stayed obscure and little known in 
western scholarship without their contribution. In recent years, works such as the iconic 
Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (1987) and The Japanese colonial empire, 1895–
1945 (1989), Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to 
Colonial Engineering (2009) attracted international scholarly attention to this sensitive 
subject. The general tendency in Japanese political discourse since the end of the war is 
to disclaim the impact of Japanese colonialism and to downplay its war-time 
criminality. Japanese textbooks by the Ministry of Education provoked the protests of 
the other Asian nations in the 1980s. Strong protests arose when the Japanese Justice 
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Minister called the Nanjing Massacre a “fabrication” and “it’s wrong to call this war of 
aggression… We were seriously thinking about the liberation of the colonies and the 
Co-Prosperity Sphere”. The Japanese emperors never formally apologized to the Asian 
nations for Japan’s war-time atrocities. Japanese expansionism was marginalized and 
“never became a very important part of the national consciousness”. Some historians 
tried to rationalize and depict Japan’s colonialism as better than that of the other 
nations. For example, Wakatsuki Yasuo, a historian specializing in Japan-Korean 
relations, explained Japan’s expansion as “…an inevitable consequence of global 
colonialism. And compared to the British or French colonialists, the Japanese were 
actually better rulers”.70 
Under these circumstances Japanese historiography is still filled with disputes 
and contradictions. 71  Until the 1990s those few interested in the Japan’s rule over 
Taiwan were faced with several obstacles due to the Cold War era’s politics and 
Taiwan’s delicate situation; it was only then that the official documents of the Japanese 
administration in the island were finally made accessible to the public. 72  The 
liquidation of the Italian and Japanese empires was not a voluntary act; it was a result 
of Rome’s and Tōkyō’s military defeat in the Second World War. As a consequence, it 
was not an issue of great political controversy domestically. In addition these two 
nations did not have a period of gradual decolonization as was the cases for Britain or 
France. There had been those like Yoshino Sakuzo (1878-1933) and Yanaihara Tadao 
(1893-1961) who had condemned Japan's imperial yearnings, but they were few and far 
between. In the first half of the 20th century, opposition to the empire was neither 
fashionable nor widespread. To the Japanese the end of empire was and perhaps still is 
virtually synonymous with the defeat in the war. As the Japanese intellectual opinion 
moved towards the left in the postwar period, at the same time it attacked imperialism 
and militarism. Socialist criticism in postwar publications targeted gunkokushugi 
(militarism) and teikokushugi (imperialism). Nipponshugi (belief in Nippon or 
ultranationalism) was also subjected to criticism. In a sense, all of Japan has grown to 
detest and distrust these concepts. In other words, it is not just a socialist belief 
anymore, but the thinking of an entire generation of Japanese. Whereas in the days of 
the empire, there were comparatively few voices raised in opposition, in the aftermath 
of the empire’s dissolution there has been a whole wave of opposition and criticism in 
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retrospect. To some extent this appears to be the case because Japan's empire was 
associated with the army more than any other institution.73  
Colonial Taiwan and Eritrea despite being the first stepping stones towards later 
expansion have received relatively little attention both inside and outside of Japan and 
Italy respectively. Japan’s decolonization and subsequent subordination to American 
imperialism not only freed Japan of any responsibility regarding the disintegration of 
its empire but also interiorized (internalized) its intellectual discourse.74 In the same 
manner Italy’s colonial and belligerent past was brushed aside after 1945 when 
Washington “envisaged Italy’s strategic role as bastion of democracy in the 
Mediterranean as an act of consolidation of the Western block in the making”.75  Some 
of these features hold true for postcolonial Germany too. 
As deduced from this research, early Japan and Italy shared unique similarities 
in the dawn of their initial imperial expansion which will be presented henceforth. Both 
the Italian and the Japanese state builders came from the educated classes and were 
conscious of their own backwardness. They were aware of the developments abroad; 
each was fearful of the likely prospect of foreign domination. Therefore, they strove to 
build up their states to withstand the challenge posed by the Great Powers of the 19th 
century. Liberalism was only a minor matter in Japan but in Italy it was the driving 
force behind the country’s unification. Liberty promised freedom from foreign 
encroachment and papal domination. Unification and modernization was a way to 
achieve this goal: Italy had to enter the system of the European power states or be 
devoured by foreign tyrants. 76  Similarly the goal of the Meiji Restoration was to 
strengthen the anaemic nation in the face of foreign threat. In order to serve this 
process, the Japanese leaders appealed to symbols of the primordial Japanese nation 
whereas their Italian counterparts appealed to Roman glory. The House of Savoy or the 
Japanese Imperial Household had never exerted much influence upon the masses. In 
both the Japanese and the Italian case, the royal dynasties were used as a favourable 
institution with which fundamental political change would be brought. Japanese state 
builders chose to adopt western forms that could be legitimized by their imperial 
system. In Italy where liberalism was well established it was the liberal constitution (lo 
statuto 1848) that legitimized the rule of a foreign dynasty upon the country. Despite 
the Risorgimento and the Meiji Restoration the ruling classes retained their power and 
blocked major social change. Both state builders were not confronted or challenged by 
the kind of politicized bourgeoisie that was active in France or Britain. They created 
centralized states adopting Prussian legal and military doctrines even though in Italy’s 
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case the state remained inefficient.77 Immature bourgeois traditions and the common 
fear of communism transformed Italy and Japan after the First World War into 
authoritarian states; the loss of political freedom was the price to pay for stability at 
home and international high standing.  
Let’s see how both ruling classes responded to the modernization challenge and 
their political choices. Camillo Benso Cavour the architect of Italy’s unification forged 
a liberal Italy, unified and free of foreign rule. Itō Hirobumi the most influential of the 
Meiji era’s politicians created a constitutional framework that limited popular 
participation and fortified imperial prerogative. Cavour also used the monarchy to gain 
domestic support and build a national identity.78 In the aftermath of Italy’s and Japan’s 
unification this step was imperative; politician Massimo d'Azeglio’s alleged phrase that 
Italy was finally made, but it was now necessary to create the Italians resembles 
Fukuzawa’s famous remark “in Japan we have a government but not yet a nation”79. A 
devout liberal but not a democrat, Cavour knew that autocracies were doomed but 
believed that the royal institution could be utilized for modernizing purposes. The Meiji 
leaders, equally cautious, also needed the symbolic power of the emperor but they 
chose to proceed to modernization by establishing a bureaucratic state. Itō used the 
throne to legitimize the new regime and to cope with the civil war, the peasant revolts, 
and the democratic movements, but he was also careful to limit the emperor’s powers. 
Italy was unified by the liberals but in Japan they were just an insignificant group 
fragmented or purged by the oligarchs. Cavour chose liberalism dressed in the cloak of 
the Savoy monarchy; Itō opted for authoritarianism under the disguise of parliamentary 
politics. Whereas Cavour created Italian citizens who actually voted for their king in 
the 1860 plebiscite, Itō created imperial subjects and established a bureaucratic state to 
serve the monarchy.80  
 The lack of investment funds, the disconnection between industrialization and 
expansionism, the ultimately limited dynamic of the Italian and Japanese economies in 
the late 19th century constitute the most obvious similarities. For the historian Yoshio 
Asai both of these states had similar “socio-economic characteristics” and comparable 
industrial development; agricultural production constituted 51,3% of the Italian and 
48,4% of the Japanese gross domestic product in 1890. Their main exports at the time 
were silk, cotton and other agricultural products. Wages were low in relation to the 
salaries received by workers in more industrially advanced nations and the lack of 
essential raw materials signified in both cases retardation in the creation of modern 
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industrial plants.81 Japan was asphyxiating under the trade restriction imposed by the 
unequal treaties. Italy much like Japan was disgraced by its technological 
backwardness. In this sense it is once again apparent that the economic justification of 
Italy’s and Japan’s expansion seems invalid; the acquisition of colonies as markets for 
the metropolis’ products cannot explain their early drive for an empire.  
When the Italian credit system collapsed in 1866 the Finance Ministry sold land 
expropriated from the Catholic Church, canals, and railways to private firms. In the 
same manner Matsukata’s reforms in the 1880s that promoted privatization to confront 
the financial crisis in Japan, favoured companies like Mitsui and Mitsubishi; they 
purchased bankrupted state owned enterprises in mining and manufacturing. The Italian 
leaders embraced the concept of free trade and turned to foreign financiers to promote 
their industrialization program. The first Italian railways used funds raised abroad a fact 
that made foreign control and influence distressing. Banca Commerciale established in 
1894, was created by Austrian and German financiers and provided the necessary 
capital for Italy’s industrialization efforts. Furthermore, French financiers owned an 
enormous part of the Italian debt and French manufacturers dominated the nation’s 
economy until the early 1880s when German capitalists replaced them. Italy’s textile 
industry was in the hands of Swiss capitalists and metallurgy was chiefly controlled by 
British entrepreneurs.82 Meiji leaders refused to become depended on foreign capital 
and very few of them supported the idea of free trade. Tōkyō selected its buyers 
carefully and refused to sell assets to foreign interests. Italy due to the lack of domestic 
private capital turned to foreign sources whereas Japan fearful of western encroachment 
preferred temporary economic stagnation to foreign domination. Italy adopted the 
doctrine of free trade that left the country’s economy vulnerable until the 1887 
protectionist tariff. Meanwhile for a weak nation like Japan protectionism seemed to be 
the only way forward but the limitations of the unequal treaties meant that Japan’s early 
economy was entirely dominated by the western trade and credit houses. In any case 
the new states had to prove that they could survive in a competitive industrial world. If 
they failed, their own sovereignty would pass to the hands of foreign creditors as in the 
case of Tunisia.83  
In the aftermath of their unification both ruling elites sought to complete 
territorially their formation: the provinces of Veneto (1866) and Lazio (1870) were 
acquired by the new Italian government while Hokkaidō (1869) and Ryūkyū (1879) 
were added to the Japanese national body with a sense of urgency by Japan’s policy 
makers. Both nations were in need of reorganization and modernization to catch up 
with the rest of the advanced states of the 19th century. Thus, they promoted the 
creation of a common and distinct national identity since nationalism and loyalty to the 
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state were deemed as sine qua non for the nation’s progress. Both ruling elites sought to 
“construct” Italians and Japanese; like the Japanese, the Italians too had deep memories 
of a glorious past. Christianity, Roman law, the Renaissance attested to Italy’s 
intellectual and cultural primacy. These ideas exploited appropriately by Rome’s state 
builders animated and mobilized the masses. Likewise, the Japanese created their own 
national myths about their divine descent and homogeneity. 84  Education was the 
medium of this indoctrination. “Moral education” and the “respect of duty” were 
equally promoted but with a substantial difference: Italy had to take in consideration 
the resistant influence of the Catholic Church in educational matters whereas in Japan 
the Meiji governments constructed a new “religion” (State Shintō) through which they 
further exalted the state and rid themselves of any opposition to their programme.85  
Centuries of political fragmentation and regionalism challenged the unity of the 
newborn German, Japanese and Italian states. However, it was only in the latter two 
that this friction escalated to animosity and division for decades to come. In Italy’s 
riotous southern provinces, the War of Brigandage lasted almost a decade. In the late 
1860s the Italian government seriously considered and sponsored exploration missions 
in remote places with the goal of founding a penal colony to “accommodate” the 
southern brigands. In Japan, the civil war of 1868-1869 subdued those that were 
unwilling to accept the new distribution of power; many of them were sent to colonize 
the inhospitable Hokkaidō. Violence and oppression by the new central governments 
marked not only two large scale military conflicts but an identical never ending 
domestic strife. The Italian south and the northern provinces of Japan were initially 
violently subjugated and then gradually incorporated by the new seats of power. These 
peripheries were internally colonized and placed in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the 
centre in political and economic terms. Their population felt conquered and exploited 
by a foreign tyrant as if they were overseas colonies. On the other hand this situation 
was constantly fueling Rome’s and Tōkyō’s strategic vulnerability and insecurity 
syndrome.  
Due to the harsh living conditions, overpopulation and poverty at home many 
Japanese and Italians decided to leave their respective mother counties and migrate to 
the Americas. In the late 19th century as we have seen, too few of them actually settled 
in Taiwan and Eritrea; continuous warfare, political instability, despotic colonial 
administration and tropical climatic conditions were not exactly what the migrants were 
looking for. This fact discredits the immigration argument as a valid justification for 
the Italian and Japanese expansionism. In addition, Japan’s and Italy’s citizens abroad 
were not treated with a manner befitting to citizens of the Great Powers or of peer 
civilized nations. Arduous manual labour, humiliating wages, prejudice and racism 
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caso giapponese e quello italiano” in Lo stato liberale italiano e l'età Meiji, 1st Italo-Japanese 
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were stomached by the desperate and politically unprotected Japanese and Italians in 
the U.S and elsewhere. 86  For example, government official Mizuno Jun in 1900 
lamented Japan’s international position: “…while it is an empire which has possession 
of its surrounding areas, at the same time it is also a weak, small country which sends 
its poor overseas as immigrants”.87 Rome clashed with Paris in its effort to protect the 
thriving Italian community of Tunisia and to even annex the Regency. Similarly, Tōkyō 
sought to exert some influence over the Hawaiian kingdom where the bulk of the 
Japanese immigrants abroad was crammed into and enhance their privileges. Without 
the means to impose their will, Japan and Italy witnessed in disgust Tunisia and Hawaii 
being absorbed by the French (1881) and the Americans (1898) respectively. What was 
even more frustrating and demonstrated how little Rome and Tōkyō mattered in the 
world stage was the fact that after these annexations, the rights of Italians in Tunisia 
and Japanese in Hawaii were limited and gradually eliminated in contrast to official 
reassurances.  
Early modern Italy and Japan were not exactly military superpowers. Their 
military unpreparedness, lengthy defenseless shores and feeble land and sea forces 
made them appear as possible targets of western aggression not as potential imperial 
states. The deficiencies and poor performance of the Japanese army in the first Taiwan 
expedition (1874) and the Satsuma Rebellion (1877) signified Tōkyō’s militarily 
weakness. Adjustment to western standards and adoption of  modern military tactics 
required more time, effort and money.88 The first major victory came against the even 
more outmoded Chinese (1895) after more than two decades of intense westernization 
and military buildup. Rome in the eve of its unification, despite being part of the 
advanced and powerful western “block”, was equally vulnerable. The defeats of Lissa 
and Custoza (1866) against the Austrians, the reluctance to operate away from home 
for example in Egypt (1882) and the defeats of the Italian army in Africa (1887, 1896) 
attest to the fact that the nation’s army was in dire need of reorganization. Better 
equipment, improved performance and modern tactics were required if Italy wanted to 
stand among the Great Powers of the time. Both newborn states initially adopted the 
French military model but after 1871 they both opted for the more successful German 
one. 
Both ruling classes came to understand that their inferior economic and military 
status did not allow them to put forward an independent foreign policy according to 
their national interests. Diplomatic support by one or more superpowers was urgently 
needed. In a rather inglorious docile way and despite Rome’s alliance to Germany and 
                                                          
86 The Italians and the Japanese discriminated against the local populations in their own colonies but 
when they emigrated abroad they were both lamenting and criticizing the discriminative legislation in 
their host countries. 
87 Eiji Oguma, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2: Korea, Taiwan and the Ainu 1868-1945, 
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88 Edward House, a journalist present at the time of the Japanese landings and military campaign in 
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Austria-Hungary (1882) the Italians collaborated closely with London at least as far as 
their colonial expansion is concerned. Their greatest concern was France. Japan on the 
other hand was racially, economically, militarily and politically looked down upon and 
deemed as a primitive and almost savage nation. It was fearful of any western nation 
with a fleet, especially Russia. Tōkyō due to its vulnerability after the Restoration could 
not afford to confront or even displease the powers. Before any crucial decision the 
Japanese Foreign Minister had to humiliatingly consult and secure the foreigners’ 
consent. The nation’s first colonial enterprise (1874) was organized in secrecy but was 
officially renounced due to the foreign protests. Similarly the Italians in order to not 
dissatisfy even minor players such as the Ottoman Empire and to avoid the powers’ 
disapproval had to act in a compliant way. For example they operated in secrecy to 
capture Massaua (1885). Their undertaking was staged by London and was in consort 
with British interests from the beginning to the end. The British stance dictated the 
Italian actions in China, in San Mun or Sanmen in 1899. In the same way, the Japanese 
plan to attack Korea (1873-1874) was abandoned partially because of the fear of British 
or Russian retribution. 89  It was the American LeGendre, among other American 
advisors, and the British Kirkwood who influenced if not shaped Japan’s imperial 
agenda. The lesser, peripheral interests of early Italy and Japan were subjected and 
subordinated to the projects of the Great Powers. Britain as the greater colonial power 
of the time was not only a model for industrialization, naval power and overseas 
expansion for these nations; its biddings commanded awe and were binding for these 
secondary states that aspired to create their own empires. Arguably Berlin took in 
consideration the interests of the other powers in relation to its foreign policy as well. It 
was also in search for alliances and support but on its own terms. However, in the end 
of the 19th century Germany was Britain’s economic, military and diplomatic rival not 
its admirer.  
Italy and Japan were left traumatized by the debacle in Adwa (1896) and the 
Triple Intervention (1895) respectively. The former found the courage to embark on a 
large-scale colonial campaign again in 1911 when it occupied Libya. The shock of the 
unprecedented defeat of a western nation in the hands of some underdeveloped 
barbarians haunted the Italians until the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1936). The 
Japanese did not experience a military humiliation of similar proportions. However, the 
arrogance and meddling of the European powers in the nation’s politics was unbearable 
for generations to come. The Triple Intervention stripped Japan of its “rightful” gains, 
terrorized the nation and convinced the majority of the elites that further military 
buildup and a future confrontation with the West was unavoidable. Both states 
reluctantly and in collaboration with the Great Powers participated in the quelling of 
the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901). Around the time that Italy annexed Libya, Tōkyō 
after decades of machinations colonized Korea (1910). Almost 15 years after their 
humiliation both nations felt strong enough to dynamically pursue by themselves their 
                                                          
89 The assertion that there was a consensus for imperial adventure within the Japanese government in 
the 1870s is open to challenge. Regarding the Korean debate the Meiji government took the road of 
caution and prudence despite voices desiring an aggressive policy involving military action. 
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long awaiting, sidelined but still coveted territorial aims. Libya was strategically 
“Italy’s fourth shore” and Korea “a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. It is difficult 
to imagine how the acquisition of the Moluccas Island complex as the Italian explorer 
Giovanni Emilio Cerruti put forward (1870) or of New Caledonia as envisioned by the 
explorer Komakichi Tomiyama (1891-1892) would be crucial to the metropolis’ 
security. Likewise, what was distant Eritrea’s strategic importance for Rome? How did 
Taiwan complement Japan’s strategic security? In the 19th century both nations could 
only contend themselves with what the colonial powers deemed unprofitable. 19th 
century Italy and Japan shared the fixation for colonies; they colonized for the sake of 
colonizing. They rushed to obtain something, anything before the opening of the Suez 
Canal or the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway that extended the Great Powers’ 
hegemony over every piece of land still available. Rome’s and Tōkyō’s early expansion 
was not necessarily interwoven with the creation of naval bases and military outposts. 
Therefore, the social (overpopulation), economic and strategic theories that 
many embraced to explain the early Japanese and Italian colonialisms are of secondary 
importance. Still we cannot exclude these theories altogether since they were very 
influential among 19th century policy makers. For example, some people believed that 
Taiwan or Eritrea were able to accommodate the surplus population. The facts 
however, demonstrated that these locations at least initially were inhospitable, 
unprofitable, and from a diplomatic and militarily point of view more of a burden than 
an asset to the state. So there has to be another explanation as to why the Japanese and 
Italians chose to acquire and hold their first colonial possessions.  
Let us now turn our attention to the humanitarian ideology of the “civilization 
mission” that was used to justify their expansion in Africa and Asia. Both conquerors 
propagandized their duty to develop and raise the intellectual level and living 
conditions of their new subjects. Based on Social Darwinism and paternalistic racism 
they treated the “barbarians” as politically immature and culturally savage who were in 
need of a western style modernization. Roads, schools and hospitals were proofs of the 
colonizers benevolent rule. Even until this day some scholars, sympathetic to Italy’s 
past colonial rule, justify it by asserting that their nation administered its overseas 
positions in a subtler and more benevolent manner compared to the other powers. 
Although this claim is unfounded, Italy’s alleged aversion to despotic and military rule 
made the myth, as Angelo Del Boca described it, appear plausible to some. In reality as 
Del Boca illustrated in his book Italiani brava gente? Un mito duro a morire, Italian 
colonial domination was as harsh and arbitrary as any other type of colonial rule. In 
Africa, Rome evoked its Christian and humanitarian tradition in colonizing backward 
races; missionaries spread the gospel and the superior Italian culture. It was in Africa 
where the Italian liberal state, until recently the “usurper”, and the Vatican made finally 
peace and collaborated to expand their influence and interests. The Japanese colonial 
administrators on their part, in absence of an instrument as influential as the Christian 
evangelic missions, had to downplay the importance of religion. Although their cultural 
superiority was undisputed they sought to find common traits in order to bring the 
colonizers and the colonized closer. Pan-Asianism rhetoric, the doctrine that exalted the 
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common racial and cultural features of the East Asian nations, was stressed by Tōkyō 
in Taiwan and later in Korea to present its rule as superior.90 In this sense Japan’s 
colonialism is regional, peripheral and unique; kinship between the master race and the 
lesser ones within the empire never existed in western overseas colonialism. This 
affinity made the theory of assimilation appear feasible. In any case, the Italians and 
Japanese shared the need to project their rule to domestic and international audiences as 
distinct and benevolent in contrast to western oppression. Domestically both societies 
were subjected and partially hypnotized by the official nationalistic propaganda. It was 
a way to divert them from the problems at home such as the infringement on civil rights 
and economic difficulties. Memorial services, military marches, monuments, poems, 
public gatherings, eulogies for the dead that fought against barbarian obscurantism 
were all used to promote the idea of empire. For example, the moving legends of 
Colonel De Cristoforis’ (1887) and Sergeant Sakurai’s (1895) desperate fight to the end 
against superior forces were glorified as acts of patriotism, selflessness and courage in 
both countries.  
 
Both nations in the 19th century were lacking colonial experience. The 
governments in a state of constant confusion did not have a concrete policy or direction 
for their first colonies. For decades Rome was unsure on how to exploit Eritrea 
(agricultural-commercial-military colony); in Tōkyō the diet was similarly divided on 
Taiwan’s legal frame (application of the constitution-law 63). After 10 year of 
domination politicians still could not agree on how to call Taiwan. As until recently 
they had been apprehensive themselves about encroachment from the West and willing 
to disassociate Japan’s benevolent rule from European colonial oppression many of 
them did not use the term colony to describe Taiwan. Early Japan and Italy were in dire 
need of modernization, economic reorganization and domestic development. Many at 
home argued that the domination over foreign territories was an unnecessary luxury for 
the state finances. When colonial administration proved to be a burden rather than a 
profit and the bodies of colonial troops started piling up they urged their governments 
to sell or abandon their first colonies. When Eritrea and Taiwan were pacified and 
made, if not profitable, less burdensome under the administration of Ferdinando 
Martini and Gotō Shinpei respectively in the eve of the 20th century these voices were 
silenced. Back in the last quarter of the 19th century certain parts of the early Italian 
and Japan societies were opposing imperialism but on different grounds. For example, 
Italian socialists and others, influenced by Italy’s ultimately triumphant struggle for 
independence, saw London’s campaign against Egypt (1882) as an infringement on the 
principle of self-determination. In Tōkyō it was not the ideas of liberty that gave rise to 
a popular sentiment of solidarity and sympathy to Orabi Pasha’s movement rather than 
the fact that early Japan, under the semi-colonial system of the unequal treaties, could 
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suffer the same fate as Egypt; 91  economic subjugation to European interests and 
military interventions went hand in hand.  
The author’s belief is that the driving force behind Japan’s and Italy’s early 
tendency towards expansion was psychological, latent, and mental rather than precisely 
assessed geostrategic considerations. It was anxiety; their ruling elites’ partially 
justifiable psychological insecurity, their feeling of vulnerability, their siege mentality. 
Military feebleness, humiliations, political sidelining, centuries of political 
fragmentation were well imprinted in their psych. The enlightened Italian and Japanese 
policy makers had to make the experiment of their newborn nation states work at any 
cost. So their genuine concern and main stimulus was to safeguard their survival rather 
than to expand their power base or seek strategic outposts. Colonies could act as buffer 
zones to protect the homeland. Semi-colonized Japan was arguably the target of 
western economic penetration and aggression. Early Italy too had reasons to feel that its 
unification after the nation’s great sacrifices was in danger having to deal with the 
stressing Vatican problem which was fueled for decades by the catholic powers, and 
bordering hostile and menacing neighbours. Both nations patiently ceded, collaborated, 
even served the interests of others since direct confrontation or standing up for their 
interests every time an international crisis arose was unthinkable. More time was 
needed; modernization and military buildup were the priorities of these states until the 
redeeming moment came when they could finally carry out their own dynamic and 
reactionary foreign policies. Decades after Italy’s and Japan’s unification when the 
danger of foreign encroachment was diminished both ruling elites irrationally 
harboured the same defensive ideas of the underprivileged latecomer, the Darwinian 
struggle for survival and the demand for a fair compensation, a place in the sun. Policy 
makers in 19th century Germany were obsessed with their nation’s strategic security 
too, as it was a newborn state among potentially hostile empires. However, 
Bismarckian diplomacy and the nation’s industrial and military capacity rapidly made 
Berlin the arbiter of the international system not its stooge. Besides Germany, the 
latecomers did not have the means to make their voices heard. They had to consolidate 
their still fragile independence and promote their national interests in another indirect 
way.  
Another incentive towards overseas expansion was the quest for diplomatic 
recognition. Numerous affirmations about the strength of the army, the benevolent 
mission, the better colonial administration, the nations’ ancient glory and about 
courage, heroism and entrepreneurial spirit attest to the fact that leadership and 
common people (merchants, soldiers, journalists) alike were obsessed with raising their 
nation’s prestige. Imperialism, as a requirement for a modern developed state and a 
trend among the powers of the time conferred prestige; it was an instrument to 
guarantee the latecomers’ admission to the illustrious private club of the Great Powers. 
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Imitation was the quickest path to prominence. Japan, in racial and political terms, was 
seen as a backward almost barbarian nation by the westerners and was treated similarly. 
Its modernization and recognition as sovereign state was arguably more challenging 
than early Italy’s. The Italians enjoyed international appreciation due to the legacy of 
the Roman Empire, the Papacy and the Renaissance. However, the new born Italian 
state was not taken seriously by the Great Powers, its interests were marginalized and 
its immigrants abroad were maltreated like the Japanese and Chinese in America. The 
decision to improve their standing hastily directed them towards imperialism, 
opportunism, aggression and the mismanagement of their first colonies. As soon as 
they formed their new states they both carelessly embarked on expansionist schemes. 
The immature early Japanese and Italian diplomacy rapidly espoused the notions and 
practices of imperialism as implemented by the most advanced nations of the west. 
Their politicians learnt that colonialism and military dominance were indicators of 
modern civilization. “If one impartially compares our country with European countries, 
we are…abreast of Italy” exclaimed the Japanese periodical Kokumin no Tomo in 
1891.92 
This is why despite the need of reorganization and the lacking means Meiji 
Japan seriously considered attacking Korea (1873) and finally sought to colonize 
Taiwan (1874) whereas Italy, disguised behind a private company occupied an African 
village called Assab (1869) and organized a series of exploration missions in search of 
a colony in Africa and the Pacific. Later, even as officially recognized colonial powers, 
humiliating incidents continued to embarrass Rome and Tōkyō. For example both 
nations were probably the only ones to have their demands upon a weakened and 
demoralized China rejected. While the Great Powers were "carving up the Chinese 
melon" the Italian claims on San Mun, backed up by an ultimatum, were rebuffed twice 
(1899). Similarly when Tōkyō demanded railway rights in Fukien (1900), in the same 
way that the Germans extracted railway rights in Shandong, the answer was negative. 
Collaborating, pleasing and imitating the Great Powers in search of prestige spurred 
these second-rate states to dispatch their troops in Beijing to quell the Boxer Rebellion 
(1899-1901). The campaign marks a point of convergence in the same time and place 
of the two phenomena. Rome had few citizens and negligible commercial interests in 
China; Tōkyō having re-approached Beijing after the Sino-Japanese war and unwilling 
to witness the dismemberment of the neighbouring empire in the hands of the West was 
unwilling to participate. However, both joined the Great Powers only to prove that they 
were no longer puppets or lesser actors in the international system. In Beijing they 
projected the image of equal, potent and modern states whose interests and voice had to 
finally be respected by everyone.  
Thus, the principal aim of the early Italian and Japanese colonialism was to 
increase their prestige. Prestige at the time was synonym of Great Power status and 
therefore security. Τhe international system of the 19th century was carved into two 
categories: the potent centre, that had the right to exist, expand, civilize, rule, and 
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decide the fate of lesser states and the periphery which had no voice and could be 
penetrated, subjugated eradicated at the centre’s will. Possession of colonies and 
militarism were part of the modernization process, as was the creation of railroads and 
battleships, adopted by the latecomers to join the international strategic-economic 
contest as equal members and to impress the powers. Colonialism for Rome and Tōkyō 
was not only their ticket to a higher standing but to safety as well. A nation that 
possessed colonies and proved able to subdue barbarians was arguably part of the 
world’s elite as it was demonstrating the virtues of the great nations by efficiently 
administrating and developing backward regions. Being part of the international system 
as one of the world’s prominent state was the ultimate goal of the Italian and Japanese 
governments. The principle of the balance of power, as embraced by the major 
European states after the Congress of Vienna, guaranteed peace and safety for the Great 
Powers. That meant that although African, Asian or secondary European nations could 
be colonized and absorbed, the system’s arbiters were beyond reproach. Of course, 
wars between potent states could erupt but the total annihilation of one by another was 
politically and practically inconceivable in the 19th century. As it has been already 
mentioned, the first colonies did not complement Italy’s and Japan’s respective 
strategic security. Indirectly though, Eritrea’s and Taiwan’s possession conferred a 
sense of parity, acceptance and safety. Peer recognition meant that Rome and Tōkyō, 
were equals and thus not possible targets of European aggression. Eritrea was one of 
the poorest regions of Africa. Taiwan was rich in national resources but the island’s 
tropical conditions and hostile population obliged the Japanese to invest heavily in 
money and to lose many men. Despite these predicaments, Italy and Japan 
opportunistically expanded the moment they found the chance. They did it without 
reservations; the colonies’ value and administration were only secondary issues. They 
just needed the titles of property.  
The Italian and Meiji governments imitating the imperial powers chose to 
participate in the race for territorial concessions. Military limitations, economic strains 
and dissident voices, mainly in Italy, meant that if the ruling classes wanted to 
implement a programme of territorial expansion they had to do it discreetly. Fearful of 
western opposition the Italian government dispatched its troops to occupy Massaua 
(1885) in secrecy. Rome acquired its very first overseas territory, Assab hidden behind 
the Rubattino Shipping Company. The same company was also used by the state to 
interfere with the French plans in Tunisia (1880) and to transport Italian troops in 
Africa. In the same manner the Meiji government sponsored the Mitsubishi firm and 
made it practically an official state instrument. Mitsubishi ships were used during the 
first Japanese expedition in Taiwan (1874), which was supposed to be undercover, and 
during the Satsuma Rebellion (1877). In order to confront foreign maritime competition 
in their waters and to implement their expansionistic policies both governments decided 
to support a private company. Their similar precarious financial state meant that 
subsidies and support were available for only one firm.  
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Late 19th century Italy and Japan encountered the opposition of two vast but 
politically and militarily decadent empires opposing their territorial aspirations. Rome 
almost immediately after its unification set its sights on Tunisia, Libya (Cyrenaica) and 
the African coast of the Red Sea, all of them under the nominal suzerainty of the 
Ottoman sultan while the East African interior belonged in principal to the Ethiopian 
emperor. Tōkyō on the other hand, clashed with Qing China that did not have a modern 
perception of sovereignty, over the Ryūkyūs, Taiwan and Korea. Japan and Italy as 
modern nation states espoused international law and European practices whereas the 
Ottoman Empire, Ethiopia and China were still employing an obsolete legal perception 
of ownership. The principle of effective occupation, as defined at the Berlin Conference 
(1884-1885), was adopted by the colonizing states to formalize the rules of the 
imperialistic scramble. In accordance with this principle Rome and Tōkyō claimed that 
the empires standing in their way were unable to secure “peace and security” in the 
above cited territories and thus they had the right to claim them. The adherence to the 
old perceptions of sovereignty by the Ottomans, the Ethiopians and the Chinese 
explains the lengthy diplomatic controversy over the possession of Assab and Taiwan.  
This political backwardness coupled with the obvious disorganization and 
military feebleness in combination with western contempt and racial prejudices made 
these empires appear as easy prey to the Italians and Japanese. The establishment of the 
first colonies was not a product of meticulous and coordinated planning. Italian Eritrea 
and Japanese Taiwan were created incidentally; Rome after humiliations and failures to 
capture any region in North Africa found diplomatic support from London and 
“vacant” areas in East Africa. Japan on the other hand, unable to secure Korea or 
Liadong after its victory over China (1895), demanded any Chinese territory to satisfy 
the militaristic and expansionist circles at home. The magnitude of Japan’s triumph 
convinced the ruling elites that besides a large indemnity, the nation’s territorial 
enlargement was attainable. However, lack of administrative preparedness and the 
immediate resort to the unsophisticated military rule proved that Rome’s and Tōkyō’s 
presence in East Africa and Taiwan was circumstantial. Someone can argue that the 
latecomers’ imperial expansion was both preemptive and reactionary to the powers’ 
colonialism.  
What is certain is that soon after the colonization of Eritrea (1890) and Taiwan 
(1895) Italy and Japan sought to further expand.93 Both nations did not simply annex 
                                                          
93 Italy and Japan were finally colonial powers. Therefore, they had to safeguard their possessions and 
even expand them. In an 1886 parliamentary session Prime Minister Crispi stressed: “We have been at 
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claimed that the campaign against the aborigines offered experience and training to Tōkyō’s armed 
forces.  
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these colonies but engaged in bloody warfare to consolidate their presence. The Italians 
the day after Massaua’s capture, easily defeated the local tribes, incorporated their 
regions and pushed towards the interior until the clamorous collapse of 1896. From the 
beginning of their presence in Africa, they had been going after the big prize, Ethiopia. 
Easy victories increased the enthusiasm and appetite of the expansionists. Militarism 
and expansion became more attractive after the colonization of Eritrea and Somalia 
(1889); in the 1890s Ethiopia was surrounded, blockaded and gradually wore down by 
Rome’s machinations. The grandiose aspiration of subjugating the whole of East Africa 
was unthinkable in the 1870s when Italy possessed the negligible colonial possession of 
Assab. To that end, Eritrea became a “military colony”.94 The Japanese had to fight 
almost immediately after establishing their presence in their first colony as well: 
initially against the Republic of Taiwan, later against the insurgents, and until 1915 
against the island’s indigenous population. It was from the new colony that the 
Japanese sought to expand commercially and politically in Southern China. The city of 
Amoy, opposite to Taiwan, was targeted first and was captured briefly (1900) before 
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops in the face of foreign protests. Acquiring Taiwan 
and later Korea seemed to complete the strategy of China’s encirclement. Therefore, we 
can comprehend that the function and purpose of Japan’s and Italy’s first colonies was 
to serve as a bridgehead for further expansion against China and Ethiopia respectively. 
It was atavism as Schumpeter put it; conquest, aggression, effortless and predatory 
grabbing of foreign resources and lands. Taiwan and Eritrea acquired previously for 
reasons connected to international diplomacy and prestige were soon after 
administrated as army camps and were transformed into advanced bases for the 
military. 
Let us now examine the similarities of these nations’ early colonial rule. The 
lack of funds as a result of the two countries’ immature capitalism was evident at home 
and in their first colonies as well. During the first years of colonial rule investments 
were scant, private interest inexistent, and the authorities, having more urgent priorities, 
neglected the local populations. Rome’s subsidies were inadequate to transform Eritrea 
into a productive and hospitable area for Italian colonizers as Deputy Leopoldo 
Franchetti had envisioned. Similarly, the Japanese government, due to the lack of 
private entrepreneurial spirit, had to invest heavily in Taiwan but as we saw, crucial 
sectors such as colonial administration and public education suffered from the lack of 
capital. In both cases roads, hospitals and post offices were manufactured in accordance 
with the model of the modernizing and benevolent central state intervention. In practice 
these improvements aimed at ensuring the colonialists’ domination for the years to 
come. In any case the colonies were military spearheads. Economically they were to be 
exploited as bases for agricultural foodstuff; huge industrial and infrastructural 
investments were not initially encouraged. While the dominant states put forward a 
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plan of industrialization and economic development at home their first colonies were to 
remain underdeveloped. Nevertheless the colonies were a burden for state finances. 
During the first years at least, colonial administration was draining the national 
treasuries while the colonies’ trade deficit was a constant source of anxiety for the 
colonial policy makers. It is not a coincidence that colonialism scholars used almost the 
same terms to describe Japan’s and Italy’s early colonial endeavours. The esteemed 
historian Francesco Surdich accurately referred to the Italian imperialism as the 
“l'imperialismo straccione” (beggars’ imperialism) whereas the Japanese historian 
Takahashi Kamekichi characterized Tōkyō’s expansion as “petty imperialism” in 
Marxist terms, as has been already mentioned.95  
Obviously, a highly trained and skilled colonial bureaucracy was absent in 
nations without any experience in overseas ruling. Initially Eritrea and Taiwan were 
suffering from corruption, abuses and arbitrary rule that embarrassed Japan and Italy 
internationally. It was not until the governors Martini and Gotō took office in Eritrea 
and Taiwan respectively that a scientific, modern and beneficial policy of studying the 
customs of the colonized was more or less adopted. The local elites were taken in 
consideration in order to facilitate colonial rule. On some occasions in Italian Eritrea, 
religious leaders and nobility administrated justice in the name of Italy through local 
courts. Accordingly, in Taiwan some locals held positions in the administration and 
collaborated closely with the occupation forces. The act of religious freedom and civil 
laws for Assab (1882), as long as they were "compatible with the Italian legislation and 
civilization" passed by the Italian parliament is reminiscent of Gotō’s policy of 
surveying and maintaining local customs in Taiwan (1901). As already seen, Tōkyō 
eventually chose not to enforce metropolitan laws to Taiwan despite its proclamation 
for equal treatment and cultural assimilation. In the Italian case although the rights of 
the indigenous were naturally encroached upon, the legal codes of the metropolis were 
applied to the possessions. At least in theory the metropolis’ laws were uniformly 
enforced with some revisions. However, in Eritrea much like in Taiwan different 
legislation was applicable for the indigenous and foreign population; the locals initially 
were subject to the ancestral customary law. In both cases the national parliaments 
were kept in the dark and were bypassed by the colonial authorities and military circles. 
Taiwan’s legislation was shaped in Taihoku not in the diet according to the famous law 
no. 69 (1896). Similarly to Taiwan’s unpreparedness to be incorporated and 
administrated as part of the Japanese mainland, Eritrea too was considered a colonial 
and not a national territory by Prime Minister Crispi. Using this stratagem Crispi did 
not bring Eritrea’s inaugural law to the parliament for debate (1890).  
In order to rapidly achieve their goal, project their possessions as pacified, 
profitable and developed for reasons of prestige, the early colonial authorities 
marginalized any kind of civil administration. Immediate results could be achieved by 
utilizing strict military rule and terror. The Japanese and Italian urgency to appear as 
equal and successful colonizers explains their eagerness to silence any opposition at 
                                                          
95 Hoston, “Marxism and Japanese Expansionism”, p. 11.  
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home and in their first colonies. In both cases we detect the prevalence of the military 
authority over civilian rule. Eritrea and Taiwan after their acquisition were destined to 
become military bases where civil rights and dissident voices had no place. In fact these 
colonies were in constant state of war, under martial law, administered always by 
generals and admirals and serving the military’s purposes and interests. Governors in 
both cases pledged their loyalty to the military, almost ignoring the national 
parliaments. For the military officers serving in the colonies the politicians from their 
comfortable seats of their assemblies in Rome and Tōkyō, utterly ignorant about the 
warlike conditions of these distant places, were not suitable to enact laws for Eritrea 
and Taiwan or administer them.  Lacking the funds to set up an efficient judicial system 
Taiwan’s courts were initially entrusted to army officials. Special “temporary” courts 
were immediately organized (1895) not to provide a fair trial to any Taiwanese 
insurgent but to punish them as criminals. Taihoku unsupervised and in haste, put to 
death and deported thousands of native troublemakers. The Italian military tribunals 
were also extremely harsh: execution, imprisonment, penal sentences, fines, flogging 
and deportation were the most common verdicts during the first phase of Rome’s 
domination. 
Both colonies’ administration was authoritarian and the governors ruled them 
despotically and virtually unrestrained as their personal fiefs. The royal act of 1891 
gave excessive powers to Eritrea’s governors and rendered them directly accountable 
only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the governors had full 
administrative, juridical, political and military authority; they issued laws, established 
courts and imposed new taxes almost arbitrarily. Japanese legislation (1895-1897) gave 
to Taiwan’s governor-generals’ considerable authority too. They had the right to 
summon the military forces of the colony, to deport any dissidents, to establish courts 
and so on. The never-ending state of war in the first colonies provided the governors 
and thus the military with “urgent” and enlarged powers for years. During these periods 
lawlessness, oppressive and abusive police action, coupled with human rights 
violations, scandals, mismanagement, confusion and even mass murders systematically 
took place but were covered up to avoid international condemnation. In Taiwan any 
interference by civilians in the colony’s military establishment, such as the one made 
by Judge Takenori Takano, was bluntly brushed aside (1897). Takano’s criticism about 
the army using excessive force, extorting money and intimidating civilians was 
suppressed by the colonial authorities. Spending the limited available funds on the 
colony’s police and armed forces instead of on the education of the colonial subjects 
prompted the first Chief of the Education Bureau, Isawa Shūji to resign in protest 
(1898). The island became a miniature police state as the result of the intensification of 
the hokō system (1898), brimming with prisons; the army and the police enjoyed great 
authority and manned the colonial administration en masse. One of the most heinous 
acts was the mass murder of 275 surrendered ex brigands (1902) organised by the 
higher echelons of the colonial administration in their effort to “pacify” the locals. 
Moreover entire villages were set on fire and many Taiwanese, innocent or not, were 
murdered instantly by the occupation forces or sentenced to death as “brigands” after 
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hasty and inept military tribunals. In practise awe and fear was employed in contrast to 
the rhetoric of the benevolent civilizing mission. On one occasion more than 4,000 
houses were burned to the ground in Yunlin (1896); the islands’ aboriginal inhabitants 
also got to know Tōkyō’s colonial brutality first by being under siege by a restrictive 
and armed guard line and in the 20th century by being the direct targets of the Japanese 
army’s purges. In Eritrea it was the African tribes that suffered by the irresponsible and 
overweening rule of the army. The Italians immediately after the occupation of 
Massaua (1885) organized campaigns in the interior and clashed with the local tribes 
initiating a period of turmoil and bloodshed. Military brutality in order to silence the 
local opposition was employed by the two latecomers.96 The best example of the civil 
element’s subordination to the rule of the army is Franchetti’s case. Leopoldo 
Franchetti’s well intended project of ensuring a fairer land reapportionment which 
would be beneficial for Italians and Africans alike, was rejected by governors Gandolfi 
and Baratieri that were unwilling to see their absolute authority compromised by a mere 
Deputy of the national parliament (1895). When Ferdinando Martini assumed the 
colony’s administration (1897) as the Eritrea’s first civil governor, he lamented the 
heavy expenditure on huge barracks and army supplies when in the same time basic 
infrastructure was still lacking. The claims about subtler, more humane rule and the 
spread of Italian culture in Africa were effortlessly discredited by the Livraghi-
Cagnassi scandal (1891). These colonial officials murdered hundreds of natives with 
the administration’s backing (governors Orero and Baldissera) and avoided capture. In 
the Italian prison of Nocra, which operated from 1887 to 1941, unruly elements, 
political prisoners and Ethiopian patriots were detained under horrible conditions; 
many of them succumbed to hunger and diseases.  
Being transferred from the mainland to these colonies seemed like a relegation 
for the Italian and Japanese servicemen. Those few that voluntarily settled in early 
Eritrea and Taiwan were looked down upon by their fellow nationals back home. 
Indeed, many of them were mere opportunists in search of easy money and adventure. 
Measures were taken by Gotō and Martini to restrict the intake of lawless and 
unproductive immigrants that would lower the rulers’ prestige in the colonies. A large 
part of the Italian and Japanese society was indifferent to their states’ colonial 
undertaking. Colonialism was a secondary, distant issue, a leverage and a means to put 
pressure upon the government for those that did not embrace the imperial rhetoric: in 
Rome the assemblies formed in the aftermath of the Dogali defeat (1887) protested 
against the government’s domestic, foreign and religious policies; in Tōkyō, advocates 
of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement demanded democratic reform by 
criticizing their government’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, despite their similar stance 
and struggle for popular rights the socialists in both parliaments were too fragmented 
and weak to impede the colonial frenzy. 
                                                          
96 Ken Ishida, “Il problema dei crimini di querra in Giappone e in Italia. Tre punti di vista comparati” 
in Memoria e Rimozione: i crimini di Guerra del Giappone e dell’Italia, ed. G. Contini, F. Focardi, M. 
Petricioli, (Rome 2010), p. 19. 
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Another common element was the use of fraud and deceit by the Italians and 
Japanese in their quest for recognition. Rome’s envoy Pietro Antonelli tricked the 
Emperor of Ethiopia into signing a document that surrendered his country’s sovereignty 
to the Italian king (1889). In a similarly deceitful manner the statesman Soejima 
Taneomi declared without any proof after returning from his diplomatic mission to 
China that Beijing had agreed to allow a Japanese expeditional force in its territory of 
Taiwan (1873). As any colonial expansion, Japan’s and Italy’s had a disruptive and 
destructive impact to the economic and social development of the colonized. The 
Italian presence in East Africa created new boundaries and identities to serve Rome’s 
interests. This policy, like elsewhere in colonized Asia and Africa, fabricated false 
identities and divided or turned against each other entire ethnic groups. The bloody 
Eritrea-Ethiopia war of 1998-2000 erupted because of ongoing disputes about the 
border of these states, a demarcation undertaken by the Italian colonizers. In the same 
way the Japanese administrators shaped a new, distinct island identity that to this day is 
a source of tension, animosity and political crisis between China and Taiwan.97 
The great difference between the two expansionist phenomena is that Japan’s 
first colonization effort is widely considered successful in 19th century imperialistic 
terms. Typical Japanese efficiency, exhaustive control, attention to detail and in depth 
social and economic policies through myriads of bureaus that penetrated almost every 
aspect of the colony’s daily life was in total contrast to Rome’s disorganization and 
near neglect of its colonial possessions. Furthermore, Tōkyō crushed China, subdued 
the rebels in Taiwan, and defeated Russia a major power (1905). On the other hand, the 
Italians, despite belonging to the supposedly “white superior race”, were humiliated in 
the hands of a barbarian nation (1896). Adwa just like the Triple Intervention left deep 
scars. It should be noted that Ethiopia’s and Japan’s victories over western opponents 
gave hope to the oppressed and subjugated nations of the world.98 They were third 
world countries providing an example to other “inferior” nations, whereas beaten and 
humbled Rome was considered part of the culturally superior imperialistic West. Italy 
and Japan were not equal to begin with despite their similar economic and social 
conditions in 1870s-1890s and their struggle to raise their status to first rate powers. 
First and foremost, Italy was a European nation-state. As such, Rome enjoyed 
extraterritoriality in the semi-colonized Japan as other European nations had until 1894; 
early modern Japan appeared to western eyes more as a primitive inferior race rather 
than a potential peer. In this way Japan’s adoption of western imperialistic schemes and 
its early colonialism are unique developments, incomparable to the expansion of any 
other state.  
In any case, it is obvious that the one case that bears a resemblance to the 
Japanese colonialism is that of the equivalent Italian undertaking; due to their common 
economic weakness both Italy and Japan are deemed by the scholars as “anomalies”. 
                                                          
97 Ching, “Becoming ‘Japanese’", p. 37. 
98 J. Calvitt Clarke III, Alliance of the Colored Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan before World War II, 
(Oxford, 2011), p. 2.  
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Two factors made Tōkyō’s bid for colonies even more eccentric: Japanese racial and 
cultural affiliation to its imperial subjects and the nation’s definition as uncivilized by 
the West that made it appear as a possible target of European aggression along with the 
other inferior Asian and African nations. For this reason the Japanese in their first 
colony did everything they could to project their cultural superiority and modernity in 
contrast to the Taiwanese backwardness. Western style architecture, western uniforms 
and western tactics of enhancing imperial prestige and commanding awe were 
employed to distinguish the position of the rulers from the ruled. The Italians acted 
similarly not only because they also imitated foreign colonial patterns but because these 
traits were part of their own cultural heritage.   
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integration in the Japanese colonial empire], Tōkyō 1996. 
 
Korhonen Pekka, “Leaving Asia? The Meaning of Datsu-A and Japan’s 
Modern History” in The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11, Issue 50, No. 1, December 
2013, pp. 1-19. 
 
Ku Minseon, Bringing “Korea” back into Sino‐Japanese War of 1894‐1895: 
Qing‐Joseon Relations Before and During the Sino‐Japanese War, Seoul 2015. 
 
Kublin Hyman, "Taiwan's Japanese Interlude, 1895-1945," in Taiwan in 
Modern Times, edited by Paul K. Sih, New York 1973, pp. 312-358.  
 
Kublin Hyman, "The "Modern" Army of Early Meiji Japan" in The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 November, 1949, pp. 20-41. 
 
Kublin Hyman, “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands: A Reexamination” in 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 43, No. 1 March 1953, pp. 
27-46. 
 
Kublin Hyman, “The Ogasawara Venture (1861-1863)” in Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, Vol. 14, No. ½, June 1951, pp. 261-284.  
 
Kuno S. Yoshi, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent. A Study in the 
History of Japan with Special Reference to Her International Relations with China, 
Korea, and Russia, Vol. 1, Berkeley, 1937. 
 
Kuno S. Yoshi, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent. A Study in the 
History of Japan with Special Reference to Her International Relations with China, 
Korea, and Russia, Vol. 2, Berkeley, 1940. 
548 
 
 
Kuroda Ken'ichi, Nihon shokumin shisōshi, [History of Japanese colonial 
thought], Tokyo, 1942. 
 
Lamley Harry Jerome, "A Short-lived Republic and War, 1895: Taiwan's 
Resistance against Japan" in Taiwan in Modern Times, edited by Paul K. T. Sih, New 
York, 1973, pp. 241-316. 
 
Lamley Harry Jerome, “Taiwan under Japanese rule, 1895-1945, The 
Vicissitudes of Colonialism” in Taiwan: A New History, edited by Murray A. 
Rubinstein, New York-London, 2007, pp. 201-260.  
 
Lamley Harry Jerome, The Taiwan literati and early Japanese rule, 1895-
1915: a study of their reaction to the Japanese occupation and subsequent responses 
to colonial rule and modernization, Doctoral Thesis, University of Washington, 1964. 
 
Langer William L., La diplomazia dell'imperialismo (1890-1902), vol. 1, 
Milan, 1942. 
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[Japanese rule and bureaucracy in Korea and Taiwan], Kyoto 2009. 
 
Yamamoto Yūzō, Nihon shokuminchi keizaishi kenkyū, [An economic study of 
Japan’s colonies], Nagoya 1942. 
 
Yamamura Kozo, "Success Ill-gotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan's 
Technological Progress", in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 37. No. 1 The 
Tasks of Economic History, March 1977, pp. 113-135. 
 
Yamamura Kozo, “The Founding of Mitsubishi: A Case Study of Japanese 
Business History” in The Economic Development of Modern Japan, 1868-1945: From 
the Meiji Restoration to the Second World War, vol. 1, edited by S. Toliday, 
Cheltenham, 2001, pp. 343-362. 
 
Yanaga Chitoshi, "The Military and Government in Japan" in The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 35, No. 3 Jun., 1941, pp. 528-539 
 
Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan since Perry, New York, London, 1949. 
 
Yazuro Horie, "The Economic Significance of the Meiji Restoration", in 
Kyoto University Economic Review, vol. 12, n. 2 December 1937, pp. 63-81. 
 
Yeh Shu-jen, Economic growth and farm economy in colonial Taiwan, 1895-
1945, Ph.D Dissertation University of Pittsburgh 1991. 
 
Yōichi Komori, “Rule in the Name of “Protection”: The Vocabulary of 
Colonialism” in Reading Colonial Japan: Text, Context, and Critique, edited by 
Helen Lee and Michele Mason, Stanford, 2012, pp. 60-75. 
 
Yoshida Ryo, “Japanese Immigrants and Their Christian Communities in 
North America: A Case Study of the Fukuinkai, 1877-1896” in Japanese Journal of 
Religious Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1, Christians in Japan, 2007, pp. 229- 244. 
 
Yoshikawa Yukie, Japan’s Asianism, 1868-1945, Dilemmas of Japanese 
Modernization, Washington D.C., 2009. 
 
Zachmann Urs Matthias, China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China 
Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1895-1904, London-New 
York 2009. 
 
564 
 
Zachmann Urs Matthias, “Imperialism in a Nutshell: Conflict and the 'Concert 
of Powers' in the Tripartite Intervention, 1895”, Japanstudien, Vol. 17, 2005, pp. 57-
82. 
 
Zagarola Marco, Taiwan-Formosa: Da Shimonoseki alla fine del Secondo 
Conflitto Mondiale, 1895-1945, vol. 1, PhD Dissertation, Sapienza University of 
Rome 1991 
 
Zagarola Marco, Taiwan-Formosa: Da Shimonoseki alla fine del Secondo 
Conflitto Mondiale, 1895-1945, vol. 2, Ph.D Dissertation, Sapienza University of 
Rome 1991. 
 
Zanier Claudio, Accumulazione e Sviluppo Economico in Giappone dalla Fine 
del XVI  alla Fine del XIX secolo, Turin, 1975. 
 
Unpublished sources  
SOAS Presbyterian Church of England Foreign Missions Committee Archive, 
series IV: Formosa Print Periodicals, box 7B, file 4, “Summary of the Administration 
in Taiwan (Formosa)”, Japanese Government, 1909. 
 
SOAS PCE-FMC series IV: Formosa Print Periodicals, box 7B, file 4, 
“Schools Department of Educational Affairs of the Government-General of Formosa, 
Japan ‘A Review of Educational Work in Formosa’”, 1916. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Abramson Gunnar, "Comparative Colonialisms: Variations in Japanese 
Colonial Policy in Taiwan and Korea, 1895 ‐ 1945," in PSU McNair Scholars Online 
Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 5 2004, pp. 11-37. 
 
Afflerbach Holger, "«Duo quum faciunt idem...» Militärische Aspekte der 
deutschen und italienischen Kolonialgeschichte vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg" in Annali 
dell'Istituto Storico Italo-Germanico, vol. 24, Trento, 1998, pp. 115-146. 
 
Aquarone Alberto, “La ricerca di una politica coloniale dopo Adua. Speranze 
e delusioni fra politica ed economia” in Publications de l'École française de Rome, 
no. 1, Vol. 54, 1981, pp. 295-327. 
 
565 
 
Asai Yoshio, “Aspetti comparati su alcune caratteristiche della rivoluzione 
industriale in Giappone ed in Italia” in Lo stato liberale italiano e l'età Meiji, 1st Italo-
Japanese Conference of Historical Studies, Rome 23-27 September 1985, pp. 219-
237. 
 
Aviles Andres, Impacts of Japanese Colonialism on State and Economic 
Development in Korea and Taiwan, and Its Implications for Democracy, Masters 
Dissertation, University of Florida, 2009.  
Ben-Ghiat Ruth and Fuller Mia, "Introduction" in Italian colonialism, edited 
by Mia Fuller, Ruth Ben-Ghiat, New York, 2005, pp. 1-12. 
 
Black Cyril, The Modernization of Japan and Russia: A Comparative Study 
(Perspectives on modernization), New York 1975. 
 
Bradshaw Richard Albert, Japan and European colonialism in Africa, 1800-
1937, Ph.D Dissertation, Ohio University, 1992. 
Chang Hui Ju, Victorian Japan in Taiwan Transmission and Impact of the 
‘Modern’ upon the Architecture of Japanese Authority, 1853-1919, Ph.D Dissertation, 
University of Sheffield, December 2014.   
 
Ching Leo Tsu-Shin, “Becoming ‘Japanese’ Colonial Taiwan and the Politics 
of Identity Formation”, Berkeley London 2001. 
Ching Leo Tsu-Shin, Tracing contradictions: Interrogating Japanese 
colonialism and its discourse, Ph.D Dissertation, University of California, 1994. 
 
Choi Jung-Bong, “Mapping Japanese Imperialism onto Postcolonial 
Criticism” in Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 9:3, 2003, pp. 
325-339. 
Clarke J. Calvitt III, Alliance of the Colored Peoples: Ethiopia and Japan 
before World War II, Oxford, 2011.  
 
Cole M. Simon, "Secret diplomacy and the cyrenaican settlement of 1917", 
The Journal of Italian history, 2/2, 1979, pp. 258-280. 
Cross Sherrie, "Prestige and Comfort: The development of Social Darwinism 
in early Meiji Japan, and the role of Edward Sylvester Morse" in Annals of Science, 
Vol. 53 (4), pp. 323-344. 
 
De Martino Giacomo, Tripoli, Cirene e Cartagine, Bologna, 1907. 
 
566 
 
Del Boca Angelo, "Myths, suppressions, denials, defaults," in A place in the 
sun, Africa in Italian colonial culture from post-unification to the present, edited by 
Patricia Palumbo, (London-Los Angeles-Berkeley, 2003), p. 17-36. 
 
Edward Howard House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, Tokyo, 1875. 
 
Fidel Camille, Les colonies italiennes, Le vie technique et industrielle, Paris, 
1927. 
 
Finaldi Giuseppe, "Adowa and the historiography of Italian colonialism", 
Modern Italy, 2/1, 1997, pp. 90-98. 
 
Fletcher Roger, "Revisionism and Wilhelmine Imperialism", Journal of 
Contemporary History, n. 23/3, July 1988, pp. 347-366. 
 
Forbes Ian L. D., "Social Imperialism and Wilhelmine Germany", The 
Historical Journal, n. 22/2, June 1979, pp. 331-349. 
 
Furuya Daisuke, “A Historiography in Modern Japan: the laborious quest for 
identity” in Scandia: tidskrift för historisk forskning, Vol. 68, No 1, 2002, pp. 121-
137. 
 
Gann L. H., Duignan Peter, The rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914, 
Stanford, 1997. 
 
Ghisalberti Carlo, "Due colonialismi a confronto: Italia e Germania nella loro 
espansione oltremare sino alla prima guerra mondiale", Clio Rivista trimestrale di 
studi storici, 33/2, 1997, pp. 327-344. 
 
Grimmer-Solem Erik, "German Social Science, Meiji Conservatism, and the 
Peculiarities of Japanese History" in Journal of World History, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2005, 
pp. 187-222. 
 
Henderson W. O., Studies in German colonial history, London, 1962. 
 
Hirakawa Sukehiro, Japan's Love-Hate Relationship with the West, Folkestone 
2005. 
Hoston Germaine A., “Marxism and Japanese Expansionism: Takahashi 
Kamekichi and the Theory of ‘Petty Imperialism’” in Journal of Japanese Studies, 
Vol. 10, No. 1 Winter, 1984, pp. 1-30. 
 
Iriye Akira, "Japan's Drive To Great-Power Status", in The Emergence of 
Meiji Japan, edited by Marius B. Jansen, Cambridge 1995, pp. 268-329. 
 
567 
 
Iriye Akira, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status” in The Cambridge History 
of Japan, volume 5, Early Modern Japan, edited by Marius B. Jansen, New York, 
Cambridge 1995, pp. 268-329. 
 
Ishida Ken, “Il problema dei crimini di querra in Giappone e in Italia. Tre 
punti di vista comparati” in Memoria e Rimozione: i crimini di Guerra del Giappone e 
dell’Italia, edited by Giovanni Contini, Filippo Focardi, Marta Petricioli, (Rome 
2010), pp. 19-31. 
 
Kuo Huei-Ying, “Learning from the South: Japan's Racial Construction of 
Southern Chinese, 1895-1941,” in Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: 
Interactions, Nationalism and Gender, edited by Walter Demel and Rotem Kowner, 
Leiden- Boston 2015, pp. 151-177. 
 
Lee Chengpang, “Shadow of the Colonial Power: Kominka and the Failure of 
the Temple Reorganization Campaign” in Studies on Asia, Vol. 2, No.2, October 
2012, pp. 120-144.    
 
Lee Kun, “Political Culture in the "Advocacy of an Expedition to Korea" in 
the 1870S: An Aspect of Japanese Imperialism” in Korea Journal of Population and 
Development, Vol. 23, No 1, July 1994, pp. 97-116. 
Leo Tsu-Shin Ching, Becoming “Japanese” Colonial Taiwan and the Politics 
of Identity Formation, Berkeley London, 2001. 
 
Lowe John, The Great Powers and the German Problem (1865-1925), 
London, 1994. 
 
Martin Bernd, Japan and Germany in the Modern World, Oxford, 1995. 
 
Μalgeri Sofia, Tutinelli Laura, "Il Risorgimento e il Colonialismo: analogie e 
differenze", in Cronache del colonialismo italiano, Il Corno d'Africa, edited by Paolo 
Dieci, Maria Rosaria Notarangeli, Giovanni Pagliarulo, Rome, 1991, pp. 160-180.  
 
Matsuda Toshihiko, “Jo, Sōgo sanshō kei toshite no shokuminchi Chōsen to 
Taiwan” [Introduction, Comparing Colonial Korea and Taiwan as cross-reference] in 
Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon ni okeru shihai to chiki shakai [The rule and the local 
society in the Japanese colonial empire], edited by Toshihiko Matsuda, International 
Research Symposium Kyoto, July 13-16, 2011, pp. 7-13. 
 
Mazzei Franco, "La Risposta Del Giappone Alla Sfida Modernizzante 
dell'Occidente" in 1868 Italia-Giappone: Intrecci Culturali, edited by Rosa Caroli, 
Venice 2008, pp. 115-128. 
 
568 
 
Michels Robert, L’imperialismo Italiano, studi politico-demografici, Milan, 
1914. 
 
Mommsen J. Wolfgang, "Bismarck, the Concert of Europe, and the Future of 
West Africa, 1883-1885", in Bismarck, Europe and Africa. The Berlin Conference 
1884-1885 and the onset of Partition, edited by Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen 
and Ronald Robinson), New York, 1988, pp. 151-170. 
 
Murdoch James, "Japan and Russia" in The North American Review, Vol. 170, 
No. 522, May, 1900, pp. 609-633. 
Naitza Bosco Giovani, Il colonialismo nella storia d’Italia (1882-1949), 
Florence, 1975. 
 
Nish Ian, “Regaining Confidence -Japan after the Loss of Empire” in Journal 
of Contemporary History, Vol. 15, No. 1, Imperial Hangovers, January 1980, pp.181-
195 
 
Oguma Eiji, The Boundaries of 'the Japanese': Volume 2: Korea, Taiwan and 
the Ainu 1868-1945, Baldwyn North 2017. 
Omedeo Angelo, “La colonia Eritrea, condizioni e problemi” in Società 
Italiana per il progresso delle scienze, edited by Angelo Οmodeo, Vittorio Peglion, 
Ghino Valenti, (Rome, 1913), pp. 1-226. 
Onor Romolo, La Somalia Italiana, esame critico dei problemi di economia 
rurale e di politica economica della colonia, Turin, 1925.  
 
Penfield Frederic Courtland, “Japan's Commercial Aspirations” in The North 
American Review, Vol. 181, No. 588, November 1905, pp. 665-675. 
 
Pierson John D., "The Early Liberal Thought of Tokutomi Sohō. Some 
Problems of Western Social Theory in Meiji Japan" in Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 
29, No. 2, Summer, 1974, pp. 199-224.  
 
Poggiolini Ilaria, “Italy and Japan: The Price of Defeat in Post WWII 
International Relations” in Italy and Japan: How Similar Are They? A Comparative 
Analysis of Politics, Economics, and International Relations, edited by  Silvio 
Beretta, Axel Berkofsky, Fabio Rugge, Pavia 2014, pp. 277-294. 
 
Rwei-Ren Wu, The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of 
Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945, VOL. 1, Ph.D Dissertation Chicago, Illinois, 
June 2003. 
Salvati Cesare, Italia e Francia nel Sahara Orientale, Milan, 1929. 
569 
 
Salvatorelli Luigi, Sommario della Storia d'Italia, Turin, 1874. 
 
Samsonovic Arkadij Erusalimskij, Bismarck: Diplomazia e Militarismo, 
Rome, 1969. 
 
Samuels Richard J., Machiavelli’s children: Leaders and their legacies in Italy 
and Japan, London 2003. 
 
Samuels Richard J., “Reinventing Security: Japan since Meiji” in Daedalus, 
Vol. 120, No. 4, Searching for Security in a Global Economy, Fall, 1991, pp. 47-68.  
 
Sfika-Theodossiou Aggeliki, Italy in the First World War. Its relations with 
the Great Powers and Greece, Athens, 2004. 
 
Shin Hwaji, “Colonial legacy of ethno-racial inequality in Japan” in Theory 
and Society, Vol. 39, No. 3/4, Special Issue in Memory of Charles Tilly (1929–2008): 
Cities, States, Trust, and Rule (May 2010), pp. 327-342 
 
Shinichiro Murakami, “Nazionalizzazione delle masse e istruzione popolare: 
note comparative fra il caso giapponese e quello italiano” in Lo stato liberale italiano 
e l'età Meiji, 1st Italo-Japanese Conference of Historical Studies Rome 23-27 
September 1985, pp. 241-258.   
 
Smith D. Woodruff, German Colonial Empire, Ann Arbor, 1998. 
 
Smith D. Woodruff, "The Ideology of German Colonialism, 1840-1906", The 
Journal of Modern History, n. 46/4, December 1974, pp. 641-662. 
 
Surdich Francesco, Esplorazioni geografiche e sviluppo del colonialismo 
nell'età della rivoluzione industriale, fasi e caratteristiche dell'espansione coloniale, 
Florence, 1980. 
 
Tanaka Hiroshi, “Modern Japan and Western Democracy: The Conflict 
between Liberalism and Nationalism” in Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 2, December 1994, pp. 55-61.  
 
Tesoro Marina, “Introduzione” in Monarchia tradizionale, identità nazionale: 
Germania, Giappone, Italia tra ottocento e novecento, edited by Marina Tesoro, 
Milan 2004, pp. 1-6. 
 
Thompson Mark R., “Japan's 'German Path' and Pacific Asia's 'Flying Geese’” 
in Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2010, pp. 697-715. 
 
570 
 
Vigezzi Brunello, "Ιl liberalismo di Giolitti e l'impresa libica", in Fonti e 
problemi della politica coloniale italiana, Rome, 1996, pp. 1225-1247. 
Wippich Rolf-Harald, "Infected with German Measles: Meiji Japan Under 
German Cultural Influence" in History of European Ideas, Vol. 20, No. 1-3, 1995, pp. 
399-403.  
 
Xiong Ying, Representing Empire: Japanese Colonial Literature in Taiwan 
and Manchuria, Leiden 2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
